Steimle Eugen (Standartenführer)
Page initiated 23.8.2022 (6 September 2022)
Current status: 6 September 2022
Chapter 3 (6 September 2022)
KV 2/966-1, page 2
The references in the right-hand column had been given by who, at least once, had been interrogated
Birth place Württemberg.
Age/Birth Date 3.12.1909.
Official status/rank: Standartenführer (1945).
Amt VI. Head of N.W. European sector (since 1943).
Also reported as head of Swiss, Spanish & Portuguese sectors.
Background: Married, 3 children.
KV 2/966-1, page 4
Connection with G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) Bekaerstrasse (Bekaerstraße)
Please digest its content yourself
Bekaerstraße (pronounce: Beka-erstrasse) was a premises which was situated at the "house numbers 32 - 36 (38)" (the long-stretched building, bending on its left-hand side)
was once the main address (H.Q.) of R.S.H.A. Amt VI
The square building on the far right-hand side constituted once a bunker (heavy air-shelter), facilitating also their archive storage
KV 2/966-1, page 7
16.10.45 Cable to Karlsruhe ref. 144 re Steimle (9a)
AOB: apparently Eugen Steimle had been traced and likely captured. Though, Karlsruhe laid within the French Occupied zone; regularly the French persisted that it belonged to their jurisdiction and long reports in French language were often resulting.
6.11.45 To S.I.S. (M.I.6) (V.F. V/48.F. & B.1.b (M.I.5) D.S.D.O.C. (AOB: I don't know the meaning of the abbreviation, but I recognise it as being related to British liaison in France) re Steimle. (13a)
9.11.45 To W.R.C.3c (W.R.C. = War Room section C)
10.11.45 Cable to USFET (United States Forces European Theater) re Steimle in reply to 13z (consider the message of 15.11.45)
KV 2/966-1, page 8
AOB: The red stamp tells us, that this is a copy, whereas the original page was kept (retained) in the according department (archives)
17.1.46 From USFET FIR (Final Interrogation Report) on Steimle, Eugen dated 12.12.45 (20b)
KV 2/966-1, page 9 (minutes 24a)
CX rest deleted It regularly looked like: CX/12xxx/some letters and number indication whom is dealing with the file. It was/is S.I.S. practice to make the file-numbers and names invisible.
24th April, 1946.
Please refer to SSU's letter of 17th April addressed to Warrec on the subject of Eugen Steimle
We have not received any copies of the report referred to nor indeed of any interrogation reports on Steimle.
Could a copy please be made available to us?
For H.A.R. Philby
(AOB: Philby - among friends "Kim Philby", belonged to the group of Russian sympathisers and according spies, also known as the "Cambridge Five")
KV 2/966-1, page 15a (minute 20b)
Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
Headquarters Seventh Army
Western Military District
APO 758 Us Army
Final Interrogation Report.
12 December 1945 Subject: Steimle, Eugen,
- - -
* * *
A. Main report, including Agent's Comments and Recommendations.
1. Personal life History of Steimle, Eugen
2. Steimle's Activities with Sonderkommandos 4a and 7a in Russia. (AOB: being once implicated in a "Sonderkommando" (Einsatzkommandos) engagements, is - most likely- making someone being involved in Crimes of War!)
3. Personalities of Amt VI, RSHA (R.S.H.A.)
4. Organization and Personalities of Amt Mil (established June/July '44)(Amt VI and Amt Mil were in some way connected to each other), especially Mil. (Amt) (section) B.
5. Summary of Recent Activities, Sources of Information, and Organization of the GIS (German Secret Intelligence), especially Gruppe (Amt) VI B, and Abt. Mil. B, in Spain, Portugal, England, and the USA.
6. The Situated of the "German Secret Service" (especially of Abt. Mil.B) in the USA.
7. The Organisation :"Sondindus" in Spain, and its leader, SS Oberführer Bernhard (KV 2/2949 PF 602735).
8. The "Desertion" of Abwehr Officers Auersberg, Gisevius, and Vaetjen, in Switzerland.
9. Police Attaches and Diplomats who were active for Amt VI.
10. The "J-Netz (Stay-Behind Information Net) of Amt VI in Western Europe.
11. The "R-Netz" (Stay-Behind "Retreat-Net") of Amt Mil. in the Western-Theatre of Operations.
12. The "R-Netz" (Stay-Behind "Retreat-net") of Amt Mil. in Italy.
13. The Issue of a "Friendensnetz" (Peacetime Intelligence Net) of Amt VI.
14. Amt VI, RSHA, Organization and General Remarks.
15. Organization of Counter Espionage in Amt VI (VI-Z) and Amt Mil.
16. Schools of Amt VI, Especially of Gruppe VI-B
17. Funds of Amt VI.
18. Files and Documents of Amt VI and Amt Mil.
19. Origin of Report of Steimle's alleged death.
20. Frontaufklärung (Tactical Intelligence) vs. Fernaufklärung (Long-Range Intelligence). General remarks about Recent Developments.
21. Organisation of the RSHA in 1945.
KV 2/966-1, page 16b
307th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
Headquarters Seventh Army
Western Military District
APO 768 US Army
12 December 1945
Memorandum for the Officer in Charge:
Subject: Steimle, Eugen, alias Bulach, Dr. Hermann, SS Standartenführer.
Leiter of Gruppe VI B, and Abteilung Mil. B, of the RSHA
I. References: (a) Report of Interrogation, incl. Arrest report by CIC Team 970/45, Backnang, Württemberg, dated 4 Oct. 1945. (Apparently he was arrested there)
(b) SHAEF cards (pink) #47267, #1958, .....
(c) Final Report of Interrogation on SS Stubaf (S.S. Sturmbannfüher = Major) Bernhard, Heinrich, Leiter of Amt VI Referat B2 (dealing with France), by the 307th CIC Det. dated 31 May 1945.
