KV-2/156-K-H-Kraemer

RSS (R.S.S.) (Radio Security Service) AOB: these messages are quite complicated and I have to guide you through it.

This map represents my reconstruction of the most prominent wireless communication lines on the European Continent as well as Argentine and some peripheral lines to the Caucasus and North Africa

As to keep this map readable, I have necessarily skipped less significant communication links.

I have long doubted whether these number actually were the true German ones, but I have come to the conclusion, that they represent British designations.

The map started with only a few communication lines about the Balkans, and on my very good (late) friend Rudolf Startiz's suggestions - it has been extended peu à peu over several years.

* Communications in Eastern Europe (like within Russian territories) ran differently, as most were maintained outside the structural receiving range in Britain and Egypt (Cyprus?)

?Passport No. 284 (AOB: please consider S1085 S1085return) (AOB: the visa data had been "borrowed" illegally at Kraemer's flat, please consider both arrows up and down at T1086 T1086return)

~~K.O.~~ Sweden actually employed as a diplomat at the German Legation since November 1942

Under alias Hasso signs operational reports from Sweden to Berlin. Only message of personal interest carded here. See also ISTOC (Copies of telex messages obtained by means of bribing by a Czech employee at the German Legation Telex office in Stockholm)

Hasso Sources from Sweden: Hektor, Berta, Zuverlässiger V-Mann , "Reliable V-Mann" Eisberg, Zuckerhut, Source (Quelle) 10. Quelle 26. Quelle 28. V.27

II/1 = Berlin - Madrid And, although, in this context irrelevant, Berlin - Buenos Aires /Argentine

12.2.41 (2418 Isos or Isba, serial number) Hamburg (Station Domäne located at Wohldorf) - Turkey. For photo - copying apparatus I need to have statement as to your current - strength. Signed Kellt (?)(should be Kelly = Kraemer)

13.2.41 (6270 Isos? serial) Hamburg - Turkey. (No. 47) 234 should receive money. Can Friede (Dr. Viktor Friede, Leiter Abw. Ankara) meet Kraemer in Istanbul (Istambul) or Sofia (at K.O.), preferably Sofia, end of next week. Reply urgent.

11.3.41 (3183 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. Can you make a statement as to how many a/cs (aircraft) are located on individual aerodromes? In addition pass reports on merchant men (Kaufleuten) as quickly as possible. Cont.

11.3.41 (3184 Isos) Hamburg - Turkey. No. 56 Final dates that are from 8 - 10 days old are of relatively little value. Greetings to all (Grüsse an alle) Kelly = Kraemer).

18.3.41 (3392 Isos) Hamburg - Turkey. Dr. Kelly (Dr. Friede?) I am in favour of sending one of my friends to As(s)yria(?). I do not believe (ich glaube nicht) that F (likely Dr. Friede) is adequate (der Richtige?) to his task.

19.3.41 (3390 Isos) Hamburg - Turkey. Please pass to us the precise names of the aerodromes in messages 211 and 213. Greetings Kelly = Kraemer)

20.3.41 (3470 Isos) (No 68. "Heil und Sieg"(?) that the box has arrived! The key by an over sight was left at Sofia, therefore break the box open. Typewriter (Schreibmaschine) and Moos will be sent off this week. Greetings to you all. Kelly = Kraemer.

21.3.41 (3489 Isos?) What is "(N)oetzxtulch" in message 238? Is it anything to do with the W/T/ base (Funkbasis) on Lemnos (Greek island) Greetings Kelly = Kraemer.

1.4.41 (3909 Isos?) For Friede. It is urgently necessary to transmit by wireless all reports concerning Turkey with all possible speed. I hope difficulties at your end are not so great, for we are in our reports extraordinary dependant on you all. Your reactions requested immediately. Heil und Sieg (Sieg Heil) Kelly = Kraemer.

1.4.41 (3910 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. Repeat message Nos. 254 and 255. Where is the aerodrome Adana being removed (moved?) Is it true that Russia (notice that Russia was not yet at war with Germany) has come so close an agreement with Turkey that Russia is delivering to Turkey an extraordinary amount of war material ? There is talk of 1200 Russian aeroplanes to be delivered as time goes on. Have you received 1050 American dollars? Greeting to you all. Kelly = Kraemer.

3.4.41 (3844 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. Confirm report, which we have received from another source, that Turkey has signed a military agreement with Yugoslavia at Uskub a fortnight ago with the purport from the same source (Quelle) that the Turkish General Staff refused 4 days ago to enter the war against Germany. Greetings Kelly

3.4.41 (3845 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. Nos. 85 and 86. Communicate with Hamburg as you propose. Does he transmit with his set and can you state where? Trunk keys cannot be sent on. I have already said once that the trunk must be broken open (aufgebrochen). It is rediculous that this has not yet been done. What about our enquiry re the Egyptian people, message No. 267 from Friede ? Can it be stated what steamship and what is the meaning M M (gross Martha Martha) in the message? From and where are the troop movements on the Turkish - Syrian border. Greeting (Grüsse) Kelly = Kraemer.

3.4.41 (3848/51 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. For your excellent message a thousand thanks. We are in the picture as regards the difficulties at your end. Am in agreement with the intelligence organisation Irak - Syria - Palestine - Egypt. We wish you full success. (Viel Erfolg). We request your reactions to the proposal to attach your intelligence people in Egypt to our well-camouflaged W/T station at Cairo. This would be of quite exceptional value for the operations of the German Air Force (Rommel's DAK) Shipping reports of ships leaving Alexandria harbour are only of use to the G.A.F. (German Air Force = Luftwaffe) if they can reach the German Fliegerkorps anything up to 8 hours after departure. Heil X and Sieg and all good luck (Hals- und Beinbruch) Kelly = Kraemer.

8.4.41 (4017 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. Gave Volkmann (AOB: he arrived in Istanbul /Istambul about 7. August 1941) to take with him quite a considerable sum for you in American dollars a fortnight ago. For you (yourself) an extra sum also. Money must arrive with the next mail (diplomatic bag?). We for our part have taken every precaution, so that if need be you can get money through a second channel. Can you answer last enquiries? Greetings and good luck. Kelly = Kraemer.

10.4.41 (4093 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. We approve proposed monthly payment to newly enlisted officers. I personally gave Volkmann 1150 USA dollars and on 27/3 in exchange for receipt, thus bordering on 3,000 Turkish pounds remitted, from deals on Black Bourse (schwarz gekauft / Schwarzmarkt). Hope that with that you will manage to cover all expenses until the middle of May. Greetings Kelly = Kraemer)

23.4.41 (4479 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. For Friede. Have informed Volkmann that you are leaving Istanbul (Istambul) on the 26th. We shall meet you all in Vienna (Ast of Wehrkreis XVII). Can you arrange for us to meet on the 30/4 or 5/5 ?. We all wish you bon voyage and are looking forward to a jolly time (schöne Zeit) when we meet. (AOB: at first I couldn't trace a visa on behalf of Kraemer; but I found out that there did not exist one. Of course not - because Austria, thus also Vienna (Wien), belonged to the German Reich and could be reached freely from Hamburg) How many parcels (Kasten-Bier) of bier shall we order? We also think friend Plessing's (Kurt von Plessing, Hungarian/Austrian , KV 2/2119, PF106889 operated in the Middle East) journey a good move, since he is to establish contact with you too. Has his instructions. Best of Luck (viel Glück) and greetings. Kelly = Kraemer.

7.5.41 (4946 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. Just returned from journey. personal questions answered 08 (hours) tomorrow. Where are the reports? Information on events in Iraq is to be sought without fail (General Felmy engagements?) Saudi Arabia is of urgent interest - the flying units, higher headquarters, types and equipment of aircraft; also ground organisation; likewise civil aerodromes, especially important ore-works (Metall) (Anlagen) at Ria d Hail on the Il Hasa coast. Can you give any information about American deliveries via India and Baghdad? Greetings Kelly = Kraemer.

9.5.41 (4963 Isos?) Hamburg - Budapest. For Dr. Kraemer. Please inform Dr. Schmidt that friend Kallmeier (Dr. Hans-Georg Calmeyer?) is arriving in Budapest on 9.5.41 as Janos Wild. Can you order rooms in the Hotel Jägerhorn in the name of Wild? When are Kamaras and Plessing leaving ? We urge them to leave immediately. Martin is now leaving Cairo definitely on the 10th. (Hungary was not yet at war with the U.K.; war broke out on 12th December 1941 between England and Hungary. Before Hungarians this latter date Hungarians operated, more or less, freely in Egypt) Try to find out by which route he is coming and the day since personal consultation with Martin (I-M? M=Marine??) is urgent. For Knappe. When are Hptm. Bogamy and Hptm. Barna coming to Hamburg? The M.T.B.s (Motor Torpedo Boats?) are already ready.

12.5.41 (5041 Isos?) Hamburg - Budapest. For Hauptmann (Captain) von Pogany. Can you ascertain from the Aussenamt (likely Hungarian Foreign Office) when Martin left Cairo and (when) his arrival in Budapest is to be expected. Best wishes Hauptmann Wenzlau. (Kraemer's colleague at Ast Hamburg). Dr. Kraemer.

13.5.41 (5096 Isos?) Budapest - Hamburg. Pogany to Kraemer. Klein reports from Lisa (= Lisbon Portugal, Wenzlau and Kramer operated for a while from there) that on 3.2.April (??) Relay stations in New York and Washington were already organised. Best wishes.

18.5.41 (5277 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. We are in touch with Army Chief (Chef A.O.) (= Ausland Organisation) (Chef Admiral Bürkner) concerning recall of 240 (an agent). We are moreover trying to stop recall. We shall give →

18.5.41 (5277 cont.) give you precise instructions. If Gauleiter (Admiral Bürkner?) insists on the meeting with 240, we shall await the return of 240. Entry into Iraq must surely be possible now by way of the Iraq Legation in Ankara (this might have to do, with the Rashid Ali al-Gaylani uprising) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rashid_Ali_al-Gaylani), now that Iraq will do anything for us. Best wishes, Kelly = Kraemer.

18.5.41 (5278 Isos?) Hamburg - Budapest. From Dr. Kraemer. Have heard from Guyla that Kamaras may not communicate with Hamburg but only with Budapest. Have our arrangements been nullified again? We negotiated with Major Baum (Major Baun?). Guyla is bringing further details with him.

21.5.41 (5427 Isos?) Hamburg - Budapest. Dr. Kraemer for Hptm. von Poganyi. As the result of conversations between us and Major Baum (Baun?) in Berlin, Kamaras is to be paid in full by Major Baum (Baun?) in Berlin. The Hungarian Reserve Officer who is travelling with Kamaras will settle the payment. We hope that Kamaras can send to Hamburg, or do the orders of Excellenz Werth run counter to this? When Martin arrives there (dort Budapest, or the scene of his actions) I should like to see your America man. We are most interested. When are you coming to Germany?

31.5.41 (5954 Isos?) Hamburg - Budapest. From Kramer. Ask Martin or Joska whether (Laslo) Almásy and Ritter's code (AOB: since about January 1941 Major left Referat I-L in Hamburg and became engaged with Lásló Almásy's operations in North Africa) was deposited in Cairo with the set or the Hungarian code for the traffic Cairo - Budapest. In addition ask whether the Japanese are to carry on W/T traffic with Almásy or Budapest. There seems to be some confusion. We are hoping for direct traffic Cairo - Almásy.

31.6.41 (5955 Isos?) Hamburg - Budapest. From Dr. Kraemer. Joska has deposited set in Cairo with code Almásy. Japanese will be in communication from Cairo with Budapest.

4.6.41 (6084 Isos?) Budapest - Hamburg. Boross to Dr. Kraemer. Joska has deposited set in Cairo with code Almásy. The Japanese will be in communication from Cairo with Budapest. (AOB: Japan was not yet at war with the Allied Powers)

4.6.41 (6083 Isos?) Hamburg - Budapest. Dr. Kraemer for Boross. Many thanks for enquiry. With whom are the Japanese in Budapest to have communication? With the Japanese Legation or with you? By whom has everything been arranged and who is at the head of the whole affair? Kamaras will have to leave immediately after the money question has been definitely settled.

7.6.41 (6495 Isos?) Hamburg - Budapest. From Kraemer. Since Gyoergy (KV 2/130, KV 2/131 Andros Gross @ Andre Gyorgy @ Andreas Greiner, PF 600052) is now not going things must remain as originally agreed upon. W/T communication with Hamburg only. (Hamburg only because during this episode Dr. Kraemer was engaged at Ast Hamburg)

7.6.41 (6113 ?) Hamburg - Turkey. (Nos. 174-175) We wish Trappe (= Trapper = Dr. Viktor Friede, of Ankara/Turkey) every success in his undertaking in Iran (Iran / Persia was not yet occupied by Russia and England; this occurred after Germany invaded Russia on 22 June 1941). It would be advisable if, in accordance with our meeting, this network remains. (AOB: do they point at Dr. Schulze - Holthaus, Bernhard sent originally as a diplomat (in Tabriz up to the Russian invasion) but operated on behalf of the Abwehr; KV 2/1484 .. KV 2/1486 PF 66327) (https://www.cdvandt.org/schulze-case.htm). The matter concerning the W/T instructor is also directly on the point of being concluded. 10300 American dollars are being dispatched today to you Trappenr. Cordial (between both academics) good wishes. Kelly = Kraemer.

7.6.41 (6144 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. Many thanks for good reports. Please send Russia answer. In our last message a slip occurred. We gave Volkmann 1300 USA dollars not 10300. Too good to be true. Greetings to you all Kelly = Kraemer.

10.6.41 (6312* Isos?) Hamburg - Budapest. From Dr. Kraemer. Where are answers to the enquiries made to Josza concerning Egypt? Answer immediately.

* (AOB: jumps /heaps of numbers were often caused by decrypt difficulties as the numbers being related to the moment of complete decryption)

11.6.41 (6357 Isos?) Hamburg - Turkey. (Nos, 185, 185of American freighters which call at Port Said several times in the week and sail to Haifa singly under the British flag (are) urgently requested. Can you find out subject (of the) discussion with the President of the Republic in →

11.6.41 cont. → in presence of (a) representative of the British Embassy? Further news from Syria (then French ruled) urgently desired. Best wishes. Kelly = Kraemer.

11.6.41 (6387 Isos) Budapest - Hamburg. Boross for Dr. Kraemer. Wild cannot obtain a Swiss visa. Is he to travel to Hamburg with full equipment?

12.6.41 (6385 Isos) Hamburg - Budapest. Dr. Kraemer for Hptm. (Captain) Barna. Can you arrange that should a Dr. Basra Guentuekin, Turkish subject, living in Budapest Hotel Lucacs attempt to leave the country Hungary he be prevented. Dr. Schmidt Guyla (last is typically an Hungarian name) can supply further information on the subject.

16.6.41 (6536 Isos) Hamburg - Budapest. From Dr. Kraemer. When did Kamaras leave? When is arrival of Wild at this end to be expected? (in Hamburg)

16.6.41 (6535 Isos) Hamburg - Turkey. (No. 19) Naturally in agreement with Syria service. We thank you for cooperating. Expenses will be shouldered (by us). Best wishes and good luck. Wenzlau and Kelly (Heinrich Wenzlau and Dr. Karl Heinz Kraemer were friends)

12.6.41 (6382 Isos) Hamburg - Turkey. Can you get a map of South Russia, scale 1:1,000,000 Sent (it) by next courier (German war on Russia was imminent). We still urgently request reports on Cyprus, also Syria reports. What units being employed by the British ? For the time being 258 (dedicated agent number) should not go to Russia (remember the German attack on Russia, code-name Barbarossa, was imminent and effected on 22 June 1941)

20.6.41 (6690 Isos) Hamburg - Budapest. From Wenzlau and Kraemer. Your reply to repeated enquiry in re Klein not yet at hand. Has telegram been dispatched. Have already had reply?

20.6.41 (6689 Isos) Hamburg - Turkey. (Nos. 195, 196) ... encyphers reports and tell him that he is to communicate directly with Hamburg. For purposes of checking give him reports that (agent) 247 too is transmitting, so that we can immediately see if anything goes wrong. Reports concerning Cyprus and Syria are urgently requested. Best wishes. Kelly = Kraemer).

22.6.41 (the day of the German attack on Russia) (6767 Isos) Hamburg - Turkey. For Trapper (agents) 240 and 243. Your report concerning despatch of 90 Turkish experts to USA important. It is possible to secure the services of one of these people to send reports from USA, as USA aircraft industry is of decisive importance. In any case see to that we are supplied with the reports of the Commission as they become available. In this connection money must be no subject (kein Thema). From United Press report from Ankara, I learnt that a number of Turkish officers are going to England to study the R.A.F. Is this report correct? Can you secure the services of one of the officers? In any case, secure delivery of the reports of this Commission. Has Trapper 240 (agent) returned? Best wishes. Kelly = Kraemer.

26.6.41 (6948 Isos) Hamburg - Turkey. (No. 219) For Trapper 240. Pass to Kamaras. Traffic must take place directly with Hamburg. Toni will not come yet for the time being. best wishes and much success. Kelly = Kraemer.

26.6.41 (6942 Isos) Hamburg - Turkey. (Nos. 212 - 215) For Trapper (agent) 240. Our journey must be postponed for some time for certain reasons. However as urgent discussion is necessary, but on the other hand, the date 17th July is also of significance to you, we request you must urgently to come to Germany. Volkmann has received instructions and after return from Berlin next Monday (he) will speak with Gauleiter (Adm. Bürkner Leiter A.O.?). Approval seems already assured. Please secure in any event sufficient supply of information during your absence. A large gap, as on the occasion of your last journey, is an extremely serious matter to us. Good wishes and all the best. Wenzlau (his real name, no cover name) and Kelly = Kraemer.

Our commitment is not to follow history entirely base upon day-to-day communication, but, making you a bit acquainted with communication on the various theatres and W/T links:

11.12.41 (474 Isk?)* Berlin - Madrid. (Line II/1) No. 74. Erbe Jr. (Abwehr Berlin, likely Obst. Pieckenbrock also known Leiter of the OKW Military Intelligence Office) to Ludwig (I-L) for Busch (Friedrich) (KV 2/527) engaged then at (I-L) to Sommer (Leiter K.O. Spain in Madrid, real name Fregatten-Kaptän. Ernst Wilhelm Leissner). Stelle Berlin (I-M) advises that Sdf. Kraemer is travelling to Weinberg (= Portugal) via Garten (= Spain) on 11/12/ Sojourn in Garten on 11th and 12/12 in Banca (Barcelona) or Media (Madrid) also between 16th and 18th. Signed Erbe Junior. No. 264

* (as Enigma encypherments had been introduced in late 1941. The low serial number 474 might point into the direction of what became known as: Isk; I hardly believe on the important "Sabine traffic link" that Isk did play a major role)

12.12.41 (15911 Isos) Madrid - Barcelona. (Line II/122) Sommer (alias of Leiter K.O. Spain) to Portal/ Schloss (Berlin) communicates that Sdf. Kraemer will stop in Banca on the 12th.

6.4.42. (5590 Isk) Taormina (Sicily) - Berlin. No. 35. Major Brede (Gruppenleiter Referat I-L Berlin; but might have been in connection with Special Operations in Rommel's DAK North in North Africa) to Ludwig (I-L in Berlin) for Busch for Hoermann (Oblt. Leiter I Rom?). Will not arrive in Munich (München) by Lufthansa until afternoon of 11th April. Conference at Ikrath for all concerned at 16 hours. Apart from those already ordered to attend the conference, Oblt. Dr. Hoermann (cover-name Tacticus) (was engaged in communications), Oblt. Walther and Sdf. Dr. Kraemer will take part in Munich (München) +conferences. Return journey Munich (München) - Berlin of Major Brede and Oblt. Hoermann probably on morning of 12th by aircraft of Oberbefehlshaber South (then Kesselring?) at present in Munich. Berlin conferences as arranged for 12/4 ('42) 14 hours. Have car ready at Air Ministry (Reichsluftfahrt Ministerium) at 1030 hours on 12/4 to collect at aerodrome (Rangsdorf?) when called for. Courier luggage.

