KV2/149-K-H-Kraemer

photo typically taken at Camp 020, after Kraemer's arrest on 15th May 1945 and his arrival at Camp 020 on My 17th

AOB: all these Camp 020 photos are typically bearing the separation between two background cover plates.

Dr. Karl-Heinz Kraemer; with wife and child, photo taken, likely, in his Stockholm flat

The red stamps in the 1970s goes back to the historical survey on behalf of Mss. McCallum, whom is, historically of rather great significance, as she apparently had access to materials no longer existing; providing essential inside- and outside vision and understanding - nowadays impossible to obtain!

2.6.45 Notes between A.D.B., B.1.a and W.R. War Room C(1) re interrogation Kraemer on Otto Witt (KV 2/471 .. KV 2/479) 353a.

7.6.45 Note from B.1.a. to B.1.g. re the Japanese Military Attaché, Madrid 368a.

I. Swedish Army circles. Direct contact to Swedish officer circles, who were often invited in his home. Grundboeck was very reserved (discrete) in giving the names. He got information about the general situation from the Swedish military point of view. More in detail were the informations he got he got via the Hungarian friends in Stockholm, especially Capt. v. Vagy and the Hungarian military attaché, Ltn. Col. Kobor, but even Finnish officers. These dealt with the military situation in the North, but even at the Eastern front and the position of the Western Allied. Vagy had contact with General Shellgreen and especial with Col. Adlerkreuz. Informations of Adlerkreuz very good. All material, I got, was given under the cover of "Siegfried B" later under the cover "Josefine" (Josephine). I never paid money for these informations.

II. Swedish Foreign Office. Grundboeck had personal contact with the economic department because of his big commerce connections. He knew certainly the chief of this department, Ihre and other members. As far as I remember, he had contact to Minister Soederbloom (Soederbaum?) too. Grundboeck got there general informations about the political situation, very good reports about the economical position of the various countries in Europe. Information were not paid, passed on under "Siegfried B" later under "Josefine" (Josephine). (AOB: we may here encounter difficulties due to the translation; quite a handicap within British Secret Services)

III. Swedish Economic ministry (Handelskommissionen). Grundboeck had close connections with the Handelskommissionen, he knew all leading personal there, the names I don't remember, because I had nothing to do with this office. One of the chiefs there was a man, named Byrochef Befrage (Belpract?), the exact name I don't know. Nearly daily negotiations there gave Grundboeck full knowledge of the economical situation (more in details) in the export and import groups, about the situation on the world market in special products, about the fabrication of goods in the various countries and the market. Such informations regarding other countries were of interest for me. I reported these informations under "Siegfried B", later under "Josefine" (Josephine).

I know that Grundboeck had close connections to Swedish concerns, especially to ASEA concern, Atlas-Diesl concern and to Svenska-Kugellagerfabriken (SKF-Koncern). As I know from other sources Swallwing (British or Kraemer's own information?) these concerns have factories or establishments in England with an own Swedish staff. All three concerns are about the economic situation not only on the world market, but even in England and USA very good informed. Their staffs in England and USA give situation reports with details about production, technical fabrication, new inventions and even about war production. So the chiefs of these concerns Hamburg and Wallenberg were very good informed about the war production not only in Germany, but even in GB and USA. Grundboeck got details out of such reports and informations about the war production from these concerns, which they certainly had got via these channels. The informations were passed on under "Siegfried B" later under Hector (Hektor) because of the fact that they dealt with production of war material and aeroplanes mostly.

Other informations Grundboeck got from other Swedish business circles, who had either contact to English circles in Stockholm or business contact, I remember the names of Normaellis, Wallenborg (Wallenberg?), Sachs, Wibom. Even his contact to very big Hungarian colony was a source for informations, mostly political. All this material was given under "Siegfried B", later Josefine (Josephine).

Grundboeck was an old Austrian-Hungarian intelligence officer, a very good friend to the former chief of the Hungarian Abwehr, Col. Usczassy. By these good relations to the Hungarian intelligence service and by his knowledge of the Balkan and the Iberian peninsula he had even contact to circles in these countries (mostly natural Hungarian), whose job was espionage. When I, therefore, talked with him in Summer 1942, about my intention to get information via Sweden or Spain, Portugal about GB and USA, he could help me with an organisation he knew in Spain and Portugal, and in which because of the high costs the Hungarians were not so interested. Grundboeck knew the chief of this organisation, Fullep (AOB, thanks to Mss McCallum: https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-242-fuellop-fullep.htm) since long years ago. On a visit to Hungary (and Switzerland) in harvest 1942 he could come in personal contact with Fullep, he arranged that Fullep should sent material to Grundboeck via the Hungarian Legation in Madrid. When I was in Stockholm before my appointment in October 1942 (becoming engaged in the diplomatic environment) I got the first material; and following facts about the organisation:

a) Persons: Besides Fullep an other Hungarian Szabo and a Portuguese, Areis, only Fullep in Madrid the other in Lisbon. This trio had an organisation in Jugoslav, Greek and Hungarian circles, especially in Lissabon, I believe even Jewish-Hungarian circles. These circle had contact with Jugoslav and Greek circles in London and USA.

b) Material: Between October 1942 and July 1943 only material about war-production in GB, factories and output, mostly aeroplanes. Details about future production, but no details about new planes. Since August 1943 besides the production information on request even tactical reports about organisation and disposition of the RAF, later the USAAF, army, strategical plans. Since beginning of 1944 even figures about the total production of aeroplanes in USA and GB.

c) Way of transmission: All this material must come on diplomatic way out of England. I or Grundboeck was never asked about secret inks, wire, etc. We both were the opinion that the close connections to the Yugoslav circles and the Legation in Lissabon was used to get material in the diplomatic bag out of England. From Spain the material was sent via Berlin to the Legation in Stockholm, in the Legation in Stockholm, in the Legation in Berlin, the from Madrid coming post was new addressed and put in a new envelope, so that one could believe at the Legation in Stockholm the post for Grundboeck came from Berlin. Orders and money were by Grundboeck sent on the same way retour, Stockholm-Berlin-Madrid.

d) Value of the material. The first material was good estimated, all in all the production information until beginning 1944 was good. Since summer 1944 it was sometimes very criticised. The tactical material was since the beginning even more various estimated, air information better than army.

A. Nov. 1942 - July 1943 Siegfried A: Production informations coming Swedish sources (A/IV) and from the Spanish port organisation (B/1)

Siegfried B: Military informations from the Swedish general staff and political and economical reports from the certain Swedish sources (A/I-III).

Berlin was informed that I got information about the British aircraft production from England and tactical informations from Swedish circles based partly on re reports from London. The certain links were not named.

July 1943 - Jan. 1944. The Spanish source gave military (tactical) informations too. Reports from Vagy since summer more and even better.

Josephine: Strategical, tactical and political (incl. economic) informations - Siegfried B and Spanish source.

Jan. 1944 - July 1944. Information exchange with Onodera had started. Informations coming from him were even divided in tactical and production.

Hektor: Production informations coming from Swedish, Spanish and Onodera's sources.

All kinds of prenames: Siegfried B, Spanish source and Onodera (e.g. Eva, Max, Heinrich, etc.

The Spanish source (Fullep?) (https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-242-fuellop-fullep.htm) began in the middle in the middle of 1944 to give informations which pretended to come from high rank British officers or circles and staffs. It was just in time, when we were very doubtful, it happened that we got some very good informations and other, which were in any way incorrect. We named these names with covers 01-06 or 07. I remember the following names: Taylor, Brown, Albiac, Harris or Harrison, Speakman. because I was sceptical, I proposed in December 1944 in a courier-post letter to generalizise the covers with English Army circles, English navy circles, etc. (see special report)/ These covers 01-09 were never used in the head of an information, only in the information itself.

When Grundboeck died in March/April 1944, the exact date I have forgotten, I had certain troubles to maintain the organisation. Regarding the Swedish contacts:

I lost this source, but I got far better compensation in Onodera's close contacts and the various Finnish reports. Even via Voetzcoendy (Vöczköndy) I got material out of his Swedish source.

These sources I lost. Regarding the Foreign Office I had compensation in the reports of the legation and the information via Halama (Hallama Reino, Chief of Finnish Cryptographical Department). The loss of Grundboeck's connections to the several industrial concern was severe.

After a short stop I got the information further from Fullep (https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-242-fuellop-fullep.htm) via the Hungarian Legation in Berlin to Stockholm. Grundboeck had a link in Berlin at the Legation (military attaché office) a man named Horvath, I think he was in connection with the Hungarian intelligence service or even an intelligence officer. I sent on the same (reversed) my orders (queries) and money. This went on till the Hungarian Legation (office of the Military Attaché) in Stockholm was closed and nearby the whole personnel left Stockholm. (Nov/Dec. 1944). Because of the difficult communications between Spain and Germany (AOB: Nevertheless, there remained a quite regular airline connection between Spain and German-controlled territories up to in April 1945!) I got the post since July 1944 very irregularly, often several post all at once. The last I got in January (1945), 3 several, and in March (1945), 5 several, mostly informations of the "Hektor" sector. Because of the fact that production reports were not so important since the begin of 1945 I gave the informations not at all at once to Berlin. The post was sent from Horvath to me via German Foreign Office. (AOB: Officially Kraemer was employed by the German Foreign Office, secondly, there existed mail exchanges by means of so-called "diplomatic-bags" passing borders un-censored)

I had nothing to pay for the Swedish sources of Grundboeck (when the latter was alive). The "Hektor-organisation" (the Spanish-Portuguese of Fullep) costed:

Informations, coming from the Grundboeck sources, I gave in exchange to Onodera since Spring 1944 till March 1945.

II. Production informations coming from the Fullep-organisations, which I reported to Berlin under "Hector" (Hektor).

a) Production figures about the output of seaplanes in USA, separated in groups and types.

b) Development of the USA was production for the year 1944 and 1945, especial in the air industry.

c) Production of various branches of the American war industry, steel, coal, iron production, ship building.

III. Tactical informations coming from the Fullep-organisation, which I reported to Berlin under "Josephine" (Josefine), later "Zuverlaessiger V-Mann".

b) Single informations about the disposition of Anglo-American troops, especially airborne divisions. Common comparisons about such informations coming from the Fullep source (Spain) and the Swedish general staff showed mostly that regarding these tactical matters the Swedish source of Onodera was far better.

c) Separate informations about the strength of the RAF. Even here possibility to compare with Swedish informations.

e) Few political reports on the general political situation, under the special aspect of the American-Japanese war.

The reports about the structure of the British aircraft industry, about the single concerns and the factories, the production in these factories showed that the organisation must have sources with some inside knowledge. The informations could be covered partly by other sources, e.g. air reconnaissance and statements of prisoners of war. This happened until spring 1944, then the informations became different. The figures about the aircraft production in GB were for the years 1943 good, for 1944 5-8% to high, compared with the figures given in the British White Book about the war efforts of the United Kingdom until November, 1944. Even on request it was not possible to get clear informations about new aeroplane types, which were in development in Great Britain. This was extraordinary, because at the same time the reports about the production of single factories were detailed. The connection to MOP and the MAP was not clear. Although often named as special source, I have certain doubts that the organisation had so good contact. I rather think that the emigrant circles in London had certainly the possibility via various sources to get informations about the British war effort, even in very detailed form. I too believe that there was the possibility to get informations about some factories. But the source had certainly no connection of high technical quality.

The information about USA aircraft industry were on the same line. The tactical and strategical reports were all the time very different, air reports better than army informations.

Notification of Release of person detained under Article 2 of the arrival from British Territory or Foreign Territory Order 1943.

I beg to report that the above named was handed to escort on 14/6/45 with a view to her deported (Instructions Home Office 900,015)

Most Secret Source Material shows that Wenzlau was attached to Eins Luft in Hamburg until November 1941, and Eins Luft Berlin until April 1942. From July 1942 to November 1943 he was Leiter Eins Luft Lisbon, using the cover of Assistant Air Attaché. From September 1944 onwards he was attached to Eins Luft Stockholm. You will see these data tally fairly well with Krämer's (Kraemer's) own statements. Wenzlau is also known to use the cover name Wessel and Leander as well as Pandur.

Our records show that Strobeck is Hans Storbach @ Storbeck and is reported to have been used by the Germans for spying on the Japanese in Portugal.

The date of Frau Reichenbach's arrival is approximately correct, although I do not agree that she was only used as a shorthand typist and did not intelligence work. Nina Siemsen also claimed that she did no Intelligence work during he interrogation by the Swedes. Frau Reichenbach was known to have acted as a cut-out between Krämer (Kraemer) and Bagyoni (KV 2/3646). Moreover, when Golcher heard the Riedel had deserted his chief concern was that Riedel would blow the "Wenzlau-Reichenbach" line which was operated by the S.D. (AOB: time and again, they didn't grasp, even in post-war days, as to how the R.S.H.A. had been organised. (H1039 H1039return))

Wenzalu was certainly posted to Stockholm to handle information on Russia and Finnland, i.e. corresponding to the old Ost Division of the Abwehr now directed by Mil Amt "C". The valuation of Russian and Finnish Intelligence by Wenzlau is corroborated by the teleprint traffic (telex (FS) communication, by means of cable trunks between Sweden and Germany towards Berlin) as almost all messages of this nature were sent by Pandur.

We are not in a position to prove definitely that Wenzlau did not give exchange information to Onodera but at least we know that Onodera has written personal letters to Wenzlau and not to Krämer (Kraemer) about Bagyoni, Enomoto etc. and that Wenzlau in return had asked Onodera several questions about these persons. Krämer (Kraemer) must surely have known all about Enomoto as well as Bagyoni. (J1040 J1040return)

His details of the K.O. (Kriegsornigation) (an German Military Intelligence Organisation, maintained in friendly countries; such as, for example, Spain, Portugal and Sweden) are correct but scanty.

1) Sonderführer (Sdf.) (Sonderführer mostly possessed no military background, though, possessed exceptional experiences /skills) Schumann, This is Hans Schumann, now believed to be IV-Z (Amt VI-Z) representative former Abwehr III-F (counter espionage) in Sweden.

2) Sonderführer Schroth. This is Eberhard Schrott. Vice Consul in Gothenburg; also held Sipo and S.D. rank. (AOB: a Vice Consul acts on behalf of the German Foreign Office (A.A.); what might, however, not well be appreciated: is, that this person once was employed at Amt IV, maybe Amt III. However, the ranking system within the R.S.H.A. were S.S. ranks as well as possessed those in Amt VI, and, at choice, later also in Amt Mil /Mil Amt) Believed to be in charge of Intelligence activities generally in western Sweden.

3&4 Hencke and Blottkow were nominally employed as watchmen, but usually used as couriers. Hencke is mentioned in Pandur (telex (FS) message No. 409.

5) This is Alice Fischer who was in charge of all the accounts of the K.d.M. (Amt Mil period) Stockholm, and has had some eight years experience in Abwehr work. She tried to commit suicide in Stockholm by throwing herself into a pond (see Istoc 71 and 76) (K1041 K1041return)

6) Roehmelt was one of the secretaries in Krämer's (Kraemer's) office but as far as we know not important.

1) This is Dr. August Finke, Leiter of the Sipo and S.D. (AOB: Finke then likely represented Amt IV) and also presumably (sometimes) Amt VI, (but then he did not represent Amt IV but operated on behalf of Amt VI only)

The contention that the Sipo and S.D.'s work largely political intelligence is a masterly under statement on Krämer's part. (AOB: how can he state this with their apparent so limited/rudimentary understanding of the structures of the German R.S.H.A. organisation?) Finke was regarded as R.S.H.A.'s best source of Intelligence from January to May 1945.

Krämer (Kraemer) statement that he obtained intelligence from Swedish sources personally presumably implies he used cut-outs.

Both Major Kempf and Major Petersen are known to be contacts of Onodera's. Kempf is reported to be unintelligent. Petersen is a member of the Swedish Intelligence Service whose job it is to liaise with Foreign Service Attachés etc. There is evidence, however, that he was on unjustifiably friendly terms with Onodera. It is quite conceivable that Petersen did supply Onodera with information about Russia, but it is doubtful whether the liaison went any further than this.

Onodera evidently has a contact in the Swedish Foreign Office and we believe him to be Sven Ichiro Brusewitz, although this has not been definitely confirmed.

General Thornell and General Kjellgren have attended official functions with Onodera at the Japanese Legation.

Gyps Mollern and Brillioth would hardly be in a position to provide high-grade information. The last named is, in any case, well known as a German propagandist.

There are two Colonel Brats neither of which seem to fit the bill so presumably Krämer (Kraemer) is referring Major General Helmer Bratt, born 1886, Second in Command of the 3rd Military District which covers most of the western coast of Sweden.

There are three Obergs on the Swedish General Staff and the most likely candidate is Erik August Oberberg, born 1887. It is perhaps relevant that a Swedish Lieutnant Ö is mentioned in one of Heinrich Wenzlau's files seen by our source. (AOB: I once encountered: an agent 0, is the latter equal to Ö?)

The three contacts von Post, Soederblom and Assersson, whose full name are Claés Eric, Stefan John and Peter Wilhelm Gustav respectively, are by far the most interesting mentioned by Krämer (Kraemer). Until 1944 von Post was Counsellor to the Swedish Legation in Germany, a post which he had held since 1939. He is now Chief of the Political Department of the Swedish Foreign Office. In 1943 Soederblom was Chief of the Political Department of the Swedish Foreign Office where he had been employed since 1939. Among other things he holds the Deutsche Adler decoration. In 1944 he was appointed Swedish Minister to Moscow and filling the post that Assersson had held until that date.

Assersson now holds a position roughly equivalent to Under Secretary of State (Staatsekretär) for for Foreign Affairs. Both these persons would be excellent sources for political material and especially regarding Russia.

First Secretary Astroem is Carl Sverker Aström who holds the rank of 2nd Secretary in the Swedish Foreign Office, and was previously attached to the Swedish Legation in Moscow.

Ragner (Ragnar) is 2nd in Command of the Political Department in the Swedish Foreign Office and also holds Deutsche Adler decoration. He is born in 1897 and has held his position in the Swedish Foreign Office since 1940. I think this source will provide us with the key to the greater part of Krämer's (Kraemer's) political information. It remains, however, to be discovered whether Krämer (Kraemer) actually obtained his information in a semi-overt manner through Dankwort as he claims or, whether he obtained it secretly through cuts-out. His information also condemns Dankwort who is now posing as a good German and ingratiating himself with both the Swedish and Allied authorities in Stockholm.