(d) Report of Additional Interrogation on Neubourg, Dr. Ludwig, Leiter of sub-section Amt VI-B/C, of the R.S.H.A., by the 307th CIC det, dated 30th Aug. 1945.
II. Summary: Steimle, Eugen, alias Bulach, Dr. Herman, German National, was arrested at the home of Herr Lindner, farmer, Gross Hoechberg, Spiegelberg, Kreis Backnang (Württemberg), on 1 Oct 1945, by (US) tactical troops of the 788th FA Bn (battalion?), upon request of the 970/45 CIC Det. Subject (Steimle) had been reported to be a Studienrat (Highschool Professor) who had recently came into the Backnang area to improve his practical knowledge of agriculture. Interrogation by the 970/45 CIC team caused Subject to reveal his true identity. Subject was brought to 307th CIC Det. The interrogation was carried out in great detail and lasted for approximately four weeks. he was transferred to USFET Interrogation Centre on 21 Nov 1945.
Please notice the location of Backnang versus Karlsruhe, Stuttgart and Ulm
Now you may understand why Karlsruhe had been considered.
I cannot (yet) judge whether Backnang belonged to the French or American Occupied zone; though, Karlsruhe definitely was then "French" ruled.
III. Life History until Entry into German Intelligence Service:
A. Chronological Summary:
8 Dec 1909 : Born at Neubulach, Kreis Calw, Württemberg as the son of a farmer.
1916-1920 : Grammer school in Neubulach.
1920-1929 : Hauptschule and Oberschule in Calw and Pforzheim.
1929-1935 : Student of History, German, French, and philosophy at the University of Tübingen (rather famous) Württemberg, and the University of Berlin.
1935-1936 : Practical year of teaching in Stuttgart.
KV 2/966-1, page 17c
B. Additional Data: Subject (Steimle) was married in July 1936, to Margarete nee Haeussler (Häussler), daughter of a retired mayor, and has three children from his marriage, ages 7, 5 and 3. His family lives now at his parent's home in Neubulach, Württemberg. Subject's father, retired farmer, who is 70 years old, still lives there.
1933/34 Subject was "Führer der Tübinger Studentenschaft and des Studentenbundes" (Leader of the University of Tübingen Student Body and the NS (Nationalsozialist) Student's League). In 1934 he was appointed Gau-Studentenführer of Württemberg. He resigned from this position in 1936, after his final examinations. Subject (Steimle) then took over the leadership of the S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst) Unterabschnitt X (Württemberg).
IV. Subject's Intelligence Activity:
A. Recruitment :
In his political life Subject became acquainted with Dr. Gustav Adolf Scheel, former Nazi students' leader, then SD Oberabschnittsleiter Stuttgart, later on Gauleiter in Salzburg, Austria. Scheel exerted a strong influence on Subject, describing the SD as an important, attractive, and promising young organisation, for which Subject would be particularly well fitted. Subject accepted Scheel's proposition in the Spring of 1936, and became a full-time. paid SD official. (AOB: SD was implying also SIPO (Sicherheitspolizei)) (AOB: in England often, incorrectly named Gestapo - which latter entity only operated inside German territory; whereas SD operated inside Germany (Amt III) as well as outside (Amt IV); where the latter entities were possessing offices in the diplomatic representations; such as in Spain and Portugal)
B. Training :
Subject did not receive special intelligence training. he did, however, have a rather extensive university training (accademic) training in foreign language, history, world politics, etc. Most of his knowledge of intelligence work he acquired by experience.
C. Present Mission :
Subject claims none. No evidence was brought to light that could disprove Subject's claim.
D. Past Missions and Assignments :
In 1936 Subject was entrusted with Stabsführung of SD Unterabschnitt X (Württemberg) in Sept. 1936. Subject held that position until Feb 1943, with two interruptions. Subject's activity in Stuttgart consisted mainly in securing personnel for and organizing the SD Leitabschnitt Stuttgart. From Sept until Dec 1941 Subject was in Russia as Leiter of Sonderkommando 4a (or 7a). (AOB: the most disgusting deployment of somebody was his involvement in the "Sonderkommandos". These entities, committed the most of the atrocities against civilians in Russia! It was the general SS policy, to let commit most of their personnel atrocities. Why? Maybe, as to become as much implicated. It is very noticeable: that it was Himmler himself whom prevented, call it blocking, that Schellenberg would become involved in this respect. Albeit, that it was against Heydrich's desire to let get also Schellenberg "dirty hands".) He returned to Russia for a second "Osteinsatz" from 15 August 1942 till 15 Jan 1943. (Details about Subject's activities in Russia are contained in Appenndix #2) After having made Schellenberg's acquaintance Subject obtained a transfer to the RSHA (R.S.H.A.), Berlin, and was appointed leader (Leiter) of Gruppe VI-B (Italy, France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal). When the Abwehr was incorporated into the various Ämter of the RSHA, in the summer of 1944, Subject was made Leiter of Abteilung Mil. B (all countries connected with the Western→
KV 2/966-1, page 18e
Steimle, Eugen, (Cont'd)
Theatre of Operations, including England, and the Americas)
In Sept 1944 Amt VI, including Subject's departments. was evacuated to Camp "Waldburg" near Berlin, and in March 1945 the Gruppen VI-B and VI-D were evacuated to Castle Lauenstein in Thüringen. With a greatly reduced staff, Gruppen VI-B and VI-D moved again in April 1945, this time to Rottach-Egern, Tegernsee, Bavaria, where these groups ceased operating, due to inadequate communications, and the imminent end of the war. After an unsuccessful attempt at connecting Kaltenbrunner (Leiter R.S.H.A.) at Bad Aussee, Austria, on 29 or 30 April 1945, Subject proceeded to Bernau, on the Chiemsee, Bavaria. He was in the company of Dr. Paeffgen, Leiter of VI-D, and Lothar Fendler, Leiter of the Spain Referat (VI) B-4. Subject and Paeffgen left Bernau in the beginning of Aug 1945, and were arrested after visiting their respective families. Fendler remained in Bernau (Note: A "lead" for Fendler was sent out by his office to Third Army CIC on 17 Oct 1945) For details see Appendix #3)
V. Agent's Comment :
Subject is an educated man of well above average intelligence. He impressed this agent as an extremely ambitious and aggressive man, with a capacity of working hard and steadily, cutting down on deadwood and unnecessary red tape whenever possible, and opposing keen judgement capable of differentiating between important and unimportant matters. His attitude is in many ways that of a proud self-made man, who hails from a humble family, and who has been catapulted into a position of great importance. His self-confidence and satisfaction with his own achievements are so pronounced, that he could be characterized as an extremely vane and egocentric person. This agent (the interrogator) has found it of advantage during the interrogation, to take these features of Subject into consideration. Subject is very quick in terming former associates and subordinates as incompetent and inefficient, and reserves praise for only a small number of GIS (German Intelligence Service) personnel. During his tenure of office he devoted much time to the procurement of capable men and the disposal of inadequate personnel. Subject showed a great interest in literature, music, and world events. He realized that his poor first-hand knowledge of foreign countries was a definite shortcoming, especially for a man in his position. He has a certain conception of honor (honour), in which loyalty to his "comrades", honesty, and devotion to a cause play a prominent role. It appears to be true that he did not enrich himself through the Nazi movement.