5.5.42 (7497 Isk) Berlin - Lisbon. No. 10 Ludwig (I-L Berlin) to Ludovico (von Karsthof Leiter K.O. Portugal, real name Obstlt. Ludwig von Kraemer-Auenrode). Support application for visa No. 37 intended for V-Mann Kraemer at the (Portuguese) consulate Berlin. Senior (= Admiral Wilhelm Canaris Chef OKW Abwehr/Ausland) (ref. to https://www.cdvandt.org/KV-3-3-Canaris-WT-transcripts-III-1942.pdf) sanctions support of the application by your Stelle. Ludwig (Berlin I-L)

30.7.42 (14855 Isk) Lisbon - Berlin Ludovico (Leiter K.O.P.) to HIOB (= Section: Heer I Ost Berlin) for Ast Wiese (?), Ludwig (I-L) (?)/ Kraemer will leave by plane on 30(31)/7, will arrive on 1 or 2/8 ('42)

4.11.43 (71066 Isk?) Lisbon - Berlin. No. 265. Ludovico (Leiter KOP) to Ludwig for Anso (= Obstlt. Kleyenstueber Leiter I-L in Berlin). For the purpose of proposed meeting with Ruediger (an alias of Kraemer) in Paris on Nov. 17 sanctions is requested for Alexander (Wilhelm Gessmann? KV 2/1458) for duty journey (= Dienstreise).

5.11.43 (71221 Isk) Berlin - Lisbon. No. 22. Ludwig (I-L Berlin) to Ludovico (Leiter K.O.Portugal) Alexander's journey to Paris sanctioned by Senior (= Chef Admiral Canaris) Sgd. Ludwig (Berlin I-L)

8.11.43 (71692 Isk)(= Enigma message decrypt) Berlin - Lisbon. No. 36. Ludwig (I-L Berlin) to Bentheim of 8/11/43. It is imperative that ANSO (= Referatsleiter I-L Berlin at the time) (= Obstlt. Kleyenstueber KV 2/1494; PF 601503) should speak with you. Can you not transfer the meeting with Ruediger (an alias of Kraemer), or come for a day to Berlin afterwards? Give now at once the time of arrival of Ruediger (alias of Kraemer). Ludwig (I-L) 1160

9.11.43 (71791 Isk) Berlin - Lisbon. No. 44. Ludwig (Berlin Referat I-L) to Bentheim. Are urgently awaiting news when and where (wann und wo) the meeting will be. Bring without fail some English Scottish books similar to those provided by Leander (Hptm. / Major Wenzlau?) for Ruediger (Kraemer) months ago. Ludwig (I-L Berlin) 1194.

10.11.43 (71959 Isk) Lisbon - Berlin. No. 292. Ludovico (von Karsthof(f) both alias; Leiter K.O.Portugal) Alexander (= Wilhelm Gessmann; KV 2/1457 - KV 2/1458, PF 65005) to Ludwig (Referat I-L Berlin). Reference 1160 (see Isk 71692)*. A meeting has been arranged with Ruediger (Kraemer) for the 17th in Paris. Removal to Berlin is not possible owing to other meetings. If Anso (Obstlt. Kleyenstüber, Referatsleiter I-L Berlin) cannot go to Paris, I will come to Berlin next.

* (Isk concerned machine codes, mainly Enigma related; and Isos concerned manually generated codes)

11.11.43 (72042 Isk) Berlin - Lisbon. No. 49. Ludwig Eberlein to Ludovico for Alexander.. Ref. for your FS 292 of 10/11/43 (Isk 71959) (thus foregoing message of 10.11.43). Anso (Obstlt. Kleyenstüber Referatsleiter I-L in Berlin) will go to Paris with Ruediger (Kraemer).

3. Stockholm - Berlin. Ref. V-Mann 27. 27 will be at Venus (?) till the end of March. Reports from the other informant in his office will in future be designated as "source 28". Separate appreciation of the two sources is requested. In view of 28's activities, there is more chance of his (word corr:) information from the Press. Petterson - Hasso (= Kraemer) (AOB: apparently this concerned an telex /FS line transmitted message not a W/T conveyed one)

4. Stockholm - Berlin. 834 W (please notice also: U1088 U1088return) Ref. Fighter production GB January 1945. Hektor (Hector) reports 26/2/45. Spitfires 391, Typhoons 212, Tempests 84, Beaufighters 98, Whirwinds 17, others 32. In all 743 fighters, Petterson - Hasso (= Kraemer)

AOB: this actually isn't correct, as in the KV 2/144 ... KV 2/157; this constitutes the final document-folder

Betrifft Neureglung - Ausbezahlung Dienstbezüge. Mitteile das Schwierigkeiten seitens Bank betreffend Gehaltsauszahlung an mich weiterbestehen. Ersuche um Bewilligung dass ich Gehalt aus Betriebsfond beheben kann /gleich Sybille/ wenn Bank weigert. mein Rückstand an Märzgehalt ist RM. 845,50.

Betrifft: Arbeitszeit Stockholmer Fernschreibstelle. Mitteile dass Stelle nachts nicht mehr arbeiten kann da wiederholte Beschwerden der Mieter unserseits unbedingt berücksichtigt werden müssen bei Sachlage der Dinge. Ersuche um Bewilligung dass Pflicht nur in dringendsten Fällen Nachtsendung vorzunehmen erfüllt werden muss.

Golcher hat ein Schreiben von der schwedischen Flygförvaltnigen, welche eine Kommission zu Daimler Benz Berlin schicken will zwecks Lizenzerwerbung für DB 605 D (aircraft engine), befürwortet aus Gründen der Propaganda und weil keine Spionagebefürchtungen bestehen. Er ersuchte weiter die Kommission in (im) Adlon Hotel (still existing 5 star hotel in Berlin, not far from the Brandburg Gate) unterzubringen. Der Kommission sollen angehörigen von Flygförvaltningen 1. Flu.Ing. Molin. 2. Byrå Ing. Hildebrand. 3. Obstlt. Krusen Stjerna. 4. von Svenck Flygmotoren Ing. Gudmundson.

Betrifft: Bagyoni. (Hungarian Intelligence, KV 2/3646, PF 603873). / Bezug 117.0 vom 3.1.45./

Bagyoni wurde im Herbst von Hö (Hungarn?) hierher (Stockholm) entsandt an anscheinend mit 3-F-mässigen Aufträgen (III-F concerned "counter-espionage"). Ueber die genauen Einzelheiten seiner Aufträge hat sich Bagyoni nie geäussert. Er war für den Anfang gut mit Geldmitteln ausgerüstet. Als Reserve hatte er, wie er uns mitteilte, Gold, angeblich mehrere Kilo. Verbindungsaufnahme sollte zunächst über Major Vöczköndy später direkt mit Budapest durch Funk erfolgen. Schon nach dem ersten Kontakt mit Bagyoni erwies sich hiesige Verhältnisse vorher nicht kannte. Aufnahme einer Funkverbindung schien auch ihm, angesichts der Ueberwachungsverhältnisse völlig unmöglich. Aus diesem Grunde versuchte er nach Abreise Vöczköndys über Pandur (= Major Wenzlau) und Hasso (Kraemer) Verbindung mit (Ungarn = Hungary) zu erhalten. Auf Befehl von Senior (= Walter Schellenberg Leiter Amt VI / Milamt) wurde von uns Verbindung mit Bagyoni eingestellt. Bei einer zufälligen Zusammenkunft am 21/22/2. (1945) erzählte Bagyoni das er zum 26.2. ausgewiesen sei, aber eine Karenzzeit bis zum 2.3. habe. Abgesehen von einem kurzem Telefonanruf bei einer 3 Stelle (III-F?), wobei er sich mit einer Mittelperson am 8.3. hätte treffen wollen, Treff aber nicht einhielt haben wir von Bagyoni nichts mehr gehört. Bagyoni musste also entweder abgeschoben sein, wobei dann seine Meldung in Kopenhagen oder Berlin zu erwarten ist, oder er ist weiterhin hier in Schweden und damit →

Höchstwahrscheinlich auf die andere Seite Übergegangen. Aus den früheren Zusammenkünften war Diesseits (German side) Eindruck gewonnen, dass er sich bei ihm um einen ausserordentlichen geschickten in der Nachrichten-Branche versierten Mann handelt, der, wenn er ein falsches Spiel treibt dieses sehr geschickt durchführt hat. Es wurde von uns im Vornhinein vermieden, in seine Aufträge einzusteigen, bezw. ihm Aufträge zu geben oder über seine Tätigkeit besonders zu befragen. Die von Ungarn (= Hungary) übersandten 4000 Dollar sowie der Privatbrief von Hö Ungarn and Bagyoni vom 21.1.(1945) hier eingegangen Ende Februar, wurden nicht überreicht, da schon längere Zeit vor dem Empfangstage erfahren hatten, dass Ausweisungsbeschluss ergangen sei. Bagyoni hat auf der Zusammenkunft am 21/22.2 (1945) Abfindung von 5000 Schwedenkronen für sich und angeblich auch von Hö Ungarn entsandten V-Mann Schomanoy zwecks Bezahlung seiner Aussenstände verlangt. Treff mit Bagyoni standen fand nach diesem Termin nicht mehr statt. Das Geld ist daher auch nicht ausgezahlt worden. Geldliche Förderungen von Bagyoni standen nach diesseitigen Erachten in keiner Weise in einem vernünftigen Verhältnis zu den Leistungen, die er hier hätte bringen können. Die Art und Weise seiner Entsendung und die mangelnde Kenntnisse der hiesigen Verhältnisse haben gleichfalls mit dazu beigetragen, dass sich Bagyoni hier nicht halten konnte, und werden ihn, falls er jetzt tatsächlich abgesprungen ist, mit auch zu diesem Schritt bewogen haben. Hö Ungarn hat auf wiederholte Fernschreiben nicht geantwortet, sodass nicht nur Bagyoni sondern auch wir hier längere Zeit in der Luft hingen. Wenn Bagyoni tatsächlich abgesprungen sein sollte, ist nicht von der Hand zu weisen, dass er für uns eine gewisse Gefährlichkeit bedeutet.

V-Mann Bagyoni hat sich am 13.3.45 um 23.30 bei Mittelsperson telefonisch gemeldet und versucht einen Treff herbeizuführen. Da Mittelsperson krank, ist Treff von dieser vorläufig verschoben, hängt natürlich auch von weiterem Anruf Bagyoni ab. Auffällig ist, dass Bagyoni sich trotz des Hasso (Kraemer) vorgelegten Ausweisungsbeschlusses weiterhin hier aufhalten kann, er zum anderen seit Anfang Februar von uns auch keine Geldmittel mehr erhalten hat. Verdacht liegt nahe, das er von Dienststellen Gastland (Schweden?) angesetzt ist, um uns zu leimen. Um Vermögensverhältnisse von Bagyoni ganz klar zu überschauen ist es notwendig, dass Hö (Ungarn - Hungary) schnellstmöglich genaue Angaben darüber macht, welche Geldmittel und sonstigen Werte/Gold/ Bagyoni von von ihm seiner Entsendung und möglicherweise noch über Vöczköndy erhalten hat. Petterson - Hasso (Kraemer)

Fräulein Fischer früher Büro Wagner (Leiter K.O. Schweden) hat am Montag einen Selbstmordversuch unternommen sing ins Wasser, Ursache soll sein ein gegen Sie von (Dr. Hans) Wagner anhängig gemachtes Partei Gerichtsverfahren weil Sie nach Berlin ohne Wissen Wagners an eine andere Dienststelle über ihn (Wagner) Auskünfte erteilt hat. Sie wurde aus dem Wasser gezogen, zuerst in Serafin Lazarett behandelt und ist gegenwärtig auf der Nervenstation in Karolinska Sjuckhus. Verbindung zu ihr bisher noch nicht hergestellt worden.

1. Die von der genannten verwalteten Kassen wurden von mir in Gegenwart von Zeugen an 13.3.45 geprüft und ergab keine Beanstandung.

2. Aus dem vorgefundenen Brief (people committing suicide are often writing a letter explaining why they did so, before) ist Bezüglich des Beweggrundes nachstehender Auszug von Bedeutung : "Nach zwei qualvollen Tagen habe ich dich den Entschluss gefasst, für meine unvorsichtige Handlungsweise die Konsequenzen zu ziehen. Ich gehe sonst dem Wahnsinn entgegen und halte es einfach nicht mehr aus, denn ich finde Tag und Nacht keine Ruhe mehr.

Zusatz Pandur (Major Wenzlau): Meines Erachtens nach handelt es sich um einen Brief, welche genannte an eine dritte Person in Deutschland geschrieben hat und darin u.a. interne Angelegenheiten der K.O. erwähnte. Dieser Brief ist bekanntlich angehalten worden (Zensur - Censorship) und anlässlich Besuch (visit to Berlin) Pandur (Wenzlau) habe ich von Otto (?) Auftrag erhalten, Doktor (= Dr. Hans Wagner Leiter K.O. Schweden) hiervon in Kenntnis zu setzen mit der Massgabe, Fräulein Fischer auf das falsche ihrer Handlungsweise hinzuweisen. Vorschlag: Ueber Durchführung Auftrag bei Doktor (Wagner) rückzufragen, da ich aus Gesprächen mit K.O. - Angehörige entnehme, dass Fräulein Fischer seit Erteilung des Verweises unter Depressionen leidet.

Augenblickliche Rumänienkriese zwischen USA - SU wird noch dadurch verschärft, dass Sowjets sich weigern, über Zustand und zukünftiges Schicksal rumänischer Ölfelder Auskunft zu geben. Amerikanische Ölgesellschaften üben auf State Department stärksten Druck aus, energische Schritte zu unternehmen. Man rechnet in London zunächst mit Behandlung der rumänischen Frage in Moskau, allerdings nicht durch die drei Aussenminister sondern in gemeinsamer Botschaftskonferenz. Auf Grund letzter Entwicklung und Intervention amerikanischer Ölgesellschaften werden USA aber unter Umständen Unterstaatssekretär im State Department Clayton entsenden. Zusammentreffen der drei Aussenminister für London ebenso unmöglich wie unzweckmässig, da Eden neben Vorbereitungen für San Fransisco Konferenz (the establishment of the future United Nations) mit Besprechungen mit Dominion Vertretern zur Festlegung gemeinsamer Linien für diese Konferenz zu sehr in Anspruch genommen, man sich anderseits auch im Foreign Office nicht zu sehr SU gegenüber exponieren möchte. Zweifellos ist Grund für dieses Verhalten Englands Rücksichtsnahme auf sich mehr und mehr zuspitzende politischen Verhältnisse in Griechenland, wo es nur Signals aus Moskau bedarf, um neue Unruhen ausbrechen zu lassen. Durch reservierte Haltung in rumänischer Streitfrage hofft England diese Krise in Griechenland zu überbrücken.

Auf Kurierbericht vom 29.3 (45), überbracht durch Kurier v. Ginath zum Vorzimmer Senior (Senior was Leiter Amt VI / Milamt Walter Schellenberg) (actually an envelope had been left at the desk of Schellenberg's secretary which had to be handed over personally to Giselher-Wirsing; herewith by-passing mail cencorship; this letter was addressed on behalf of Kraemer). Angelegenheit aktualisiert sich jetzt so, dass schnellste Entscheidung erforderlich. Fernschriftlicher Vorbescheid in getarnter Form möglichst bis Sonntag den 8 (April) erbeten.

Betrifft Brief an Egmont handelt es sich um eine Weitergabe einer einer Aufzeichnung von Pf. (= Pfeiderer) an Egmont auf Grund Aussprache Pfeiderer - Egmont Berlin, über Senior unterrichtet ist. Dieser habe sich ein paar private Zeilen zugefügt. der Brief wurde von Kurier von Ginath im Vorzimmer Senior für Egmont abgegeben (please notice foregoing message), da Kurier ohnehin im Stammhaus (Bekaerstrasse?) sofort nach seiner Ankunft Besprechung hatte. Somit dürfte dortiges Missverständnis geklärt sein. 7.4.45.

3. F. (?) weiterhin schonend durch behandeln und klarmachen, dass Rückruf im Zuge der Auflösung erfolgt. Falls Bedenken, dort Urlaub auf Wunsch zusagen und spätere Einzelrückkehr vorschlagen. Vergleich 24483 vom 23.3.45 and Pandur (Major Wenzlau).

4. Keine offizielle Mitteilung, sondern wiederum inoffiziell durch Pfeiderer an A.

5. Büroräume von Doktor (former K.O. Leiter Sweden Dr. Hans Wagner; thus the K.O. office) sind aufzugeben. Dafür zuständige Stelle wird von hier unterrichtet.

Telegramm von Pandur (Major Wenzlau) an Ludwig (= I-L, Milamt Berlin) Otto vom 24.1.45

(Quelle) 26 mitteilte bei heutiger Aussprache folgendes: Der am 20. oder 21.1.45 hier (in Stockholm) aus Deutschland eingetroffene japanische Staatsangehörige Dr. ~~Enomoti~~ Enomoto Vertreter der Zeitung "Jomiuzi" welcher mit Auto und Familie ankam* hat sich bei 26 (= the Japanese Military Attaché Onodera) gemeldet. Dieser feststellte dass Enomoto von hieraus im Auftrage GMD (= Geheimer Meldedienst) oder einer verbündeten Macht gegen Golfplatz (= England) oder Farmland (= U.S.A.) arbeiten soll. Enomoto zugab dass er in Sofia einen "Luftlande - Kopf" kenne. Zusatz Pandur (= Major Wenzlau) : Eventuell den bestimmten Freund (Onodera) (Quelle) 26 wird ersuchen bei nächster Gelegenheit darüber nähere Einzelheiten zu erfahren. Weiter mitteilte Enomoto das er im November 1944 einen Codeschlüssel (?) ab den dieser benutzten sollte, mit den Kennworten "Michael" "Czok" "1250 km. Länge" über den Codeschlüssel steht Dienstanweisung. 26 (Quelle Onodera) wies Codeschlüssel im Original vor. Wir nehmen an dass (diese) Unterlagen von einer deutschen Dienststelle im Süd - Ostraum stammen. Unter den derzeitigen Verhältnissen (due to the current military turmoil in central Europe) ist es von den Auftraggeber nicht zu verantworten Enomoto als Privatperson →

in Marsch zu setzen. Enomoto hat Absicht von hier aus gegen Feindländer West zu arbeiten, hauptsächlich mit Indern, Leuten die er aus Deutschland kennt und die er heraus holen will. 26 (Onodera) hat Schlüsselunterlagen vorsorglich abgenommen, uns um Nachprüfung ersucht, vorgeschlagen das wir bei Richtigkeit an gemeinsame Auswertung schreiten sollen. Zusatz Pandur (= Major Wenzlau) : Anlässlich Anwesenheit Pandurs im Stadtbüro am 8.1 war Enomoto bei unserem dortigen Vertreter, welcher in der Lage sein wird, genaueres über Enomoto zu berichten. Es interessiert zu erfahren für welche Dienststelle er arbeitet.

* Please be aware: a foreigner, albeit employed at the friendly Japanese Secret Services, with some diplomatic cover - crossing Germany, from South-East Europe (Balkans) to, more-or-less, Northern Germany in to Denmark; from there entering in to Sweden. Being provided with the necessary paper-documents including food-ration cards, and, more essentially - possessing papers to be allowed crossing several borders with his accompanied family-members, in his own car; and in a desperate time, where Germany was lacking virtually everything - as well as petrol ration-papers (December 1944)! Thus, he travelled from the Balkans up in to Sweden, covered with German licenses and according provisions - mmmmm!