Most Secret Material has not provided any information on any of the cover names claimed to have been used by him between 1039 and 1942. Rüdiger and Hasso are known to be cover names of his (Kraemer), but I doubt that Liang, Gunther and Siegfried were his personal cover names. Teleprint (FS) evidence suggest that they were more likely sources or agents of his or possibly other offices in the Eins Luft (I L) Department. It is strange that he does not mention Kelly which we know to be cover name of his from Most Secret Material.

We shall have to accept Krämer's (Kraemer's) statements regarding Andersson and Petterson as we have completely in the dark about these. The explanation, moreover, sounds reasonable.

The disuse of the cover name Josephine (Josefine) is an interesting confirmation of my deductions referred to in my letter 12736/28 (= CX/12736/28/V.F.20) dated 17th May, 1945. The question of Josephine, however, is another weak link in Krämer's (Kraemer's) defence. He first stated that Josephine was a source of Onodera's teleprints (FS) however, definitely show that Josephine was a sub-source of Quelle 10 and that Hektor (Hector) presumably had the same status. In the report at reference, however, Krämer (Kraemer) states that Quelle 10 was a cover for political information obtained by the Legation from members of the Swedish Parliament. Krämer (Kraemer) is obviously not telling the truth here and should be further interrogated along these lines.

Egmont → (AOB: Mr. Giselher Wirsing whom published unique secret letters called (named) Egmont briefe ('Egmont was derived from Wolfgang Goethe's Egmont') (https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egmont_(Goethe)) It constituted extremely well expressed information, packed into a letter-form critically expressing the dangers for the Third Reich. Giselher Wirsing was supplied with most secret intelligence directly in utmost secret way by Dr. Walter Schellenberg and Giselher-Wirsing composed his "Egmont Briefe" there upon. These were (in some way) distributed to: Kaltenbrunner - Schellenberg's Chief being head of R.S.H.A. and Keitel, Jodl and some restricted others. Whom were not on the list of distribution were: Ribbentrop, Goering and Goebbels. Sometimes Keitel even provided Hitler with the information. Hitler once noticed to Schellenberg: that he should not waste his time and instead to dedicate attention to more useful matters. (https://www.cdvandt.org/wirsing-gieselher.htm) (https://www.cdvandt.org/schellenberg-survey.htm) The art was, not to act too much illegally, but just touching the Nazi-nomenclature and sparking their bleak future) → Our source stated that Egmont was a cover name (?) for Gieselher Wirsing. We had some doubts about this and Krämer's (Kraemer) explanation sounds more reasonable.

Siegfried is more likely a cover name for an officer dealing with administrative matters.

Krämer (Kraemer) appears to be a little out of date as teleprints show that his sources are from 0 to 28 not 0 to 27. Siemsen's (Kraemer's secretary) statement that 0 to 10 represent sub-sources is probably correct although 01 to 09 is probably the actual truth, as we have no record of anything above 05 the next in numerical source being 10.

In this Krämer (Kraemer) does not explain 35.79 and 35.72 (AOB: in the Abwehr context normally representing the actual administrative agent numbers, divided into areas). These are probably earlier symbols allotted by Colonel Petersen or perhaps Colonel Wagner and subsequently taken over by Wagner (AOB: these official administrative numbers constituted also the base of payments and that like) Also V-Mann Carlsson, Giftlaus and V-Mann Golfplatz (AOB: they were pointing at countries where someone had been engaged, as Golfplatz was the German code-name for England) are still unaccounted for.

Quelle 10. Extremely little information has been obtained by Quelle 10 himself indicating that he is acting as a cut-out or head agent for Josephine (Josefine) and Hektor (Hector). The Swedish police, on the bases of the view teleprints the y have seen (snown on behalf of the British M.I.6 believe that he has a contact in the Swedish Foreign Office. (all being apparent set-ups by British services, as to, partially, desiform Swedish Services). Out of 15 recorded messages 3 are of a political nature and the other 12 are purely military.

Quelle 11. Quelle 11 (see message No. 134.0) is not mentioned by Krämer (Kraemer).

Quelle 13. Quelle 13 and 14 (see messages 134.0) and 534.W. are not mentioned by Krämer, nor Quelle 24 (see message 492.W.)

Quelle 10 ist auf Grund von Nachrichten aus Quelle 10, 14 und 12 der Ansicht,, dass SU (Sovjet Union) Politik gegen Japan grundsätzlich geändert hat. Auffassung Quelle 11 ist durch Nachrichten aus USA und SU voll bestätigt. Zum Kommunique des weissen Hauses (White House) vom 20.2.45 wonach auf Krim - Konferenz Krieg gegen Japan nicht behandelt worden sei, wird von Quelle 10 bemerkt, dass auf Grund von von laufender Berichtserstattung von Quelle 14 bekannt ist, das für volle Wiederaufnahme der Land u. Lease Lieferungen an SU Änderungen der sovjetrussischen Japanpolitiek Grundvoraussetzung gewesen ist. Dieses sowie die weitergehenden Konzessionen Roosevelts in Europa an SU gegen Beteiligung an Japankrieg ist nicht nur in Washington, sondern auch im laufe der Krim-Konferenz allzusehr bekannt geworden, so dass man sich nach Auffassung Quelle 10 gezwungen sah, selbst unter Gefahr das öffentliche Meinung in USA entgegengesetzt reagiert, offiziöse Mitteilungen herausgegeben, dass erst in Kairo bei einen kurzen Zusammensein zwischen Churchill und Roosevelt über Japan unmittelbar vor der Jalta Besprechung nicht mit den Tatsachen überein. Bekanntlich haben Anglo - Amerikaner in Malta 3 Tage über Japankrieg konferiert und sind mit den Beschlüssen zur Krim gefahren. Nach gleichen Ankara Telegramm? hat Besprechung Churchill - Roosevelt in Kairo die im übrigen ja nur 3 Stunden dauerte, gemeinsame Abstimmung der Vorderorien? fragen gegolten, nachdem Roosevelt und Churchill getrennt vorher verhandelt haben. Gesandtschaft Tolio meldet in einem Telegramm vom 16.2. dass japanisches Aussenministerium nicht am Erneuerung des am 24.2.45 ablaufenden Nichtangriffspaktes glaubt. / Zus.Hasso (Kraemer): Der Bericht Quelle 10 scheint die Tatsache zu treffen, auch die Auslegung der Erklärung des weisen Hauses (The White House) vom 20.2 (45) halte ich für richtig. Hier vorliegende Be?richte über die Lage in China sowie Einwirkung der neuen Entwicklung auf sovjetrussische u. amerikanischen Chinapolitik liegen noch nicht in voller Fassung vor. Berricht ? erfolgt schnellstens./

Quelle 27 We are not in a position to state how Krämer (Kraemer) received his intelligence from Source 27 whom we believe to be Pierre Albert Garnier. It is interesting to note that in Nina Siemsen's note-book Hoffmann's name appears. Hoffmann is Garnier's chief source of political information.

Quelle 28 Certainly closely connected with and probably a sub-source of 27's if not entirely notional.

We have no record here of Major Berthold but are making enquiries from our representative in Stockholm (Section V ?)

There is at present under interrogation at C.S.D.I.C. (Combiner Services Detailed Interrogation Centre) (U.K.) a certain Brede who was Leiter I Luft, Berlin. (Major Brede was preceded in 1943 as Leiter I L in Berlin by Kleyenstueber) Brede has given a considerably body of information regarding Abwehr officials of which appears to be accurate. Among others Brede refers at length to "Sonderführer" (Sdf.) Kraemer whom he describes as of Abwehrstelle Hamburg (think mainly of 1940/41) and for a short time of Abwehrstelle München. I cannot, I think, do better than to send to you a full copy of the information which Brede has given regarding Kraemer and this is attached herewith.

As you will see Brede confirms the suspicions which we have had in the past that information which Kraemer obtained regarding British air power was derived from a member of the Swedish Legation in London who passed it to a member of the Swedish Foreign Office. It will be observed also that von Dewitz was, according to Brede, the recipient, or one of the recipients of Kraemer's reports. Brede also repeats the allegation that Kraemer paid considerable monthly sum to his informant(s). You will also observe that Brede reiterates other allegations which have been made against Kraemer. He suggests a very close contact between Kraemer and von Dewitz which (Ohletz KV 2/106) Kraemer himself hitherto appears not to have got into the hands of the Russian intelligence service is probably without substance but, if true, might possibly explain the present reluctance to tell us the truth about his activities.

B.1.w./EBS (= Mr. E.B. Stamp)/ PF 66365 (= Kraemer's 'old days' archive reference; which number still can be maintained, successfully) 12.6.45

After discussing the Kraemer case with Captain Marseille this morning I said that I would let you have a note of the results of various discussions and exchanges of minutes which we have had with S.I.S. in the course of the last week.

As you know S.I.S. have always taken the view that a substantial part of the information common to Kraemer and Onodera was obtained by Kraemer and passed to Onondera was obtained from Kraemer and passed to Onodera. This particularly applies to the Josephine (Josefine), Hector (Hektor) and "the reliable V-Mann" reports. Kraemer states precisely the contrary asserting that these three sources were sources of Onodera's.

I was disposed to think that the material was re-examined in the light of Kraemer's statement it would be found that there was nothing inconsistent with Kraemer's statement and that the position had hitherto been wholly misunderstood and I put this view forward as strongly as I could to S.I.S.

For reasons which I explained to Captain Marseille I am now satisfied that there is the strongest possible ground for thinking that S.I.S. were right in the original view the took and that Kraemer is misleading us regarding the 3 sources - or rather the 3 types of material referred to above.

In the first place we know from a source of utmost delicacy (AOB: U.S. interception (J.M.A. Intelligence) and decrypting by the Americans of the Japanese J25 code traffic, in particular the communications between Tokyo (Tokio) and Manila) that Onodera described these three classes of material as K ("K") material. In as much as all the material so described is of a type equal? to Kraemer and Onodera the inference that K. is Kraemer is almost irresistible. Furthermore, as indicated to Captain Marseille, there is an additional reason for thinking K to be Kraemer.

Finally there is the fact that the date upon which Kraemer passed on this type of material to Berlin is invariably in advance of the date on which the other man (General Onodera) passed it on to his masters.

There are certain other respects in which Kraemer is demonstrably either not telling the truth of mis-informed. He states that the the Polish? Officer who must be in the possession of a typewriter with Russian lettering gave information regarding the disposition of Allied Forces in the Far east but also that information derived from this source comprised such matters as the disposition of Allied air and ground forces in the West & strength of units and production figures. There can be no doubt at all that the man referred to by Kraemer is the name and/or function made invisible answers to the description given by Kraemer and in fact typed his material in Russian on a typewriter with Russian lettering. Name made invisible reports, however, all related to the Far East and any suggestion that they related to the disposition of Allied air and ground forces in the West, strength of units or production figures or that that the Hector ( material or "reliable V-Mann" material was derived) name made invisible is incorrect. It would appear that Kraemer in fact saw the actual reports sent by name mad invisible. If so he must have been aware that the reports did relate to the Far East.

As you know it has always been thought that the Hector (Hektor) and Josephine (Josefine) and "reliable V-Mann" material came from Swedish sources. Riedel and the Swedish police have both stated that Kraemer's chief was a Swede. The Swedish police have stated that the source was Marion Santesson.

S.I.S. have the following comments on the Camp 020 report of 25.5.45 which are perhaps worth passing on viz:-

(a) It is not entirely true to say that the teleprinter at the German legation was at the disposal of the whole legation, It was they say in the Air Attaché's office and only used on rare occasions by anyone but Kraemer and Wenzlau. (There existed a direct connection between the German Legation in Stockholm and the German Foreign Office in Berlin, via Swedish and German cable trunks)

(b) It is correct that Kraemer obtained information required by Onodera from Berlin. We know from a highly delicate source (US intercepts of Japanese J25 messages) that Onodera obtained his information for Kraemer in a similar way.

(c) The cover names given by Kraemer in paragraph 9 appear, say S.I.S. to be correct though they have no definite information of Otti being Ohletz (KV 2/106), Ranken being Ritter (nonsense, as Ritter left Ast Hamburg already about January/February 1941) or Doctor being Schutze?. There are a number of Ritters.

(d) S.I.S. go on to say that Josephine (Josefine) certainly used to cover all reports concerning strategical and tactical information but these were equally certainly not provided by Onodera, that Hector (Hektor) was certainly a cover name for information relating to production but equally certainly the information was not supplied by Onodera and that Zuckerhut was at the H.Q. probably in Switzerland but that the information was not Onodera's information.

(e) S.I.S. comment that it is strange that Kraemer does not mention ~~Devitz~~ Dewitz which leads them to believe that he has mistaken Ohletz for Debitz?. Other noticeable omissions are Kleyenstueber (KV 2/1494 PF 601503) and Alexander von Bentheim.

We have ascertained that there was never an Esthonian military attaché in Stockholm in the accepted since of that title. There was Colonel Leithammer (a military lawyer) and a Colonel Rattist who "was interested in military matters". Major Berthold is unknown.

I attach herewith a letter received from S.I.S. dated 3.6.45 regarding Swallving. Kindly let me have the letter back in due course together with a copy thereof if you are having it copies.

Further to my Minute attached, I have now obtained the following additional replies to your questions.

An examination of the J.M.A. 'K' (= Kraemer, intercepts during the message exchange between Tokyo and Manila, in the U.S.) Intelligence shows that out of the very large volume of Kraemer material only a small portion is common to both. In all cases where the material is common to both Kraemer sent it to Berlin several days before Onodera despatched it. (from Stockholm to Tokyo, from there being intercepted when communicated to Manila)

There were a few occasions when Onodera was seen to ask Tokio (Tokyo) for information required by Kraemer. The replies were seen in the traffic from Tokio to Onodera, and several days later it was seen on the Kraemer material, and in every case attributed by him to "Source 26".

S.I.S. point out that the coverage of the J.M.A. material was only about 70% effective, and it is therefore not possible to say whether Onodera passed on to Kraemer all the material he received.

An inspection of the Sunrise traffic (?) shows that it was all related to the Far East. This traffic was written by Sunrise in Russian on a typewriter with Russian lettering. When Kraemer states that he had a glimpse of a letter from Onodera's agent in London, the description of the letter tallies with those written by Sunrise (whom is he or she?). Kraemer however, is either mistaken or lying when he states that the information derived from this source and passed on to him by Onodera comprised such matters as disposition of Allied air and ground forces in the West, strength of units and production. When Kraemer states that Onodera claimed to receive details information from this source regarding disposition of Allied forces in the Far East, this exactly fits with the Sunrise traffic. We have only seen one instance of Kraemer passing Sunrise traffic; it is to be found at Istoc No. 36 dated 5th March, 1945. (not found among the files)

I hardly think that Camp 020 can be exercised as you are that there is a serious danger of this investigation coming to nothing if there is any substantial delay in briefing them. You will recollect that I have repeatedly asked for the return of the files during the last 10 days or fortnight, and they only reached me yesterday morning. I have still not received the PF which is now on its way back from the country.

S.I.S. were briefed the day before yesterday regarding the Sunrise aspect of the case, and promised a reply as early as possible.

The following are the answers to those questions in your note which can be given immediately.

1. The position was that Kraemer is known to have received 3,000 dollars a month, out of which he paid Onodera 2,000 dollars but S.I.S. cannot say what happened to the balance. They do, however, say that on one occasion there was seen in Kraemer's flat (L1042 L1042return) an unsigned receipt for 1,000 dollars and suggest, for what it is worth, that this cannot have been a receipt for Onodera as Onodera never visited the flat. I am bound to say that this does not seem a very conclusive argument.

3 and 4. S.I.S.'s comment on this is that they know that the Swedish Police kept very close watch on Marion Santesson, even to the point of the use of special equipment. They conclude from this therefore that when the Swedish Police stated that Marion Santesson was a source of Kraemer's and not a source of anyone else.

When they were arrested at Flensburg, Kraemer and Siemsen were staying at our using the address of one Oblt. Walter Berg, a former Abwehr officer. According to a preliminary report which has been received from 21 Army Group (AOB: in contrast to what the designation 21 Army Group suggests, it constituted a joined British-American unit), Berg, after being wounded in the early years of the war on two occasions, was appointed to O.K.W. -Abwehr I. Luft (I L) in 1942. Berg, according to this report, followed the fortunes of that department through its assimilation into the R.S.H.A. (Amt Mil/Mil Amt) and its flight from Berlin to Flensburg in April/May of this year (1945). Also arrested with Berg was one Karl Schnurre of the Foreign Office (A.A.) and his secretary Klensmann.

We should be grateful if Kraemer could be interrogated in due course regarding these three characters.

On 14.5.45 S.I.S. informed us that an Hungarian by the name of Dr. Sigismond (Sigismund?) Morvay de Draskocz maintained contact with Kraemer, with Major Friedrich Kobor, member of the Hungarian Intelligence Service in Stockholm, and two suspects Liv Wahrendorf and Horst Albrecht. (AOB: please be aware that before the end of 1918, Hungary and Austria formed the Donau-Monarchy and had a quite mixed population. After both entities separated in two different states: The Austrian Bundesrepublik and the Hungarian State citizens were quite free to make a choice to what new State they should become a citizen)

Morvay de Draskocz arrived in this country on 11.8.37 and was landed for three months. He was the representative of the Hungarian paper "Uj Magyarsag" and his duties, according to his own statements, were to report on current British and international news and events, to write articles on British institutions, events and personalities and economic problems as seen through an Hungarian eye. In his spare time he acted as liaison between the International Union of Local Authorities, London, and the Hungarian member organisation of the Union.

As reference he gave the names of Sima, who was then the Hungarian Press Attaché in this country, and three others.

Shortly after his arrival in this country Morvay de Draskocz was recommended to the S.I.S. representative in Budapest as reliable and well-educated person who might be of possible service to Scotland Yard. In view of this subsequent activities it appeared possible that the man, when he arrived in this country, was making an attempt at penetration.

We should be grateful if, in due course, Kraemer could be interrogated regarding his knowledge of Morvay de Draskocz.