Subject admits frankly that he was great believer in the Nazi cause, and points out that he belonged to the generation of young Nazis who wanted to introduce liberal ideas, more freedom and enlightenment, and peaceful foreign relations to the system that had been created by the man of the 1933 revolution, and that was characterized by strict dictatorial controls, the "Führerprinzip", and often by crude force. He mentions Schellenberg and Sandberger (KV 2/105) as other members of that young group, which, he added was never organized. Subject states now that, as a realist, he is convinced that the total collapse of Germany is conclusive proof that the Nazi system was not efficient, and that it would therefore be unwise to ever resurrect such a system again. In regard to his future political reorientation Subject stated that he deems politics→
KV 2/966-1, page 19f
Steimle, Eugen, (Cont'd)
to be of secondary importance now, and that the primary task is at present, as he sees it, to insure the biological survival of the German nation. When asked what type of political system Subject would recommend for Germany, he described a system of "checks and balances", of democratic procedures in the field of elections, freedom of the press, speech and criticism, backed by strong and rather centralized executive. There should be only only very few parties, perhaps two or three, as in the USA. He added that he is not a advocate of the "Führerprinzip" in the strict sense, and that he is not a militarist. He expressed his glowing love for the fatherland and his interest in a speedy reconstruction. In the field of foreign relations, in which, as he flatters himself, he is an expert and competent judge, he suggests that advantage be taken of Germany's geographic and geo-political key position in Europe which will cause different major powers to compete for control of Germany. Cooperation should be obtained from one or more of these powers in the reconstruction of Germany. Cooperation should be obtained from one or more of these powers in the reconstruction of Germany. It is this agent's (the interrogator's) opinion that Subject's opinion on the future of German internal politics was influenced by his desire to please the Americans, and to create the impression that he is a (former) Nazi leader who is capable of a political reorientation. The facts seem to be that he is too smart to be a fanatic, diehard Nazi, but he is, as a profoundly nationalistic German ready, willing, and probably able to help engineer an ultimate resurrection of the German power, in economic, and militaristic fields (AOB: about early 1949 the New "Bundesrepublik Deutschland" had been established; and about late 1956 the Germans possessed a new "Bundeswehr" and became thereafter a Member of NATO), under unscrupulous employment of any means and methods at his disposal. Subject would be a logical person to be contacted and to cooperate in the organization of any German movement aimed at undermining the Allied occupation and peace effort. It is in this sense that Subject should be considered a security menace (poor chap). (AOB: in my opinion: the interrogator could not have imagined the new course Europe would go quite soon, think of: since 1949, under Bundeskanzler Adenauer (1949-1963))
Throughout this interrogation, Subject's personal conduct was correct, polite, and by and large cooperative. He responded favourably to considerate treatment, and greatly appreciated occasional small favours, which paid dividends in terms of information. At the beginning of this interrogation Subject (Steimle) was somewhat reluctant to talk about former associates, friends, and subordinates, because his conception of honor would not permit him to become a "stool pidgeon." He was then given to understand, and repeatedly reminding during the interrogation, that our information of the GIS (German Intelligence Organisation) is so complete, that we are in no need of Subject's statements for successful CI operations; that his statements are merely of interest because they would come from Leiter of Gruppe VI-B, and Mil. (Amt) B, who as an important man, was in an excellent position to have a good overall picture of all Amt VI affairs in general, and VI B, and Mil. B in particular; that he could choose to be cooperative in giving information, which would then guide the American authorities in their opinion of Subject. As a result of this, Subject decided to talk freely. The information he gave has been found reliable, as far as this agent could determine.
It must be pointed out that in one specific instance Subject has intentionally withheld information: His two periods of "Osteinsatz" (quite understandable, as after all he was later sentenced to death for his commitments in Russia; which finally, by McCoy, had been changed and he was set free in 1954) as Leiter of a Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei) and SD Sonderkommando in Russia. (Details are contained in Appendix #2). That subject was not brought up by this agent until the very end of the interrogation, and had a rather devastating effect on Subject's state of mind. He is fully aware of the grave implications of the position he held in Russia. He admits having ordered the→
KV 2/966-1, page 20g
shooting of active partisans and Communists, which he considers justified under the provisions of international law, but he emphatically denied ever ordered the shooting, or killing by other means, of civilians, jews, or hostages. Although Steimle does not impress this agent as a cruel and bloodthirsty person, he will undoubtedly be a worthwhile subject for a special investigation by Allied War Crimes Authorities.