The Kraemer case (known more often as Josephine, from the cover-name he used for one of his supposed agents) starts with an entry in Liddell's diary, dated 2 September 1943, which deserves to be quoted in full:

"He ('C') (= Sir Steward Menzies) then referred to the agent in Switzerland who had been handing out German BJs (Blue Jackets, were highly secret folders, which only may be accessed by especially qualified persons) relating to Goertz and also reporting on certain messages emanating from Josephine. It seems that this agent, who in first instance made contact with OSS representative, may be something in the nature of a XX (double cross), but it is not really clear at the moment. 'C' was evidently not aware of the fact that we had no official knowledge the Josephine messages (these were actually S.I.S. matters as these had been obtained via their Section V in Stockholm). I said that we should be very interested to know precisely what these messages were. He (Sir Steward Menzies) said that of course we should be informed. (Valentine) Vivian (M.I.6) was present and I think slightly embarrassed. The fact is that everything is being done by (Felix) Cowgill (M.I.6) to keep this information away from us. However we now have an opportunity to taking the question."(1)

Two days later MI5 were sent a copy of one message and summaries of three other messages* - all signed Kraemer, emanating from Stockholm - which came from what was described as "a source other than usual". [In other words, though the message carried the usual prefixes, that were not radio intercepts.] Two of the messages began "Josephine reports ...", the other two quoted "Source Hector". (AOB, if the spelling is true, then it concerned already translations, as the genuine German text would van been: Hektor) Josephine was, apparently, reporting from England on shipping/naval matters; also the alleged embarkation of two tank regiments for the Middle East. Hector was more interesting and reported "... statements made by Cripps at meeting of MAP, demanding increase of 4-engined bombers. Marden of Fairey was present"; and again "... conversations by Cripps with Portal and Harris about round the clock bombing". (2)

The messages appeared to point to an alarming leakage of information, and DDB (Dick White of M.I.5) called on Cowgill to find out more about the "other than usual" channel which had produced them. The story was an odd one. On 19 August (1943) a representative of OSS in Switzerland was said to have been approached by an unidentified Irishman and introduced to an alleged courier of Berlin Foreign Office, who offered to do business with the American. The courier, whose name was given xxx produced seven messages which he declared were verbatim copies of telegrams received in the Wilhelmstrasse from diplomatic missions abroad.* Upon examination it was seen that three of the messages were from Dublin and undoubtedly genuine since their contents could be matched against Pandora. The other four Swedish ones looked ominously genuine. More over there was also information through an SIS organisation in Paris, to the effect that the Wilhelmsstrasse was receiving speedy information on deliberations of the British War Cabinet and, in particular, matters concerning Sir Stafford Cripps, through Stockholm, from "a source called Hector (Hektor) and another called Julliette (Josephine). A similar story was later received from the Free French but almost certainly had a common root.(4)

The possibility that it was a plant by which the Germans hoped to put over deception material could not be ruled out but further investigations tended to prove this unlikely.(5) (AOB: most unlikely, because Section V, "borrowed" documents, even taken from Kraemer's private safe in his own flat and (photographically-copied) and returned to the place where the various documents had been taken-away. Kraemer's second step was to convey these papers to the telex-(FS) office of the German Legation, from where these messages had been coded sent to Berlin by Postal lines (and sea-cables trunks) towards Berlin; thus in no way could have been intercepted by means of W/T!) Meanwhile both Section V and MI 5 expected considerable interest to the SIS and OSS representatives in Switzerland. The courier was to be encouraged and any new material that he had produced was to be reported immediately. MI5's interest was confined to whether or not Josephine (Josefine) and Hector (Hektor) messages represented a genuine leakage.(6)

Josephine messages which had also appeared occasionally in Isk (Isos) were being checked.(6a) (AOB: these should be considered being intercepted on W/T lines from Berlin towards other locations. Think of Berlin - Paris; or Berlin Budapest; or Berlin - Iberian Peninsula, and that like, because quite some communications was, for practical reasons, handled by W/T means) Hart (MI5) recorded (7) "I have now obtained some appreciation of the Josephine (Josefine) messages ... where she descends to facts as distinct from general statement or speculation she is almost always wrong, though some of her speculations is not unintelligent. The general flavour of these reports reminds one strongly of Felipe and Ostro (AOB: Ostro's real name was Paul Georg Fidrmuc and will, Deo volente, be re-considered again after the termination of the Kraemer file series) ... and encourage the idea that they are being manufactured by a source with some access to newspapers but little other important information". Hector's (Hektor) messages, too, were being checked, and Hartm later, wrote "I have ascertained that there was no special meeting of MAP at the beginning of the week commencing 21 June 1943.* Further, though the production of 4-engined bombers is a constant topic, Marden who is the Controller of 4-engined bombers is discussed, since his firm does not produce them ... I think therefore that Hector's (Hektor) veracity is about on the same level as Josephine's (Josefine).(8)

MI5 continued to hold this view as other messages from the "unusual" source came in and were matched with the facts. In particular the agent said to →

* As given in one of the two original Hector messages forwarded from Switzerland.

→ operate in the inner counsels of MAP - reported by so many different sources - proved to be wholly fictitious.(9) (whether fully true is hardly checkable, but what was apparent - was that some military referees considered that some was remarkably near to the truth as to be fictitious) It seemed probable that Kraemer was using names of a number of high Allied officials either to conceal the real (and vurnerable) source or to add verisimilitude to his notional agent(s). Besides Sir Stafford Cripps, Air Marshal Harris of Bomber Command, Sir Archibald Sinclair the Minister for Air, Sir Charles Portal the CAS, and Mr. Donald Nelson the American representative on the combined Production and Resources Board, all figured in the traffic; as did other less renowned but equally real names.(10) Section V were by no means so sure that Kraemer's sources in the United Kingdom were non-existent and continued to pursue the case with considerable enthusiasm.

If Josephine (Josefine) and Hector (Hektor) remained illusive, the same could not be said of their controller - or begetter. It took very little time to identify the "Kraemer" who signed the original messages with Karl Heinz Kraemer of Abt. 1/Luft (I-L). He was German national, born 24.12.1914, whose early early history could be traced both from overt information and in Isos. He was married, and his wife and (two) children were with him in Stockholm where he had been posted as Legation Secretary (thus constituting a diplomatic function) towards the end of 1942. He was known to travel extensively and had been identified personally in MSS (Most Secret Source) under the cover names Rüdiger, Kelly and Hasso. He was reported as making a particular study of all British and Swedish newspapers; articles dealing with Allied aircraft production being of special interest to him; he was said to keep press cuttings of these and to listen frequently to the BBC. He was known to have visited the United Kingdom just prior to the war and was said to have been one time in charge of a concentration camp in Hamburg.(11) (AOB: Kraemer's profession was lawyer, and he was for some time engaged at Ast Hamburg; I personally, doubt the fact of being in charge of a concentration camp. Though, PoWs were nearly always interrogated after they had been captured; and call a PoW Camp a Concentration camp; a misinterpretation is then quickly engendered)

By now (February 1944) information from Kraemer was beginning to appear in the Stockholm BJs(12) and SIS by a lucky chance had been able in December 1943 (there exist strong evidence that this existed already before June 1943!) (notice please W1090 W1090return), to penetrate his household (where Section V "borrowed" temporarily documents as to photographically duplicate these). This came about when his maid and a (female) friend were searching his (Kraemer's) bureau for chocolate and discovered a number of what were described as "compromising, highly secret, documents". The friend, an Austrian named Anna Erikssen, was pro-Allied and offered these papers to a representative of SIS who copied them before handling them back to be returned to the desk. (AOB: reconsidering this story I would not wonder that this is a cover story; as Anna might have been brought in touch with Ellen as to access Kraemer's papers. At one moment MI5 managed to obtain a "butter" copy of Kraemer's safe-key and MI5 provided thereafter the safe-key-copy so that both girls accessed since what was noticeable inside Kraemer's safe).

The maid, Helen Fiedler, was unaware of what was being done.(13) In April 1944 MI5 were asked by SIS to have a key cut from a scale drawing (untrue: it concerned a "butter- moulded copy, instead); this was done and the result, when handed over, was said to be "a great success and fits perfectly".(14) It is not stated whether the key was for Kraemer's flat or his safe presumably the latter (of course) since bundles of draft telegrams, or notes for telegrams, continued to be passed to MI5 for checking: together with long lists of dollar notes in his possession, and details of innumerable journeys taken from various passports.(15) Incidentally his passport entries highlighted his activities as a courier over the years, recording the many trips to the Balkans (particularly to Budapest), Switzerland, the Iberian Peninsula and Sweden, covering the years 1939-42. [To a considerable extent these travels were reflected in his personal Isos traces.](15A). (Please notice: X1091 X1091return)

In July 1942 yet another source of information opened up when what were named the "K" Intelligence Reports came to hand through the Japanese BJs.(16)

In July 1942 yet another source of information opened up when what were named the "K" (= Kraemer) Intelligence Reports came to hand through the Japanese BJs.(16)

AOB: The Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm communicated with Japan, I my perception by means of Swedish Postal channels with Tokyo. However, the weak point was, that the Japanese communicated Onodera's messages also to the Japanese High Command in Manila. This Communication had been monitored and intercepted by US Services as it was conveyed - in what became known as the J25 code. This Japanese code was broken by the US Services and so its relevant content came to the knowledge of the Americans. They shared their knowledge with the British Services, and so they got knowledge about what Kraemer once had shared with Onodera (thus the Japanese).

These contained a great deal of air information, together with some troop movements and bits and pieces of political interest. It was not difficult to make the connection between this traffic and Kraemer. An SIS (VS7) report of 9.12.44 (17) noted "we have now ascertained that Karl Heinz Kraemer →

→ supplies information to the Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm, general Onodera Makota, which is subsequently forwarded by him to Tokyo under the heading of 'K' intelligence reports ...(17) Although we have not been able to obtain access to the traffic between Stockholm and Berlin (AOB: yet, as from about early 1945 Section V bribed two men among one Czech person, to supply the integral message copies of the common teletype (FS) communications which had been maintained by "Secret teletype machines (Geheimschreiber)" by means of Swedish land-lines - sea cable-trunks and German trunks up to Berlin" thus no way of wireless interception was possible) ... The reason for this gap in the chain of communications was that Kraemer had access to a teleprinter (FS) land-line from the Air Attaché's office in the Stockholm Embassy to Berlin, and though a certain amount of his information was reflected (occasionally) in Isos, by no means all of it came to hand. However this stumbling blocj appeared to have got over January 1945 when SIS succeeded in recruiting an agent - a Czech subject employed in the Embassy (Legation) - from whom they were able to obtain carbon copies of the teleprinter (FS) messages.*(18) Unfortunately the steps taken to monitor his activities came afer the peak of his successes.**

* It is probable that the Czech and his partner (colleague) in the matter were also selling copies to the Swedish Police.

** According to Farago (AOB: too much fantasy I therefore don't trust this source) was the year of Kraemer's greatest triumphs. "... the files of the Luftwaffe High Command, where his dispatches wound up, show that he forwarded nearly a thousand different intelligence reports during this most productive year. Dealing with every phase and aspect of the Allied war effort they contained both strategic information about the Allied invasion plans - and pinpointed tactical data about the RAF and growing American air power in Britain, the concentration of Allied war-ships, and about major plants of the British war industry as target for the Luftwaffe ..." No doubt this is the usual Farago exaggeration but, nevertheless, Hesketh has stated, in his Fortitude Report, that the first six months of 1944 - the crucial period leading to D-Day - was largely dominated by the "uncontrolled" agents, of which Josephine (Josefine) and Ostro were the most highly regarded (18a) (see Appendix I).

Be-netted as he was with spies, (Kraemer also obtained information from friends whom were possessing good contacts within Swedish society even up to very high levels such as the C.i.C. of the Swedish Army; the latter wasn't even aware of this) so that he could hardly sneeze without it being monitored or reported by some Allied informant (a key role plaid S.I.S.'s Section V in Stockholm; who had a spy connected with Kraemer's household maid!), Kraemer still managed to maintain the secret of his sources. Had he or had he not got some genuine agent in the United Kingdom? MI5 did not believe in them: SIS emphatically did. Both parties had interests to protect. MI5 were by this time convinced that they controlled the whole German intelligence organisation operating in this country, and to find that Kraemer had penetrated their protective screen would be a major setback. SIS had invested an immense amount of time and trouble (not to mention money - the Czech (an operator at the Legation teletype (FS) room) and his partner had been heavily bribed) (19) in circumventing Kraemer; to discover that he was not worth their efforts would be a considerable blow. Quite apart from the rivalry between the two Services (SIS versus MI5).

It is now necessary to take a closer look at the contents of the traffic to ascertain, if possible, who was right. The early Josephine (Josefine) messages, when checked, proved to be low grade information where they were not absolutely wrong. The transmission of material from the United Kingdom to Sweden, when investigated, apparently most unlikely. Taking into consideration the dates of the various messages Swedish diplomatic bags →

were ruled out, as were aircraft;* it was thought that one very long message could not have been illicitly left was diplomatic cables, but this too seems to have faded away as a likely method of transmission. RSS (Radio Security Service) made a search of unidentified traffic without success.(21) A request to Geneva - who were sending only summaries of messages from the "other than usual" source - for more details of Josephine's (Josefine's) alleged sources, brought forth the unhelpful reply that "it is evident from the text that Josephine obtained the information direct from the people named ... these people were presumably in London ..."(22) This was clearly nonsense, since, among others, the Chief of the Air Staff was named, as was the Chief of Bomber Command, Air Marshal Harris.(23)

A further batch of Geneva messages forwarded by SIS of 8.1.44(24) looked more hopeful: one source was said to hold a key position in MAP (Ministry of Air Production), to be of Irish origin, and related to "Minister Law"[? Richard Law, appointed Minister of State 25.9.43], his work was reported as being in connection with American supplies to the United Kingdom and USSR.(25) Alas, even with this mass of information it was impossible to identify a real spy. Another "named" source was Air Commodore Taylor who was reported to have left by air for Cairo to assist Mr. Eden in his conference with the Turks and is later credited with giving information on a Soviet request. to the Egyptians → for airfields.

* That is to say, if the messages went directly from the United Kingdom to Kraemer. Obviously this argument did not hold good if the information was filtering through several sources before it reached him (eg from the Swedish Embassy in London to the Swedish Foreign Office or Air Ministry, then, say, via Onodera or Grundboeck (Grundböck) to Kraemer - see below pp. and Appendix II)).

Incidentally Taylor had also cropped up in a BJ (Blue Jacket, secret folders marked by their 'blue jackets' only to be accessed by especially selected Crown Servants), information in which was alleged to have come "from the German Minister (head of the Legation) in Stockholm.(27) Another BJ of 17.2.44 (28) seems to have caused considerable consternation, since the information was substantially correct and the source seemd likely to be Kraemer's MAP agent - if he existed. [Various leakage of information from MAP had been under investigation from some time time and one of the possible culprits (wrongdoers) was James Stanton, a personal assistant to Lord Beaverbrook (now Lord Privy Seal with responsibility for post-war Civil Aviation), who was known to have given confidential information to members of the Swedish Legation regarding civil aviation and possibly other matters (29) (see Appendix II) Unfortunately he proved to be neither Irish nor related to "Minister Law".]

The messages continued to be sent to MI5 in batches during the year and the laborious business of checking them with the relevant ministries went on. In November (1944) an analysis of the "K" Intelligence Reports was carried out on the Japanese BJs [JMAs]. (30) (these originated from the Americans, because they possessed the technique to decrypt the Japanese 'J25' communications, in our case mostly intercepted on the link: Tokyo-Manila) Up to that date about thirty of these reports had been sent off from Stockholm to Tokyo (on behalf of the Japanese Military Attaché General Onodera); they dealt mostly with Air Force matters and the majority gave no indication of their source. (AOB: some originated, albeit indirectly from the French Military Attaché in Stockholm but went via Baltic diplomatic channel; think of Garnier the French MA in Stockholm) (https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-2128-garnier.htm); they dealt mostly with Air Force matters and the majority gave no indication of their sources, In two cases, however, a "secret agent in England" was quoted. The first, dated 7.8.44, dealt with the number of carriers and aircraft in 58th Task Force - the figures were much inflated: the number of carriers being given as 22. This may be coinicidence the total numbers of US carriers, but as Americans, in fact, published all their launchings and losses, the Admiralty did not consider it a serious leakage. The other →

→ message, dated 26.10.44, stated that American deliveries or armaments to Russia had recently decreased sharply because of the sudden increase in the requirements of American forces and also because of internal political developments; British deliveries, it continued, had also dropped sharply, mainly for political reasons. This report was entirely untrue; indeed the opposite was the case. While these two messages were satisfactorily wrong, the rest of the "K" reports were judged to be more accurate than Onodera's usual material. The assessment concluded: "As in all cases of leakage on Air Force matters, one is tempted to assume that the originator of such report is the Swedish Air Attaché, Major Cervell, (30A) though apart from the place of origin of the material there is no evidence, so far, to connect the "K" reports with such material as we receive from Major Cervell". (See Appendix II)

On 1 December (1943 or 1944?) SIS forwarded more Kraemer messages, including a questionnaire for Hector, with the comment "It is very interesting to note that Kraemer had apparently given his HQ full particulars of his source in England, as this appears to make the possibility of invention fairly remote ..."(31) Which drew the sharp reply from MI5: "..[I] do not understand the penultimate (last but one) paragraph of your letter. I should have thought that it was impossible to deduce from these telegrams, or that the fact that Kraemer (or indeed any other German agent) had given 'full particulars' about a source in England, that that was any indication that such a genuine source existed. Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc in Portugal) never thinks from the most minute description of his sub-agents, nor does Garbo!" (alias of: Garcia Juan Putjol).(32)

At the end of the month SIS wrote Peter Riedel, an I/Luft (I-L) officer in Sweden, had defected, and quoted him as saying that most of Kraemer's UK air→ information was obtained from a contact in the Swedish Foreign Office;

Kraemer contacted this individual three or four times a week, and received from him what appeared to be copies of original reports. However during the "steel curtain "period* this source dried up completely** Hart minuted the letter "This shows that K's source in the UK is probably diplomatic if it exists at all". (33) A (Czech report of 13.1.45(34) gave more information on Kraemer, saying that he "works at least as much for England as for Germany. His source of information is said *** to be an official in the Swedish Foreign Office, who give him reports which come in about England ..". It seems possible that this is merely a garbled version of Riedel's remarks - or at least both reports had a common origin.

On the 16th (Jan. 45?) a fresh batch of telegrams arrived. For the first time for months one question was specifically put to Josephine (Josefine). It was also to go to "Source 27" and "Eisberg" - both new names. (35)

A much more careful and detailed study was now made of the "K" reports (originating from US intercepts of Japanese J25 coded messages, between Tokyo to Manila; originating from Onodera in Stockholm, also obtained via Kraemer) in the JMAs by MI5, since "that is ... where prima facie important and accurate information is appearing". The results of this survey (37) was to show that the air information (both RAF and aircraft production) was exceedingly accurate. Indeed, it is described by Hart as "the best illicit intelligence derived by the enemy from this country which I have seen in this office". In only four cases was the source stated to be a secret →

** Riedel's facts are incorrect. Most of Kraemer's UK air information came from Jozef Fullop (Fullep) in the (Iberian) (KV 2/242 PF 603361) Peninsula, who later admitted t it (see below). Far from drying up during the diplomatic communications ban, Kraemer's reportage continued at full spate during the run up to D-Day. (See Appendix I)

agent in England or London and these showed a considerable difference in quality, being vague and unspecific and containing false information [two of them have been quoted on page 9 (page 45j). Hart concluded cautiously (with many ifs and buts) "... the study of reports, thus strongly suggest ... that the information is obtained by Kraemer from some Swedish official department and is ultimately obtained from this country through Swedish diplomatic sources ...". The survey concluded:

"There is, therefore, strong evidence in favour of the view that the accurate 'K' information (= Kraemer's information supplied on to the Japanese Military Attaché General Onodera in Stockholm; thereafter conveyed by whatever means to Tokyo - and from there conveyed by means of W/T from Tokyo to Manila. On the latter trajectory the Japanese J25 code had been intercepted and decrypted by US Services, and they ultimately sent these decrypts to SIS) is in fact sent from this country to Stockholm through Swedish diplomatic channels, and is there made available to the Germans through an agent in the Swedish Foreign Office or perhaps Air Ministry. It is possible to go a step further with the suggestion that the strong Anglo-American flavour in the accurate reports about Air Force and air production matters in this country reflect the work of the Swedish Air Attaché who is known to have such close links with the American Air Attaché in this country, himself of Swedish origin.* We have unfortunately not been able to obtain an appreciation of a considerable portion of the 'K' messages relating to American aircraft production, which might further strengthen this hypothesis, which certainly fits all the known facts, though it is of course theoretically possible that the Anglo-American flavour of the accurate 'K' reports and the opportunity open to the Swedish Air Attaché to obtain Anglo-American information, through his close friendship with the American Air Attaché, constitutes a coincidence and nothing more. It is true that this hypothesis leaves certain problems unsolved. What, for example, is the source of the inaccurate military reports? The answer to this question may be that these are invented by Kraemer, who has on the one hand been reported to make frequent references to newspapers and to books** when answering Berlin's questionnaires, and on the other hand to be secretly anglophile and thus capable of including false or misleading matter among his reports."(38)

Some corroboration (justification) of this last paragraph was obtained from Peter Riedel, currently being de-briefed (at Camp 020?). He stated (39) that despite the fact that →

Kraemer was regarded by Berlin as far and away the most reliable source of UK intelligence, he was suspected of fabricating a certain portion of his material and every effort was being made to discover the extent to which he was doing so. Riedel himself was convinced of it, and quoted one particular instance when he was asked by Kraemer for the loan of the current USAAF Order of Battle and some time later noticed a message from Kraemer to Berlin based on that report. Apart from this he (Kraemer) made a careful study of newspapers and journals as well as the "Geheime Kommandosachen" (known regularly as: gKdos) to which he had access through the Air Attaché's office; Kraemer was well in with those who handled this latter material and he was suspected by Berlin of using it. Despite all this Riedel was convinced that Kraemer's source in England and the Swedish Foreign Office were quite genuine. He quoted three instances to substantiate this:

1. Just after the airborne landing at Arnhem a furious telegram arrived from Berlin to the Air Attaché demanding to know why Kraemer's report on a parachute landing had not been teleprinted (FS) in time. Apparently Kraemer had reported a parachute landing some fifteen hours before it took place.* (It arrived via Mr. Horvath of the Hungarian Legation in Berlin, but originated from Fullep (Fullop) [Jozef Fullop in the (Iberian) (KV 2/242 PF 603361)]

2. Riedel saw a very secret report on Swedish/English and Swedish/Russian relations. This was after a very secret mission from Russia to Stockholm and concerned the eventual effect should Sweden enter the war, etc.