1. Schweiz-Genf (Genève). This explanation sounds extremely thin. It is more likely to be connected with the Zuckerhut organisation which Krämer (Kraemer) himself admitted had its H.Q. in Switzerland. I suggest that he be questioned further on this point.

2. Hubert. We have record of a Hugo Schaeffer (?) who was paymaster in the German Legation, Stockholm; known to the personal friend of Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer) and a member of the K.d.M. Schweden (before, say, July 1944 known as K.O. Schweden).

3. This is Hauptmann (Captain) von Almassy (Almásy?), known to be a member of K.O. Bulgaria. We have no record of his cover name being Alwin. His movements described by Krämer seen to be more or less correct.

5. Mention of Scott is very interesting as he had previously come to our notice in connection with the snuggling of Time articles into Sweden from the U.S. It appears that he had some sort of courier system of his own using British and American airmen. He claimed that he could get articles across from the States in a day or two by this method and consequently outstripped all his compatriots by a good margin. We had no reason to suspect Scott from the intelligence point of view but this mention of him by Krämer (Kraemer) certainly puts him in a suspicious light.

6. Brown. the explanation of Brown sounds plausible enough but we must accept it with considerable reserve, a) because he has not in any way explained Brown's relationship with Berta (vide note book entry Berta - VI Brown) and b) there is frequent reference in the teleprints to Air Vice Marshal Brown.

7. This explanation sounds plausible but on the other hand we know that Krämer (Kraemer) was interested in the collection of technical publication for which journalists could suitably be employed.

8. Eisberg first appeared in March 1944 in German Most Secret Material (AOB: for your simplicity, think of Bletchley Park or that like decrypts). Eisberg reports were evidently received by Krämer in Stockholm from a non German source, transmitted to Berlin by teleprint (FS) and subsequently forwarded by Eins Luft to their representative in Italy. (there existed a quasi direct telex (FS) connection with the German Foreign Ministry (A.A.); in case Kraemer wanted to convey intelligence to the German Abwehr - it was retransmitted by local telex (FS) to the offices in charge; during the early course of 1943 Tirpitz Ufer then it went to "Zeppelin" in the course of 1944 this was Belinde and since, say, June/July to Mil Amt/Amt Mil, located at the Berkaerstrasse, in Berlin) The latter twice asked Berlin for the identity of Eisberg but unfortunately we have no record of any answer. There is a possible indication that Eisberg is a neutral diplomatic source in Berne (Bern) (AOB: likely Okamoto the late Japanese Military Attaché, in Bern) this, however, cannot be substantiated. (Maybe when they would have been better informed, but they weren't aware of it)

9. This entry had always been a mystery to us for the present Krämer's (Kraemer's) statement will have to be accepted. (British Interrogations always were hampered by the very fact - that under all circumstances, they never should give the slightest indications that they knew matters derived from intelligence that constituted the "greatest Secrets of Britain". The MSS secrets had for the first time been lifted a bit about 1973/74 in Winterbotham's book: The Ultra Secret (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F._W._Winterbotham). Here again, however, Krämer (Kraemer) does not explain the connection between Major and Feng (?)

12. This explanation sounds reasonable. Krämer (Kraemer) is known to have had direct dealing with ZF (= Paymaster / Zahlmeister).

13. This statement is doubtless correct. The implication of Ottokar von Knierien, in these arrangements is interesting.

14. This further implicates our old (Swedish) friend Florman. This is all the more interesting because about this date Florman was loudly proclaiming that he had nothing to do with the Germans for the last two years and that he was in fact persona non grata with them. Not only does this show Florman's relationship with Heimann(?), but also provides further evidence of his continued connection with Alexander von Bentheim.

As indicated to you orally I am seriously perturbed (worried) about the Kraemer case. Everything which I have seen leads me to the conclusion that Kraemer is telling the truth when he says that the Hector (Hektor), Josephine, Eisberg and "Reliable V-Mann" reports were obtained by him from Onodera. S.I.S. on the other hand assert that the flow was the other way (AOB: they knew this because S.I.S. Section V in Stockholm got regularly access to Kraemer's private safe in his own residence)→(M1044 M1044return) and generally that Kraemer is holding back and not telling the truth. I am bound to say that the letter from (name made invisible) of 7.6.45 does little to assist me.

If I can be quite sure that Kraemer is lying then I will ask Camp 020 to start up a blitz (implying quite crewel measures, breaching the conditions of the Convention of Genève!) (N1045 ↑↑↑ N1045return) and will see if we cannot do better. But I am most disinclined and indeed it would be most dangerous to start such proceedings unless we are quite sure that we are on firm ground. Moreover if a blitz is to be successfully carried out the Camp 020 interrogation themselves must be convinced that they are on sure grounds. Please consider also: [183] The London Cage The Secret History of Britain’s World War II Interrogation centre. Helen Fry Yale university Press New Haven and London, 2017. ISBN 978-0-300-22193-0

1. What evidence is there to support the proposition that the 2000 U.S. dollars per month paid by Kraemer to one source are not part of the 14,000/20,000 dollars which Kraemer says he paid to Onodera?

2. What evidence is there to support the proposition that the reference to the dollar quota for the period January to March (1945?) was not a reference to the dollars which Kraemer admits paying to Onodera?

3. What is the evidence on which the Swedish police base their statement that Marion Santesson was a source of Kraemers?

4. Is there anything known to S.I.S. that is inconsistent with the view that Marion Santesson was not a direct source of Kraemers but a source of either

5. Since all Source 26 reports emanate from Onodera and Onodera's date of despatch is always later than Kraemer's, is it not agreed that some reports (viz 26 reports) received by Onodera were not passed on by him until after he had passed them to Kraemer?

6. Since some reports received by Onodera were passed on by him after he had passed them to Kraemer is it not agreed that no firm deduction can be drawn as to the direction of the flow from the fact that Kraemer invariably reported first?

7. So far as regards Source 26 did Onodera pass on all the material obtained or only a percentage of that which Kraemer passed on.

8. What evidence have we as to to the supply of material to Onodera asked by him for Kraemer? If any evidence is available can we be told what type of information was supplied to Tokyo and whether any, and if so what, part of it is reflected in Kraemer's teleprints (FS).

According to Kraemer information received from the man identified as Sunrise comprised:

We know that information under heading (a) and (b) was passed by Kraemer to Berlin as coming from a "Reliable V-Mann" and that information under heading →

(c) Was passed on to Berlin by Kraemer as information coming from Hector (Hektor). The inference is that Sunrise was the source of some of the "Reliable V-Mann" reports and some of the Hector (Hektor) reports.

9. Can I please be informed whether the Sunrise traffic has been compared with the Kraemer traffic?

10. Was any, and if so which, of the information in the Hector (Hektor) reports supplied by Sunrise?

11. Was any, and if so which, of the information in the "Reliable V-Mann" reports supplied by Sunrise?

12. Is it correct, as stated by Kraemer that the Eisberg reports came from Sunrise? (AOB: Stop: may Sunrise have been:- the Japanese Military Attaché Okamoto in Bern? Bingo!)

13. Were the Eisberg reports passed to Tokyo by either Onodera or his (late) counterpart (Okamoto = Sunrise) in Berne (Bern)?

14. If so, were they sent after the corresponding reports had been sent by Kraemer to Berlin?

I appreciate that some of the information for which I have asked above may take more than 24 hours to supply. Some of it could, however, no doubt be supplied by return and I would be grateful if I could be supplied with the answers to my questions so soon as such answers are available without waiting for a reply to all questions. There is, in my view, a serious danger of this investigation coming to nothing if there is any substantial delay in briefing Camp 020 further on the case.

The following list of comments on the 020 reports that we have so far received concerning Karl Heinz Krämer (Kraemer).

Reference paragraph 6. Krämer here makes no mention of his payments in dollars. We know that he paid out 2,000 U.S. dollars per month to one source and that he probably has some 10,000 dollars laid up. You will also note that message No. 136.0 (not available among the huge numbers of document pages) mentions his dollar quotas for the period January to March (1945).

Reference paragraph 7. This is an indirect contradiction to what Riedel and the Swedish Police have told us. Both have stated that Krämer's (Kraemer's) chief source of intelligence was a Swede presumably in the Swedish Foreign Office. The Swedish Police went so far as to state that the source was Marion Santesson; employed in the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office. We are inclined to think that Krämer's (Kraemer's) source was of higher rank than that, but the Swedish authorities would never admit to a Swede being implicated unless they had extremely good reasons for it.

It is not entirely true to say that the teleprinter (FS) at the German Legation was at the disposal of the whole Legation as the teleprinter (FS) he used was in the Air Attaché's office and was only used on rare occasions by anyone but Krämer (Kraemer) and Wenzlau.

Reference paragraph 8. Krämer's (Kraemer's) main source of Military information was certainly not General Onodera. This can be definitely debunked on the evidence provided by Ultra material. Onodera, as you know, has sent numerous reports to Tokyo headed by "K" Intelligence which are, in fact, portions or summaries of Krämer's reports derived from Zuverlässiger V-Mann or Hector (Hektor). The fact that Onodera only passes on to Tokyo a small percentage of the total number of Zuverlässiger V-Mann and Hector (Hektor) reports coupled with the fact that Onodera's date of despatch is always later than Krämer's (Kraemer's) proves that the flow is rather in the other direction, i.e. Krämer (Kraemer) to Onodera not Onodera to Krämer (Kraemer).

It is true that a mutual exchange of intelligence was established between Onodera and Krämer (Kraemer) (AOB: there were two major reasons: Grundboeck's death and Okamoto's death in Switzerland) as we have external evidence of meetings between Onodera and Krämer (Kraemer) and also an exchange of reports between the two via Nina Siemsen. It is known moreover that all Source 26 reports emanate from Onodera. (AOB: It was Onodera whom received Okamoto's intelligence information first)

Details of information requested by Onodera seems correct. As for the information obtained by Onodera,

b) and c) might have been obtained from Rudolf Maasing (AOB: according my notes considering Garnier's file (KV 2/2128, page 28): The Estonian diplomat Bertold or Bergmann might be identical with Colonel Rudolf Maasing)

e) may well have been supplied by double agent Sunrise (= Japanese M.A. Okamoto in Bern) to Onodera (Japanese M.A. in Stockholm)

g) These were obtained by Rajgrodsky (KV 2/2455 KV 2/2456 PF 601676 Polish) and Hallamaa (Finnish) Correct.

i) if obtained from Maasing or Hallamaa this is correct, but this information is also available to Krämer (Kraemer) through Quelle 12 and Swedish Finnish source.

The statement that Krämer (Kraemer) obtained information required by Onodera from Berlin is borne out by an analysis of the teleprints (Section V in Stockholm bribed since January 1945 at least a Czech person employed at the telex (FS) service, so that his man kept message copies which for considerable amount of money and handed these over to the fore named Section V). The reverse is also true, i.e. that Onodera asked Tokyo for information required by Krämer (Kraemer).

We have no evidence of this having contacted Ohletz (KV 2/106) who is Mil Amt C (Leiter) and consequently more likely to be Wenzlau's superior than Krämer's (Kraemer's). He certainly contacted the Luftwaffenführungsstab as ~~Devitz~~ Dewitz (no file remaining; as this PF serial number is actually pointing at Ohletz's file KV 2/106) of Eins C, reported to be Krämer's (Kraemer's) immediate chief, worked there.

I am glad to note that Krämer (Kraemer) euphemistically calls Onodera's information "of uneven value". If Onodera succeeded in deluding Krämer (Kraemer) that he was a focal point of information for all countries in Europe he is certainly a better man than we thought he was. The only evidence we have of Onodera receiving information from Switzerland (via late M.A. Okamoto) is from Ultra where it is known that Hans ~~Meissner~~ (Meisner, Leiter K.O. Schweiz; KV 2/281 KV 2/282), sent money and possibly reports through the Japanese (diplomatic) bag to Krämer (Kraemer). It is quite possible, therefore, that Krämer (Kraemer) used Onodera's bag facilities for certain reports, but it is certainly incorrect to say that Onodera provided the intelligence. (information went mainly from Okamoto in Switzerland to Onodera in Stockholm)

Reference sub-paragraph iii. It is most unlikely that Onodera would ever accept money from Krämer (Kraemer) for his personal use or information provided by him. He might, however, quite possibly have agreed to Krämer (Kraemer) paying some of his agents (The Japanese diplomats in Europe lacked usually currencies like dollars, as no refreshment was received since December 1941), such as Sunrise (AOB: I doubt this, as Okamoto the Japanese Military Attaché in Bern, was a colleague of Onodera) or to act as a cut-out for the payment of some of Krämer's (Kraemer's) own agents. (AOB: I get the strong impressing that S.I.S. did not understand what it all was about). There is no evidence of Onodera having received money from the German Legation in Stockholm although it is correct to say that Onodera had experienced difficulties in obtaining funds from (via?) Germany and Switzerland. It is, however, known that Onodera entered into some understanding with the German authorities with regard to Sperrmark or Devisen accounts.

Reference sub-paragraph iv. These three sources are certainly correct although certainly only minor ones. Swalling was probably (agent-number) 35.79 and was in any case only a sub-source of Schaefer (Schäfer) (Representative of the German Lufthansa Airline). The Swedish Police have some information on Grundboeck derived from teleprints which they dated from (early) 1943 (as the Germans thereafter introduced more secure FS types among it the SFM T52d; which the Swedes couldn't decrypt) which they have not shown to us. Vöczköndy (Hungarian) is possibly identical with Quelle 12 although he has now left Stockholm. He was known to be in close contact with both the Finns and the Japanese.

Krämer's (Kraemer's) statement that he had no information from Schäfer (Schaefer) is directly contradicted by Schäfer's (Schaefer's) own statement to the Swedish Police. It is true that Schäfer (Schaefer) reported to Wagner (Dr. Hans Wagner was Leiter K.O. later K.d.M. Schweden, and possessed no jurisdiction over Kraemer at all), but he had also previously reported to Colonel? Petersen? and Colonel Reinhard von Heimann.

The cover names given by Krämer (Kraemer) in paragraph 9 appears to be correct although we have no definite information of CITI being Ohletz (KV 2/106), Ranken being Ritter or Doktor?? being Schulze. There are a large number of Ritters and it is difficult to say which one he is referring to.

Josephine (Josefine) certainly used to cover all reports concerning strategical and tactical information, but these were equally certainly not provided by Onodera.

Hektor (Hector) certainly a cover name for information relating to production, but not supplied by Onodera.

Zuckerhut Organisation H.Q. probably in Switzerland, as stated by Krämer (Kraemer), but not Onodera information.

Reference paragraph 10. It is strange that he never mentions ~~Devitz~~ Dewitz which leads us to believe that he has mistaken Ohletz for Dewitz. (AOB: did he really, so long engaged in the business?)Other noticeable omissions are Kleyenstueber and Alexander von Bentheim.

The following is an extract from Camp 020 report on the interrogation of Kraemer:-

"Kraemer has remembered the cover name "Berta", and believes, but is not sure, that this was used to designate information obtained from the Japanese Military Attaché in Madrid (AOB: please bear in mind - that Japan was not yet defeated and consequently still at war with the Allies; and therefore he was not been interrogated, yet). This information had proved of greater value than the bulk of reports obtained by Onodera from Spanish sources, and it was for this reason that it was considered advisable to designate information originating from the Attaché concerned.

Onodera told Kraemer that his colleague in Spain obtained this information from a Spanish journalist, who Kraemer assumes must have been a Spanish journalist in England. Onodera claimed to have no further information, and certainly gave non to Kraemer."

I am asking Camp 020 whether they can find out from Kraemer whether he can fix the date when this source was operating. I am also endeavouring to find out the nature of the information supplied by this source. This information may enable us to determine who the Spanish journalist was. It may of course have been Calvo (Luis Calvo-Andaluz; KV 2/712 .. KV 2/714, PF 66318 ?) or Peppermint.

I would be grateful if you would let me have your comments on this information as soon as conveniently may be, and also if you would let me know whether you have any specific questions which you would like the interrogators to put to Kraemer or any other particular line of enquiry to which you would like them to direct their attention.

I attach a copy of a further report (minute 366a) from Camp 020 regarding the progress which is being made in the Kraemer case.

I also attach a copy of an interrogation report regarding the extract from Kraemer's diary which was sent to Camp 020. We are calling the attention of the interrogators to the fact that Kraemer was much better acquainted with ~~Schaffner~~ (Schaefer) than he suggests. (AOB: at least on the continent - there existed also friendship between citizens of the same country when living abroad. Not everything has necessarily to be translated in intelligence obligations. What also might have counted, was that both - Kraemer and Schaefer - were actually "non military men"; this will not mean that some information might have been exchanged, as is quite usually among personal friends)

I should be grateful for your comments on these two reports as soon as conveniently may be. It seems that the burden of Kraemer's song? is in effect that information on a variety of subjects reached him from Onodera, and that it was according to the subject of a report that the source cover name was chosen. For example, he states that information on production figures received from Onodera was attributed to Hektor (Hector) and that information obtained by Onodera from Switzerland was given the cover name Zuckerhut.

We know from the traffic that Hektor (Hector) messages invariably dealt with production figures, and that information from Zuckerhut came from Italy. It may well be that Kraemer is misleading us, but the story is not on the fact of an impossible one, and is not inconsistent with the fact that information received from Onodera was attributed to "Source 26".

Kraemer has given the following further information regarding sources operated by Onodera and the Abwehr (later the Mil Amt):-

Onodera informed Kraemer that he was obtaining military and air force information from a Polish officer attached to the War Office in London who also had contacts with the M.A.P. Kraemer does not know this man's name, but was told that he had been promoted lieutenant-colonel (Obstlt.) early in 1945, and knows that he speaks and writes fluent Russian, in which he is stated to have been given lessons. Kraemer had a glimpse of a letter from this man to Onodera in that language. He must also be in possession of a typewriter with Russian lettering.

Onodera's contact with this man was through the Polish Military Attaché in Stockholm, via Colonel Ito and Dr. Inouye. Information derived from this source and passed on to Kraemer comprised such matters as disposition of Allied air and ground forces in the West, strength of units, and production figures. The manner in which source's reports were drawn up renders it certain, in Kraemer's opinion, that he is a military or air force officer.

Onodera also claimed to receive detailed information from this man regarding dispositions of Allied forces in the Far East.