Although this report contains the bulk of Subject's factual knowledge of the GIS, as far as it is of direct CI interest, and as far as it will aid in further CI operations, Steimle is in a position to give further interesting information of the more general nature, such as "Inter-Office Politics in the RSHA (R.S.H.A.)", "Cooperation among the agencies of the GIS", "Germany's Future". etc.
(a) Subject, who has been transferred to USFET Interrogation Center (sorry: Centre), should be put at the disposal of such higher Allied agency that may, in order to complete their overall picture of the GIS, require a certain type of information from Subject which has not been covered in this report.
(b) This case should be brought to the attention of the Allied War Crimes Authorities. In this connection Appendix #2 of this report might serve as a starting point for a special investigation.
(c) Subject should be interned in accordance with SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) Counter Intelligence Bulletin, dated 13 April 1945.
/s/ George G. Charing
Special Agent, CIC.
(Sgd) John G. Hammond,
As to prevent too much duplication, I have decided to transcribe only some of the Final Interrogation Report
KV 2/966-1, page 22a
At first I was given Stabsführung of SD (S.D.) Unterabschnitt X (Württemberg and in Sep 1936 appointed Führer SD (S.D.) Unterabschnitt (Württemberg). I retained this position until Feb 1943 when I was called into RSHA (R.S.H.A.) Berlin. My superior were Oberabschnittsführer des SD (S.D.) Südwest - later re-named Inspekteur Südwest, Dr. G.A. Scheel, and since 1941, Dr. Fischer who became Inspekteur in Berlin 1944. I am referring to the task and organisation of SD (S.D.) Inland (Amt III) in a special chapter. My activities in Stuttgart consisted in securing personnel and organizing what later was known as the SD (S.D.) Leitabschnitt Stuttgart. For leading positions I selected young men with college education who, generally speaking, were not SS (S.S.) members at that time. At that time no special training was required. Only later on some of my collaborators were sent for 3-4 weeks' training to SD (S.D.) school Bernau near Berlin. At the outbreak of war, all SD (S.D.) members born 1913 or later had to be returned over to the Wehrmacht. This meant a 50% reduction in personnel. It was only from this time on that female personnel was employed in S.D. (S.D.). My call to Berlin was the result of a meeting I had with SS Brigadeführer Schellenberg (Head of Amt VI). This meeting was on official business in which Schellenberg (KV 2/94 ... KV 2/99) got to know me and resulted in his efforts to have me transferred to Berlin. I personally agreed with my new employment as I was under the impression that this was a way to attain ambitions to participate in foreign policy activities. I quickly adjusted myself to the new job. I had taken over the direction (Leitung) of Gruppe VI-B in Amt VI (Actually Amt VI-B)of the RSHA (R.S.H.A.). Within the framework of Amt VI and its scope of obtaining political information of Italy, Spain-Portugal, Switzerland, France, Belgium and Holland. The Gruppe was subdivided in 4 Referate B1 - B4. Also, in this department the selection and the number of personnel was poor and insufficient and handicapped me seriously throughout my tenure of office. The reason for this was the fact that the Politische Auslandsnachrichtendienst or "Geheimer Meldedienst" (G.M.D.) had no tradition and for all practical purposes was created only in 1941 by Schellenberg. This implied that G.M.D. had neither the factual experience nor trained personnel. The creation of an official new organization in neutral countries during times of war - or, even more, in enemy countries is practically an impossibility if serious results are to be the →
KV 2/966-1, page 23b
criterion of such an effort. nevertheless, my Gruppe succeeded in realizing shortly the political attitude and developments in the countries coming under it, and, also, did it succeeded in obtaining detailed information. On the basis of collected news items, reports re the respective countries were edited at irregular intervals. Special reports were made up and submitted to Brigadeführer Schellenberg. It was up Schellenberg to decide whether they were to be filed or passed on through Dr. Kaltenbrunner (Leiter des R.S.H.A) (KV 2/269 ...KV 2/274), to Himmler, Ribbentrop (Minister of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt)) or Goebbels (Minister of Propaganda). I was thoroughly satisfied and deeply interested in my work, mainly because I was in complete agreement with Schellenberg especially in refusing the policy of the German Foreign Office (Ribbentrop) We both felt the urgency for an understanding with the Western Allies at the cost of sacrificing domestic and foreign aims of National Socialism, as well as the need of personnel changes in Germany's leadership. The difficulties Amt VI and Schellenberg had to face were tremendous. The Foreign Office (A.A.) did not approve of the G.M.D. and rendered no support. Moreover, it continuously tried to impede our work. On the other, G.M.D. held a particular and controversial place within RSHA (R.S.H.A.), often finding itself in juxtaposition to Amt IV (Gestapo) (AOB, not correct: Gestapo was Amt V; Amt IV covered S.D. and Sipo abroad. On the other hand there existed overlaps, so was the Leiter of Amt IV known as: Gestapo Müller) (and, for example in Lisbon, located inside the diplomatic representation, the Leiter of Referat IV took sometimes also care of Referat VI matters) because the nature of its work was entirely different, and there was a distinct difference in the type of people engaged in it. (Most Amt III and Amt IV personnel originated from former police branches) Due to his personality more and more people gathered around Schellenberg. (AOB, at least since 1944 - Himmler himself protected Schellenberg to a great extent) These people were all striving for new political ways, especially in regard to foreign politics and were of a generation which felt was new compared with that of the 1933 Revolution (Hitler's Machtsergreifung). We were resolved to use our influence permanently and in an evolutionary way so as to convert our views into practice at the right time. However, developments of the war after the invasion were so fast, that there was no chance for the hoped for development to go into effect. Evacuation of Camp VI (Bekaerstraße32 ..38) to Camp "Waldburg" near Berlin in Sep 44 an to Castle Lauenstein of Thüringen in March 1945 brought about separation of German leadership agencies to an extent which more and more curtailed the efficiency of Amt VI. Finally, with the removal of the remainder of Amt VI to Tegernsee all activity was suspended. Evacuation to Lauenstein and Tegernsee was effected exclusively by Gruppe VI-B and VI-D.