3. Ernst A. Hepp (German Press Attaché in Stockholm) told Riedel that there was very heavy leakage from the Swedish Foreign Office, Stockholm, to the German Legation, Stockholm.

Meanwhile what was apparently a more serious leakage - this time a military one - was being investigated in London. The message, (40) teleprinted (FS) to Berlin by Kraemer on 31 January (1945?), but giving the date of the information as → five days earlier

five days earlier, reported "As a result of the unexpected rate of the Russian advance the Anglo-American offensive will be put forward to the beginning of the first week in February (1945). The attack will be from the Aachen Wedge to Venlo (1944) and will be preceeded by heavy bombing of German back areas. The 1st and 9th US Armies and the British 2nd Army will take part. A part of the Canadian Army and another British Army are held in reserve. The reasons for advancing the time of attack are direct instructions from the White House, political reasons and the movement of German troops from East to West". This was thought to be uncomfortably near the truth, although the details were far from accurate.

Liddell summoned the situation up as follows: (41) "The facts seem to be (1) that on 20 January (1945) some plan approximating to that outlined ... was known in high circles here. (2) It is perhaps reasonable to suppose that in so far as this country is concerned the Air Ministry would be more likely to be involved [in a leakage]... since they would conducting bombing operations from this country. (3) On January 26th (1945) the plan as outlined ... was in the possession of Kraemer in Stockholm. (4) On 28th January the same plan was known to the German High Command. (5) On January 31st the same plan was communicated from Stockholm to Berlin by teleprinter (FS). We have to consider whether we should be justified in the light of ... previous information and ... research into 'K' (indication Kraemer within Japanese communications between Stockholm - Tokyo and Manila) intelligence in recommending to the JIC that action should be taken to get Cervell the Swedish Military Attaché and turner [the American Army Air Attaché] removed.* I do not think that we can represent that the evidence against → Cervell is conclusive.

Cervell is conclusive. On the other hand I do not think that we can withold from the JIC our strong suspicions and the information on which they are based. We should also I think consider whether we would be justified in taking the somewhat dangerous course of obtaining more positive evidence ..." )In fact no further steps were taken at this time and an endeavour to plant a titbit (scrap) of information on Cervell came to nothing.(42) Further enquiries appeared to exonerate (forgive) Turner, (43) and when an exhaustive American check was carried out on the "K" reports it was found that practically all the accurate US information could have been obtained from published sources.(44)

MI5 continued to investigate the steady stream of Kraemer teleprints (FS) forwarded by SIS without discovering any authentic agents (or for that matter any further authentic information).(45) Three named RAF officers were closely scanned but, once again, it seemed that Kraemer had dragged them in to add local colour to his inventions - at any rate the information attributed to them wholly inaccurate and, at least in one case, the officer named could not possibly have been the source since the war in a position to know that the subject matter was actually untrue.(46) Two Swedish merchant navy captains to whom were attributed some interesting reports on landing-craft concentrations on the east coast also turned out, on investigation, to be imaginary figures.(47) And other even more shadowy informants faded away when looked at closely.(48)

At the end of March 1945 MI5 decided that the detailed checking* of Kraemer's endless stream of misinformation had gone far enough and → informed SIS that only on special cases would enquiries be put to the Service Ministries.

* Possibly not detailed enough, since his Order of Battle reports were not (apparently) checked with the deception planners. Had this been done, a somewhat clearer picture would have emerged. See Appendix I.

informed SIS that only in special cases would enquiries be put to the Service Ministries who, it was implied, had better things to do.(49) The position was explained very clearly in a letter of 14 April (1945) :(50) "I attach the long-awaited appreciation of the batch of Kraemer messages. You will see ... that these vary from accurate to hopelessly inaccurate ... the grossly inaccurate [are] very much the majority. The only conclusion that we can draw from these ... is that Kraemer ... from time to time obtains from the press, or through diplomatic channels a certain amount of true information which he either passes on direct or on which he bases a certain amount of guesswork, which he attributes to one or other of his notional sources. I think that, taken as a whole, these checks tend to disprove rather than to prove the existence of any actual agents working in this country under cover. This confirms the view which we have come to hold as the result of our attempts to check up on those sources about which we have sufficient information to attempt identification ..". The Swedish ships' captains were instanced - not only was the information provided by them complete nonsense but it was ascertained that there were no Swedish ships in the areas concerned at the times stated. "... we know that the Germans are very concerned about the possibility of landings in Norway or the north coast of Germany. Our special Agents have repeatedly been asked for signs of any such operations and it is reasonable to assume that Kraemer has also been asked the same. On receipt of a request of this sort Kraemer would probably conclude that the Germans had information indicating that such an operation was being prepared, and therefore invented not only his report on the subject, but also his source."

(AOB: the latter author of this statement, apparently hasn't read the many existing German-language messages, in which this subject had been discussed, but the considered Kraemer's Scandinavian experts (Swedish and Norwegian) denied the option of an Allied invasion of Northern Europe. The tone of the MI5 summaries were quite often reflecting: on the one hand the actual fact of the 'K' related valid intelligence and the rest, but suppressing the 'K' intelligence value - though enhancing the less relevant intelligence conveyed to the various offices in Berlin)

In any case the Kraemer investigations were about to change course in a dramatic and (it was thought at the time) highly satisfactory manner. On 31 March SIS notified MI5 that the Swediosh Police intended to expel Kraemer in the near future and arrest the least two of his associates. It was hoped to manoeuvre him into making a full statements to the Swedes by pointing out to him that on the one hand if he returned to Germany he might be arrested as a traitor who had worked for the British (which some Germans - particularly in OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe) - suspected; on the other hand if he was arrested by the Allies at the end of the war, which was fast approaching, he would have to answer for his activities as commandant of a concentration camp in Hamburg.*(51) However shortly before the German capitulation Kraemer and certain other members of the German Legation left for Denmark (probably on the prompting of the Swedes).

(AOB: it went differently than SIS had worked for - from a quick 'persona non grata' came nothing (SIS naively even thought of the arrest of Kraemer), as Kraemer still possessed a legal diplomatic status; he actually left Swedish territory on 1st May 1945 for Denmark; in his DKW car, together with his secretary Nina Anna Siemsen) (Kraemer's wife and two children remained in Stockholm). He was arrested at ~~Flensberg~~ Flensburg together with his secretary Nina Anna Siemsen, on ~~14 April~~ (Oh, Mss. McCallum you should have known that Germany surrendered on 8 May 1945)(it actually occurred on the early morning of 15 May 1945) and brought back(?) to Camp 020.** (52) (where Kraemer arrived on 17 May) (please read the file).

If the British intelligence authorities now thought that the case would reach a conclusion they were destined to be disappointed. Kraemer appeared to be ready enough to talk but what he said did not agree with what they knew [or thought they knew] about his operations. He denied categorically that he had obtained any direct assistance from the Swedish → authorities

* This story from SIS and is occasionally reiterated in Kraemer's file. It does not seem to fit in with his career as it was known. When Kraemer was in Hamburg he was working as an Abwehr officer (Sdf.) with Ritter (and his successor as Ritter had left already Hamburg before February 1941), and he also had a courier's job with the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt). As far as is known he had no connection with the Gestapo or the Police. There is no apparent gap in his life in which to fit a concentration camp commandant's appointment. (51A)

** CAGS. It would probably have suited Section V better if he had been held by the Swedish Police (the have worked for it, in vain!) where they could have directed his interrogation through their contacts, rather than have him fall into MI5's hands at Camp 020!

authorities; his main source of military information, he told his interrogators, was the Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm: General Onodera - they had established a mutual exchange of intelligence. He outlined the kind of material that was passing between them. He also named three other sources: Swallving, a Swedish friend in the ABA (Swedish Air Line) in Stockholm, who gave him information about ballbearing traffic from Sweden to the UK and other commercial intelligence; Grundboeck (Grundböck), a naturalised Swedish businessman of Austro-Hungarian extraction, who was well known in British and American circles and who obtained economic data on the UK (aircraft production, steel and shipping), and also regarding Finnish and Russian activities in Sweden; he had dies in ~~February~~ (actually late March) 1944. Kraemer gave as his third source the Hungarian Military Attaché in Stockholm: ~~Voelekoendy~~ Vöczköndy (Voeczkoendy). As for Josephine (Josefine) and Hector (Hektor), the former was a cover-name for reports concerning strategic and tactical information given by Onodera; Hector covered production information from the same source. It was as simple as that. The name Zuckerhut (which had lately appeared in the traffic) also denoted information from Onodera obtained via Switzerland (the late Japanese Military Attaché Okamoto).(53) For the rest he was quite willing to give his Abwehr connections; mostly well-known names, some of whom had perished in the 20 July "Putsch" (20th July assassination attempt on Hitler) , in which he had himself been involved to a certain extent. His Abwehr information was accurate and such cover-names as he knew in this context also proved correct. His account of his own career was checkable against his Isos traces, which bore out what he said.(54) [One of the more interesting details that he disclosed was an early (1941) connection with the Hungarian IS while he was visiting the Balkans. It was here, and his context, that he first met Grundboeck (Grundböck), who, incidentely, he later found out was an agent of Ast (Wehrkreis XVII) Wien (Vienna).] (54A)

SIS were not amused. "preliminary reports of Kraemer's interrogation are most unsatisfactory, they wrote.(55) "He has presented us with a clever fabrication of untruth, which on the surface appears entirely plausible. He has attributed the greater part of his information to the Japanese Military Attaché, and states that Onodera was, in fact, identical with the two sources named Hector (Hektor) and Josephine (Josefine) who have appeared in capture German documents as being sources for British and American aircraft, etc..." (Looking backwards, all these answers must have constituted a rather great deception for the British Secret Services; Knowing, that they likely will not penetrate evidence any further) (one dirty game versus the other equally dirty game) (AOB: please bear in mind, Kraemer was intellectually far ahead the concerned British Civil Crown Servants; of whom no-one graduated with a PhD. in Law) In their view the only information given to Kraemer by Onodera was attributable to "Source 26" in the traffic.(56) They agreed however that the Camp 020 interrogators might show such of the intercepts as they though helpful to Kraemer in order to make him change his story.(57)

There was, at this point, some clash of opinion in MI5 about Kraemer's statements. The BIB (B.I.b) (E.B. Stamp) who was the link with Camp 020 wrote: "It may well be that Kraemer is misleading us regarding these matters but the story is not on the face of it impossible one and does not appear to me to be inconsistent with the fact that information received from 'Source 26' in fact came from Onodera..."(58) The B.I

The SIS arguments sought to prove that Kraemer was a liar and to uphold their contention that his British sources (or Swedish official sources in a case officer (Ryde)* was wholly convinced by SIS reasoning and side with them.(59)

The SIS arguments sought to prove that Kraemer was a liar and to uphold their contention that the British sources (or Swedish official sources in touch with London) did, in fact exist. Their comments on the first Camp 020 are revealing. Every tiny detail is picked over; and though they were forced more often than not to concede that what he said was correct, they→

made much of what may well have been unimportant slips of memory.(60)(please keep the reference 60 in mind!)

Please notice the empty page section:

xxxxxxxxxxxxx

This clearly indicates that something is to be kept hidden from us!

Please notice the third line visible again, the reference (63); Hence the two reference (61 and 62) have been skipped as well!

For me (AOB) all is not so unusual - though in the Kraemer context it truly is!

The reason always is: that they desperately would like to keep information un-accessed by us!

... was possible to check his (Kraemer's) statements against known facts they usually proved extremely accurate. For example, he gave the following résumé of the SNOW case. (63) (= Arthur Owens: https://www.cdvandt.org/arthur-owens-snow.htm ; https://www.cdvandt.org/arthur-owens-page-3.htm ; https://www.cdvandt.org/arthur-owens-page-4.htm) "While undergoing training in ... Ast Hamburg at the beginning of the war [he] was taught to evaluate information which came from sources in Belgium (like was: during wartime days was the case in Arthur Owens engagements) and Holland and from V-Mann 3504 = Arthur Owens British alias Snow. This man Arthur Owens was an English agent who had been working for Eins Luft (I-L) since the spring of 1939 (incorrect, he started with his German contacts already in 1935!) and sent over messages from London by W/T until the end of 1940 or the beginning of 1941 ... this man's name was Arthur Owens and he lived in, and about, London. His occupation was that of an engineer, his age 40, his stature small, and he came from Wales or Ireland. His information mostly concerned the RAF, ie dispositions and movements of RAF squadrons, air defence, searchlights, etc. This agent was controlled by (Major) Ritter (Referatsleiter I-L Ast Hamburg), who after the collapse of France →

in 1940, met Ritter in Lisbon Prior to that, Arthur Owens had apparently been in a position to visit Belgium and Holland. Paid a visit to Lisbon (February 1941) he was contacted by Ritter (whom actually had quit already Ast Hamburg as to become engaged in Rommel's DAK in North Africa), accompanied by another man called Dickens (MI5 alias Celery; KV 2/674 PF 66315). In Lisbon he was contacted by Ritter, ~~who brought~~ he was accompanied by Hptm. (Capt.) Georg/George Sessler (KV 2/528 PF 601032) he stayed for a 3 weeks. Communication from London between Arthur Owens and Ast Hamburg ceased after a decision within MI5 and as an excuse they used that that he was sick (ill). (Instead Arthur Owens had been arrested and imprisoned at Dartmoor up to in the second half of 1944). ~~This could hardly been more correct~~. (AOB: Mss. McCallun should have known better about mid 1970s!)

Leaving aside the niggling over unimportant details, SIS's main objections to Kraemer's statements boiled down to two. He had said that he had had no direct assistance from the Swedish authorities and this was in direct contradiction to "what Riedel and the Swedish Police have told us. Both have stated that Kraemer's chief source of intelligence was a Swede* presumably in the Foreign Office. The Swedish Police went so far as to state that the source was Marion Santesson, employed in the commercial department of the Foreign Office.** We are inclined to think that Kraemer's source was of a higher rank than that, but the Swedish authorities would never admit to a Swede being implicated unless they had extremely good reason for it ..."(64)*** They also stated flatly: "Kraemer's main source of military information was certainly general Onodera. This can be definitely debunked (demystified) on evidence provided by ultra material. (AOB: an impressive collection of gathered bits and pieces captured/decrypted and from whatever corner, but very secret materials; known as MSS) Onodera ... has sent numerous reports to Tokyo →

* This could perhaps refer to (late) Grundboeck (Grundböck), who was a naturalised Swede.

** It will come as no surprise to learn that Farago credited him with not one girl from a Government department but three! Farago, p. 550 (Don't trust Farago's information!!)

*** Looked at closely this argument does not hold water. The Swedes had already told categorically by the British that there was a leakage through their Defence Staff, when an emissary (Group Captain Plant) had been sent to Stockholm, in February 1944, to discuss the case of Major Cervell (Swedish MA in London) with General Nordenskiold. (See Appendix II.)

(AOB: Please remember these 'K' messages originated from US decrypts of Japanese J25 coded messages communicated between Tokyo and Manila. I wonder still how did Onodera communicate with Japan? The Swedes as did also the Swiss, they prohibited W/T communications exchanged between diplomatic representations and their governments. At least between Sweden and Japan I tend to consider that communications had been maintained by Swedish and Japanese PTT organisations as were maintained before the war. Albeit, that special permission to communicate in the case there did not exist such latter noticed communication means. These considerations are mine but from sources we have been confronted with in the rather wide range of materials already available on our website, that communications on inter-PTT means is a quite likely option.

which are, in fact, portions or summaries of Kraemer's reports derived from Zuverlässiger V-Mann* or Hector (Hektor). The fact that Onodera only passes on to Tokyo a small percentage of the total number of Zuverlässiger V-Mann and Hector (Hektor), coupled with the fact that Onodera's date of despatch is always later than Kraemer's proves that the flow is rather in the other direction, ie Kraemer to Onodera not Onodera to Kraemer.** The letter continued grudgingly (reluctantly); "It is true that a mutual exchange of intelligence was established between Onodera and Kraemer as we have external evidence of meetings between them and also an exchange of reports between the two via Nina Siemsen [Kraemer's secretary - also under arrest in the UK]. (AOB: Oh, Mss McCallum, why don't you notice that she was only in Britain kept between 17th May and 16 June 1945; thus only for a very brief period; whereas Kraemer was keep almost for two years in Camp 020). It is known moreover that all 'Source (Quelle)' reports emanate from Onodera".

Details of information requested by Onodera from Kraemer were, they admitted, correct. As for the information said by Kraemer to have been obtained by him from Onodera, this was analysed under the headings (a) to (m) and all but headings (a), (d) and (f) were said to be correct; the three exceptions all referred to information from those mythical (by this time almost mystical) characters Hector (Hektor) and Josephine (Josefine), (65) whose existence had now become an article of the faith to SIS. [The "incorrect" information was (a) Disposition of Anglo-American ground and air forces in England, France, →

* The name Josephine (or Josefine) had largely disappeared from the traffic in favour of some of Zuverlässiger V-Mann/ZbV-Mann "A reliable source" or a most reliable source". Hector (or Hektor) was still used for production figures.