He also obtained from this source and passed on to Kraemer, copies of the New York Times and other American papers which were unobtainable in Stockholm. These papers were quite recent, some of them only 10 days old.

Onodera told Kraemer that whilst acting as Military Attaché in the Baltic States, he had made the acquaintance of two Polish officers. These officers had subsequently been in London, where Kraemer believes Onodera to have been in contact with them, but at the end of 1944, they had been transferred to the Italian theatre of war, to the Polish brigade under General Anders.

Onodera had tried and succeeded in re-establishing contact with these officers through Zürich, and had received from them information, some of which had been passed on to Kraemer and forwarded to Berlin under the cover Eisberg.

Kraemer believes that the name of one of these officers was something like Andrinski.

Whilst undergoing training in the Abwehr under Ast Hamburg at the beginning of the war, Kraemer was taught to evaluate information which came to the Ast from sources in Belgium and Holland and from a V-Mann 3504 (= British: Arthur Owens, alias Snow KV 2/444 .... KV 2/453 PF 45241) (the Owens Case was blown about early March 1941 and Major Ritter Referatsleiter I L of Ast Hbg. left for an engagement in North Africa) (https://www.cdvandt.org/arthur-owens-snow.htm) (https://www.cdvandt.org/arthur-owens-page-3.htm) (https://www.cdvandt.org/arthur-owens-page-4.htm) This man →

Kraemer states to have been an English agent who had worked for Eins Luft (I L) since the spring of 1939 (AOB: the story about Arthur Owens /Hamburg started about 1935!) and sent over messages that this man's name was Owens and that he lived in London. His occupation was that of an engineer, his age 40, his stature small, and he came from Wales or Ireland. His information mostly concerned the R.A.F., i.e. disposition and movement of R.A.F. squadrons, air defence, searchlights, etc.

This agent was controlled by (Major) Ritter (alias Dr. Rantzau), who, after the collapse of France in 1940, met Owens in Lisbon. Prior to that, Owens had apparently been in a position to visit Belgium and Holland. Kraemer states that Owens paid a visit to Lisbon early 1941, accompanied by another man called ~~Dickens~~ (Walter Dickitts, alias Celery) (KV 2/674, PF 66315). In Lisbon he was contacted by Ritter, who brought ~~Dickens~~ (Dickitts) to Hamburg (Not Ritter but someone with the alias of George; real name Sessler) where he stayed for a week (maybe even longer). Communication from Owens ceased shortly afterwards, as Owens fell ill. (Actually - Owens was put in detention at Dartmoor Prison , up to later in 1944)

Kraemer states that Professor Hans von Euler, a famous scientist, a German by birth but Swedish by nationality, was assisting Germany by passing on Anglo-American scientific literature which he received as a member of the Royal Swedish Scientific Academy. Kraemer served as intermediary between Euler and the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute (K.W.I.) (after the war known as Max Planck Institut).

Kraemer states that this man, who was an officer in the Swedish Air Force, was until 1944, attached to the press and information department of the Swedish Air Command. He was a friend of Riedel, technical deputy Air Attaché at the German Legation, and, according to Kraemer, furnished this man with information. Kraemer claims that he himself had no intelligence relation with him.

Kraemer states that Bergmann was transferred from his post to a squadron in Southern Sweden as a result of something of his relations with Riedel having leaked out.

According to Kraemer, this man has been Swedish Military Attaché in Helsinki since 1943/44, having before that date been Chief of the Swedish Intelligence Service. Kraemer goes on to say that Adlercreutz worked very closely together with the German Military Attaché and the K.O.(Sweden) throughout the years 1940/42 and that during this time, there was an exchange of information between Adlercreutz and Kraemer, the extent and details of which are unknown to Kraemer.

Adlercreutz was still in Stockholm when Krämer arrived in 1942, but Kraemer claims that he had no contact with him.

Kraemer has remembered the covername 'Berta' and believes, but is not sure, that this was used to designate information obtained by Onodera from the Japanese Attaché in Madrid. This information had proved of greater value than the bulk of reports obtained by Onodera from Spanish sources, and it was for this reason that it was considered advisable to designate information originating from the Attaché concerned.

Karl ~~Hans~~ Heinz of I Luft, Stockholm, now under interrogation at Camp 020 has given the following particulars of the S.D. (R.S.H.A. Amt IV) organisation in that city in 1944. (AOB: Amt IV's duty was Sipo S.D. abroad; think of matters which judicial nucleus often originated from inside Germany. But as individuals might live - or temporarily staying, abroad, Amt IV officials (often police members of Sipo and S.D.) operated against these persons under a kind of diplomatic cover abroad; strictly speaking they had no jurisdiction over K.O. or K.d.M. employees, nor possessed legal means in the diplomatic fields) It was, he says, as follows:-

These had all left Sweden, except Frl. Felltange, who was also intending to leave, at the time of Kraemer's departure (28/29 April 1945). He does not know of their whereabouts or intentions. The S.D. work was large political intelligence and Finke's chief contacts in Swedish circles were with Right Wing extremists, the Lindholm party and the Folkets Dagblatt circle."

Attached is a schematic diagram drawn up by a delicate Swedish source in Stockholm. This shows the evidence available to the Swedish Police prior to the arrest of Hans Schäder (Schaefer, the German Lufthansa representative) and Harald Swalling.

Most of the personalities are, I think, known to you. If not, perhaps we could go through them together sometime if you think they are of sufficient interest. U.D. stands for Utrikes Department (please consider next drawing), i.e. the Swedish Foreign Office.

This schematic drawing will be, for most of you, hard to understand, as it looks quite extensive and complicated

The just foregoing schematic, might draw a better picture of the indirect contacts of Karl Heinz Kraemer and Major Wenzlau.

I therefore have prepared myself a different schematic, placing matters in a more logical context, than the Swedish officials could hardly have imagined the real picture; and the according implications!

AOB: One additional comment: I have drawn this schematic about 2016/17 and I would like to emphasise - that Okamoto might have been more in direct touch with Onodera - than it looks as if Kraemer was the first receiver of the information, whereas we may consider - that it had been Onodera, in stead.

Please take your time to digest the implications of all the various interactions; of which all have been dealt with, in our survey.

The Supreme Commander has ordered that the under-mentioned persons, believed to be of German nationality, be transferred from Continental Europe to the United Kingdom for interrogation, on completion of which the are to be returned in military custody to the Theater of Operations:

AOB: here we learn at least, that Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer couldn't be kept for unconditional time in England, as he has to be returned to the Continent.

Nina Siemsen did return on June 14th already, due to an Order on behalf of the Home Office: (P1046 P1046return)

However, Kraemer's case will take longer, as he was a P.o.W. in contrast to Secretary Nina Siemsen.

Further information on the above case is set out below. Some items from the questionnaire attached to B.1.b. (Mr. Stamp's) memorandum of 19.5.45, not previously covered are also dealt with hereunder.

Kraemer first met Major (wasn't he in 1941, not a Hauptmann yet; = a Captain?) Wenzlau in (Ast) Hamburg. Wenzlau was at this time a Luftwaffenoffizier in Belgium. Kraemer does not know his real function in Brussels, but states it was connected with Abwehr work.

They met again in Berlin early in 1942m when Kraemer visited the OKW. Here Kraemer learnt that Wenzlau was deputing in OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr for an officer was on leave.

In May 1942 Wenzlau was appointed deputy air attaché to the German Legation in Lisbon, where he remained until the end of 1943. Kraemer on a visit in Portugal in July 1943 saw Wenzlau and his chief General Kettenbeil, with whom Wenzlau seemed on very good terms.

They met in the house of a German business man named Strohbeck (Strobeck) in Estoril. Kraemer knew none of Wenzlau's agents.

Wenzlau came to Stockholm in September 1944 official as deputy to the German Air Attaché Major Golcher. He was jointed in November by his secretary Frau Reichenbach, who, according to Kraemer was merely a shorthand typist and did no intelligent work.

Wenzlau was really ??sted? to Stockholm to handle Kraemer's information on Russia, Finland and Sweden, also to act as a go-between with the office of the German Air Attaché.

When Onodera had Russian or Finnish intelligence Wenzlau received this evaluated it and passed it on to I Luft. (AOB: I doubt that this designation was maintained under the Mil Amt structure) Wenzlau only came in towards the end of Kraemer's association with Onodera, and did not give exchange information.

It was the idea of Hansen (until 21 July 1944) and later Ohletz (KV 2/106) (I Luft) to have an officer in Stockholm to deal entirely with information about Eastern Europe.

Kraemer does not know any other source of information of Wenzlau, though he knows that he was acquainted with Bagyoni (KV 2/3646).

Kraemer stated that from 1940 the chief of the K.O. (Kriegsorganisation, military intelligence service established in friendly, mostly neutral, countries) in Sweden.

Kraemer stated that from 1940 the chief of the K.O. in Stockholm was Obst. Dr. Hans Wagner (cover name Doktor), his deputy being Hauptmann Utermark. Both had to leave Sweden in the beginning of 1945.

At that time of Kraemer's departure (28/29th April 1945) the following were still in Stockholm:-

Kraemer claims to know very little of the K.O. activities, as he himself was on a special assignment with diplomatic cover and had no personal or official contact with the K.O.

Schumann was employed entirely in office work. He is a dentist by profession and anxious to return to his work.

Schroth was installed as a Vice-Consul (Konsul) in Gotenburg, but Kraemer knows nothing of his activities there. He is an Austrian.

Hencke and Blottkow were soldiers employed purely on guard duties, as far as Kraemer knows.

Kraemer does not know Wagner or Utermark's present whereabouts, The former was suffering from severe heart trouble, the latter might have returned to Breslau (then Russian/Polish occupied), where he had previously been in business. His home there had been bombed out (Ausgebombt) and he had no news of his family.

Kraemer gives the following cover names which have been used in connection with himself during the period of his work for the Abwehr:-

All Krämer's (Kraemer's) teleprint (FS) messages were signed with a double name, the prefix Andersson or Peterson.

Andersson denoted that the subject matter was of interest to the Foreign Office.

Kraemer, well known I. Luft agent whose activities in Stockholm have attracted considerable interest with his secretary, Nina Siemsen, were arrested at Flensburg on 15.5.45. They had fled to Flensburg from Stockholm following the interrogation of Siemsen and others by the Swedish authorities. They were both immediately brought back to this country for interrogation at Camp 020 and arrived on 17.5.45.

Kraemer, who entered the German Government legal service (Kraemer graduated University in Law) in 1938 with a view to a diplomatic career, was recruited by the Abwehr (I Luft) in Hamburg on the outbreak of war. He travelled extensively throughout Europe in the course of his diplomatic and Abwehr duties and at the beginning of November 1942, was posted to the German Legation as its secretary at Stockholm. It was known from most secret (MSS) and other sources that Kraemer while in Stockholm, had been actively engaged in espionage and had been a prolific reporter on the results of his activities. Much of the information which he supplied was unreliable or invented but some of it too near to truth for our peace of mind.

Kraemer, since his arrival at Camp 020, had admitted that whilst in Stockholm he had an arrangement with Onodera the Japanese military attaché, for an exchange of intelligence information, Onodera, from sources the particulars of which Kraemer is beginning, somewhat unwillingly, to supply, provided the latter with strategic and tactical information regarding the disposition of Allied Forces in this country, particulars of troop movement and Allied intentions on the Western Front, of the French Army and Air Force, of the British aircraft industry, reports regarding events in the Far East, regarding the disposition of Angle-American airborne units, regarding Russian code-books and regarding the U.S. raw material position. It was apparently considered that the material supplied by Onodera was of greater value than that supplied by Kraemer and the latter states that he paid Onodera altogether between 14,000 and 20,000 (Swedish) kroner to to make good the balance. Onodera found difficulty in receiving money from Tokyo and Kraemer was a party to an arrangement under which dollars were made available to him in Stockholm against funds paid to the German Embassy in Tokyo.

Kraemer states that Onodera obtained information direct from Major Kempf whom he describes as chief of the Attaché department of the Swedish War Office and Major Peterson, a Swedish intelligence Officer. Kraemer obtained his own information indirectly through Hepp, the German Press Attaché in Stockholm, from Gyps, correspondent of the "Svenske Dagblad" who visited England and reported upon damage and from other Swedish journalists whom he has known as well as from Colonel Blatt and Commander Oebert of the Swedish General Staff. He obtained political information from members of the German Legation who in turn obtained it from members of the Swedish Parliament and certain named Swedish officials. The latter information, according to Kraemer, was limited to reports regarding the Swedish attitude to Allied and neutral countries.

Investigation is in its early stages but it seems probable that Kraemer, who originally adopted an un-cooperative attitude, will in the end provide material of the utmost value.

Siemsen, Kraemer's secretary, made very substantial admissions when she was first interrogated and provided a lever which enabled the case against Kraemer to be opened.

2.7.45 Extract from information obtained from Schueddenkopf (Schüddenkopf) (KV 2/2646 ... KV 2/2648; PF 602055) appeared in Lisbon at the Legation and apparently Amt VI-D (England)

We have now received some scraps of information about Karl Heinz Kraemer as a result of the interrogations of Walter Berg and: von und zu Gathen.

Berg states that he does not know the origin of Kraemer's information, though he was aware that his cover name in TP (teleprints) was Hasso and that all reports from him to Abwehr I/Luft (I L) were signed this manner. The cover name Rüdiger is also known to have been used but only very rarely. Berg further states that situation reports and reports of a military nature from Kraemer went straight to Obstlt. von Dewitz in Mil Amt B, which fits in well with what we already know. Obstlt. Ohletz (KV 2/106) probably identical with the man Kraemer spells as Olitz, used the cover name of Otte in teleprint messages. It would seen from this that Otte is not identical with Ota, which we know from other sources to be the cover name for Obstlt. von Dewitz. Perhaps Kraemer can elucidate this point.

Von zur Gathen was a member of Ic Luftwaffenführungsstab from March 1944 onwards and worked in most department of Fremde Luftwaffe West (FLW?). He is of interest in the Kraemer case, as he states he has seen Hektor (Hector) and Josefine (Josephine) reports. Hektor supplied detailed information on aircraft production in the U.S. and Great Britain, which he believes came from a diplomat in London. He did not think this had any connection with the Japanese. Josefine was already in operation in March 1944. Von zur Gathen, however, did not know anything about Kraemer personally.

Extract from Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg. (Leiter Amt VI later also Mil Amt)

Karl Heinz Kraemer (Stockholm) was formerly a lawyer in Hamburg. Schellenberg heard his name the first time from Daufeldt (Hans; Amt VI - CH - English desk KV 2/141 ... KV 2/143; PF 45727) for whom he had occasionally. Dr. Paeffgen and Schüddenkopf were very critical of Kraemer saying that he took his reports from the British Press or from the British Intelligence Service (AOB, this smells more of resentment than actual facts) On the other hand, Dr. Wirsing (Dr. Gieselher Wirsing) (http://www.cdvandt.org/wirsing-gieselher.htm) one of Schellenberg's most able collaborators (Egmont Briefe) who was chief of the "Zentralbüro" thought a great deal of Kraemer. Schellenberg was struck by Kraemer's reports for the Amt-Mil (Mil Amt) They were political reports and concerned the U.K. and the U.S.A. (where Gieselher Wising had been a journalist in the later part of the 1930th). For this reason Schellenberg sought closer contact with Kraemer (Kraemer dropped even about mid of March 1945 an envelope at Schellenberg's secretary desk; addressed to Gieselher-Wirsing, as to by-pass German censorship). In the political domain he cooperated closely with Dr. Wirsing. Kraemer needed a great deal of money. In Schellenberg's view this was the reason for the suspicion that existed against Kraemer for a long time. Kraemer was first 'run "by Kleyenstüber" (think of mid 1943 - mid 1944) and later by Obstlt. von Dewitz who was formerly in the Luftwaffenführungsstab, and there had differences of opinion with the Ic Obst. Wodrag. Wodrag's opposition to Dewitz was transferred to Kraemer. For his chiefs of sections Wodrag ordered a comprehensive memorandum saying that the reports of Kraemer represented conscious deception by the enemy, or fraud. This memorandum, comprising nearly eighty pages, was given to Mueller (Leiter Amt IV, known also as "Gestapo Müller"?) by Wodrag, without consulting Schellenberg, with a request to start proceedings for espionage against Kraemer. Müller (Amt IV) put two of his best specialists on the job. There now began a dispute between Müller and Schellenberg about Kraemer. There were a number of weak points in Kraemer's military reports. he had, for instance, reported British aircraft factories which, according to the evidence of prisoners of war, did not exist at all. Another mystery was the time factor in the transmission of Kraemer's reports. (teleprints / FS sent from the German Legation in Stockholm) Often, for instance, counter enquiries referring to some remote place in England were answered within ten hours. After many discussions and negotiations, Schellenberg was himself obliged to summon Kraemer to Berlin. Müller's was not to let him depart again but arrest him. Schellenberg prevented this by telling Müller that he had succeeded in a personal talk with Kraemer, in clearing up the issues that were most doubtful, and that for technical reasons he could not renounce Kraemer's collaboration. Schellenberg allowed Kraemer to leave Germany again. In fact, Kraemer was important to Schellenberg owing to his political reports (Gieselher-Wising's Egmont Briefe). HGe was forbidden to be in direct contact with the Luftwaffenführungsstab or any other department, in order that Schellenberg should not be reproached with the fact that Kraemer secured at the source important material for a possible exchange of intelligence undertaken by him. In the talk Schellenberg had with Kraemer, the latter declared that he would not reveal to Schellenberg the names of his collaborators unless Schellenberg was prepared to dispense with his services in future. At the same time, Kraemer offered a plausible explanations for his cooperation with Swedish friends were in the Swedish Foreign Office. Kraemer sent good political reports about England, about the situation in the British Foreign Office and about the views of "Conservative Opposition within the Inner Circle" (Anderson)/ Schellenberg ways that it was Kramer's mirror of events which confirmed him in his intention to do everything in Germany itself in the question of Jews and the church policy, in order to prepare the way for the creation of a Western Bloc of states under the leadership of Britain, of which later a crippled Germany should form part. Schellenberg assumed that there must be contact between the "Conservative Opposition in England", the Vatican and a Conservative group in France under Bideaux. This contact could be exploited by the cleansed Germany. Thereby the basis could be created for a compromise. All this happened in 1944.