After cessation of hostilities I personally left Austria for Chiemsee, Bavaria. Early Aug 45 I went to Württemberg to inquire the whereabouts of my family. I lived under the assumed name Hermann Buelach and also had a passport made out of this name for identification purposes. I had requested this passport from the Office of the of Police, Berlin, in 1944 for reasons of official business. When I was interrogated 20 Oct 45 by CIC in Backnang I volunteered my original personal data. Having assured myself of the whereabouts and condition of my wife and children I saw no more reason to hide from American Authorities. In my political activities I was always guided by idealism. The love of my country was born with me.
Sgd. Eugen Steimle
Backnang, 4 October 1945
KV 2/966-1, page 24a
Steimle's Activities with Sonderkommandos 4a and 7a in Russia. Personalities of Skd 4a and Skd 7a
Part A: Steimle's first "Osteinsatz":
1. Steimle's first "Osteinsatz" (Commitment in the East (Russia)) lasted from Sep'41 Dec '41, as the Leiter (Chief) of Sonderkommando 4a (or 7a) (The Germans invaded Russia on 22 June 1941) of the "Einsatzgruppe B". Skd 4a was then attached to the German 9th Army and had it's last headquarters in Kalinin. Steimle admits having signed orders for the execution of active partisans. He further admitted to this agent that he carried through, according to orders, the registration of the Jews in Kalinin. he denies emphatically, however, that he never ordered the shooting of Jews or other civilians, or ever having ordered the execution of hostages. As this agent points out in the main part of this report (under Agent's Comments), Steimle declined to write a voluntary statement about his activities in Russia for fear of making a written commitment that may be introduced as evidence in a legal court, at a future date. He did, however, cooperate in giving information on the subject orally.
2. Steimle left Kalinin on or about 5 Dec 1941, and proceeded to Stuttgart. There he obtained a certificate from a dentist to the effect that was in need of urgent dental treatment. he was thereupon relieved of his duties as chief of the Sonderkommando, and continued to lead the SD (S.D.) Stuttgart.
3. Sonderkommando 4a (or 7a) consisted of approximately 100 persons at the time Steimle was in command. These included personnel of the SD (S.D.), Gestapo (strange these operated normally on German territory only), Kripo (Kriminalpolizei, actually the police dealing with thieves and burglars) and Waffen SS (more or less to be compared as: a voluntary military organisation; leaving out excesses). At various times under Steimle's command headquarters of Skd 4a was established at Welish, Wieliki-Luki, Wjasma, Rschew, and Kalinin, all in Russia.
4. Steimle recalls the following leading personalities of Skd. 4a (or 7a) which he headed from September to December 1941:
a. Blume, Dr. fnu* (First Name (or Forename) Unknown), SS Standartenführer, Leiter of above Skd. before Steimle. He had been chief of personnel in Amt I (Organisation of R.S.H.A.), before his "Osteinsatz". Later on he became BdS (Befehlshaber des Sicherheitsdienstes) in Athens, Greece, and was finally commandeered to the Waffen SS/ According to Steimle he had the reputation of being correct, almost soft man.
b. Rapp, fnu, SS Standartenführer in Munich (München). Later on he became IdS? in Brunswick (Braunschweig), and finally chief of Gruppe VI-C of the RSHA (R.S.H.A.). According to Steimle he had the reputation of being a ruthless man.
c. Foltis, fnu, SS Hauptsturmführer, in charge of the executive branch of above Skd. He came from SD (Breslau?). F. Together with other young men of the same Skd, ho?left to attend a course at the University of Berlin. He passed his examinations, obtained a law degree, and became an official of the Gestapo or Kripo. Age 30-32; probably comes from Silesia.
d. Radl, who is known as Skorzeny's adjutant, and who was arrested with Skorzeny, was Steimle's adjutant, and was recommended to Skorzeny by Steimle.
e. Mayer, or Meyer, fnu, SS Obersturmführer, Kriminal Kommisar (regular police), former student of theology, left for Berlin to complete his studies. Age 30-32; he comes from the Rhineland.
f. Heuser, fnu, SS Untersturmführer, Kriminal Kommissar, was on the leading Amt IV (Ausland S.D. and Sipo) men of above Skd. He comes from Schleswig-Holstein.
KV 2/966-1, page 25b
Part B: Steimle's Second "Osteinsatz":
5. Steimle's second "Osteinsatz" lasted 15 August 1942 to 15 January 1943, as the Leiter (chief) of Sonderkommando 7a (or 4a), which part of "Einsatzgruppe C". At the above Steimle's Skd. was attached to the 6th German Army (this Army surrendered on 1st-3rd February 1943 in Stalingrad!) and later on the 2nd German Army, in the area of the Ukraine and the (Donetz Basis). The Skd was following German advance towards Stalingrad at that time. Steimle states that there were no more Jews in the area his Skd. had to cover, indicating that certain Sipo-Kommandos ahead of his own had finished most of that "job". Last Command Post of Steimle's while he was heading it, was in Kursk, from October 1942 to at least 15 January 1943. (AOB: the German Army was retreating from the east towards more west, as to escape Russian encirclement; though Stalingrad was far too much East at the banks of the river Wolga, and their supply-lines were cut-off; its >300,000 men necessitated about 500 tons supplies each day!) Steimle states that the main activity of his Skd. (or 4a) during his presence was the elimination of partisans and active Communists.