** It is at least possible that Kraemer and Onodera were receiving their information from a common source, i.e. Fullop (Fullep)(KV 2/242 PF 603361) in the (Iberian) Peninsula, and not from each other at all. This is argued below, pp.36-37. [Although] Ultra was considered an infallible source, those who interpreted it were sometimes in error!]. (AOB: why does she neglect apparently Pierre Garnier the French Military Attaché in Stockholm (KV 2/2128; PF 601069), whom moved some relevant information via some Baltic Diplomat towards Onodera and from the latter reaching Kraemer? https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-2128-garnier.htm)

Italy and the Far East and Pacific. Armies, Corps, Divisions. RAF and USAAF roughly in Europe, but details as to Groups and Squadrons in the Far East. (d) Information regarding raw materials in great Britain. Details about British aircraft industry (production, type, quality). (f) Disposition of Anglo-American units - number of Divisions or Brigades. SIS attributed all these to Hector/Josephine (Hektor/Josefine) reports, but see below pp. 33-37 and Appendix I](65A)

Mr. Stamp was not entirely (or even partially)(65B) convinced and asked a series of pertinent questions to which Ryde passed on answers from SIS. Finally after discussing the case with Blunt (in Ryde's absence), he too accepted that SIS could be right in their view that Kraemer was lying when he claimed that the three types of information labelled Josephine (Josefine) , Hector (Hektor) and "Zuverlässiger V-Mann reports all came to him from Onodera.(86) What is more the Camp 020 interrogator dealing with the case was likewise persuaded, (67) and this led to considerable pressure against Kraemer and something in the nature of a "break" was obtained.(68)

Before leaving the subject of Onodera and moving on to fresh Kraemer revelations, it is worth noting that two genuine sources, and another possible onem had been identified as supplying information through the Japanese channel. The first of three was Pierre Albert Garnier (https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-2128-garnier.htm), the French Military Attaché in Stockholm, who was acting - either consciously or unconsciously - as a source for the JIS (Japanese Intelligence Service), through an Esthonian cut-out Colonel Rudolf Massing. SIS had identified Garnier as Kraemer's "Source 27" (Quelle 27) whose whose information dealt mostly with French military and political affairs; but who had visited the UK in February 1945.(69) (AOB: SIS thought to catch Garnier by this latter occasion, with some kind of permission of the French Government; but SIS failed ultimately bringing the truth and the responsible servant at SIS got quite some (diplomatic) troubles by failing in this respect!) (The next time Garnier travelled to Stockholm directly from Paris to Stockholm vice versa). Another Onodera source was described as "a Polish officer to the → Wat Office in London who also had contacts with MAP";

he was alleged to have been promoted Lt. Colonel in 1945, to speak and write Russian fluently, and to own a typewriter with Russian lettering. All this sounded promising.

???? AOB: a part of this line might have been deleted. There was also a probable link between Onodera and the Swedish authorities. Kraemer claimed that the former had told him that he had Swedish contacts and mentioned specifically Major Kempf, Chief of the Attaché Department of the (Swedish) War Office, and a Swedish Intelligence Officer; Major Carl Petersen; he was also in contact with General Thoernell, C-in-C of the Swedish Army until mid-1944, and General Shellgreen,* Head of the Operational department of the Swedish War Office. SIS confirmed that the two latter had attended official functions with Onodera at the Japanese Legation; Kempf was also a known contact but reported as "unintelligent". Petersen's job was to liaise with Foreign Service Attaché but there was evidence that he was on unjustifiably friendly terms with Onodera.(71) (AOB: there existed friendly relations still between neutral Sweden and Japan) All of which might be said to confirm a possible link with the Swedish High Command.

To return to Kraemer. It will be remembered that he had already named on of his sources as a naturalised Swede - since dead (late March 1944) - called Grundboeck (Grundböck)** (p.18 above = in our counting: page 54s). Under pressure he now amplified this considerably and confessed that Grundboeck (Grundböck) was one of his principle sources; quite as important as Onodera. He (Grundboeck (Grundböck) was an old Austro-Hungarian →

Intelligence Officer who had kept in contact with Intelligence circles (mostly Hungarian) in the Balkans and the (Iberian) Peninsula.. One of these agents - head of the network in Madrid - was Fulep or Fullep (Fullop)* whom he now recruited for Kraemer, arranging that information should be sent to Stockholm via the Hungarian Legation in Madrid (AOB: the messages passed on via Diplomatic bags to Berlin and via a Mr. Horvath routed via bags of the German Foreign Office to Stockholm) The material sent, according to Kramer, between October 1942 and July 1943 concerned UK war production mostly about aircraft; after August (1943) there were also reports about organisation and disposition of the RAF and later the USAAF, Army units and strategic plans;** from the beginning of 1944 there were also total production figures for aircraft in the UK and USA. This Spanish source (Fullep) "pretended to come from high rank British officers or circles and staffs... remember the following names: Taylor, Brown, d'Albiac, Harris or Harrison, Speakman ... I was very sceptical .." *** Grundboeck (Grundböck) was also said to have Swedish military and Foreign Office contacts which were lost to Kraemer when the former died (late March 1944); but the Fulep (Fullep/Fullop ...) link continued to function until the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm was closed in November/December 1945 **** (AOB: maybe not before early 1945) After this information still continued to trickle through and, because the production figures were no longer important, this information was sent to Berlin bit by bit.(74).

* Wrongly identified as Jozef Fuelop or Fullop (spellings vary widely), formerly in Lisbon but moved to Madrid in October 1944 (AOB: I have my doubts about the move from Lisbon to Madrid, which might have happened much earlier). Hungarian national (KV 2/242). (73) [It was later found that the name identified the network. Jozef Fullop (Fullep) was only part of it and, perhaps, not even the most important part.] (73A)

Kraemer's information now came through in something of a spate (wave). SIS sent over a number of questions to be put to him and were forced to acknowledge that "in most cases" he was replying truthfully. However the thought information from Fullep was of a far lower grade than that attributed to him by Kraemer and believed that the latter was still protecting his own direct sources in Sweden and was "attempting to cover ways, however, he is undoubtedly telling us a great deal of truth. He has described in some detail at least three agents who have been under control, and he has given a quantity of important about Hungarian, Finnish and Japanese organisations based in Stockholm. As far as this can be checked it turns out to be accurate.(75)

Although SIS were still busy exploring very possible detail of the case in order to obtain the maximum amount of information from Kraemer, the crux of the matter was the source of reports labelled Josephine (Josefine) and Hector (Hektor). In spite of the fact that Kraemer himself maintained that these were cover-names for types of information Major Blunt (like was SIS Kim Philby, belonged also Major Blunt (MI5) to the traitor group whom informed the Russian KGB with British delicate secrets) - who had taken over the investigation in MI5 from Major Ryde - pointed out that Berlin appeared to regard them as real individuals and quoted instances to prove this point from MSS (Most Secret Source).*(76) It is clear that Kraemer was as much a mystery to his own people as he was to the Allies. Although information about him was now coming from a number of captured Abwehr officials, who had known and even worked alongside him, little was emerging to help solve the central →

* This may have arisen from the fact that Kraemer himself was sometimes referred to personally as Josephine, lng after he had substituted ZbV-Mann in the messages.

mystery.(77) Rather the reverse. Captured documents taken from Luftwaffe HQ (which one?) showed that an investigation had been carried out there to discover if the Josephine (Josefine) and Hector (Hektor) reports had been fabricated by Kraemer himself, as was strongly suspected (one of the nuclei was Major Busch KV 2/529, PF 602057), but this investigation - like similar onsed undertaken in the UK - came to no firm conclusion.(78)

Meanwhile, at Camp 020, Kraemer had disclosed two more names of some value. The first, and more important, was Count Paul von Toggenburg (Von Toggenburg was married to an American), described by Kraemer as "a valuable source of information out of influential Swedish circles, the Court, the Swedish Foreign Office, the Army and the Corps Diplomatique .. He was from 1941 to ~~1945~~ (early December 1944) one of the leading German journalists in Sweden and represented the 'Hamburger Fremdenblatt' and other German newspapers ... Naturally I was interested about the information ...[he] ... got in these circles.. I made reports to Berlin ..." von Toggenburg who was, incidentally, married to an American, seems to have supplied Kraemer with much of his political information and, as a good newspaperman, may well have been fount of the "intelligence speculation" which was a feature of Kraemer's reporting. On of his (von Toggenburg's) sub-sources was said (by Kraemer) to have been Count Carl Robert Douglass, the brother of the Swedish C-in-C [who was not, however, identical with Count Carl Ludwig Douglas, Secretary of the Swedish Foreign Office, who was one of the Grundboeck (Grundböck) sources of information].(79) SIS expresses the view that "this story sounds authentic ...[but] ... by the look of things ... does not cover Hector (Hektor) and Josephine (Josefine) and consequently does ot invalidate his previous statements ..."(80)

The other source named by Kraemer was also a journalist: Avro Aari,(81) a Finn, who was said to have excellent contacts with the Finnish sources, as →

well as official Swedish circles. Most of the information he gave, however, was concerned with Eastern Europe and was handed over to Kraemer to his co-worker Major Wenzlau (another Abwehr officer working under cover as Deputy Air Attaché) AOB: actually, Major Wenzlau was higher in military ranking than was Kraemer whom only was a Lt. Though, both were friends and had worked together at Ast Hamburg and on the Iberian Peninsula about 1942) and sent it to Berlin Hasso -Pandur. (see for example: D1092 D1092return) (albeit that the latter had been signed by Pandur - Hasso) (Known from the Kraemer intercepts (ISTOC) (AOB: ISTOC concerned always teletype (FS) messages) *

With these two names, and their alleged sub-sources, Kraemer's information petered out. The case was now drawing swiftly to a close.

On 26 October 1945 Karl Heinz Kraemer was escorted to Croydon and put on a plane for Germany, where he continued to be held in custody (82) while various further questions fro Section V ware forwarded to BAOR via MI5 (83) On last flicker of hope (AOB: certainty has already vanished) was kindled in the SIS case officer's breast when an interrogation of an Abwehr official produced the following item: "...One agent in particular ... worked for I/Luft (I-L) - a pilot or engineer in the RAF, and did excellent work. Two weeks before the Dieppe raid (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieppe_Raid) ... this contact tipped them [the Abwehr] off a message that arrived in Lisbon two days before the raid..." In forwarding this titbit Wood wrote "...This looks like a possible clue to Kraemer's source Josephine (Josefine) whom we have been vainly chasing all over Europe..."(84) Unfortunately the pilot concerned was all too obviously the MI5 double-cross agent Father (AOB: I have no idea how to trace further information of this latter noticed double-cross agent)

Finally, as a last desperate effort to clarify the case, Kraemer was shown the whole range of teleprinter intercepts and was asked to mark their various sources.(85) No new names emerged. In fact this (unique) exercise tended →

* CAGS I have deliberately excluded the Pandur side of the case†, since this dealt with Russian and other Eastern material. Also Wenzlau's PF has been destroyed.

† AOB: the latter notice that Wenzlau has merely left out, is, actually, not really valid, as quite a bunch of teletype (FS) messages have been reproduced covering mainly Wenzlau's message directed to Milamt in Berlin.

MI5 the case seems to have suffered from a multiplicity of "handlers" while in Section V the case officer remained constant until practically the last gasp (AOB: I suppose April 1947) and was therefore, in the end, able to get his views accepted, and repeated verbatim.(92)

It was also unfortunate that the long and patient unravelling of the Kraemer story was based on a limited amount of material.

It will be remembered that the first Josephine/Hector (Josefine/Hektor) messages did not come to hand - from other than usual source" - until September 1943 (AOB: what we seen it must have gone back to at least June 1943!); and then they were few and far between. Throughout 1944 (AOB: after MI5 managed to provide a "butter-moulded" safe-key copy to the girls in Kraemer's household) a number of useful drafts and notes were obtained from Kraemer his flat (located at: E1093 E1093return), together with details of his travels taken from his passports, and the numbers of dollar notes in his possession. In 1945 (since somewhere in January; via heavily bribed personnel among it a Czech employed at the teletype (FS) office in the German Legation) a (? full) series of teleprinter (FS) copies; but by this time the case had passed its Zenith.

(AOB: please bear the following in your mind: German messages actually were printed after undergoing encryption, on 9 mm paper tape and being cut at adjusted lengths, possessing on their back a water-activate glue. The purpose being that messages were kit in succession on paper sheets. Why? Encrypting teletype (FS) sheet data is, also encrypting the "Baudot coded carriage return signal", and this is of course also encrypted, and, consequently is causing a total break-down in communications. We have, nevertheless, encountered printed texts on paper-sheets. In my, perception: these were the so-called: Vorlagen - used for typing-in the messages on the (SFM 52d or SFM 52e of even the unique SFM 43 machines. Telex messages were for economical reasons - saving transmission time firstly recorded on punched-paper-tape; the side effect was, that typing errors could be prevented ultimately, and coded message-transmissions could be transmitted on maximal transmission speed; as what counted was: the actual time a line being kept busy).

A great deal of what material was attributed to him came from the "K" Reports in the JMAs (AOB: The US Service intercepted Japanese J25 coded signals between the Military Communication link between Tokyo and Manila; after their decryption and judgements what was of British SIS interest was then conveyed, on due time, to the latter Service, and then attached onto the already existing JMAs.

According to Kraemer only the shorter messages went by teleprinter; he carried much of his material himself on his frequent journeys to Berlin (about once a month); and other lengthy reports were sent by diplomatic courier (bags?) According to Farago (AOB: be most careful with believing Farago!) (an unreliable source but one who claims to have got his information direct from Kraemer after the war) (AOB: When Farago is pointing at this, you should be even more warned and be careful), 1943-44 were the years of Kraemer's greatest activity; and this is borne out to a large extent by Colonel Hesketh's Fortitute Report (our [120] The D-Day Deception Campaign by Roger Hesketh') [certainly, according to latter first six months of 1944 - the vital period before D-Day were busy ones for Josephine (Josefine) See Appendix I.]

to show how much Kraemer relied on Onodera and the (Hungarian) Fulep (Fullep) (KV 2/424 PF 603361) Organisation for his information. SIS remained unconvinced to the end and recorded that they found him a "most convincing liar, both in speech and print".(86) This view was not shared by the BAOR interrogators who wrote "it is not felt that Kraemer is endeavouring in any way to conceal information, at this late stage in his detention. No purpose would be served in so doing..."(87) He was released in April 1946 (AOB: Here Mss McCallum is in an error as he was released about April 1947; thus after being about two years lasting British captivity, both in England at Camp 020 and later in Germany).

It is probable that the final papers in the MI5 Kraemer file do him considerably less than justice when they state baldly: "Kraemer was found to be an inveterate liar and most of the information proved to be untrue. Warning that Kraemer is a most convincing liar and a totally unreliable source of information is placed in a prominent position on all our records concerning this man, and we are always careful to access and qualify any information from this source.* Owing to this believe the Camp 020 case officer's summary was not circulated.(89)

It is unfortunate that the last few papers should invalidate all the careful and painstaking investigations that had gone into the case by repeating parrot-fashion a bad tempered letter from SIS(90), without any understanding of what had gone before. Undoubtedly SIS went on believing blindly in the existence of Josephine (Josefine) and Hector (Hektor) as real agents, in spite of all the evidence against the theory. They believed, and continued to believe, that Kraemer was a liar and was protecting real sources. (AOB: in my long-standing perception I would not wonder when he did so in some extent) This was not the view of the interrogators either at Camp 020 or the Rhine Army.(91) In → →

* The quotation is taken from a letter written by Joan Chenhalls (MI5) to BAOR.(88) (AOB: Having worked myself through hundred's of KV 2/xxxx file series, since 2015; my strong perception there-out: this latter Mss. could, sometimes, constitute quite a bitch)

Thus, in the light of hindsight, it appears that the lack of evidence on which to base a wider assessment, together with an obsessive pre-occupation with detail. led to the conclusions quoted above. To brand a man as an "inveterate liar" when only a modicum of material is available is available on which to judge him, is less than fair to the man himself and also throws doubt on the value of the information (admitted by SIS to be correct) obtained from him, both while he was at Camo 020 and later in Germany. For lack of evidence, too, the most interesting part of the case was never probed at all (See Appendix I.)

It was not until after the war, when the Fortitude Report(93) was being researched and written, that much of the missing Kraemer material came to light. New facts also became available when Jozef Fullop (Fullep) (KV 2/242) was interrogated in 1946(94, giving a clearer picture of the (Hungarian) Fulep Organisation in the (Iberian) Peninsula - of which he formed only a part.

The Fortitued angle is dealt with more fully in Appendix I, suffice it to say here that it was discovered that a good deal of the deception material put out by the Allies through the double-agents (such as Garbo) was also appearing in the Kraemer reports (AOB: implying that unknown cross-connection did exist which had been unknown by the British Services) - though how such material came into his possession remains a mystery. References to FUSAG (a fake entity) and other notional formations appeared regularly in the Josephine (Josefine) traffic; and the famous Garbo message of 9 June 1944, covering the Overlord invasion, was paralleled by a Josephine (Josefine) message(95) which read (in part) "... Zuverlässiger V-Mann reports regarding invasion situation early on 9 June (time of report the night of 8th June) .. an absolutely clear picture on the British side cannot yet be given as critical period for the invading troops is only just beginning. Strength so far employed is also described ... as considerably greater than originally →

intended ... according to information from other sources a second main attack across the Channel directed against the Pas de Calais is to be expected..." This was certainly a boost for Fortitude and seems to have a considerable influence on events - according Jodl and Keitel (both latter men had been convicted to death at the Nürnberg Verdict) who were both interviewed after the war by Colonel Hesketh (96). No doubt the deception planners would have been duly grateful had they known about Kraemer's assistance, but they did not know. As Hesketh writes, rather plaintively, in the Fortitude Report: "We had no idea at the time that Kraemer was playing with our toys. Having built up the whole of Fusag (First United States Army Group which as such did not existed as an entity) from nothing we naturally supposed that we had the undivided control of it ..."(97)

Throughout the deception period Josephine (Josefine) continued to aid Garbo and Brutus in their efforts in their efforts to maintain the threat to the Pas de Calais, and to move imaginary divisions backwards and forwards in the UK - unbeknown to the Fortitude Staff - and as late as the end of March 1945, notional and real formations used for Fortitude South II were being reported by Josephine (Josefine) (that not-so-reliable V-Mann).(98) [Unfortunately ISTOC (as the teleprinter (FS) intercepts were named by GC & CS who circulated them) does not appear to have been shown to the Deception Staff. Nor, in the days that MI5 were checking the Kraemer material with the Service departments, is there any suggestion that LCO was asked for comments.](99)

It has been suggested, by Hesketh(100), that Kraemer obtained his knowledge of the phoney Order of Battle from German Intelligence Situation reports that he saw in the ordinary course of his duties. This may well be so. nevertheless he worked apart from KO Sweden and there is some evidence to suggest that he was regarded by them as a pirate operator(101). Whether →

they would have been prepared to open their most secret files to him is perhaps doubtful. Also it is hard to believe that he simply parroted (copied) back their own reports to the Abwehr, even with twists and trimmings of his own devising, someone would not have noticed it sooner rather than later*. This would not, of course, preclude him from picking up OB material from the Attaché's office, which he was known to frequent, and presenting it in a new form as his own intelligence. A plausible suggestion is advanced in Major (Michael) Ryde's (MI5, B1a) letter (quoted on page 16 above; is our number 52q)(103) i.e. that leading questions put to Kraemer created their own answers. Incidentally, the fact that Josephine (Josefine) reports contained deception material goes a long way to exonerate (forgive) Swedish diplomatic sources (see Appendix II). Diplomats, whether Swedish or Spanish, were hardly in a position to report on formations more likely that, at any rate in their early days, Kraemer's false Order of battle information came to him via the Iberian Peninsula. Madrid and Lisbon were, without doubt, buzzing with rumours (AOB: this was the main play-field in which Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc) operated) (being, Deo volente, my next extensive re-approached survey), speculation and even some facts; Stockholm can never have been in the same category as the the Iberian capitals for purely geographical reasons. (AOB: Lisbon constituted a "Hub" function in many ways, shipping and airline hub, and quite many personnel lived there or stayed for a while)

There is a strong possibility (see below) that Jozef Fullop (Fullep) (KV 2/242), the front man for the Fullep Organisation that was supplying both Kraemer and the Japanese, may himself have been only a figurehead for a group run by (Hungarian) Colonel Szantay, → the Hungarian Military Attaché

* It is true that the German Air Ministry (RLM) held an enquiry into the origins of Kraemer's intelligence to see if it was "Spiel Material", but this was largely at the prompting of Friedrich Busch (KV 2/529 PF 602057) , an old enemy of Kraemer's; he was an Abwehr official attached to the Air Attaché office in Stockholm (diplomatic status in the German Legation; he was succeeded by Major Wenzlau), who had first tried to take over Kraemer and later tried to discredit him with the Luftwaffe (Ic Obst. Wodrag's Kriegsgerichtsverfahren; compare: F1094 F1094return) The enquiry came to no firm conclusion.(102)

the Hungarian Military Attaché in the Iberian Peninsula. (Madrid or Lisbon? I suppose it was Madrid; both Madrid and Lisbon is not likely). It was said by Fullop (Fullep)(104) that Szantay "busied himself with collecting military information, and issued orders to his staff to obtain as much information as possible on troop movements, locations, recognition signs, etc." It is not impossible that the Colonel was the channel through which the deception material leaked. Whether the Abwehr and the Hungarian IS in the Iberian Peninsula were exchanging information was not investigated, but it is tempting to suppose that at least some of Kraemer's Fortitude information originated with Garbo (the latter's Führender Offizier/guiding Officer was Sdf. Kühlenthal /Kuehlenthal) (KV 2/102 PF 600733). This could perhaps have come about either (a) legitimate intelligence swapping;* (b) by Hungarian penetration of the K.O.s in Lisbon and/or Madrid; or - highly unlikely but just possible - by monitoring the Garbo traffic and decoding it. It was known that the Hungarian had W/T facilities at their disposal in the Iberian Peninsula.