Extract from Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, 27th June - 12th July, 1945.

77. Sweden: Wagner (Dr. Hans, Leiter K.O. / K.d.M.), Finke, Kraemer, Count Douglas, Golcher, Von zur Gathen, von Knorr (DNB) (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro) (German Press Agency), Frau von Knyphausen, Krueger (Krüger), Kleist, von Gossler, Johansson, von Koenigsbeck, Wahlert, Becker, Dankvort (run by Finke). von Gienandt, Thorner (run by Six), Penzlin, Bauersfeld, Klaus. Rasch (Swedish Jew who lived for a long time in Russia), Prince Melar-Sakomelski.

(Please bear in mind that Schellenberg as a Leiter might not have known all the exact details entirely correct)

I got from General Onodera more and more informations, which came from Finnish sources. On request I learned that it was Hallamaa, who passed these informations directly or indirectly on to the Japanese Military Attaché. The informations were decoded political and military telegrams, , from various sources and legations. hereby I got the following facts about the personality of Hallamaa:

He is finnish Lieutenant-Colonel, chief of the decoding department of the Finnish intelligence service chief of the wireless - department and wireless school under Colonel Passonen C.i.C. of the II department of the Finnish General Staff. (AOB, considering Kraemer's spelling, this text might be considered Kraemer's own wording and writings) His more important position was certainly the former named as chief of the decoding department. He is ardent an anti-Sowjet and was during the course of the war on the German line. His relations to Passonen were not always very good often there were tensions between both officers. During the whole war Hallamaa was in close contact contact to General Heinrichs, chief of the Finnish General Staff.

When Finland made the armistice with the Sowjet-Union in July 1944 most of the Finnish general Staff officers came to Sweden, Hallamaa too, not knowing how the things would run in Finnland after the Russian occupation. Late in July Hallamaa went back to Helsinki. Since this time the contact between Onodera and Hallamaa as well as his new built organisation became closer and closer. It was at that time the question too if we should ourselves come in contact with Hallamaa or if we should strengthen our influence on Onodera and guide all the Finnish source through the Japanese Military Attaché. The reasons not to take up contact with Hallamaa in this early time I sum up as follows:

1) In 1944, especially during and after the armistice between Finland and Sowjet-Russia, the Swedish authorities watched over all German-Finnish contacts with the utmost intensity. Naturally the Swedish government had engaged herself very much in negotiating between Moskwa (Moscow) and Helsinki, because the end of the Finnish war was of greatest interest for the Swedes, naturally fearing that this activity was directed against the Swedish policy and intentions. During this time several Germans, among them diplomatic members of the Legation in Stockholm had to leave Sweden or were arrested.

2) Onodera had the contact to Hallamaa since 1940, as far as I remember he knew him even from his activity in the Baltic States. The intelligence contacts was started in 1943. I agreed, therefore, with I/Luft (Mil Amt C) that with regard to my exchange contact, which became bigger and bigger since spring/summer 1944, only to act together with Onodera in this Finnish business. It was now Onodera's policy that neither Wenzlau nor I came in direct contact with Hallamaa during the whole period. In April (1944) yet the situation changed in some respect and, if the war had not ended in the beginning of May 1945 we had met us at the end of May. besides all these facts I believe that the Swedish police did not suspect Onodera regarding Finnish contacts, whilst they shadowed me ...

To: Colonel R. Stephens From Major A.F. Blunt (a member of the "Cambridge Five")

"Our Stockholm representative has reported that Mrs. Kraemer has now been interned by the Swedes. (AOB: might S.I.S. have pressed the Swedes?) Before her internment her younger child had to undergo an operation which caused her some difficulties.

"She is assisted by Albert Hilding Kinberg, who is well-known to you by connection with Kraemer and ~~Rajgrodzki~~ Rajgrodsky (Victor, KV 2/2455, PF 601676, CX/38651/836/I/M/) cases. He undertook to have internment delayed or alternatively have it prematurely ended should she require any such action.

"Kinberg was apparently relying on an individual of the Swedish Foreign Office by the name of Melander. Unfortunately we have no record of any of such individual/ Kinberg apparently expected Kraemer to return up in the Argentine:

"Mrs. Kraemer had also been associating with his wife of Paul Huttner. Huttner is director of Zeiss, and is now known to be a close associate both of Kraemer and Major Heinrich Wenzlau."

I should be very grateful if Kraemer could be asked what he knows about Melander and Paul Huttner.

Attached is a copy of a report received from U.S. sources concerning Dr. Hans Wagner's (military) espionage organisation (= K.O. Sweden) in Stockholm. The information was obtained from Erika Erika Wendt who, as you know, * jumped off (went over to British side; thus provided German information) some time ago. This ties up fairly well with what we already know and seems to be moderately reliable.

I feel this may be of some use to (Camp) 020 in connection with the Krämer (Kraemer) case. The mention of Sandbergs Bookstore, for example, is interesting. It is also fairly evident that Krämer (Kraemer) did take over a number of Wagner's (K.O.Sweden) sources when the latter left Sweden.

The evidence so far collected seems to indicate that the persons with cover names were Wagner's (= K.O.Sweden) agents and those with numerical symbols, Kraemer's ??, the only exceptions being 3572 and 3539, who were evidently remnants of Colonel (Obst.) Jens Petersen's network.

Unreliable, worthless information, his double game recognised at the legation in the spring of 1944.

Didi not work for Dr. Wagner ('s K.O.Sweden), but presumably for Dr. Krämer (Kraemer).

Captain, born 11th, 1903 (1902?), residence Breslau. In Abwehr service (Officially "O.K.W. Amt Ausland/Abwehr; towards the end of the War: Amtsgruppe Auslandabwehr) since before the war (Polish boundary). Worked for Ast (Abwehrstelle - Abwehr Office -Tr.) Breslau, then Ast Danzig, whence he went to Berlin, Stockholm Helsingfors (Helsinki). Was for a considerable time engaged in the Abwehr (K.O.) in Helsinki before he officially became Wagner's co-worker in the winter of 1942. He represented Abwehr I (Wi), but worked at least as much for Abwehr III (Counter-Espionage related), handled the whole thing, had many conferences with V-men (Verbindungsleute - Liaison People - Tr.) and had the secret V-men file. It was actually he who carried on the work. In the spring of 1944, he officially took the Abwehr III desk. In Berlin they were not satisfied with his I (military intelligence) work. The results were small and he was said to be too careful, but they were wholly convinced of his value as a III-man.

Please refer to the statement handed in by Kraemer on 3.6.45 on the activities of General Onodera.

S.I.S. have now commented on this, and it is fairly clear that Kraemer has told us the truth, at least in great part.

The facts about Garnier mentioned in paragraph 2 are that he went back to Paris in February (https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-2128-garnier.htm) for a conference and was kept there by the French at our request (in vain). We know that rumours reached Stockholm that Garnier was not going to return (he ultimately did return to Stockholm) and these may well have been the foundation for the idea in Onodera's mind that Garnier was taking up a permanent post in Paris.

S.I.S. have failed totally to identify Major Berthold. They suggest that this may be a cover name for Colonel Rudolf Maasing, through, whom, as we know from Most Secret Sources, Onodera was receiving the Garnier material. It might be worth asking Kraemer whether he knew Berthold personally, and if so, whether he could give a description of him. The name of the Estonian professor mentioned in this paragraph is Kasik.

With reference to paragraph 3, this account of Onodera's use of Estonians to send to America agrees completely with the information from Most Secret Sources, and the names of the Estonians are actually known to us. There was, however, in M.S.S. (Most Secret Source think, for simplicity, of Bletchley Park kind of materials) a further indication that Onondera and (Major) Wenzlau also had a large organisation of the same type working eastwards into Finland and Estonia. This organisation included quite a considerable wireless network, and it would be of great interest to find out what Kraemer knows about this.

Dimitrewski (Dimitrewsky?), mentioned in paragraph 5, is apparently a well-known dabbbler (dilettante) in espionage in Stockholm with whom S.I.S. had, at one time, some contact. He seems, however, to be a character of no great importance.

Paragraph 6. It would be of great interest if Kraemer could tell us more about Colonel Passonen, whose connection with Onodera is not? known to us. In particular S.I.S. would welcome any details ?? ?? who? is also involved in his intelligence activities.

The same applies to the organisation of Reino Hallamaa and Heikki Aulo ?, mentioned in paragraph 8. S.I.S. believe that Kraemer could tell us quite a lot about them.

With reference to B.1.W's (War Room) (Mr. Stamp's) memorandum of 20.6.45. I enclose herewith a statement from Kraemer regarding his knowledge of Schaefer.

In amplification and explanation of his statement, the following dispositions made by Kraemer under interrogation are appended.

According to statements by Schaefer to Kraemer at a later date, the former was a pilot of the Lufthansa from 1925 to 1934 or 1935, flying over most of the European routes, but mainly on the lines between Berlin and Stockholm, Berlin and Spain, and from Spain to Cap Verde.

In 1935, he spent six months as Lufthansa representative in Geneva, and thereafter was employed for one year at Travemuende in the training of pilots. This was followed by six months at the Hamburg airport.

In 1936 approximately, he was sent as Lufthansa representative to Copenhagen where he stayed until 1940. During this period, he was for a short time transferred to Oslo on relief duty.

Schaefer, again according to his own statements, was recruited for the Abwehr in 1938, by a naval officer called von Schmitt-Hartung, and in 1939 he narrowly escaped being involved in an espionage case as a result of which von Schmitt-Hartung was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.

Schaefer stated that his job was only to act as a P.O. box and forward reports that would come to him from other agents. His activity was in any case not to commence until hostilities broke out, and he maintained that he had, in actual fact, done no espionage work whatsoever.

Schaefer was at the airport at the time when the Schmitt-Hartung affair broke. Somebody telephoned him and warned him that the police were making a search for his house. He immediately jumped on a plane 'plane which was just leaving for Berlin with a view to making a personal report to the Abwehr on what had happened.

It would appear, however, that the police were not able to find any evidence against Schaefer, as he was allowed to go back to Copenhagen.

Schaefer was transferred to to Stockholm as Lufthansa representative in 1940, and Kraemer made his acquaintance in May or 1941, when he visited Stockholm.

Kraemer maintains that Schaefer had done no work for the Abwehr between the time of his leaving Copenhagen and Kraemer's visit to Stockholm in 1941, and supports his contention (disagreement) by the allegation that Schaefer was not registered with section ZKV (Zentraler Kartei Verwaltung?) of the Abwehr in Berlin at the time when he was recruited by Kraemer, as otherwise he would have retained his old cover number and not been given a new one. Schaefer's previous connection with von Schmitt-Hartung had apparently never been registered in Berlin.

In the autumn of 1943, GHQ of Luftflotte V at Oslo asked copies of Schaefer's reports. They were interested in the number of planes arriving and →

departing from Bromma airfield as it provided them with a check on the number of 'planes passing over Norway which might possibly be engaged in dropping agents, on the assumption that the 'planes they picked up on their radio location (radar and HF/DF) devices and could not be identified as proceeding to or from Sweden, must be engaged in other activities.

In November, 1944, there was a scare as a result of the Lönnergren-Paulson affair, and Schaefer's reports were temporarily suspended. They were resumed, however, early 1945 on the instence of Luftflotte V.

It has not been possible to shake Kraemer' as regards his assertion that Schaefer did not work for him, and that he did not pay him. He has admitted, however, that Schaefer did some way act as liaison between him and Swalling, at time bring him Swalling's reports, and at others arranging rendez-vous.

Schaefer was also useful in arranging parties under cover of which members of the German Legation, in particular Golcher and Busch (Kraemer's great enemy), could meet people whom they wished to contact. For instance, Busch first met Sundgren at Schaefer's whilst Golcher on one occasion asked Schäfer to arrange a party where he could meet Ijungdahl.

Kraemer is strongly of the opinion that Sundgren furnished Busch with information.

Kraemer asserts that Schaefer was not paid by Wagner, but did receive from Wagner money to pass to Kueller? which Kraemer believes to have amounted to 200 Kr. per month.

These next lines are for us not of great significance please digest it yourself.

1941. May 6 - 10th. I met first time Schaefer at my arrival on Bromma Airport in Stockholm on May, the 6th. I came to Sweden on an order given by Oberst Piekenbrock (Leiter I in Berlin up to the end of 1942; when he was succeeded by Obstlt. i.G. Georg Hansen) and Major Brede to Ast I/Luft (Referat I-L) to start intelligence work in Sweden against GB and U.S.A. The C.i.C. I/Luft Major Wenzlau (AOB: the might have succeeded Major Ritter after he left about February/March 1941 after he preferred to be engaged in Rommel's DAK operations) (~~perhaps still Major Ritter~~) latter sent me to Stockholm for overlooking the situation and to find out if there would be in future a possibility to get intelligence contact and informations. It was not expected, that I should come back with big contacts and informations. The negotiations between the German and Swedish authorities about the air-courier-traffic between Norway and Finland were the official; reason for my visit to Sweden. (AOB: please bear in mind that Kraemer had a penchant for diplomacy matters). On an official lunch-party given by the director of the Deutsche Lufthansa, von Gablenz, I met besides other guests Schaefer. We all had a typical lunch conversation. Later I had the opportunity to talk alone with Schaefer. Then I asked him about the conditions in Sweden for his work, about his his contacts and acquaintances and the international traffic. I learnt that he had his best contacts in ABA circles. I did not come out and did not ask him for any information during this visit. I intended at first to get a general view. But it may be possible that Schaefer yet at that time had the impression I had something to do with intelligence work.

1941. May 11-31st. After returning to Hamburg, I reported to Kapt. z. See Herbert Wichmann (Leiter K.O. Hamburg) and Major Wenzlau about my visit and proposed to force the intelligence work in Sweden. I asked ZKV about details regarding Schaefer and C.S. Swalling. At the end of the month I got from OKW the answer of ZKV: Schaefer and Swalling at ZKV and Gestapo (?) not known.

1941. October 12-16th. Between May and October 1941, I heard nothing of Schaefer. In October Major Wenzlau decided to make a visit with me to Stockholm and to develop the intelligence work there. We met several times Schaefer, Major Wenzlau with the cover name "Dr. Wessel". I talked with Schaefer quite frankly about our real job and our intentions, to get informations, mainly air-reports, about GB and USA. I asked Schaefer a) if he had contacts that he could get English and American newspapers and periodicals (air) for us, b) about his possibility to get air-information for Ast Hamburg I/Luft (I-L) out of Sweden or via Swedish nationals from GB and USA, we mentioned his good relations to the ABA, c) about communications between Sweden and GB and USA, the air policy of the Swedish and the Angloamerican air-lines, Schaefer pointed at once to the difficulties to get informations and newspapers because of the German blockade. He declared further that if anyone could get informations, it would be Swalling because of his position and hios good relations, but Swalling we knew and we could negotiate with him personally. nevertheless he, Schaefer, would try to do his best, look out for intelligence contacts and try to get information, if possible. He promised to give us notice via the legation or K.O. to Ast Hamburg I/Luft (Referat I-L). Wenzlau and I paid a visit to the C.i.C. (Commander-in-Charge) of the K.O. Oberst Dr. Wagner and informed him about our intelligence contact with Schaefer and Swalling.

1941. October 20-30. After returning to Hamburg we announced Schaefer and Swalling at ZKV, Schaefer later in November got cover-code "3572"and Swalling got "3579".

1941. November 1941. Ast Hamburg I/Luft (Referat I-L) received via OKW Gruppe Ausland/Abwehr and K.O. Schweden the following letters:

Nr. 1) Letter by the secretary of Dr. Wagner, Frl. Fischer "Lieber Dr. Kraemer, angehängt finden Sie eine Kopie eines Schreibens von der V-Mann Fink zu seiner Direktion, der Deutschen Lufthansa. Absender Alice Fischer".

Nr. 2) Vertreter der deutschen Lufthansa, Stockholm, Hans Schaefer. Zu der "Verkehrspolitische Abteilung der Deutschen Lufthansa AG", Berlin. In der Periode zwischen ... Oktober ... bis Oktober auf Bromma Airport zwei Englische Douglas Maschinen der BOAC mit Kennzeichen GB-xxx und GB-yyy sind gelandet. Das Flugzeug GB-xxx hat Bromma verlassen, GB-yyy steht noch immer dort. Yours Hans Schaefer. (approximation of the genuine German text)

1) We got the first report after our visit to Sweden in October 1941, but before December, because to this date we were transferred to Berlin. There is no doubt about it that we got the first letter in Hamburg.

2) It is absolute possible that Schaefer had sent earlier reports about the English courier traffic to his firm (Lufthansa Headquarters in Berlin). I think that he gave the first report. when the traffic started.

3) We discussed during our October visit naturally this courier-traffic too. As far as I remember, Schaefer did not mention his reports about the air traffic, but this I cannot definitely say. I know that we were astonished to receive this report. The fact is certainly that we got reports about the English air traffic in 1941.

December 1941. In Berlin I learnt at I-L from Major Boeckel, later in the air staff by Obstlt. von Dewitz too that I-L received the same information regarding the English air traffic from Scotland to Sweden on the following channels: Schaefer sent the original to the "Lufthansa", from there the information went on to Abwehr I-L, I Wi and the air staff. Schaefer sent a copy to K.O., Air Attach, Krämer and perhaps Finke (this suspicion had Major Wenzlau late in 1944). (About the time Major Wenzlau arrived in Stockholm).

I received once in a month the copies of Schaefer's report to the "Lufthansa". They dealt with the English air traffic, sometimes Schaefer added wishes of the ABA regarding the Stockholm-Berlin traffic. The reports obtained the landing and starts of the 'planes in a certain period. with the aeroplane numbers. Abwehr I/Luft (I-L) had the reports via K.O.Sweden and Lufthansa.

1942. March15-18th I had conversations with Schaefer about his reports. He had to sent the information to the Lufthansa, Luft attaché and and K.O.Sweden. At that time I could not overlook (übersehen) the situation in Stockholm so good as it was later possible for me (of course, he lived too short in Stockholm), when I was a member of the Legation. I gave him the order of the air staff too to identify the letters on the aeroplane parts of the English courier planes. I had sent the order earlier with the courier-bag, it was possible that Schaefer had not yet received the letter. Definitely I spoke with him about this order. He was special, if it was possible for him to get these letters. Regarding my other wishes I learnt that it was impossible for him to get English and American periodicals. He had not succeeded to get other intelligence contact for me. Finally I asked him and the K.O.Sweden to pass on the informations earlier to me, because it was useless for me to pass on information yet known in Berlin.