Ukraine is nowadays well known
Please orientate yourself at Charkov (Charkiv) and follow the yellow border-line up to its most eastern point south-wards; here lays about the Donetz area, were currently heavy fighting is taking place daily.
Wolgograd, once named "Stalingrad" was occupied by the Germans for ca. 95 percent (the battle started 20th August 1942; though, the German chances changed vastly after the Russians initiated their huge counter-offensive against the Germans on 9th November 1942).
At the bottom-end down we just encounter the Caucasus (Kaukasus) Mountain Chain.
One of the German aims were, to cross the Caucasus and join with Rommel's troops arriving via the "North African" route; then the Middle-East would have been encircled and likely occupied by the Germans; but this, luckily, never matured!
He (Steimle) admitted to this agent that he did sign orders for the shooting of such persons. Steimle claims that he suffered psychologically when he reflected on the duties and activities of those Sonderkommandos or similar organisations. He attempted, then, to find a justification for the cruelties performed by those "Kommandos", pointing to himself the ruthless bombing policy by the Allied Air Forces, resulting in the death of numerous German civilians, and numerous casualties inflicted on the German troops by Russian partisans and Communists. Steimle left Russia approximately 15 January 1943, to return home for a furlough (leave). While in Germany he finally obtained the long wished? for transfer to the RSHA (R.S.H.A.), as Chief (Leiter) of Gruppe VI-B.
5. Steimle recalls the following leading personalities of Sonderkommando (Skd.) 7a (or 4a) Einsatzgruppe C, which he headed in Ukraine from 15 August 1942 to 15 January 1943:
a. Blobel (spelling uncertain), fnu, SS Standartenführer (Obst.; Colonel), chief of above Skd. from the beginning of the Russian campaign until the Skd. reached Charkow (Charkiv). He remained until about 15 March 1942. Blobel had previously been SD (S.D.) Abschnittsführer in the Rhineland. He was a veteran of the First World War, and is over 50 years old. Members of the Skd. who worked under him, decribed him as hard and ruthless. He was very unpopular. (Note: He became notorious as the Commanding Officer of Skd. 1001, concerned with the extermination of gas of political prisoners).
b. Weinmann, Dr. Erich, SS Standartenführer, successor to Blobel. He is? 36-37 years old, a physician. Hhe comes from Tübingen, Württemberg. Before his "Osteinsatz" he was SD (S.D.) Abschnittsführer of Berlin. In September 1942 he became the BdS (Befehlshaber des Sicherheitsdienstes) in Prague (Prag), where he remained until the time of the collapse. Steimle describes him as smart, intelligent man of good character, who was very popular with the members of his Kommando. He allegedly tried to avoid hardship whenever? possible. His prestige with the 6th German Army was excellent, in contrast to that of Blobel.
c. Schmidt (spelling uncertain), fnu, SS Sturmbannführer (Major), Regierungsrat?
KV 2/966-1, page 26c
He joined the above Skd. in September 1942, in the area of Don. He came from the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei) and had previously been Chief of Investigations, with the Investigation Judge (Untersuchungsrichter) of the RSHA (R.S.H.A.). He handled all matters of Gestapo interest in the Skd. After Steimle was relieved, in January 1943, Schmidt headed the Skd. until it was dissolved. Subsequently he became the Chief of Gestapo Stelle Kiel, Germany, where he probably remained until the end of the war. He is 36-38 years old, and comes from the Rhineland.
d. von Radetzki, fnu, SS Sturmbannführer (Major) . He was about 35 years old and comes from the Baltic States. he originally joined the Skd. as interpreter (Russian), but was mainly employed as liaison officer with the staff of the Army to which the Skd. was attached. He also lead sub-detachments of the SS?. In Spring of 1943 he was transferred to the staff of the BdS Kiew. In the Summer of 1943 Steimle requested von Radetzki's transfer to Amt VI, which was approved. Radetzki then became liaison officer with the SS Standarte "Kurt Eggers" which which was made up of SS Propaganda Companies. Steimle disclaims any knowledge of Radetzki's whereabouts.
e. Schlierbach, fnu, SS Sturmbannführer, Regierungsrat, successor to Radetzki, as liaison officer between the Skd. and the 6th Army. Age 35-36. he belonged to the Gestapo. Steimle states that according to his mental makeup, Schlierbach was not the right man for the police-executive, but a good legal mind for administrative matters. He was not an SS-man or Party member of long standing. Steimle lost sight of him after he left the Skd. in October 1942.
f. Riesle, fnu, SS Obersturmbannführer (Obstlt. - Lt.-Colonel), formerly a Krimminal-Kommissar with the Kripo. Age about 32; he comes from Northern Germany. Riesle left Skd. because illness, in November 1942. He wished to return to the Kripo (Criminal Police think of burglary, thieves and prostitution ...).
g. At the end of October 1942 the above Skd. took over two SS Obersturmführer from Sonderkommando 4b, whose name Steimle does not remember. One was a Kommissar of the Kripo, the other a Kriminal-Inspektor of the Gestapo.
h. Thomas, fnu, SS Gruppenführer, Befehlshaber (Chief) (Leiter) of "Einsatzgruppe C" (Ukraine), with headquarters in Kiew. This was the next higher echelon of Steimle's Skd. Thomas had previously been in Paris, and became later on Höherer SS and Polizeiführer" of the Crimean Peninsula. Steimle heard by way of a rumour that Thomas was furloughed a few months before the end of the war because of illness or injury.
/s/ George G. Charig
Special Agent, CIC.