One thing is certain. Had Josephine been a real agent, she would have had to be a member of the deception staff! In no other way could her messages have been based on Fortitude material. It is in fact quite clear that Josephine was a cover-name used for a type of material, as Kraemer claimed and SIS disputed, and no doubt the reports were put together from a number of different sources. Which could, of course, explain their uneven quality - again as Kraemer claimed.

So much for Josephine. The mystery of Source Hector (Hektor) was at least partially cleared up by the confession of Jozef Fullop (Fullep) (KV 2/242) in the summer of 1946.(106) This man, a Hungarian intelligence officer, had had a mixed career, both in America and the Iberian Peninsula, finishing up as Press Attaché in Madrid. At → the end of the war

* Farrago (AOB: should not be trusted fully), for what it is worth, reports a deal between = Canavis and the Hungarian IS going back to pre-war days.(105)

the end of the war he found himself without a diplomatic passport, and applied to the American Embassy for help; he was sent on by them to see the British PCO. (AOB: please bear in mind, that Hungary had been occupied by the Soviet Union, and thus was since Communist ruled, in contrast to the wartime situation) On leaving the British Embassy he was arrested by the Spanish police, who, after interrogating him handed him over to the Allied authorities at Gibraltar on 1.7.46. Which was how he came to be interrogated by the Allies.(107) (and the file PF 603361 was created, since the 1950s also known as KV 2/242)

A good deal of the confusion was caused by Kraemer himself, who had met Fullop (Fullep) on one occasion in Portugal, and believed him to be Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) agent Fulep (Fullep) - in spite of the fact that Grundboeck (Grundböck), who was extremely secretive about his sources, denied it.(108). However, his interrogation (109) bore out the view of SIS (110) that Fullop (Fullep) himself was not sufficiently high grade to fulfil the claims made for Fulep (Fullep). His Allied interrogators noted: "All the information at hand indicated the [the] Prisoner was identical with Fulep (Fullep) source of Kraemer. It is now apparent that he is not even the most important part, of this source..." After a devastating evaluation of Fullop's (Fullep's) character, which included the statement: "The moral aspects of his actions did not come into his consideration. He worked for the Japanese (AOB: both Japan and Germany were on friendly terms with the Japanese Government), the Hungarians and the Germans, taking care, however, to ensure that he came into no personal danger..." the assessment concluded: "He is emotional, sentimental and unstable - the very last type of individual to be trusted by Szantay, or Grundboeck (Grundböck), with any matters of importance". (111)

Nevertheless Fullop's (Fullep's) reports (112) - which he handed to Szantay in Madrid, or the latter's deputy in Lisbon - contained much accurate information put together from printed sources. These included (the periodicals) Life, Fortune (very valuable → this one),

this one*), Flight, Aeroplane, Aero-Digest, 20th Century, Atlantic Monthly, The Economist, Engineers and Engineering, and the daily newspapers, including the London Times. He seems to have exercised considerable ingenuity in giving an air of verisimilitude to his reports by using old materials as a basis for forecasting future trends. These reports were frequently headed "It is reported from Washington..." or "It is reported from reliable sources in London...". These reports were always written in Hungarian, except the copies sent to the Japanese Legations in Madrid and Lisbon, which were written in English. A number, if not all, of these reports ultimately found their way to Kraemer via Onodera; Kraemer thus received practically duplicate copies occasionally, one via Grundboeck (Grundböck), one via Onodera.(113) If this is accepted it throws considerable doubt on the origin of the "K" Repoirts. It was argued at the time and the reasoning seemed, then irrefutable (indisputable): that because the "K" Reports contained only some of Kraemer's material, and the Kraemer reports (such as being received) preceeded the Onodera ones, the latter must have been getting his material from the former, not vice versa [as Kraemer in his first interrogation claimed'.** If both were receiving much of their information from the same Iberian Peninsula source (i.e. Fullop (Fullep) himself, or the Fulep Organisation (?) run by Colonel Szantay, then no doubt the Western European intelligence → would have been sent off

* One issue in ? March 1941 gave a complete picture of US aircraft production, which Fullop (Fullep) was still using as late as 1944. A later issue gave the heavy bomber programme and the potential of the Ford Plant. Yet another gve detailed description of industrial problems, i.e. a breakdown of Manpower requirements, stocks of raw materials, details of shipbuilding potential, and production figures for steel, aluminium, magnesium, fats and oils, etc. No doubt the American publications lent the "strong Anglo/American flavour" to the "K" Reports as noted by Hart (MI5), (above page 12 = our page reference 48m)

would have been sent off more fully and with greater priority by Kramer, to whom such information was vital, than by Onodera to whom it was only of peripheral interest.

Several leakages of genuine information may have reached Kraemer. Of these one of the most serious seems to have concerned the British aircraft production, as reflected in the "K" Reports. These figures, according to Hart (ADB @ MI5 B.1.b), were altogether too accurate for comfort. They were labelled Source Hector (Hektor), which suggests that they may have come from Fullop (Fullep) - which would mean that they came, almost certainly, from published sources. No doubt Kraemer could have checked the material against his own published sources; and in this particular case he might have been able to match them against information forwarded legitimately (or taken by Cervell (The Swedish Military Attaché in London) to his Government before he was put under surveillance in London (see Appendix II). In the latter event they could have come to Kraemer from an informant in the Swedish Foreign Office or Air Ministry direct or - as he would no doubt have claimed - via Onodera. It would be impossible now to find out, nor does it matter much if the Swedish informer (if indeed he existed at all) was not regular source of intelligence. It should be noted that the only atom of proof that such production figures were sent by Cervell at all was his own boast to Lemon (see Appendix II, p. 1). When the Americans did their check up on the US aircraft (and other) production figures appearing in the "K" Reports they found that all the material could have come from published sources(114) - thus lending weight to Fullop's (Fullep's) confession.

The other (military) leakage that caused such consternation in London (above pp 14-15 in our context reference pages 49n and 50o) could easily have been the result if intelligent guesswork. It must have been obvious to a close student of military affairs (as Kraemer undoubtedly was) that Russian successes in the East would have to be balanced by a fresh Allied offensive in the West, and the area indicated (the Aachen Wedge) was an obvious target; the date too - though uncomfortable close - was only within the fortnight period as set out in the planning document; the troops involved were not correctly listed and finally the reason given "for advancing the time of attack on direct instructions from the White House" is nonsense on two counts. One, the President did not give direct tactical orders; and two, he was at that time on his way to the Yalta Conference.

Leaving aside the Fortitude material which can hardly be classified as a "leakage", there remains the Arnhem story, as told by Riedel (page 13 above our page reference 48m). Not only did Kraemer himself give a detailed account of this while at Camp 020 (see Appendix III), but it was also confirmed by ~~Schellenburg~~ Schellenberg (please consider: G1096 G1096return). Asked, during his interrogation (AOB: Schellenberg made rather critical remarks about aspects of his quite cruel treatment at Camp 020) (consider also: https://www.cdvandt.org/schellenberg-survey.htm). Asked, during his interrogation, whether Amt VI (AOB: actually Milamt (Amt Mil and not Amt VI) had had warning from any source of British airborne landing at Arnhem, he replied (115) "Yes, but the message itself, which was sent by teleprinter (FS) (Blitzfernschreiben) from Kraemer in Stockholm was held up at the Attaché's office in Berlin, owing to a technical hitch (or sabotage?) so that no realm that is to say effective warning reached the general Staff.

(AOB: please bear in mind: Kraemer was an accredited diplomat and diplomats are everywhere servants on behalf of the their Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt). The Military Attaché, albeit like was Kraemer (also) working for I-L at Milamt were both also engaged at the German Legation and therefore communications went first from the German Legation in Stockholm to the German Foreign Office (A.A.) and from there these should be directed towards the Milamt. Whether Schellenberg had been informed on the exact route I doubt, as Ohletz noticed that the delay was within the Mil Amt; maybe were they both a bit fuzzy informed; as Chiefs do hardly bother about minor technical procedures)

Nevertheless importance was attached to the message in spite of the delay. It was never established who was responsible for delaying the transmission of the message (towards OKW)". Another Abwehr~~/SD~~* official Ohletz (= KV 2/106 PF 602765) (p20 above = our page reference 56t) also gave the same information; as, in a scrambled form did Kraemer's old enemy, Busch (117) (KV 2/529 PF 602057)

* It is a pity that even so long after the war (think of about 1975) Mss. McCallum was still so poorly informed : that the SD had nothing in common with Amt Mil (Milamt) and Amt VI; but only that they were both part of the R.S.H.A. Foreign S.D. was managed by Amt IV and inside Germany the S.D. was managed by Amt III.

It is one of the peculiarities of the case that although this story came from many different directions, and Kraemer gave chapter and verse for it, no full investigation seems to have been made. (but see Appendix III.)

It seems that Hart was not so very far wrong when he wrote, at the very beginning of the story, that "the flavour of these [Josephine] (Josefine) reports reminds one strongly of ... Ostro..." (AOB: after this Kraemer Survey I would, Deo volente, like to start up my re-approach of the Ostro/Paul Georg Fidrmuc Survey) He also suggested that much of Kraemer's intelligence was fabricated "by himself from close study of foreign papers and technical journals". (AOB: Fidrmuc was a journalist and a specialist on the Iron Industries, and had in pre-war days published in US technical periodicals; he also was a merchant on canned fish products) Again this is probably not so far from the truth, although "put together" might be a better term than "fabricating". [In the case of hector (Hektor) reports Fullop (Fullep) confessed(118) to assembling them - at least in part - in just this manner.]

If the case is to be even partially understood it is necessary to accept that, in his later interrogations, Kraemer told substantially the truth - with some normal lapses of memory* and, possibly, some tactful elisions (exclusions) of emphasis (i.e. that he played down the extent that he regurgitated the German Intelligence Reports that he saw). It must also be accepted that Josephine (Josefine) and Hector (Hektor) were, as he stated at Camp 020, types of information and not agents. He had no agents in the UK. The names of senior Air Force officers and the "source in MAP", etc were merely trimmings. It is obvious that Kraemer himself regarded them in that light, and whether they were his own inventions, or came to him second hand from the Fulep (Fullep) Organisation, is → relatively unimportant.

* His story, which he occasionally amended, would have been less convincing had it been more glib (casual).

relatively unimportant. A good deal of the confusion about Josephine (Josefine) arose from the fact that it was used as a personal nickname for Kraemer by ~~Hanson~~ Hansen (Obst. i.G. Leiter Abwehr and between ca. May 1944 up to, say, 19 July 1944 Leiter of the Milamt. He was heavily involved in the failed assassination attempt on Hitler of 20th July 1944. He has sentenced to death and being hanged on a most cruel way at the Plötzensee Prison, on 8 September 1944 German version → (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Alexander_Hansen) English version → (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Hansen), and possibly other Abwehr officials, as well as for the message he sent. Another mistake (this time Kraemer's) that befogged the issue was the identification of Fullop, the man, with Fulep (Fullep), the organisation, which was probably run by Colonel Szantay and the Hungarian IS in the Iberian Peninsula.

Kraemer's two main sources (or channels) of intelligence must be accepted as Grundboeck (Grundböck) and Onodera, in so far as Western European and American information were concerned. They, in turn, drew their material from a number of outside informants, which no doubt gave rise to the uneven quality of the traffic. {Kraemer was admitting by everyone to be a highly intelligent man and it would therefore seem incredible that the more blatant nonsense he forwarded, on occasions, to Berlin, came from his own pen.] (AOB, where is the ultimate proof??)

On the other hand, he clearly had access to some very high class gossip (to put it no higher) through his Press contacts Aari (Finnish) and Count von Toggenburg (German). There is also evidence that he obtained accurate information on matters, pertaining to Eastern Europe through the Finns (including Aari) which he passed over to Major Wenzlau for his Pandur traffic. In addition (and he confessed as much) he was able to get news of labour problems and aircraft figures through Schaefer, (119) the German representative of the Lufthansa in Sweden; and Swallving, (120) the head of the freight department of ABA (Swedish Airline) was in a position to give him accurate details of the Swedish/Allied ball-bearings trade and other related matters. [Both these → men were tried

men were tried (and convicted) by the Swedes on espionage charges in 1945 and found guilty; they were, however, given only what amounted to nominal sentences. (1210 Kraemer denied that he had any direct means of obtaining information from the Swedish General Staff 9to whom beyond Cervell (Swedish MA in London during wartime days), the industrious Air Attaché in London, was sending much information that should not have left the UK - Appendix II), or from Swedish Government sources as a whole. Any such information, he alleged, came in the early years from Grundboeck (Grundböck), who had excellent official contacts, and later, after Grundboeck's (Grundböck's) death (late March 1944) from Onodera who (who as was known to SIS) a number of good contacts among high-ranking Swedish officers. It seems plausible that this claim is substantially true. Grundboeck (Grundböck) was a highly placed, naturalist Swedish subject; Onodera held the rank of General and was head of the JIS (Japanese Intelligence Service) in Western Europe. Either, or both, were likely to have better relations with Swedish official circles, than the civilian "loner" Kraemer, who was even something of an outsider in his own Embassy and Service (AOB: he likely was intellectually far beyond all others surrounding him).

Although Kraemer admitted using official German summaries, he made little of it; claiming that much of this information consisted of evaluation of Allied and neutral Press reports.(122) Colonel Hesketh suggest, however, that the Fortitude material used by him in the Josephine (Josefine) traffic (Zuverlässiger V-Mann) was culled from OKW Intelligence Summaries (see above pp 31-33 (our page references: 1af, 2ag and 3ah) and Appendix I.(123) It will be remembered that Peter Riedel made a somewhat similar accusation regarding Air Force Order of Battle material. (124) (page 13 above; our reference page 49n) When Kraemer's sources were being investigated by OKL (= Oberkommando der Luftwaffe) it was suggested (probably by Busch) that he was → using Luftwaffe estimates

using Luftwaffe estimates to back up his own researches into technical journals and press reports.(1250 [It was also suggested that he was a British double-agent(126) which in view of the Fortitude material he was reporting, was not without its amusing side.]

Finally it must be admitted that the Kraemer case is and will always remain something of a mystery. Let him sum up in his own words:(127)

"My direct connections often of a strictly personal character, I co-operated partly with friends in intelligence matters and not with agents, if the word 'agent' means cash and carry for intelligence'. Naturally, I asked some of my friends to look out for agents and these I provided with money for the agents. That means that the list of my real agents must be a relatively poor one. What I know are intermediaries, which enabled me to get intelligence."

The investigation into whether there was a genuine leakage of information to Kraemer from London and, if so, whether it came through a diplomatic source,* took up a considerable amount of time in MI5 during late 1943 and most of 1944. Indeed Cervell, the Swedish Air Attaché, was still under investigation until the end of the war. For this reason some account must be given to what took place.

The problem was whether accurate air information reaching Kraemer was sent out through diplomatic channels. A report dated 27.10.43(1) set out the problem "In relation to the serious leakage of information about aircraft production figures to the Germans, it has been suggested that a neutral Service Attaché may well be the channel for these reports.."

After considering the matter carefully and weighing various neutral Embassy candidates, the writer continued: "... with the Swedes, however, the case is quite different.** Cervell, the Air Attaché, arrived in this country in March 1943. Since that time there have been several indications that he is undesirably well-informed about Air Force matters ... At the beginning of August Lemon (a female) *** reported that Cervell had told her 'that he had exact details about fighter and bomber production in this country'. When Lemon expressed some doubts.. he became very cagey (cautious) and refused to

** This referred to the dates of the information, which ruled out a member of the Spanish Embassy staff.

*** xxxx her name being made invisible @ Lemon was a valuable (MI5) B.1.b. agent.(2)

say how he got them, stating however that it had been very difficult. The fact that he is actually well-informed on this subject is confirmed by another small incident. As a means of building up Lemon "I" the writer: Major Blunt]" obtained authority for her to give Cervell the figures of the fighter production for a particular month. She let this figure drop in conversation, but was surprised to find that Cervell appeared to be perfectly informed already. In August, moreover, Cervell went back to Sweden to report and it is known through Lemon that he received very high praise for the information which he sent from England and was told that it was far better than any received from his predecessors ... ??deleted source show ... that Cervell has sent extremely good reports on which the Air Ministry say that although they contain nothing specifically very secret they were so intelligently put together that they would be of considerable interest to the enemy..."

At this point in time it was not known what sources of information were open to Cervell. He was believed to be in touch with a "Vickers's Test Pilot"; he boated to Lemon that he talked freely to air officers and others when he visited aerodromes - in spite of his RAF escorting officer who could not, apparently, control him; he was in touch with MAP with whom he was negotiating for aircraft for the Swedish Air Force and, through them, with the aircraft companies themselves. All this was very suggestive but was not, in the words of the case officer, ".. nearly enough to prove that he is the source of the reports reaching the Germans but it ism I think, enough to indicated that of all the Service Attachés he is the one most likely to be able to obtain it. If we add to that the fact that information is known to leak from Stockholm to the Germans and the Japanese the probability of his being connected with the leakage is increased..."(3)

It was decided to put all possible checks on Cervell, including (AOB: I suppose GPO watch on mails) his telephone would also be covered; the office?? would, naturally, be carefully watched; the Air Ministry would be asked for details of his visits to airfields and factories, and also for names of his RAF contacts; Lemon (female MI5 Swedish secretary agent?) would remain very much on the alert.(4) In the event these measures did not succeed in tying up Cervell with Kraemer's alleged sources in the UK, but they did reveal a considerable leakage in Sweden, through him, of information much of which went beyond what a man in his position could legitimately discover and send home. As an MI5 officer wrote at the end of 1944: he has obtained and Iwarsmatched?? a good deal of information that "There is abundant evidence that ↑ is less useful to the Swedes than to the Germans and which a stricter interpretation both of his country's neutrality and of an officer's code of honour would have confined to his own knowledge". (5) (AOB: I always wonder what secret Service personnel mean with code of honour? What Section V accomplished in Sweden was an offence, at least, against Swedish legislation)

One of the first serious leakages known to have occurred was started by a visit made by Cervell to the Bristol Aircraft Factory of which he boated to Lemon on 24.11.43. It had been, he said, the most valuable visit he had made since he had been in the UK.(6) A Copy of his preliminary report home was obtained through (Section V?). In it he stated explicitly that he was not mentioning the most important points as there was some danger that the (diplomatic) bag in which he was sending his report might be opened; in spite of which he gave details of the Orion and Centaurus* engines, (still on the secret list), the Hawker Tornado, etc; he noted that the firm were "to some extent going behind the Air Ministry's back" in an endeavour to build up post-war commercial connections. He also referred to the 12 Lb incendiary jet → bomb, a document concerning which

* In our around this time a story about the Centaurus was published in the German aeronautical magazine "Flugsport". It is not clear if this leakage from the Bristol Aircraft Co. can be attributed to Cervell or not(7)

bomb, a document concerning which had come into his possession through the misdirection of a letter, and promised further details about it. Other matters were referred to and it became clear that he was getting information refused him by the Air Ministry from Colonel Milton Turner, the US Military Attaché. On 6.12.43 the case officer commented: "For some months we have known ... that Cervell has been obtaining more information than he is entitled to have, and it was partly for this reason that we raised the whole problem of the Service Attachés with the JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee??)(8) and urged them to apply stricter measures to their activities ..."(9)

One of the complications of dealing with Cervell was his relationship with General Nordenskiold, head of the Swedish Air Force, who regarded him not only as a protégé but almost in the light of an adopted son.(10) Incidentally both General and Cervell himself, before he came to the UK, were reported by Section V as being actively helpful in supplying information to the British in Stockholm, and also as being on extremely intimate terms with the Assistant British Air Attaché there (in Stockholm). (11) It was, perhaps, for these reasons that he was, on arrival, accepted as being very pro-British - words deleted and other sources were to reveal a somewhat different picture. On 9.11.43 Lemon reported(13) that "Cervell is becoming somewhat embittered with the English on personal grounds. He apparently came over here with the opinion that he would be able to fix the English without any difficulty and be able to get all the information he wanted, and also make all arrangements for post-war developments in civil aviation. He is now beginning to realise this is not as easy as he expected, and he is beginning to think that the English are not as splendid as he first believed ..."