I got to Berlin, since the beginning of May to Munich (München) the usual reports, the copies of Schaefer's letters to the "Lufthansa", via K.O. / OKW, some times now via the Legation/Foreign Office (Kramer had, for particular reasons, been a diplomatic status, and consequently, his main employer was the German Foreign Ministry (A.A.). Certainly Schaefer tried to →

4) the aeroplane-park of the ABA and the use (Einsatz) of the planes on the several routes.

I was astonished about the information regarding the letters on the aircraft parts. When I intended to give those reports to Berlin, I learnt again from Major Boeckel OKW I/Luft (I-L) that I/Luft had received the information earlier via K.O.Sweden and Lufthansa.. It was therefore, not necessary for me to give the information to Berlin.

After my arrival in Stockholm I at once asked Schaefer about his source for getting the letters on the parts of the English planes. He answered that he had received the information from Mueller a mechanic of the ABA on the Bromma airport and an agent of the K.O. Mueller had always the possibility to come close to the planes and to get the informations, we required. For his service Mueller got monthly 200 sKr from Wagner (Leiter K.O.Schweden) through Schaefer. I had later with Wagner a conversation on Mueller, Wagner said that he could not miss Mueller, because Mueller had a special sabotage-order in case of emergency and be needed Mueller for the Abwehr II (Abwehr II was factually not an intelligence Referat, but a sabotage organisation with various designation over the years, the most prominent one was "Division Brandenburg").

In Berlin at I/Luft (I-L) I reported about my negotiations with Schaefer and Wagner. Major Brede (Referatsleiter I Luft in Berlin, up to ca. mid 1943) intended at first to get an order by Obst. Piekenbrock (Leiter I, in Berlin, up to the end of December 1942) that I/Luft (I-L) could take over Mueller, But finally I/Luft (I-L) gave up all claims.

During this period I received reports from Schaefer in the form of a copy of his letters to the "Lufthansa"( H.Q. in Berlin) The letters came via K.O.Sweden or Legation, but not periodically, the reason I don't know. These reports dealt with:

1) the usual reports about the English courier traffic (AOB: the Germans, for instance, in Norway couldn't simple shoot-down these British courier machines, as then, consequently, the diplomatic relationship might have been broken-off; and consequently, also the supply of 'iron-cores' and other means).

2) few new letters on the parts of planes (in 1942 mostly the same few English planes came)

6) short information from-passengers, coming from England. Reports about the economical situation-shortages in different kinds of goods- the political situation, attitude against the war.

7) the import from USA and GB of goods destinated for the ABA, as Wright Cyclone motors (engines) or for the Swedish air force as special aircraft parts.

Again I phoned at first to I/Luft (I-L) (Berlin) from Munich (München), if they had yet received the informations. I got always the same answers, you are coming one →

week to late, several copies via K.O.Sweden and Lufthansa. I was later astonished about the informations, especially as I did not receive in all the times reports from Swalling. In these copies I found no special note from Schaefer to me.

At my visit in October I went at first to Swalling, who asked me at once about his informations. I could now see that the information in the Schaefer report to the Lufthansa (in Berlin) came from Swalling. Swalling thought that Schaefer would pass on these informations to me. I think that Schaefer credulous (naive) thought it was quite the same, if I got the Swalling information in his copy of the letter to the "Lufthansa". He never could really understand that it was important for me to get as quickly as possible the original, apart from from this the K.O. had the hand (im Spiel) in it too. On the other side (hand?) I could understand that Schaefer was interested that his direction (Lufthansa Direktion) should see how their representative in Stockholm worked. Nevertheless I bagged Swalling now to give in future, when I would be permanent in Stockholm (living), all informations, which were confidential, to me. I had with Schaefer a conversation thereafter in absolute friendly (freundschaftlicher) tone, explaining him my reasons I asked him to realise that the sending of confidential informations regarding the future plans of the ABA and BOAC (British Overseas Airways Corporation), but informations regarding the goods-traffic and about the im-and export were quite another matter. We both agreed and so I separated the Swalling source completely from Schaefer. When I asked Schaefer about new contacts, he could not give me anyone.

In the time between November 1941 and November 1942 I had received 8-9 copies of these "Lufthansa" reports. I think that Schaefer sent the reports monthly, he never gave the report a number, therefore one had no control and I can't say, when he had started with these reports. Only the first time I gave the information to I/Luft (I-L), later it was useless, because Berlin was informed.

I came to the Legation in Stockholm. (AOB: the reason was quite pragmatic: Personnel employed at K.O. Sweden necessitated a "working permit" and this was, at the time a difficult question. Kraemer always operating in the diplomatic spheres, was made an accredited Secretary at the Legation; albeit that it also was described as an Air Attaché). My contacts in air circles were Swalling and Schaefer. Yet at the beginning I repeated my opinion to Schaefer that I thought Mueller was the agent of Wagner (Leiter K.O.). I was, therefore, not interested in the informations about the English courier-traffic. But he was my man and if he would find a contact, I would claim for him. Nevertheless Schafer also in the future until spring 1943 sent a copy of these Mueller reports always to me.

At I/Luft (I-L) we talked about these Mueller reports. Major Busch (Kraemer great enemy: KV 2/529) was especially interested, because he should go to (K.O.)-Sweden) to succeed Obstlt. Buchner. Sfter conversations with the chief of the Lufthansa (von Gablenz ?), now Direktor Bongers, Schaefer gave report to the Lufthansa only regarding the international air traffic including the English courier traffic. "Lufthansa" did not pass on these reports. K.O. Sweden got the same report for I/Wi (I Wi) (Wi = Wirtschaft), which was interested and the deputy air attaché for informing I/Luft (I-L), air staff and if necessary Luftflotte 5 (stationed in Norway). I had the opportunity to see the reports in the office of the air attaché, I myself did not report. This agreement went into function certainly before August 1943. I think in May or June. 1943 May-June.

Since my visit in October 1942 I got very clearly that Schaefer could not bring valuable informations for me. We stayed all the time as comrades and helped us each other. But he had not the special sense to feel, →

where he could get an information, he was clumpsy (clumsy?) and, what I saw later more and more, he was frightened. His only source would be Swalling, I had him as my agent. I learnt through Schaefer the following Swedish nationals:

Frh (Freiherr) and Baronesse von Fries (I don't know the exact name), a business man, met him never again, he was without interest for me.

Mr. Carl Florman, got his informations via Swalling, Busch was very close to him. Not interested.

Major Busch came to Sweden. From the beginning it was an implied state that Schaefer dealt with Busch. By the agreement between the Abwehr and the Lufthansa the deputy Air Attaché was entitled to guide the Lufthansa representative, so it was the case in Portugal, Spain and Switzerland (all during the war neutrally versus Germany). As I stated earlier Schaefer had to give his reports of the courier-traffic (English) not to me, but to the deputy Attaché. In the second half of 1943 the personal contact between Busch and Schaefer became closer and closer. Busch was the Abwehr officer, who invited the most people and gave the most parties, the Schaefers (including his wife?) were mostly present. Because of the tensions between Busch and me (Busch became a great enemy to Kraemer) and the special character of Mrs. Schaefer we came not so often together. The families met only a few times until the end of the war, but my relations to Schaefer were nearly unchanged. I saw him always a very good comrade.

Shellgreen?. representative of the Hamburg-America Line, he had connections in Stockholm, was friend of Busch and Riedel. (It was natural that we never approached a man, who was in contact with an other comrade in Stahlhelm?)

Ljungdahl, Chief of the Civilian Aviation Department in Stockholm, Busch and Golcher were interested.

I may further add that Schaefer was in contact with a) Busch b) Golcher, Air Attaché, c) Wagner Leiter K.O. d) Fincke S.D. (AOB: = Amt IV representing).

About Schaefer activity in Denmark I got knowledge from Schaefer after my appointment in Sweden 1942 and by Kapt. z. See von Schmitt-Hartung. About his activity in Norway he never told me anything.

1) He was involved in the espionage case of Schmitt-Hartung in 1938/39. He should be a letter-box for his agents and pass on the information to Schmitt-Harting.

3) The Danish police made no case against him an that he stayed in Denmark till 1940.

I had no possibility in Berlin to ask for information, all or most of the documents were burnt in the big air raids in November 1943 at I/Luft (I-L) (AOB: this might have concerned the Offices at Tirpitz Ufer in Berlin)

1) Schaefer had to do with intelligence work in Denmark 1938/39, the (exact) extent I know only by Schaefer. He never mentioned intelligence activity in Norway.

2) ZKV gave in May 1941 the report that Schaefer was there and at Gestapa (Gestapo) unknown, that was binding for me.

3) Schaefer gave reports to the "Deutsche Lufthansa" in 1941, Ast Hamburg I/Luft (I-L) received a report in November and December 1941. These reports dealt with English Courier traffic. These reports in November and December 1941 were certainly not the first one, but I don't know, when he started. I further don't know if he started these information reports to the "Lufthansa" by himself or on order of the "Lufthansa".

4) Schaefer was since October 1941 agent of Ast Hamburg I/Luft (Referat I-L). I took Schaefer with me to Berlin, Munich (München) and to Stockholm (AOB: curious as in Stockholm he lived already) by decision of Abw.I/Luft (I-L Berlin?). I could not prevent it all the years that Schaefer since then was in close personal and also intelligence contact with the Luft Attaché, the deputy Air Attaché Buchner and especially (Major) Busch, the K.O., Wagner (its Leiter) and Utermark, the S.D. (represented by Amt IV) Dr. Fincke and last but not least with me. It was, therefore, very difficult to guide Schaefer. besides this I had the opinion that Schaefer could not bring informations and contacts, the reasons I gave. For these reasons I was not against it that the Mueller source stayed at the K.O. and that Schaefer was in contact with Major Busch. About Schaefer's activity are informed:

Kapt. z. S. (Herbert Wichmann (only the beginning in Hamburg) (Wichmann was Ast later K.d.M. Leiter 1939 up to early 1945; after the latter had to resign due to his age and shortly thereafter had to serve again)

Reference 020 report of 16.6.45 on Grundböck's organisation, enclosed with your letter PF 66365/B.1.a/Michael Ryde (M.I.5) of 19.6.45.

Grundböck's full name is Kapten Anton Bela Ferenz Grundböck, Hungarian of German (Austrian?) (Sudeten?) origin, born 4.11.91. He was an engineer and a former I/Wi (I Wi) agent. He was reported in Turkey from 1941-43 and arrived in Sweden December 1943. He died in Stockholm on 29th March, 1944. As far as we can judge all Kraemer statements about Grundböck are entirely correct. This, of course, is fairly natural as Grundböck is already dead and can be safely blown. It is perhaps rather strange that Krämer (Kraemer) did not did not mention this person during his early interrogations, unless of course he had been planning ahead with a view to producing this pearl only under pressure.

The information that Vagi contacted General Kjällgen and Colonel Adlercreutz is interesting. Krämer (Kraemer), however, has previously admitted that Adlercreutz worked in close conjunction with the German military Attaché and with K.O. Schweden. This would seem to be more efficient channel than Grundböck's.

"Siegfried B" has never appeared in our teleprints (FS), but is probably known to the Swedes from the teleprints they (manually) decoded in the early part of 1943. (https://cryptocellar.org/pubs/sturgeon.pdf) We hope soon to be able to see these.

Krämer's (Kraemer's) statement that Grundböck's information later went under cover of "Josephine" (Josefine) is in complete contradiction to what he previously said, i.e. that all "Josephine" reports came from Onodera. (AOB: not a contradiction, as it was Grundböck whom first was in touch with Onodera, and it was only some time after Grundböck's death that by chance of luck that Kraemer manage to get in touch with Onodera). I suggest full advantage be taken of this contradiction on his part. Krämer (Kraemer), therefore, doubtless did receive information from the Swedish army circles from Grundböck, but this was certainly duplicated or even better received through other channels.

Ihre is Nils Edvard Ihre formerly a departemental chief of the Commercial Section of the Swedish Foreign Office. He is, now Commercial Attaché to the Swedish Legation in London. Ihre was born in 1910 and has a Deutsche Adler Decoration among others.

Minister Söderblöm is Steffen John Söderblöm Swedish Minister in the U.S.S.R. Up to 1944 he was chief of the Political Department of the Swedish Foreign Office. He was born in 1900.

The Swedish Police have stated that they thought Krämer's (Kraemer's) Foreign Office source was in the Commercial section. They believed it to be Marion Santesson. It was obvious that his source was of a higher grade than a mere secretary, but they probably did not wish to compromise any important Swedish Police in this connection. At present will not be possible for us to find out. It may also be that their suspicion were founded on evidence provided by 1943 teleprint (FS) breakdown (Swedish decryption) (https://cryptocellar.org/pubs/sturgeon.pdf)

Befrage? is Leif Axel Lorentz Beierage??. In 1943 he held a junior secretaryship in the Ministry of commerce. In 1944, however, he was appointed departmental chief of the commercial Department of the Swedish Foreign Office taking Ihre's place. He was born in 1910.

This also ties in well with Grundböck's I Wi activities and is a possible channel of communication. Here Kraemer appears to admit that he obtained information from Swalling. he should be pressed on this point and asked how the information was obtained and what cover name was used for Swalling. As far as we know, he is (agent number) 3579's "Hintermann", once referred to in teleprint (FS) traffic, i.e. Schaefer's sub-source.

Wallenberg is presumably Henry Wallenberg Director of a large Swedish export company at Birger Jahlsgatan 4. He is always been considered highly suspect, if not an active German agent.

Wallenborg is either Harry or Tore Wallenborg, both directors of C.A. Wallenborg and Son, a large Swedish firm at Birger Jahlsgatan 73, 75, dealing in motor-cars, engines, oil, etc.

Sachs is presumably not Theodor Sachs, a well known Abwehr agent who first came to Stockholm in October 1944. The only other Sachs who has come to our notice is Direktör Ragnar Sachs of Karlapan 14.

Wibom is Kommendör-Kapten Sven Ivar Wibom. His name has appeared in Major Wenzlau's private files in such a way as to indicate that he was an agent of his. Wibom is on the Statutory List. A visit to his firm was used by Alexander von Bentheim as the ostensible reason for the visit to Sweden in December 1943.

If Krämer (Kraemer) only began to receive French Army information from Onodera in July 1944, Onodera was certainly holding out on him, because we know from Ultra material (American J.M.A. Intelligence) that he was obtaining information of this nature as early as September 1943.

This is interesting as Garnier himself has now admitted to the French authorities that he maintained close contact with Colonel Rudolf Maasing and that there was a frequent exchange of intelligence between the two, although he denies having supplied Maasing with intelligence about the French Army. Garnier also said that he believed Maasing was in contact with the Japanese Military Attaché. This seems to be a further indication that Berthold is a cover name for Maasing. It may be that Onodera did not tell Krämer (Kraemer) his real name, although this must have been known to Krämer owing to Maasing's connection with the Swedish Intelligence. Perhaps Onodera was aware that Krämer (Kraemer) was receiving intelligence from Garnier through another channel and did not want to blow his own cut-out. Moreover, as Onodera definitely named Garnier to Krämer (Kraemer) as a source of information in the French Military Attaché's office, this, taken in conjunction with Ultra (US. J.M.A. intercepts) evidence, proves that the intermediary was Maasing.

Re Garnier's trip to Paris in November 1944, you will recall that there are some lengthy Ultra reports (originating from US J.M.A. intercepts of Japanese J25 signal traffic, mainly between Tokyo and Manila) giving his impressions and views. The information Krämer (Kraemer) received from Onodera during Garnier's absence may well have been supplied by the future Source 28, who was perhaps on trial at the time (concerning a quite ill S.I.S. obsession).

Krämer (Kraemer) is evidently referring to the Onodera received from Garnier early December 1944.

This seems to exonerate (pardon) Roser from any participation in Garnier's intrigues, and it would seem that the Estonian professor (Kasik) is, in fact, Source 28.

I do not think Onodera has been trying to enhance the importance of his information by saying it had come from Garnier, as there is ample proof that Garnier did, in fact, give information to Maasing.

This is plausible, but it seems rather improbable that Krämer (Kraemer) would have allotted a symbol to a person he did not know or whose particulars he did not have on record. According to a report received from the U.S., Colonel Maasing was a source of Dr. Wagner's (Leiter K.O.Schweden) and worked in close conjunction with Major Carl Pettersen of the Swedish Intelligence Service.

All this seems substantially correct. Garnier's principal motive for contacting Maasing was, in all probability, to obtain intelligence relating to Russia. I am not inclined (tending) to believe that he ever accepted any money for the information he gave.

Reference Krämer's (Kraemer's) statement of 3.6.45 concerning the intentions of the Japanese Intelligence Service in Europe. This is quite a good near truth report.

Krämer (Kraemer) is correct in saying that Switzerland (Okamoto) and Sweden are the two foci of the Japanese Intelligence in Europe.

Onodera's Polish source, i.e. Sunrise was valued fairly highly by Tokio (Tokyo) but is by no means his chief or only source of information.

If Onodera told Krämer (Kraemer) in April (1945) that Garnier was to go back in the summer to take over a post in the French General Staff, this is not what Krämer (Kraemer) told the R.S.H.A. - vide message No. 676.W. in which he mentions the "Attachchébestrechung".

How is it possible to refer to a "reference" without passing-on the true (cross) reference?

Major Berthold has so far not been identified by us but enquiries are under way in Stockholm. This, on the whole ties up well with evidence from Ultra material and it would seem that berthold is Rudolf Maasing, I feel that Krämer may possibly have come to know that Onodera was receiving reports from Garnier through Maasing and this covered up his own possible connections with Garnier by other channel quite nicely.

This is correct. Onodera had intended to send one or both of the brothers Kirotar to the U.S.A. One of the brothers was a former Estonian Naval Lieutenant and may well have had W/T training. The other, however, was a former member of the Estonian Foreign Office. There is no evidence that Onodera approached the →

Germans about W/T communications for Kirotar, but this remark of Krämer's (Kraemer's) does not tie up well with Pandur 445/45↓↓↓

Crown Copyright

Sk.2. Ludwig (Mil. Amt. Abteilung Luft) für Pandur (= Wenzlau) am 27.3.45

Bezug Dort. FS (Fernschreiben) 445/45.