KV 2/966-1, page 27d
Personalities of Amt VI, RSHA (R.S.H.A.)
Paeffgen, Theodor, SS Obersturmbannführer, Gruppenleiter VI-D. Paeffgen left Austria with Steimle, and lived in Bernau on the Chiemsee under his correct name until 1 August 1945, when he decided to go to Bad Toelz (Bad Tölz), Bavaria to visit his wife. He intended to report voluntary to the American authorities after that visit. Steimle expressed his believe that Paeffgen carried out his intention of reporting to the American authorities.
Wirsing, Giselherr, SS Sturmbannführer (he wasn't actually engaged in these services), .. His Amt VI activity is not listed in SHAEF cards.) He is reported by USFET. He is known in Germany as a Journalist. For many years after 1933 he was the main editor of the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" (A Munch daily news paper). As a top-flight journalist he had many interviews with famous politicians, among others, with President Roosevelt. He was a political author widely read in intellectual circles. His book about America "Der Masslose Kontinent" (The Unlimited Continent) is especially well known. His latest book, Zeitalter des Ikarus (The Era of Ikarus) was particularly successful. He rejected sharply the politics of the German Foreign Office (Ribbentrop's Ministry), and was advocate of "Westverständigung" (Agreement with the Western Powers). Wirsing stayed in Tegernsee, Bavaria until 20 April 1945 and then tried to reach Schellenberg in Northern Germany. (where Schellenberg dealt with Heinrich Himmler! and Giselherr Wirsing was attending as well, albeit on Schellenberg's demand) (please consider the according link on our website) (The story of his escape in a Ju 88 night fighter flying towards Lübeck on Schellenberg's request; also his returning flight from Flensburg to Southern Germany was also spectacular).
Steimle is almost certain that Wirsing left Munich by plane (Ju 88) (https://www.cdvandt.org/Wirsing-Giselher-Egmont-PF602866-V5.pdf) towards the end of April (1945) and believes (incorrectly) Wirsing is a prisoner of the British. he is about 40 to 45 years old, his home is in or near Würzburg.
KV 2/966-1, page 37a
Organization and Personalities and Personalities of Amt Mil., Especially Abteilung Mil.-B.
The former Abwehr des OKW (OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr), previously known in OKW as Amt Ausland/Abwehr, was transferred according to its elements into Amt Mil (Militärischer Amt) of RSHA in the spring of 1944 (originating due to the defection of the Vermehren couple in Istambul (Istanbul) about 6-7 February 1944; Hitler decided on 12 February that from-now-on the OKW Ausland/Abwehr should merge with the R.S.H.A. Amt VI), Chief of Bureau (Amtschef) was Obst. i.G. Hansen. (formerly under Admiral Canaris) he headed (Leiter) Amt I in the OKW Amt Berlin. After 20 July (the failed assassination attempt on Hitler), Chief of Bureau (Amtschef) VI was Schellenberg (whom was already the Leiter of the entire Amt VI in Berlin), also took over the Amt Mil (once headed by Hansen the former OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr) (Personalunion). Remaining in Amt Mil of the old Abwehr were the so-called Abwehr I (Army Air, Navy), Abwehr II (sabotage) and Abwehr III-F (counter espionage in neutral and enemy countries). The Amt Mil was organized along the same lined as the Ämter of OKW into Abteilungen and Gruppen.
Abteilung Mil A: Organisation, Personnel, Training and Administration. Abteilungsleiter: SS-Standarten-Führer Dr. Sandberger (KV 2/105).
Abteilung Mil B: Western Theater = (theatre) of Operations. Abteilungsleiter SS-Standartenführer (Obst. - Colonel) Steimle (subject of this file series).
Abteilung Mil C: Eastern Theater of Operations. Abteilungsleiter: Obstlt. i.G. Ohletz (KV 2/106) (i.G. = im Generalstab; a high class military career).
Abteilung Mil D: Sabotage and destruction. Abteilungsleiter: SS-Obersturmbannführer (Major) Skorzeny (KV 2/403). (It is not known to Steimle to what extent Mil D has been merged with VI-S (also Leiter Skorzeny)
Abteilung Mil E: Communications section (Abteilung für Nachrichtenwesen) Nachrichtenregiment 506 Abteilungsleiter: Major Poretschkin (in post war days a General of the Bundeswehr)
Abteilung Mil F: Tactical Intelligence (Abteilung Frontaufklärung) Abteilungsleiter Obst. i.G. Buntrock.
Abteilung Mil G: Intelligence technique (Nachrichtentechnik) such as papers ink, etc. (: think of falsification of passports, documents etc.) (Abwehr section G handled the same type of commitments) (G = Geheim) Abteilungsleiter: Obstlt. Boening (according to Steimle's knowledge this Dept. was later on merged with VI F as well as Mil E) (Its actual address was not situated at the Bekaerstrasse 32-38, but at Beymestraße 12, in Berlin)
KV 2/966-1, page 41 (partially)
Portugal. The Chief's name is Obstlt. (Lt-Col.)
Friederici (Frederici). He is mentally clumsy and,
from the intelligence point of view, incapable officer, whose recall was
urgently demanded by Steimle. In the search to find an able successor, the
recall did not materialized until in the very end. The KO-chief in Portugal, was
a Lt.Col. 50 to 60 years of age. Until his appointment to this post (April-August
1944), during the summer of 0f 1944 he was Chief of the "Abwehrstelle"
Krakau or Warschau. The entire KO consisted of about 7 to 10 officers. Its
news-results were insignificant. On the other hand, one "Nachrichten-Netz
'Ostro', (actually Paul Georg Fidrmuc) (AOB: the
first huge file I have dealt with in 2015-2017:
https://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-queries.htm and extensively:
https://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm), guided (nonsense,
as Paul Georg Fidrmuc alias Ostro operated totally free from any direct
German guiding) (directly from "Gruppe Mil B3" (AOB: the only
explication could have been: that in the OKW Ausland/Abwehr days, this before
12th February 1944; we was guided strangely by HIOB which stood for: Abwehr I
Heer Ost Berlin) (when someone would take the time,
I only can advice your consider my rather extensive
'mp4' session on the
case. The British XX Committee
considered twice to kill/eliminate after 'Osto'
predicted damn accurate about the expected Allied Landings on D-Day!)