Investigation pinpointed the "Bristol leak" to Captain K.J.G. Bartlett, the sales manager of the Bristol Aircraft Company.(14) Colonel Milton Turner was thought to have been responsible for the leakage of information regarding the US Air Force, details of which were obtained from (name deleted) about 13.12.43; this referred to a report circulated by the Swedish Air Ministry in Stockholm giving notes on various types of aircraft, follwed by a passage on the 8th US Air Force in England which revealed the number of tons of bombs dropped by the unit, US losses and enemy losses, including those probably destroyed and those damaged. The figures covered the period from August 1942 to July 1943 and, when checked, were found to agree very closely with the facts. [This was very Kraemer-ish material.](15) Another, and perhaps more seriousm leakage was also detected trough (deleted Lemon or Section V in Stockholm?) and deleted . It concerned a Czech officer, later identified as Lieutenant Milosh Knorr, attached to a British reconnaissance regiment undergoing final training for the invasion, who visited Cervell and Carlblom (the Swedish Assistant Air Attaché in London?) at their private address on 12.10.43. While there he disclosed a good deal of information about training metods, troop strengths and movements, together with some uncomfortably intelligent speculations about invasion date or dates.(16) Cervell's unauthorised ferreting did not stop there. On 27.1.44 he again reported on the probable dated of the invasion of the Continent, saying "After many discussions I am more than ever convinced that the invasion will not begin before the end of April or the beginning of May, and that it will then begin in the Balkans and then immediately afterwards in Southern and Northern France". By no stretch of the imagination could this kind of speculation be considered of his Attaché's duties.

In a brief prepared by B.1.b. for the JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee??)(18)* its author wrote: "...it is considered that the presence of Major Cervell as Swedish Air Attaché in this country constitutes a very grave danger to Security. Up till now no direct action for his removal has been suggested because almost the whole of the ... information is derived from most secret and delicate sources. Instead the policy has been followed of taking every possible precaution to prevent him from obtaining information by limiting his visits to the utmost and warning aircraft factories and RAF establishments to exercise the greatest possible caution when such visits take place. In addition the Americans have been asked to warn officers in contact with him to observe the greatest discretion. It is now felt, however, that such preventive measures can never be wholly effective, especially since Cervell has established good personal contacts with people connected with the aircraft industry which are almost impossible to control. It seems that if he remains in this country at all there is a serious possibility that he may obtain, during the next few months, information of vital importance to the enemy, and that his removal alone will completely remedy the situation ... If, however, this is considered too drastic a measure the following alternative are suggested:

(i) No request should be made to the Swedes for the withdrawal of Cervell, but a responsible ofiicer of the RAF should fly to Sweden and point out to General Nordenskiold that it has been discovered that certain persons had in fact communicated matters completely secret to Cervell, which matter he, in the proper course of his duties, had doubtlessly passed to his Chief.

(ii) As soon as this conversation has taken place Bartlett and the Czech officer should be interrogated, with a view to bringing out a case against them. General Nordenskiold would have been told that Cervell would not be personally implicated in → any way.

any way. General Nordenskiold is not nerely's Cervall's superior officer but had also a personal interest in the young man's career. This method may therefore easily tie them more closely to our cause.

(iii) In view of the seriousness of this case the previous instructions regarding restrictions of visits to aerodromes and aircraft factories, military camps, naval dockyards or ships, should now be reinforced by a total ban.

(iv) General Eisenhower should be requested to place the same ban on admittance to the areas administered by the Americans, on the simple grounds that these Attachés are accredited to te Court of St. James and not to the USA".

On 1 February 1944 Liddell presented this brief to the JIC (Joined Intelligence Committee?) and attended the discussion that followed.(19) He recorded what happened as follows: "Cavendish-Bentinck (Foreign Office) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Cavendish-Bentinck,_9th_Duke_of_Portland) was against drastic action against Cervell but favoured the plan sending out an Air Force officer to see Nordenskiold. DNI (Lt. Cdr. Montagu?) was in favour of turning Cervell out. Cavendish-Bentinck asked me (Guy Liddell) whether I would be satisfied with the alternative project. I said as long as Cervell was here we could not say there was adequate security ... On the other hand I thoroughly understood the diplomatic difficulties and if the meeting felt they out-weighed the extra security that would be gained by Cervell's removal, the procedure suggested was the next best thing. It was agreed that Service Attachés should be refused leave to visit within a 15-mile belt and ... the Foreign Office should be consulted about extending this ban to other neutral diplomats. The Americans are to be brought into line with this policy and also with the policy of closing down entirely on all visits to factories, aerodromes, dockyards, military camps, etc."

Steps were now taken to brief Group Captain Plant, the officer chosen, for his trip to Stockholm to see General Nordenskiold, (20) and he left on 22.2.44. To some extent his mission had already been pre-empted by the British Air Attaché, Group Captain Maycock,(21) who, it was learned name deleted (Captain Maycock or someone else of the British Legation) had come to know about the matter and had already visited Nordenskiold and told him that the British authorities were alarmed because they feared that Cervell was on such friendly terms with many people in the UK that he might obtain information to which he had no right. As the result of this Nordenskiold wrote to Cervell explaining the position to him and warning him to be careful and particularly not to "appear interested" in secret operational matters. At about the same time Maycock also wrote to Cervell himself telling him that the British authorities were alarmed about his activities and warning him to be cautious. This letter was sent by Maycock, open, to the Air Ministry with a request that it should be passed on to Cervell if there was no objection to its going to him. The letter was seen - entirely by chance - by an MI5 officer and was not, in fact, delivered. This was not the first - or last - indiscretion by Maycock (22) but it was most serious. By warning Nordenskiold and attempting to warn Cervell at this particular juncture [ just at the moment when the JIC were considering what action should be taken to limit the activities of Cervell Maycock undoubtedly acted improperly and might have very seriously hindered the investigation and embarrassed the British authorities.

In the event Plant arrived in Stockholm carrying a letter of introduction from the CAS and well received by the General. Perhaps unfortunately, he was attended at all his meetings by the ubiquitous Maycock. Plant gave the General a full account of the story as contained in his brief, and notes: →

Location, of their new Atlantic 'plane and the new engine, for instance the Orion which isn't out yet, I should go home like a shot for that, I expect". Cervell later expressed the view that the matter would be best dealt with by the British Minister in Stockholm calling on the Chief of the Defence Staff or the Foreign Minister, stating that there was a leakage inside the Defence and the report sent home by the Attachés in London were being passed on.* There was a good deal of talk about the recall of Count Oxenstierna (the former Swedish Naval Attaché) who had already sent home [see below]. Cervell declared that he would send no more reports, only "hand-written letters".

On 14.3.44 (name deleted) produced Cervell's reply to Nordenskiold's letter about Plant's visit.(25) He was dismayed but not surprised he had felt for a long time that the British thought that all Swedish reports went on to Germany - that was why (Count) Oxenstierna had been recalled, He had discussed the matter with Air Commodore Beaumont who told him there was a leakage in Sweden; he asked for particulars on receipt of which he would write to Nodenskiold and asked to be allowed to send personal letters instead of reports. Beaumont replied that certain matters were bound to be dealt with by the Air Force HQ, even if he (Cervell) wrote personally to Nordenskiold, and the reliability there was unknown.

It was usually assumed officially - especially in the Air Ministry - that Cervell was "a good fellow" and "extremely pro-British"; these views might well have been modified had the officers and officials concerned been → "the General listened patiently ...

* The fact that the three Attachés accepted without question that these could be a leakage through their Defence Ministry does lend some support to the theory that Kraemer had - or could have had - an informer there.

"the General listened patiently ... The gist* of his reply was that he had already warned Major Cervell after Group Captain Maycock had informed him that Major C was seeking information of a secret nature ... On the subject of invasion, the General admitted he was naturally curious but ... Sweden did not which to know details and he had specifically warned Major C not to seek information on forthcoming operations .. he had received a letter from Major Cervell denying that he ever discussed invasion plans... He said further that no secret information had ever been reported to him..." Before he left Stockholm Plant discussed the matter with the British Minister and informed him that "in spite of his impression to the contrary, either General had lied or that reports of which I was fully aware, had not reached him". General Nordenskiold agreed to renew his instructions to Cervell in the strongest terms and also sent a letter to the same effect to Sir Charles Portal. This undertaking was communicated by the General to Cervell at the end of February.(23)

(Name and/or function deleted) showed with what consternation the news had received in London.(24) Although the conversation is scrappy and hard to piece together it is clear that Cervell, Carlblom and Prince Bertil (the Naval Attaché, in London) were deeply concerned at what they believed to be the leakage to the British about their own misdoings, or of information from their reports reaching the Germans, is by no means clear]. At one point Cervell said specifically ".., if there is a leak in the Defence Staff I may be sent home over a thing like that. If the British want to give me the damn drawings of Radio (word deleted; radar??) → been privileged to read this ??? report. (26)

* It does not emerge whether Plant spoke Swedish, the General English, or whether Maycock acted as interpreter - it would be interesting to know!

been privileged to read this (word deleted) report.(26) The Air Ministry, Cervell wrote, was "chiefly afraid for its own skin". The Secret Service had discovered that they had given him (Cervell) information and they were now trying to get out of the resulting difficulty. The officer who had accompanied him to the Bristol factory knew little about technical matters and routine report he put in must therefore have caused confusion. The Czech captain was not one of his circle of friends; he had met him twice at Carlblom's house; it was true that the Czech had spoken of invasion plans and Cervell considered that he had behaved correctly in reporting these - "they must have leaked out at home or en route". He tried to avoid meeting all Allied officers, they were "mere scum", but occasionally it was unavoidable at other people's parties. He had never broached the question of invasion plans or other vital strategy; indeed he had ordered Carlblom some time ago not to ask questions about, or discuss, strategic matters. He therefore had a clear conscience, "more so than most Attachés here". The British were "in a complete state of panic" in regard to both Allies and neutrals - a state which, however, he could understand. Although "flattered by the concern felt about him by the British" Cervell's pride was modified by the fact that 99% of the Attachés - and indeed of all the officers, tactical, or any other training. Most of them limit themselves to newspaper articles as sources of information. It is rare to hear one discussing technique or tactics with any knowledge of the subject". The authorities appeared to have judged him (Cervell) by the standards.*

* This tirade might unwittingly points to Cervell himself as the possible "reliable diplomatic source in London from whom, by whatever route, Kraemer may have culled his true information - if all the other diplomats in the UK were "worthless"!

[In view of this report it is hardly surprising that one of the MI5 case officers, who had read it, was later to sum up Cervell's character as follows: "This officer, whose general education is as negligible as his moral character is deplorable, but who can exercise considerable charm on both sexes, is an astute and unscrupulous investigator in his own particular subject.(27)]

Meanwhile steps were taken to deal with his two principal informants. Captain Bartlett and the Directors of Bristol Aircraft were given what was described as a very stiff warning by a high official of MAP, and the former was thereafter a "much chastened humiliated man". (28) The Czech officer, Lieut Milos Knorr, was also interviewed; this time by Colonel Barry of MI5 who was favourably impressed by him. He freely admitted his acquaintanceship with Cervell and Carlblom*, also the Swiss Military Attaché; he only saw these people because they were friendly to him and, being a Czech, he had very few friends in London. He was fully aware of the danger of imparting any information to neutral Attachés, as he realised that any such information be passed on by them to their Governments. He did not attempt to deny that he had discussed the general was situation with them, including the number of German divisions opposing an Allied invasion as given in the newspapers; he also believed that an invasion would have to be coordinated with the Russians and this would affect the timing - → these were purely personal views.

* In view of the number of times Carlblom is mentioned in connection with Cervell, it must be made quite clear that the former was genuinely pro-British and much under the influence of Lemon (was she a secretary?)(29)

these were purely personal views. He was asked about other specific matters which had appeared (sentence partly made invisible: in their mutual discussions?) (i.e the strength of the invading forces, the number of division in this country, and the training and equipment of this unit) but he was quite positive in his denials and pointed out that he himself had no inkling (feeling) of the number of divisions which would take part in the invasion, or of the invasion date, or of the number of divisions now stationed in this country; he added that he was told the Swedes that he was attached to a British Rece Regiment and that this meant armoured cars but had never talked about anything else connected with the (Rece) regiment. This appeared to be somewhat watered down account of what had been heard on the (words deleted) (by Lemon watched or attended conversation??) and, as Knorr appeared to be conscious of his indiscretion and unlikely to repeat the offence, no specific warning was given and the matter was dropped.(30)

Another alleged contact/informant of Cervell was James Stanton(31), a Canadian temporary civil servant and journalist, attached to Lord Beaverbrook's staff. The latter, now Lord Privy Seal, had responsibilities for planning post-war civil aviation. Stanton had been guilty of very grave indiscretions - to put it no higher. A considerable amount of information regarding civil aviation plans had been leaked to the Americans and the Swedes by him. And, to quote Liddell (MI5),(32) "...There are strong indications that this leakage maybe connected with the leakage of other information which has been disclosed from Stockholm BJs (Blue Jackets; AOB: for me the first time I come across a BJ dedicated to Sweden/Stockholm). Stanton has been in touch with Cervell and also with Carlsberg (the Swedish airline ABA) and of information acquired, which covers not only civil → aviation but Air Ministry information,

aviation but Air Ministry information, has probably leaked through the German connection in the Swedish Staff in Stockholm"[? to Kraemer]. It was suggested that this channel should be tested by planting information on Stanton, but before this could be arranged his conduct was reported to Beaverbrook who immediately sacked him*. It is only fair to record that neither (Stanton and Beaverbrook??) confirmed his alleged connection with Cervell.

To return more specifically to the latter. Although, like all other diplomats, his "news service" was curtailed by the ban on diplomatic communications which came into force on 18.4.44 (lasted up to - at least 6th of June or thereafter), he continued his efforts to obtain secret technical information and, later, make reports and collected details about such matters as flying bomb damage: which he knew the Foreign Office had particularly asked diplomats not to mention. In July 1944 the MI5 case officer recorded(34): "... it is clear that he was steadily and deliberately broken the undertaking which General Nordenskiold gave in his name ('that he would not in future try to obtain information about Allied operational intentions or about and secret matter')". It was admitted that he had not tried to get information about Allied operational plans, and he had been more cautious in his methods but "the evidence has accumulated to show" that he was carrying on his erstwhile activities. In his pursuit of information Cervell had been in contact with at least five potential sources, namely Captain Bartlett → of the Bristol Aircraft Co. with whom he had made fresh contact;

* It seems probable that some confusion had arisen over Stanton's place of employment. Liddell (MI5) refers to him both in his diary and in a letter to "C" (= Sir Steward Menzies) of 30.3.44(33) as being a personal assistant to Lord Beaverbrook - which he was. But the same letter he says he was sacked from MAP [it will be remembered that Kraemer was alleged to have an agent in MAP] - which he cannot have been. Beaverbrook became Lord Privy Seal on 29.9.43 and the current Minister of Air Production was A.T. Lennox-Boyd, appointed 12.11.43.

of the Bristol Aircraft Co. with whom he had made fresh contacts; Group Captain Maycock, then in the UK; and Colonel Milton Turner of the US Embassy. Either wittingly or unwittingly they had provided him with information which should not have been in his possession.* In addition he had required two new and valuable contacts: Pilot Officer Ulf Christiernsson, a Swede serving in the RAF, who had given him a great deal of information of a nature on technical training in the Air Force; and Hans Kristiansson, a Swedish technical journalist who had supplied him with apparently secret information on Allied Air Forces, together with information ob flying bomb damage. The memorandum concluded: "He (Cervell) has already been treated with considerable leniency and given a chance of mending his ways, and since he has deliberately rejected this chance, it is the opinion of the Security Service that there is no alternative now to declaring him persona non grata ... It is evident that if he continues to stay here nothing will prevent him from pursuing his present course and any attempt at getting honourable cooperation from him will clearly be useless".

A month later this view had been slightly modified. In a paper (35) prepared for the Air Ministry it was reiterated that it was unlikely that Cervell would mend his way but, at the stage the war had reached, the danger was no longer so extremely serious and it might not be worth endangering relations with the Swedes by insisting on his recall. According to Liddell(36) "The attempt to get rid of Cervell has been stymied (blocked) by the Air Ministry. Apparently they were influenced to some extent by the fact that the Swedes have given us the V2 which dropped in (southern) Sweden a few weeks ago, minus its head charge ..." (A story told by → Carlblom to Lemon (British female agent, probably acting as a secretary or that like to Cervell)

* AOB: This notice is essential, but what someone should- or should not do is a question of interpretation. Diplomats can not be charged but made 'persona non grata'. Should Section V, in the Swedish legal perception, have penetrated, maybe even more or less bribing Kraemer's household maid and her girl-friend and intervening in his private business and stealing matters on a rather regular basis for several years (albeit, as to maintain this practice, they had to return it quickly; but illegal and criminal, in Swedish legislation, they certainly acted. What is bothering, at least me, is, the lack of understanding that all 'intelligence matters' being in someway or another, most dubious. And, those writing reports, are entirely de-coupled, from what they are acting and constituting within themselves.

Carlblom to Lemon that Cervall had been pesonally instrumental in getting parts of the rocket sent to the UK, were largely discounted (not-acknowledges)(37).

Checks continued to be kept on Cervell until the end of the war but little more came to hand of Security interest, apart from one flare up of suspicion in January 1945, when it was suggested that information which came in a Kraemer BJ (Blue Jacket; AOB: equal to the Stockholm BJ?) might be traced back to Cervell? Turner (see main narrative pp 11-12) (our page reference numbers: 29bb and 30bc). In the end this came to nothing, Cervell continued to play off the British as heretofore, and concerned himself mainly with the purchase of fighter aircraft for the Swedish Air Force.(38) In the end those acquired were American Mustangs rather than the new British Spitfires, so all the information given to "sweeten" him by the British aircraft industry and the Air Ministry was wasted.

His private life, as revealed by (name(s) made invisible) telephone checks and Lemon (the MI5 female agent), continued to scandalise the MI5 case officers: but he returned to Sweden in 1946 without any official steps being taken against him.

Cervell was extremely lucky to survive being sent home, the Naval Attaché, Count Oxenstierna, was not so fortunate. It is difficult to discover what actually happened since his PF(39) has been destroyed and the Farago account (in The Game of The Foxes, pp 549-50) is patently untrue; this suggests that information on the Count's activities was obtained from teleprinter in the German Embassy in Stockholm at a time when only a smattering→ of these messages were being received via Switzerland (see narrative).

of these messages were being received via Switzerland (see main narrative). Incidentally had information about the Count been received through such a red hot source (Alexander Foote or Rado?)

(https://www.cdvandt.org/rote_drei_espionage.htm ) (https://www.cdvandt.org/rote_drei_espionage.htm#Roessler) it is most unlikely that his file would have been destroyed. references to his re-call - he was not declared persona non grata - abound throughout the Cervell file but amount to very little. The only scrap of "hard" evidence is a short entry in Liddell's diary of 21.10.43 "... We discussed the Swedish Naval amd Air Attachés ... The Naval Attaché seems to have been more nosy, and the other day bounced a midshipman into allowing him to see something on board a ship. He told him the Captain had given permission. This was untrue ..."(40)

When, after the war, Colonel Hesketh came to research into the success or failure if the Allied Plan Fortitude, which covered D-Day landings, and other deception plans based on a continuation of the same theme (AOB: like also other Secret Services strategies, it was really considered to use the same misleading strategies in post-war days. Be it pro- or contra their current fellow associates), he uncovered a great number of Josephine messages which had never come to light in the wide investigation carried out by MI5 and Section V into Dr. Kraemer's activities. These messages, which were very highly rated by the Germans, may have had a considerable influence of the German military tactics.(1) (AOB: in my understanding, this was a too much flattering picture, as the OKW assessments were often rather critical about information delivered by Popov (Tricycle) and Johan Jebsen (Artist). (AOB: I went in rather deeply into these aspects in my: https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-560-wrede-artist.htm . Reconsidering the latter noticed web link, it ended up in a rather scandalous deception of the very same MI5 offices some years after the war had ended) (Please take you time; because I have gathered (incorporated) all KV 2/xxxx files we possess copies of; now accumulating in more than 1152 serials!)