Dort Bericht und Planung grundsätzlich von Interesse. Vor schwierigen Vorbereitungsarbeiten und endgültigen Hier entscheid jedoch nach folgenden nähere Angaben bzw. Erläuterungen zu Dort - FS (Fernschreiben = teleprint) erforderlich:

1. Gilt Absicht nur für dem Fall, dass keine Zusammenarbeit mit H/Gastland (= Sweden) besteht? Was geschieht im Falle künftiger, auch von hier für wahrscheinlich gehaltener Zusammenarbeit? Hierüber müsste in erster Linie Gewissheit bestehen.

2. Der Vorschlag: "Ueber (Quelle) 26 Funkverbindung zwischen Eierkopf-Netz und Otte Stelle (Mil Amt-C Leiter Obstlt. Ohletz) aufnehmen" unverständlich.

3. Wie soll Funk laufen: "Funkverkehr (Quelle?) 26 - Eierkopf/ dürfte schwierig sein/ oder Funk Otte (via Prague, Havelinstitut or K.d.M. Hamburg?) - - Eierkopf und Weitegabe an Euch für (Quelle?) 26 / technisch ohne Schwierigkeiten möglich/

4. Was ist unter "materialmässiger Versorgung "und "funkmässiger Unterstützung "zu verstehen?

5. Unter welche "Umständen" und in welchem Umfange wäre diese erforderlich ?

6. Stellungnahme von Ii (Rauh ? as Rasehorn Ii had quit Berlin since somewhere in 1944, or Ii Trautmann of K.d.M Hamburg?) erst nach Vorlage technischer Daten/ Standort, Geräte Ausstattung, Frequenzen Betriebsart usw. / möglich Grundsätzlich zu jeder möglichen Einschaltung und Unterstützung bereit. Ohne Klarstellung zu 1-6 kann aber Senior (= Schellenberg) - Bescheid nicht eingeholt und verbindliche Zusage im einselnen nicht gegeben werden.

in which the whole question of W/T communication for the Estonian and Finnish networks was put up by Wenzlau, obviously in conjunction with Onodera. Here again Krämer (Kraemer) certainly knows far more about the whole thing than he has told us up to the present.

Onodera certainly got at least occasional pieces of information relating to Russia from the Swedish military authorities and also may have had access to secret material through his liaison with Major Carl Petersen of the security Police. However, this could have been obtained through ordinary M.A. (Military Attaché) liaison and necessarily by secret means.

Onodera will most likely not get into contact with the Russians, as Krämer (Kraemer) says, not because he does not want to but because he can obtain a considerable amount of information from the Japanese Embassy in Moscow (Russia was not yet at War with Japan) on these matters.

Dimitrewski was at one time employed by us and produced some information on Onodera. This was, however, rather low grade and Dimitrewski was considered unreliable and consequently dropped. He probably supplies the same type of low grade information to Onodera who is presumably somewhat less critical (arrogance).

Colonel Paasonen is well known to us and his connection with Onodera has been known for some time. However, this confirmation of it is interesting. It will be very useful for showing to the Swedes in order to ensure Paasonen's extradition or arrest, as and when necessary.

Can Krämer (Kraemer) give us any details about Mrs. Paasonen, who is also known to have a hand in intelligence activities?

There is little doubt that General Okamoto (Bern Switzerland) is some sort of contact with the Swiss Intelligence Service and also with the remnants if the S.I.M. (Italian Secret Service).

Onodera's "Polish Army friends in Italy" presumably refers to Sunrise, in which case the liaison is maintained through London and not through Switzerland (and controlled by the British Services?) (or did ran it via the Polish Legation in London?) The source the Japanese had in Spain Krämer (Kraemer) later admits to be Fuelop (Fuelop/Fullep actually was controlled by the Hungarians, sometime communicating by means of "microdots") please notice as to get an impression of the implications: (R1050 R1050return)

The Finnish and Estonian organisations, Reino Hallamaa and Heikki Aulio are also well known to Wenzlau and certainly to Krämer (Kraemer) as well. This seems to be another example of his telling as little as possible.

Ultra confirms the suggestion that Onodera should come to an agreement with the Swedish Intelligence Service regarding the Hallamaa organisation, although there is no evidence yet that it has been agreed upon the Swedes.

This person has been sending numerous telegrams of rather mysterious content back to Sweden since his arrival in Switzerland. (AOB: might this imply, that the British Services intercepted the telegram exchange between Sweden and Switzerland?)

There is little doubt that Krämer (Kraemer) knows quite a lot about Paasonen's activities, as he (Paasonen) has been mentioned several times in Most Secret material using the cover name of Aladar. Moreover, at the time of his mention in this traffic Krämer (Kraemer) was connected with the Balkan Group. (please consider also: (S1051 S1051return)

I feel Krämer (Kramer) has hit the nail on the head by saying that he "lives from the information market".

I attach herewith the folder for Kraemer, together with a new Camp 020 report on which no action has been taken. You (M.I.5) are to take over the case.

Captain Marseille who is dealing with the case at Camp 020 rang me up yesterday and asked that he might have for further reference the teleprint (FS) messages. (These had been stolen from the Fernschreib section at the German Legation, since January 1945 by at least a Czech, whom had been paid a lot of money for delivering to S.I.S. in Stockholm all so-called Durchschläge; think of carbon-copies) What he would like if this can be obtained is a full copy of the German text. He would, however, in any event like to have such of the messages as we have got and as are obtained in the link volumes of the file. I have asked the registry to send up the link volumes to you for forwarding to Camp 020.

I should perhaps add that it is our practice to keep a folder containing copies of all the papers which are placed in the file.

Kraemer has given the following information about Dr. Enomoto, Masson's espionage activities in Switzerland, and Auersperg's air source in Switzerland:-

In connection with the Klatt affair (AOB: I intend to renew a survey on Klatt, later this year, Deo volente. Please consider the first part of: https://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm) This Japanese Secret Service, who had been somehow involved with Klatt. This Japanese, whose name was Dr. Enomoto, was a journalist working for Nichi-Nichi Shambun.

Originally, Enomoto had been in the Balkans (Sofia), where he had had some sort of contact with Klatt (real name Richard Kauder) and with the Head of K.O. Bulgaria, Dr. Delius (real name Obst. Otto Wagner) As the Russian penetration of the Balkans progressed (firstly occupying Rumania), Enomoto moved on, first to Budapest (Where Klatt already was as a sort of cover operating on behalf of the Hungarians, but still in contact with the German Abwehr. The latter were prohibited to deal with Klatt after the 5th August affair in 1943, ordered by Hitler personally) (the chief of the K.O. there is unknown to Kraemer) (AOB: I doubt that there existed a regular K.O. in Hungary), and from there to Vienna (~~Leiter of the Vienna K.O. was Count Maronya~~) (AOB: the latter is nonsense: Wien (Vienna) was Wehrkreis XVII and a regular German City and therefore possessed a regular Ast Wien (Funkleitstelle Wera, Ii Obst. Hötzel) (Its Leiter was Rudolf Graf von Marogna-Redwitz, up to the failed assassination attempt on Hitler on 20 July 1944; and he was later executed, on 12th October 1944); with both these (K.O.) Chiefs Enomto had contact.

In Oct./Nov., 1944, Enomoto travelled by car with his wife and 2 or 3 children all the way from Budapest to Stockholm.

AOB: this all is far to simple put on paper: Without German backing such an endeavour would have been impossible! Everybody necessitated at least legal documents as to pass borders with a car. But more significant - one necessitate vouchers for obtaining petrol; as there existed quite a shortage and one necessitated special passes to cross from Hungary into Germany, as Austria was then a part of; as for inside Germany. What to think of crossing by a car from Germany into Denmark, where someone necessitates Danish kroner; then the legal papers as to be allowed to take the ferry - and entering legally into Sweden.

Kraemer knew that Enomoto brought a code to Stockholm with him. This code was definitely not German, as it contained Hungarian code-words, and Enomoto had brought it for purpose of setting up a W/T station in Stockholm (illegal and therefore necessarily clandestine, since it was forbidden by Swedish law to operate a W/T set) which was to be used to contact Klatt (AOB: nonsense!) ........... However, in addition to this, Kraemer thought that Enomoto had come to Sweden in preference to the Iberian Peninsula because it was easier to take his wife and children with him to the former country. Apparently at one time Switzerland was under consideration as the place to which he should go after leaving the Balkans.

Enomoto was known to have a network in Spain, one of his agents there being half-German, half-Japanese woman (name unknown) in Barcelona; this woman was possibly also working for Klatt too (AOB: nonsense) Kraemer could not say whether Enomoto had communications of any sort with Spain from Sweden:

At the time when Enomoto arrived in Stockholm with the code, Onodera remarked to Kraemer that Enomoto was also a member of the Japanese secret Service, and praised him as a very clever man. He said that Enomoto would be working under him (Onodera), and if there was anything that Kraemer wanted, he would 'pass it on'. From this, Kraemer deduced that Enomoto was subordinate to Onodera.

Kraemer himself never met Enomoto, although he once caught a brief glimpse of him, but Wenzlau had met Enomoto.

Kraemer and Wenzlau were very suspicious of Enomotyo, largely on account of his connection with Klatt, whom they thought to be working for the Russians, notwithstanding the fact that he had (once, think of 1941 - 1943; less 1944 and Klatt was arrested about January 1945 in Vienna (Wien)) a large espionage set-up in south Russia.

2. Masson's Espionage Activities in Switzerland. (AOB: after all this proved to be nonsense and more based upon "wishful-thinking".)

AOB: I therefore prefer not to transcribe this section, but you can yourself read it.

(AOB: please be also careful with this paragraph as it contains, most likely, a lot of rubbish; The Germans say: Mit Vorsicht genießen)

Kraemer originally learnt of the connection between Masson and Schellenberg (Senior) (of Amt VI and Mil. Amt) from Prince Auersberg who himself also had contact with Masson. On one occasion, Masson furnished a long report on the general political and military situation in England just prior to the invasion (June 1944?), and giving details for the preparations for the invasion, numbers of forces available, stores and reserves, and petrol reserves and locations of dumps, etc. (Kraemer is not absolutely sure whether the last mentioned item was petrol or some other stores). Auersberg forwarded this document to Ein Luft (at Mil. Amt), and Kraemer himself heard about it from Hansen (at that time still heading Mil Amt), who remarked that Masson was "a new source in Switzerland".

In addition to this, Kraemer remembered that when Eins Luft prepared a list of tactical information required regarding the R.A.F., one copy went to Auersberg, which gave him grounds for thinking that the information might be sought, in the ultimate, from Masson (in view of what we know of the connection between Auersberg and Masson). though it was, of course, possible that Auersberg might have other air sources in Switzerland.

Kraemer described Masson's attitude in all these espionage as being merely pro-Swiss (corresponding to the Wallenberg group in Sweden). Kraemer believed that he most certainly had contacts with the British and American intelligence services in Switzerland, and he knew for a fact that in exchange for the information he gave the Germans, he received information relating to Russia and the U.S.A. Therefore, he was working for neither side, but merely for Switzerland.

One of Auersberg's air-sources in Switzerland of which Kraemer knew, was a certain Heimann, the editor of 'Interavia', the aviation journal. This man was a Jew, and had formerly been a German national (Deutsch Nationale). In view of the ban on the use of Jewish agents, Auersberg was recalled to Germany because of his contact with Heimann, but did not obey the summons, and is still, Kraemer thinks, somewhere in the neighbourhood of Berne (Bern) (Incidentally, Auersberg was also involved in the July Plot (the assassination attempt on Hitler of 20th July 1944), and received a second summons to return to Germany on that account; this he also disregarded (verweigert).

I note that a diplomatic transit visa has been granted to Captain Arnold Kaech Swiss Military and Air Attaché in Stockholm.

Kaech has been reported on various occasions as a source of General Onodera's. It is also learnt from JMA's (US intercepted Japanese J25 coded transmission, likely intercepted between the traffic from Tokyo to Manila) that Luthi Swiss Military Attaché in Helsinki, was supplying information to the Japanese there.

There is presumably no action we can take, but I thought you might be interested in his background.

From the reading which I have so far been able to do on the Kraemer case, the following points occur to me and may be of some use.

1) It is quite clear that the translations of the teleprint (FS) messages supplied by S.I.S. are in many cases seriously inaccurate. The worst example is the link Volume 2, serial 105a message "J" of which I have now added an alternative and certainly more probable translation.

The inaccuracies may in general not be misleading, but it should, I think, be laid down as a principle, that any point based on the precise phrasing of a message should always be checked on the German. Unfortunately this is not always sent to us, but presumably we could, if necessary, get it from S.I.S.

2) Kraemer is now maintaining that Hektor (Hector) Josephine (Josefine), etc. are not people, but type of intelligence. It is, however, certainly the case that Berlin regarded them as real individuals, The evidence for this is to be found in many messages, but I would call for attention to the following:-

3) Although I think that it is correct to say that "K" Intelligence (consisting of US. J.M.A. intercepts, based on Japanese communications, mainly maintained by means of the "J25" code between Tokyo and Manila; dealing with intelligence provided by Kraemer ("K" Intelligence) of which S.I.S. possessed already text copies. Whether "borrowed" by Section V from Kraemer's private home by means of the Kraemer's household maid; or stolen carbon copies from the Fernscheib Office (teleprints) of the German Legation in Stockholm, doesn't matter) was given by Onodera by Kraemer and not vice versa, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the argument supplied by S.I.S. at serial 109a in Link Volume 2 does not really prove this. (I have found this reference among the quite many remaining bits and pieces) The facts which they state could be explained on a different hypothesis, namely that Berlin asked Kraemer for information, that Kraemer passed the request to Onodera, who obtained the information, handed it back to Kraemer for transmission to Berlin, ant at the same time, passed it to Tokyo. This is, however, a less probable explanation, and I daresay that S.I.S. have other examples which prove their case. In any case, we agreed that there are very strong indications to show that Kraemer is in fact the origin and not the recipient of the common information.

4) It seems to me fairly clear that (agent number) 3579, is in fact Swalling. B.1.L note of 20.6.45 mentions 3579 as the source of which Swallving admits having supplied the material. ......... It would be interesting to know whether this date coincides at all with any of the occasions on which Swallving was arrested.

With reference to B.1.W. (W = War Office) (Mr. Stamp's) memorandum of 19.6.45, Meisner (Leiter K.O. Bern (Berne), in Switzerland) (KV 2/281 - KV 2/282; PF 600813)

With reference to B.1.W. (Mr. Stamp's) memorandum of 19.6.45, Meisner has been interrogated regarding his relations with Kraemer, with the following results:-

One day, Meisner thinks in 1943, he was told that an officer from Stockholm was in the Embassy and wished to pay him his respects. (AOB: Meisner himself was a Naval Officer) This officer turned out to be Kraemer (formerly being Sdf. for practical reasons Kraemer was made Lieutenant). Meisner had heard Kraemer's name previously from (Dr. Hans; Leiter K.O. Schweden), but had no knowledge of his activities beyond the fact that he was connected with the Nachrichtendienst in Stockholm.

Thereafter, Kraemer called on Meisner on about five or six occasions during 943 and 1944, but Meisner insists that those were merely courtesy visits from one officer of the Abwehr to another, and that he has no knowledge of Kraemer's activities in Sweden, or of his intelligence contacts, if any, in Switzerland. In particular, he has no knowledge any contact with the Japanese (Okamoto). He himself did not exchange any Intelligence information with Kraemer, and their conversations were entirely devoted to general topics of common interest.

Meisner has confirmed that, on instructions from Berlin, he remitted some 15,000 dollars to Stockholm, but he was not aware at the time that this transaction had anything to do with Kraemer.

Having received orders from Berlin to promote friendly relations with the Japanese Military Attaché, Okamoto, and, if possible, to keep himself posted as to the latter's activities, Meisner, on his own initiative but with the knowledge of Berlin, gave Okamoto Intelligence information. He maintains, however, that he did not receive any information from Okamoto in exchange. If this is true, it would tend to confirm Kraemer's contention that the exchange of information with the Japanese as regards Swiss sources, was effected through Onodera in Stockholm.

Krämer (Kraemer) has been interrogated regarding various articles in his property, and gave the following explanations:-

Krämer's (Kraemer's) Diplomatic Passport, valid for one year. His old one had expired on 27th December, 1944, and therefore this present one was issued on that date. The entry for the journey to Berlin relates to his last visit there in March, 1945.

i) A temporary Sonderausweis issued on May 6th, 7th or 8th, 1945, when Krämer (Kraemer) first arrived in Flensburg.

ii) The proper Ausweis to replace (i); this was issued to Krämer (Kraemer) on May 12th (The Germans surrendered unconditionally in Reims on 8th May 1945). Like (i) it merely served as a Camp Pass for the OKW Headquarters (Flensburg-Mürwik).

i) Freight certificate for the transport of Krämer's (Kraemer's) (DKW) car from Stockholm to Halsingsborgs (Southern Sweden) by railm on the occasion of Krämer's (Kraemer's) departure from Sweden. The car was sent by rail to save petrol.

ii) Permit issued in Sweden on May 2nd, authorising Krämer (Kraemer) to take his car out of Sweden.

iii) Driving licence issued in Stockholm (AOB: where Kraemer resided since Autumn 1942).

iv) Permit authorising Krämer (Kraemer) to circulate in the so-called "OKW-Zone" in Flensburg (-Mürwik) in the capacity of an official engaged in carrying out the conditions of the surrender agreement. (This Zone had been created by agreement between Field Marshals Busch and Montgomery, in order to facilitate cooperation between the British Staffs in the circumstances of the surrender; there was no curfew enforced within the Zone). In point of fact, Krämer (Kraemer) was not engaged in the duties specified in the permit. The signature is that of Millbach, Deputy Undersecretary of State to the Foreign Office).

Notebook prepared by Krämer and his wife (the latter was still remaining in Stockholm), containing addresses via which each would communicate with the other in the event of their being separated and unable to get into contact (a duplicate is in Frau Krämer's (Kraemer's) handwriting, and Krämer (Kraemer) accounted for the large number of names and addresses listed by the fact that Allied bombing had caused such devastation in Germany. All these addresses were written solely for the aforementioned purpose, with the exception of that of Brodersen. Krämer (Kraemer) had written down this man's name as being a person to whom reference could be made by the Allied authorities (if necessary) in order to prove that Krämer .......?.... people. Krämer (Kraemer) had met →

Brodersen, who was a member of the Norwegian Resistance Movement and often came to Stockholm by illegal means, on behalf of the German Minister Thomsen (Head of the German Legation) in connection with negotiations between Germany and Norway to avoid the latter country becoming a scene of active warfare in the European theatre of war. Krämer (Kraemer) had seen Brodersen on two occasions in all, between the 20th and 30th April, 1945.

Certificate of demobilisation issued to Unteroffizier Heinz Köhler (Kraemer's cover name) entitling him to draw civilian food rations in Flensburg. When Krämer (Kraemer) stopped in Flensburg, en route from Copenhagen to Hamburg, he found there Berg, whose home was in Flensburg. Berg made out this permit for Krämer (Kraemer) to use in an emergency, although in actual fact, Krämer (Kraemer) obtained his food at Doenitz' H.Q. (Flensburg-Mürwik) Berg chose the fictuous name of 'Heinz Köhler' at Random because it was something like Krämer's (Kraemer's) (Krämer (Kraemer) could not be issued with such a permit in his own name because it was uncertain whether his status was officially that of a diplomat or a soldier.)

iii) Bill from travel bureau for tickets from Stockholm to Copenhagen for Kraemer and Frl. Siemsen. (T1052 T1052return)

i) List of articles which Kraemer brought back to his family in Germany in March 1944.

ii) Address of Edward Ward, B.B.C. correspondent; this was written down by Kraemer at the time when Ward was seeking an interview with Doenitz or Schwerin-Kroesigk (at that time "Reichsminister der Finanzen"; name it Finance Minister in the short weeks after Hitler's suicide), in Flensburg/ On the reverse is a certificate of the registration number of Kraemer's (DKW) car, which was made at the Danish customs house, crossing over to Sweden.

iii) Notes relating to his finances which Kraemer made when leaving Sweden. They were intended as an aid-memoire in the event of his being interrogated by the Allied authorities regarding his financial transactions in Sweden.

Report of negotiations with B.B.C. correspondent Edward Ward, who was seeking an interview with Doenitz (then "Staatsoberhaupt" succeeding Hitler) Kraemer was deputed by von Steengracht (Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, for some time, Staatssekretär des Auswertigen Amts (A.A.) ( Under-Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office) to handle the matter, and for an interview with Schwerin-Krosigk (in this episode for a short while the German Minister of Foreign Affairs (A.A.)), which took place on May 11th. Later Ward's report was censored by Kraemer before being broadcast on the evening of May 17th (Kraemer had been arrested on May 15th).

The interrogation of Fregatten-Kapitän Michael Obladen (formerly Sdf. KV 2/521; PF 46805) indicates that Karl Heinz was one time transferred to Munich (München) doing a disbanding

(dissolution) operation. You will recall that this statement tallies with what P.o.W. Brede says (AOB: be always careful with statements by former colleagues when jealousy is doing its part), see our letter text deleted dated 18.6.45. However, we have no confirmation that he was ever there from our material but perhaps (Camp) 020 could ask him about this.

Further to Mr. Stopford's note to you of the 29th May, we have received some more information from S.I.S. regarding the interrogations in Stockholm of Schaefer, Mueller, Swallving and Rüter, which may be of assistance to you in the interrogation of Kraemer.

Born Mainz 31.5.1903. Address Alviksvägen 121 II, Stockholm, tel. 28 25 60. Arrived in Sweden in October 1940. Introduced into Sverige Tyskland Föreningen in 1941 by Captain Carl Florman. Instructed before he came to Sweden to report direct to Germany on the conditions for air travel in Sweden and all other matters of interest.

On arrival in Sweden, Schaefer was instructed by Jenz Peter af Petersen. German Air Attaché to report on all arrivals and departures of British 'planes to Petersen. From September 1942 he reported to Reinhard von Heymann or (Major) Friedrich Wilhelm Karl Busch (KV 2/529, PF 602057; and after all a great enemy of Kraemer), later to Heinrich Maximilian Golcher and finally to (Major) Heinrich Wenzlau).

Schaefer first met Dr. Hans Wagner (Leiter K.O. Schweden) in 1936 or 1937. From late in 1940 or early 1941 he gave Wagner copies of all his reports to the Air Attaché. In September or October 1944, Wagner told Schaefer to cease reporting, as it is too dangerous in view of the number of deserters from the German Legation. Wenzlau told him to start reporting again in December 1944.

Schaefer first came into contact with dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer at the beginning of 1941 (Kraemer points it Autumn 1941). During 1943 and the beginning of 1944 they were frequently together, but early in 1944 they ceased to see much of one another as the result of advice to Schaefer from Major Busch (Kraemer's great enemy) . Schaefer supplied Dr. Kraemer with similar information to that which he gave the Air Department and Dr. Wagner.

Schaefer's reports consisted of the identification marks and days of departure and arrival of all British and American planes. They did not include exact times of arrival and departure. He also reported on matters of general interest at Bromma (Stockholm Airport) and latterly on freight carried on Allied planes. He derived his information from Mueller (see below) for times of arrival and departures, from Swallving for freights, from Rüter for names of British passengers on two or three occasions only, and from his personal observations. Schaefer did not give passenger lists to Dr. Wagner or anyone else and was told that Wagner was getting these from another source. Wagner implied that he wished Schaefer to explore the possibility of obtaining a source among the Swedish pilots on the British line and hinted at Greve von Rosen. Schaefer did not follow this up.

Schaefer met Regierungsrat Mueller of Oslo with Dr. Wagner, but the question of sabotage of a British plane was discussed only between Regierungsrat Müller (Mueller) and J.E. Müller.

Born Erlangen 7.3.1899. Address Platslagarvägen 10, Abrahamsberg. Telephone number 26.01.78. Controller at Bromma. Granted Swedish nationality in 1931. Met Captain Carl Florman at Malmö in 1925 while employed by Junckers, and was then introduced by Floman into A.B.A. served first in Malmö, then at Jonköping and finally in 1940 was brought to Stockholm. His daughter, Sofia Hildegard, married Gunther Pioch.

Müller provided Schaefer with the days of arrival and departure of Allied planes from July 1941 onwards. He gave the identity number of each plane, but not the exact hour of departure or arrival.

Müller alleges that in the summer of 1942 Schaefer asked him whether he was willing to assist in sabotage a British plane. Müller states that he refused.

Born Hälsingborg 1.7.1900. Address David Bagaresgatan 20, Stockholm. Telephone number 20 22 63. Employed at A.B.A.'s freight department, Birger Jarlsgatan 55, Stockholm, telephone number 10 38 31.

Swallving first met Dr. Kraemer in 1936 or 1937. Swallving was then employed by Illis and was given a free trip to Berlin by Reichsverband der Deutschen Luftfahrindustrie?. He met Krämer at a Restaurant belonging to the Reichsverband. Swalling next met Kraemer about the beginning of 1943, when Kraemer called at his office. Swallving believes that Kraemer obtained the address either through Schaefer or through Alexander von Bentheim.

Swallving once met Dr. Wagner and Hauptmann Albert Utermark at lunch with Schaefer, but claims that no attempt at recruitment was made.

From the middle of 1943 Swallving gave Schaefer notes on the weights of ball-bearings which were to be transported to the U.K. He also gave the names of the addressees on consignments to the U.K. (AOB: will be dealt with later)

From the end of 1943 Swallving supplied Kraemer weights, number of packages and addresses of consignees of freight to be sent to the U.K. by air. Swallving denies having drafted the telegram on page 21-24 of the Police report, of which the source is given as 3579. He admits, however, that most, if not all, of the information in the telegram came from him.

Born Hamburg 29.19.11 (1 or 9) Address Herrestadsgatan 8B, Malmö. Telephone 790 37. Traffic assistant at Bulltofta aerodrome. On two or three occasions he gave Schaefer the names of british passengers. He was posted to Malmö in April 1942 and has been out of contact with Schaefer since then.

Schaefer was paid nothing in his own account by Dr. (Hans) Wagner, the Air Department or Dr. Krämer (Kraemer). He received Kr. 200 a month from Dr. Wagner from 1942 onwards on behalf of Müller. He signed receipts for this under the name Fink. He paid the whole sum to Müller. Rüter received Kr. 100 from Schaefer in all. Swallving received no payment either from Krämer (Kraemer) or Schaefer.

It would be interesting to know from whom Wagner was obtaining his A.B.A. passenger lists, and Krämer (Kraemer) might perhaps be able to throw some light on this. The Greve von Rosen referred to as a prospective source on the A.B.A. British run is presumably Count Carl Gustav Ericsson von Rosen (PF. 49702); he never actually flew on the Stockholm-Scotland route, but several times applied for visas, which were refused in view of our information about him. We do not know anything about the telegram referred to in connection with Swallving, but I am writing to S.I.S. and will ask them if they can give us some more information about it. I will of course let you know as soon as I hear from them.

KV 2/150-2, page 18 (minute 400a) The following subject has quite often been dealt with before in this current KV 2/150-2 serial.

With reference to S.I.S. comments on the explanations given by Kraemer of the entries in his appointment list for Berlin on the 7th March 1944, forwarded with B.1.W (War Room) memorandum reference PF 66365 (= M.I.5's Kraemer document reference number) of 12.6.45, Kraemer has not yet been interrogated on the alleged identity of Berta (= Intelligence via a Spanish journalist in England via the Japanese Military Attaché in Madrid) with the name appearing in item 6, as it seemed to be unlikely that if Berta is really identical with Brown Kraemer would be under any necessary of making a note of this fact against Brown's name.

It occurs to me that this not, as well as the further note of Major being identical with Feng, may have been written by someone in S.I.S. (different hand-writing) or possibly B.1.W., particularly in view of the fact that pencilled notes on the questionnaire forwarded with the original Kraemer documents show Hasso as being identical with Kraemer and Pandur as being identical with Wenzlau.

I suggest that this aspect of the matter be investigated before Kraemer is tackled as regards the alleged identity of Berta with Brown.

At the end of 1943 (AOB: Kraemer's actual remembrance on exact dates must noticed) I got the order to develop if possible the intelligence work in southern Europe with sources, I could direct from Stockholm. I had a conversation about this with Grundboeck (Grundböck), who told me that he perhaps could get information from Switzerland. In February I received some small informations from Switzerland. In February I received some small informations about the situation in North-Africa, strength of the troops in the Mediterranean, air force units. Now I asked Grundboeck (Grundböck) about the source, he answered that he would tell it later because he had promised not to give the name. I have reason to assume that the informations came from a Swedish source, he gave me a political short notice, which he read out of a letter. This was written in Swedish, the letter was dated in Bern. Then I had a view to go the Switzerland (beginning of May) (1944) I intended to ask Grundboeck (Grundböck) again, if I could not go to the source. At that time, beginning of April 1944, he was so ill, that I did not succeed. I got no further informations from this source, Grundboeck (Grundböck) died soon after. After I had received the first information from this source via Grundboeck (Grundböck) I reported at a personal visit in March 1944 that the new source "Eisberg" was running. (Eisberg Klappt). In the mean time I had learnt that Grundboeck (Grundböck) was a friend of the Swedish military attaché in Bern and had relations to the economic department of the Swedish legation in Bern too. I guessed therefore that the informations came from this source.

In the late spring of 1944 I received informations about the European southern front even from Onodera. he got military reports from his colleague, General Okamoto, and since June 1944 informations, which the Swedes had got from their legation in Bern. These the Finns got on legal and illegal way. Because of the fact that the cover "Eisberg" was free, I took for these informations coming from Switzerland the cover "Eisberg". Under this cover I gave then all material, which I got from Onodera except those informations, which came from the Swiss General Staff (General Masson) via Okamoto. These reports got the cover "Zuckerhut".

Some production informations even from the Spanish and Portuguese sources of Onodera, not more than 10% in all.

Zuverlässiger V-Mann ZV Mann a) Strategical and tactical informations, which the Swedish General Staff got from Swedish Foreign Legations. This material via Onodera-Kempf/Peterssen or

d) Material, strategical and tactical, coming from the Fullep organisation. Please notice again: (T1053 T1053return)

Quelle 10 a) All political informations, coming from our legation and expressing the official Swedish interpretation to political questions concerning Sweden and Scandinavia.

b) The official interpretation of the Swedish High Command of the military situation in Europe in elaborated form, not in single informations coming from the Swedish foreign legations. These informations coming from three sources:

Zuckerhut Connection to Swiss General Staff via the Japanese Military Attaché (Okamoto) in Bern. Military informations about the European Southern Front.

Eisberg At first source of Grundboeck (Grundböck) in Switzerland, after May 1944 (in April Grundböck passed away) Japanese Intelligence Service in switzerland. Military informations about the Southern front. Sometimes, but not often, decoded Swedish telegrams of the Swedish Legation, coming from the source of Hallamaa, sent from Bern to Stockholm.

Quelle 23 ~~Voeszkoendy~~ (Vöczköndy) (Hungarian) (not Grundboeck) (Grundböck) in spring 1944, Vöczköndy had the cover "Quelle 12". Informations about the Eastern front from the Finnish General Staff. Few informations from the Swedes military attaché/

Quelle 24 Spanish source in France, which was several times special mentioned in the reports of the Japanese military Attaché in Spain. Tactical informations.

Quelle 25 Informations which came from journalistic circles in Stockholm, and gave material for some sort of political reports.

a) Quelle 26-Haifisch. Informations regarding the Far East, all coming from Tokyo.

b) Quelle 26-Eierkopf. Informations of the organisation Aolea, these reports mostly given by Wenzlau.

c) Quelle 26-Gifthaus. Few informations coming from the Polish Military Attaché in Stockholm, regarding East and West.

Quelle 27 Garnier. Informations regarding the Western Frontg, coming via the Estonian Military Ataché in Stockholm through Onodera.

Quelle 28 Estonian professor X in the office of Garnier. Started in spring 1945.

Berta Spanish source in England, sometimes special mentioned in Japanese reports coming from Madrid, occasionally a Spanish journalist.

01 -06 or 07 The names of High rank British officers, but which the information dealt or who were sometimes personally named. This happened in the informations coming from the Fullep organisation. We were from the beginning very suspicious and expressed our doubts for to F (Feng?). Names of the officers I remember: Tedder, Harris or Harrison, Speakman, Taylor, Albiac, Brown. I proposed in a courier-post-letter at the end of December 1944 to change in English army, navy and qirforce circles, American officer circles and British Foreign Office circles.

Egmont ~~Political information to the Foreign Office~~. (AOB: Not true! Egmont had to do with Giselher-Wirsing's Egmont Briefe, semi-secret letters 'composed' by Gieselher-Wirsing via the bureau of Schellenberg by-passing German censorship. On the list of those receiving these highly secret and sensitive letters were: Kaltenbrunner (Leiter of the entire R.S.H.A.), Keitel, who sometimes showed them to Hitler, and some others; but those whom definitely were not supposed to be informed were: Goebbels, Goering and Ribbentrop the German Minister for Foreign Affairs (A.A.)!

Reference your B.1.a/MR (=Michael Ryde)? pf 66365 (reference number) of 13.6.45 this report is interesting. There are a lot of points which P.W (P.o.W.) has got right and also others which he has not.

Kraemer to our knowledge, has never been Assistant Press Attaché; his cover was that of Legation Secretary. On his visits to Sweden, prior to his appointment, he was known to the Swedish authorities as a "Wissenschaftlicher Hilfsarbeiter". (AOB: why not designating a Dr. in Law a: Scientific assistant?) As far as we know his cover name in the teleprinter traffic →

→ was Hasso and not Siegfried, although Kraemer himself claims to have used both, as you know. (AOB: one aspect which they in Camp 020 neglect is: - that for practical reasons, they didn't always saw all messages, as some were conveyed in diplomatic bags, which were sealed and conveyed by regular Lufthansa flights.)

P.o.W.'s statement that Kraemer supplied information about British air-power seems to indicate that he (the P.o.W.) only knew of source Josefine (Josephine). We have had indications that this information was derived from a member of the Swedish Legation in London, although none of these have been substantiated (verified). The latest of these indications mentions the possibility of Lagerfeldt being the culprit (perpetrator). There is little doubt that Kraemer paid heavily for his information wherever it came from.

P.o.W. mention of Obstlt. von Dewitz confirms our information that Dewitz was Kraemer's chief (at Mil Amt). Kraemer's rather pointed omission of Dewitz's name in his interrogation is curious. The mention of the South American Consul in Hamburg and the Chinese diplomat in Lisbon is interesting. The latter may possibly be identical with Feng mentioned in Kraemer's notebook. It might be worth interrogating Kraemer on his supposed contact with the Swedish jeweller in Stockholm. This may well be Hallberg, who is well known for his connection with the Germans.

Re Para. 4, Major Friedrich Busch's (Kraemer's great enemy) statement about Kraemer should be taken with considerable reserve, as there appears to have been some animosity or jealousy between the two men. Busch told Peter Riedel, for example, that Kraemer was working for the British. One reason for this may be that Kraemer as Busch said, did not share his information with other people. He was always officially maintained a lone-wolf status, being neither a member of the K.O. Schweden nor of the Sipo and the S.D. proper. (Sipo and S.D. belonged to R.S.H.A. Amt IV, which covered the forenamed functions abroad, thus outside Germany; inside German territories these functions were maintained by Amt III)

Kraemer's wife, as you know, was formerly (née) von Pontow. ~~She was married to Kra~~e~~mer in Sweden but is not Swedish~~. Please notice the true facts: (V1055 V1055return) The wedding ring was inscribed EP 24.12.38 where the 'P' might point at née von Pontow; it is hard to believe that someone carries a wedding ring from another marriage)

There is no real indication that Kraemer was working for the Russians or that his material was reaching them. P.o.W. or Busch may have been confusing Karl Heinz Kraemer with Haputmann (Captain) Kraemer, who was recruited by the Russians after having been taken prisoner at Stalingrad (AOB: between end of August 1942 and 3rd February 1943).

I would like to succeed in due course with a new serial dedicated to: KV 2/151 file series