Before going further it must be explained how Abwehr agent reports reached the German High Command. At the beginning of the war, when they were carrying all before them, Hitler had not thought it necessary for OKW to have its own Intelligence Branch; after reverses in Russia, however he revised his opinion, and such a branch was set up under Colonel Krummacher, who had hitherto acted as a sort of officer between the Abwehr and OKW. It was now his job to assess the intelligence that came to him and route it on to higher authority depending on its importance; if he thought it sufficiently interesting he would show it to Feld Marschall Jodl, and perhaps to General Warlimont. If Jodl in his turn thought that the Fuehrer should see it, it was duly passed on (2)

AOB: what a nonsense! Typically, like was the understanding of the way of organisation on the German side understood even up to 1944/45! Simply ridicule! Significant to remember: Almost every MI5 member lacked the ability to read German language texts themselves, fully.(2) True was, that OKW - thus Keitel, and Jodl possessed great legal judgement to bring intelligence in, when appropriate, to Hitler. But Intelligence OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr existed already about since 1935 and was headed by Admiral Canaris. A good example was Arthur Owens' (Snow's) engagements since about 1935, with Ast Hamburg (Wehrkreis X)

https://www.cdvandt.org/arthur-owens-snow.htm

https://www.cdvandt.org/arthur-owens-page-3.htm

https://www.cdvandt.org/arthur-owens-page-4.htm

After the war Krummacher's files were examined and it was found that the "uncontrolled agents" Ostro and Kraemer (AOB: also nonsense: Kraemer was employed as a diplomat and engaged with - up to about Springtime 1944 a member of I-L Mil Amt (Amt Mil) - beside being since Autumn 1942 firstly engaged on behalf of the German Foreign Office (A.A.); whereas Ostro was 'legally' the great exception - he was de facto not engaged with any Wehrmacht Service!) (After the conclusion of Kraemer current file series, I would, Deo volente, like to reconsider the intriguing Ostro file series again)

Brutus (Johan Gruen) only rated one each. In the month following the opening of the invasion, twenty five Josephine (Josefine) messages contrasted with ten from Garbo and nine each from Ostro and Brutus.(3)

AOB: sadly again, Mss. McCallum is not appropriately informed! It was Ostro, whom informed Berlin, via the W/T link from KO Portugal to HIOB in Berlin - what actual details of the Allied invasion plans were (3rd June 1944). See HW 19-177 - Isk 100131) Kept since hidden by MI5, but I traced it some years ago. Ostro was thereafter considered being so dangerous, that a firm discussion was to be commenced at the XX-Committee*. It was considered whether they (SOE) should kill Ostro. Though, it was the very wise final decision of "C" (Sir Steward Menzies) whom ultimately decided that they should do not! His, rather valid motivation was - that the Germans may well wonder whom the intercept-source of the striking message to Berlin was. Ostro was not a member of any German organisation! Then the likely question might have been raised on the German side - how could they knew this? This might well have endangered one of Britain's most valuable MSS = Most Secret Source, think of endangering all the valuable work accomplished at Bletchley Park! MI5 and MI6 members were furious against this decision! Nowadays such behaviour is known as a typical "tunnel-vision".

AOB: I prefer to skip Mss. McCallum's more-or-less irrelevant discussion. As this lady is not adequately informed in these respects. Not she is to blame, but those responsible during the wartime days and its short aftermath.

.... The first, which came in at 13.55 hours on 9 June (1944), was an intercepted W/T (Isk) message from London to an Allied sabotage organisation in Brussels, penetrated by the Germans, containing coded warnings that an attack was imminent. This Krummbacher (?) did not consider was of sufficient importance to show to Jodl. The The second message came in at 18.10 hours on 9th June

(almost 3 months would it take before they actually reached Brussels ca. 3rd September), since British Forces landed near Caen on the Normandy shore on the early morning of 6th June. This aspect is often neglected, and what remained was the the Successful landing would progress swiftly; in reality it took ca. 76 days before Paris was reached; about 25th August. The reasons were manifold, among it poor planning, poor knowledge on the actual circumstances encountered in the Normandy, for example. Maybe, the Germans were well trained after so many years of severe combat and their ability of improvisation.

AOB: Again this is showing that Mss. McCallum wasn't aware of the true circumstances; she apparently lacked understanding of the circumstance and likely the word Isos.

Let us first quote: Ostro (Paul Georg Fidrmuc) was certainly a contemporary headache and his material was available in a huge spate of ISOS ....

When this lady had sufficiently been informed (or had informed herself) - she should have known that Ostro's information went only partially via KO Portugal's W/T means; and since Autumn 1941 all Lisbon W/T communications were commenced by means of Enigma. Isos covered only manually generated codes; whereas Enigma constituted machine-codes and decryption was managed and registered by a running Isk serial number. This very fact - this lady should have, at least, known about! Does it make sense transcribing text, composed by someone not possessing adequate knowledge? Actually: she is not to blame, but those wartime Crown colleague Servants! There apparently exists among many British historians a hesitation - as to correct what the PF file serials incorrectly notice; among them also Nigel West. Simply, think also of maintaining incorrect spelling of subject-names.

The sentence ... We know that Dr. Kraemer had in fact access to German intelligence documents This is also very probably true in the case of Ostro. Oh. Mss. McCallum! you should have been informed: when you would have formerly accessed Ostro's file series (KV 2/196 ... KV 2/201), you would have known that Ostro never visited the KOP himself. His reports had been handed in by an intermediate - enclosed in a double sealed envelope. Then it arrived at Dr. Alois Schreiber's desk (Leiter I at KOP) and someone decided whether a report should be send by "diplomatic mail bag" or a special courier (both by means a regular airline; such as Lufthansa) or, when speed was necessary - it was transmitted (W/T) in the actually valid Enigma code towards: HIOB Berlin - and was addressed to Skapura (actually Oblt. Wilhelm von Carnap). Thus Ostro/Fidrmuc never had access to available information folders at KOP. Nevertheless, he maintained quite close private friendship to KOP Leiter Ludovico (Obst. Wilhelm Kremer von Auenrode) (both Austrians and had Triest in common), since April/May 1944, the latter was succeeded by Obst. Rolf Friderici (real name) though on a quite more formal way. Even those in Berlin, when visiting Portugal - they didn't always grasped the true circumstances. However, even Obst. Hansen (the latter was up to, say, 19 July 1944 Leiter Amt Mil/Milamt) and his successor Obstlt. Kuebart (then Leiter I) guessed what Paul Fidrmuc's actual military rank was (he actually did not possess any military function); both Hansen and Kuebart met with Ostro (privately). This latter fact emphasizes clearly the importance of Ostro - when the highest in charge came to Lisbon and did sometimes personally (dressed, of course, in civil) meeting-up with him somewhere.

(Deo volente, I would like, soon after this huge Kraemer endeavour has brought to a closure - to succeed with Ostro's/Fidrmuc's file series; also sparkling file stories.

That Kraemer sent an advance warning of the Arnhem airborne operation (Market Garden) is beyond question (see main narrative pp 38-39) (our pages 38bk and 39bL). How he got the information is another matter. In view of the continuing interest in the possibility of an Arnhem leakage, it is perhaps worth quoting the statement he (Kraemer) wrote about it while at Camp 020.(1)

"A. 1. My information given to (Milamt) I/Luft Berlin (Bekaerstrasse?) (but passing firstly via the German Foreign Office), at , at Saturday before the actual landing of airborne divisions in Holland, which took place on Sunday (approximately 16.9.44) (we in Holland designate it on the 17th of September 1944) called in my former statement 'the Arnheim Report' (German spelling). I confirm my former statements.

The Allied Sopreme Command intends airborne-operations in the environs of Arnheim, Tilburg and Eindhoven (Note: I am not quite sure if Eindhoven was mentioned).

The Allied units consist of the 1st British, 82nd and 101st USA Airborne Divisions, all of them will start from England.

The operation will be carried through between Sunday and Thursday (Note: In the information the figures of the dates of the two days were mentioned).

I had got the report sub 2 from Fullep (KV 2/242 PF603361) in the form as given above (microdots: notice please: H1097 H1097return) without further comment to me by diplomat mail, which arrived at Friday night (Sept. 14th?) I had a look on the mail the same night and on the following morning, Saturday, I read through the reports and found on one of the microdots the 'Arnheim' information. Immediately I gave the information (personally and not by means of telephone) to the Air Attaché's teleprinter (FS) office with the order to forward it to Berlin I/Luft (Milamt) as 'KR-Blitz' (Kriegsentscheidend), the signification for the most urgent importance of a message. Conform to the original message asd as usual in the case of Fullep-intelligence, which dealt with strategic matters, I chose the cover designation 'Zuverlaessiger V-Mann' (Reliable agent).

" By several mishaps, interruption of communication-lines, delay by coding and decoding, etc. the telegram was received by Abwehr I/Luft only after the actual landing-operation had already begun. Obstlt. Ohletz (KV 2/106 PF 602765) and Lt. Berg were probably - by Schellenberg (whom was Leiter Amt VI as well as Milamt/Amt Mil) - immediately called to account for the delayed deliverance. But it could only be found unfortunate circumstances had caused the delay; also it was stated that the report had been forwarded by me correctly and in good time, (AOB: The Germans this time, nevertheless, defeated ultimately, the British troops at least in and around Arnhem) When I came to Berlin in November 1944, Schellenberg mentioned the affair only briefly and confirmed that there was no fault on mine ...

About 2 or 3 days before the actual Arnheim operation, Onodera told me to have received from the Swedish General Staff, in exchange for other intelligence, the dislocation † report that the 1st British, the 82nd and 101st USA Airborne Division were now in England since about a month. Together with this he had got other dislocation reports concerning the Western Front. The whole disloaction report was handed over to me by Onodera. I remember that we wondered about the new dislocation of the Airborne Divisions, which were supposed to be in France.

the Swedish General Staff expected a big Anglo-American airborne operation in Holland as immediately imminent; it was further reported that the 1st british Airborne was in sealed camps. (AOB: this was always indicating that an operation was to be expected imminently)

I knew what it meant to keep Airborne units in 'sealed camps' and reported reported this very important information to Berlin as quickly as possible under the cover designation 'Quelle 10' (Source 10). This announced that the report [was] based on the official opinion of the Swedish General Staff.

The message referred to in the Kraemer statement above do not appear among the collection of intercepts procured by ~~Allied~~ Intelligence (gathered by Section V or by intercepted teletype from the Legation) There is a referenced to an airborne unit (9th Parachute Battalion) being in "sealed camps"; but it was part of an incoming telegram, dated 14.11.44,(2) asking Kraemer to check on information regarding the whereabouts of "various groups of the 6th Airborne Division" and therefore appears to be a different matter. Apparently no intercept were obtained from the end of August until the beginning of December (1944), when a fresh batch (likely via the bribed Czech employed at the Legation's Fernschreibstube) - containing among others the "sealed mamp" message - was forwarded by Section V to MI5 for checking.(3) (Likely obtained with the support of Kraemer's household maid)

† Presumably Kraemer means "location"- his English is reproduced as he wrote in the above report.

There is no record of any leakage from the Swedish Embassy in London or near the Arnhem date (17.9.45) but, it should perhaps be noted, Cervell was in Sweden during the moment of August; arriving back in the United Kingdom on 11.9.44. He had been doing this months' attachment as ADC to the King, and may well have been the indirect source of any information [or informed speculation] obtained by Onodera or Kraemer [did not matter since they were pooling their intelligence] from the Swedish General Staff, to members of which he (Cervell) no doubt talked with considerable freedom. (AOB: when I studied the Kraemer file series for the first time about 2016/2017, I remember that within MI5 there was discussed how matters were so soon arriving in Stockholm as the British troops had been informed on the 12th of September, and no-one knew a date earlier!)

Another version of this story appears in the Fortitude Report.(5) The background is a complex plot involving Brutus (= Johan Gruen) was an airborne attack on Kiel by the fictitious force, giving the real date; while suggesting that the real force would make a second attack later. In support of this a message was sent on 14 September, three days before the Arnhem assault, saying(6): "I have just learnt that there has been great activities at headquarters of the Allied Airborne Army and that they have been formed a second task force. In view of the general situation there is talk in our headquarters that three or four days one should expect an airborne attack against Denmark, Kiel Canal or against ports in Northern Germany. This appears to confirm my own opinion, already transmitted several days ago, especially when I learned of the move of the Fourth Army†." And on 20 September, three days after the Arnhem landing: "Regarding the airborne attacks. I have learnt that → it is a question of the 1st British Airborne Corps ..

is a question of the 1st British Airborne Corps and the XVIII American Airborne Corps and not the task force as supposed by me. As far as I know, this task force is still ready for the operation with the Fourth Army (notional thus a fake existence). It includes the 9th (fake), 17th (fake) and 21st (fake) American Airborne Divisions and the 2nd British Airborne Division."

According to Hesketh, Brutus's (Johan Gruen) earlier messages of 10th September (7) had told the Germans that an attack might be expected against the north of Germany in the region of Bremen and Kiel, against which Kraemer had given Jutland and Southern Norway. He the goes on to say:(8) "It seems fairly clear that he {Kraemer} must have seen Brutus' message of the 19th and felt a desire to fall into line (AOB: why, her wishful thinking?) for on the 15th he told the Germans: 'Fusag (First United States Army Group, actually fake as this did not exist) continues in Eastern England as far as the Humber. Formations in Northern England and Scotland do not belong to Fusag'. And a little later "Air Vice Marshal Trafford stated in London on 11th and 12th September to a reliable informant that Fusag is not to be employed in Jutland, [or] Southern Norway, but that it is to be used in connection of the Second English, First American and First Canadian Armies. The Second English Army will be advanced on a broad front as far as the Meuse (Maas) and if possible even as far as the Waal by 24th September. After that the employment of powerfull airborne forces in Eastern and Northern Holland and the German frontier region is planned [to] eliminate German river positions in the rear, it is intended to use Fusag in Eastern Holland and the Helgoland Bight'... Dr. Kraemer's new operation was more detailed than anything we had offered and his airborne drop was now unpleasantly near to Arnhem, but his main Fusag (not existing fake) objective of Eastern Holland and and the Heligoland Bight might be said to approximate the Brutus's (Johan Gruen's) → Kiel-Bremen target (AOB: please bear still in mind, that all this is purely an unsuccessful attempt to mislead the German OKW)

.. . Schellenberg confirmed (10) the warning given by Kraemer, also that it arrived too late, but again not distinguish which message - if there were two. Ohletz (KV 2/106), however, stated specifically(11): "A signal arrived in Berlin from the Air Attaché, Stockholm, addressed to OKL (this was thus not sent to Milamt) Although it arrived before the Arnhem landing, it was unaccountably held up by OKL and was not received by OKW (High Command of all German Forces headed by Keitel on behalf of Hitler) until after the landing. The signal in question gave the correct date and stated that a strong landing was to take place round Arnhem (AOB: in this context widely neglected the Americans landed successfully about Nijmegen, albeit encountering stiff German resistance) It also stated that there was to be another landing between Wesel (SE of Arnhem) (AOB: here Mss McCallum might be confused with the fact of Montgomery's second attempt to cross the Rhine but now about Wesel but this commenced successfully in March 1945) and Bocholt.

AOB: As Mss McCallum might be continuously confused please read the according passages yourself.

If Kraemer is to be believed - and there seems no conceivable motive for him to fabricate such an elaborate story - on which, moreover, is backed up by ~~Ohlitz~~ Ohletz, who was well placed in the hierarchy and in a better position to know the facts, than say, Busch - then he (Kraemer) did receive a precise and accurate report of the pending Arnhem operation from the Fulep (Fullep) Organisation in the Iberian Peninsula. The date was right. The target was correct. Obviously the aim of of the operation was a stated: though this could have been a deduction from the data given. What was more he claims to have named the three Allied airborne divisions correctly as the 1st British, and the 82nd and 101st American Divisions; and also given the information that the operation would be mounted from the United Kingdom, although the two American divisions had already been engaged in France. Kraemer claims as well that he got confirmation of these details from Onodera, including the identification of the three divisions, which the latter attributed to the Swedes. It seems more likely that Onodera's information came from a common source, i.e. the Hungarian IS (Intelligence Service) in the Iberian Peninsula, rather than from Swedish general Staff who could have "expected a big Anglo-American airborne operation in Holland as immediately imminent", but were unlikely to have obtained details of the divisions involved.

The timing is important. According to Kraemer he received the message from the Iberian Peninsula, via the diplomatic mail (?courier) on D2, i.e. 15.9.44(14) (D5 was 12 September) But the outline plan for the operation was only communicated to the Chief of Staff, Allied Airborne Army, on the afternoon of 10 September; D-7), when General browning returned from the continent where he had attended a meeting with Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery. Planning started the same night, but the final date was not fixed until 24 hours later; briefing was held on the 12th; D-5.(15) It seems staggering that information could have reached Stockholm, by somewhat round about route from the Iberian Peninsula, within three days.

Neither does Hesketh's timing make much sense. He puts forward the theory that Kraemer saw the Brutus message of the 10th: (D-7) which he had itself to be digested by the Abwehr, passed to OKW, and reach Kraemer in the time for him to re-hash it and sent it back in a message of the 15th (D-2)*. But all sources seem to agree that Kraemer's message, which according to himself he sent off marked "very urgent" (KR) early on Saturday (16th: D-1), should indeed have received very urgently treatment, and it did not do so. It was "inexplicably" held up at OKL (AOB: I still take into account that the message route passed firstly via the German Foreign Office, as it was sent from the German Legation and this entity obeyed to the Foreign Office (A.A.)) But there seems no particular urgency about the message(16) quoted by Hesketh, starting "Air Vice Marshal Trafford stated in London..." Nor does its content really justify the description given in the Intelligence Summary of the 17th as "an agent's report ... which predicted these air operations correctly." It is true that the Summary goes on to say that the same agent reported that immediately after the airborne landing another landing would take place, and this clearly refers to the message of the 15th Fusag's notional (fake) attack, which may or may not have been based on Brutus (Johan Gruen) or other controlled agents by way of intelligence summaries.

It seems probable therefore that there were two Josephine (Josefine) messages which have been run together; the rambling general prediction of the 15th and the sharper, more urgent message which Kraemer sayd he sent on 16th, pinpointing the details of the airborne attack. Incidentally this agrees better with Riedel's statement that Kraemer had reported a parachute landing "some fifteen hours before it took place".

A minor question of interest remains as to why the message (? of the 16th) was held up. If it existed in the form by Kraemer, and endorsed by ~~Ohlitz~~ Ohletz, anyone - however junior - who deciphered such teleprint at OKL →

* He certainly could not have seen Brutus's more urgent-sounding message of the 14th.

would have been bound to have recognised its urgency and sent it post haste to ~~OKH~~ (nonsense OKL). The most likely answer is human error - or human negligence. The message was not deciphered with the urgency that it should have been, and that, conceivably, may account for its? disappearance.

Do we seriously consider the forgoing assessment being relevant? It might come down to: are we Anglo-Saxon or not. And we, actually, aren't.

Probably because details about the "Arnhem Report" were only fully disclosed by Kraemer long after the event (what do we consider being long?) He was soon confronted with rather tough investigations that this certainly has printed-in someone's mind a vivid reflection.

We have noticed on two places of Mss. McCallum manuscript - that it concerns the "2nd Draft.

This implies, likely, that someone might have peered here concepts, and consequently forcing her to reissue it a bit.

This peer, should have been in the possession of superior understanding; or was he only looking for keeping matters undisclosed or that like?

Today we encounter the termination of this most intriguing Karl Heinz Kraemer file series