... was especially successful
England. The name of this Netz is unknown to Steimle. The "Netz" (which
it actually wasn't) was known by the name of
"Ostro" and was active in Portugal in economic affairs (AOB:
More than that!)
Steimle mentions in this connection, that the good results of "Arabal" (likely a
cover name of the extremely effective British "Double-Cross" agent Garbo real
name Putjol Garcia: KV 2/39 .... KV 2/71 ++ who's existence had been kept
for decades as a top secret strictly) in Spain and "Ostro" in Portugal
occasionally brought about the suspicion that enemy decoy-information was being
delivered, although this never could be proven. The Headquarters of the
individual Armed Forces, in spite of inquiries, never had any doubt as the
genuineness of the material.
KV 2/966-1, page 44c
B. Amt Mil.
1. Kommando-Meldegebiet (KdM) Spanien, formerly KO-Spanien* (KOSp), 90% of which was concentrated in Madrid. Most of its members appeared on the list of persons to be expelled from Spain. (AOB: some weren't the British offered Spain huge bargains, but not all had been expelled whatever British pressure. Some were returned to Germany, but not always on British terms and landed in the US (American) controlled Zone) like was the case with 'Ostro' (Paul Georg Fidrmuc))
That list was published by the Spanish government in the Spring of 1944, and originally comprised (in wartime days) 400-500 names. Through negotiations the Germans were able to reduce that number to below 100. The Kommando-Meldegebiet (KdM) Spain consisted of approx. 80-100 men, including section "Chi", i.e. the coding, decoding and deciphering section. Only four or five officers of the KdM Spain were in the possession of true diplomatic credentials. (AOB: though, these possessed a valid "working permit" (Arbeitserlaubnis)) Besides Madrid, Barcelona was a concentration point of the KdM.
* KO = Kriegsorganisation (formerly connected to: OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr) ; was established in friendly neutral countries, and were mostly located inside the Consular premises.
KV 2/966-1, page 45 partially
Leiter of the KdM (formerly KO) (KOSp) Spain was
Lenz, fnu, (AOB: Lenz was,
among many an alias: his real
name was Korvetten-Kapitän Wilhelm Leissner),
who, however, was well known to the Allies as a leading German intelligence
Officer. He was therefore replaced in Oct 44 (August 1944
is more likely) by (Obstlt.) Lt. Col.
Kleyenstueber (he originated from Abwehr I L,
thus its Luftwaffe section) Ernst Arno Paul Kleyenstuber (Kleyenstüber).
Lenz (an alias of Wilhelm
Leissner) was instructed to continue posing a Leiter of the KdM Spain
to give Kleyenestueber an opportunity to reorganize the KdM (K.d.M.)
unobtrusively. (Agent's Note: Further details about Kleyenstueber's function (he
actually was the Leiter of K.d.M.
Spain; and no longer headed by: alias Lenz) was,
according to Steimle, (a) to clean up the KdM from a personnel point of view
(AOB: >> 500 men) (AOB: many
men used Madrid as a shelter against the war-reality in Germany). He was
to select, if possible, the persons that should be placed on the Spanish
expulsion list. (b) to consider and start with a reorganisation of Amt Mil. in
Spain (in this new Amt VI Amt Mil
were collected all those once ruled by OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr
and were designated to be transferred to Amt VI and they entered Mil Amt)
(Remaining in OKW were all those who were engaged in
short-lasting intelligence; think of a few
hours or one or two days only. These
informations possessed tactical - rather then
intelligence value) (AOB: another curiosity
- all those once on the OKW pay-list
(Personalamt) stayed there,
for administrative matters. One significant reason
was: that someone in the Military Services,
made a "career and this influenced their whole
military life"; as to prevent downfalls - as the R.S.H.A.
was SS controlled a possessed a rather different personnel system) He
succeeded in placing 5-6 German Intelligence Officers in Spain, outside the
channels of the KdM, with good "cover".
(c) he was to coordinate the efforts of the KdM Spain with those of the KdM's inside Germany (here replacing the 'Ast and Nest organisations'), that had ties, contacts and possibly agents in Spain.
KV 2/966-2, page 1
The "I-Netz" (AOB: the character capital "J" in German spelling stands for capital "I"; though outside Germany no-one knows this and mistakenly will introduce J instead of correctly "I") (AOB: S1 might point at Amt VI-S Skorzeny's sabotage Referat; where the letter S actually stood for) (Stay-Behind "Information Net" (sometimes "Invasions-Netz") of Amt VI in Western Europe.
The political and military situation in Western Europe was characterized by Allied preparations for the Invasion at the time Steimle took charge of his post in Amt VI in February 43. Therefore, after a brief period of orientation Steimle proposed the formation of an "Invasion-net" (J-Netz) (AOB: according German spelling it then would have been written: Invasionsnetz; or Invasion-Netz) (AOB: We always should be aware - that there are more readers than Anglo-Saxons only) to Mr. Schellenberg (Leiter Amt VI and Amt Mil). After his Chief agreed this plan, a corresponding order was signed by Kaltenbrunner (Leiter of the entire R.S.H.A.) (AOB: above Kaltenbrunner stood only Heinrich Himmler) in May 1943.
The order read that a net of confidence men was to be built up to sections of France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway in view of a possible invasion of the territories in question. That would enable Amt VI to obtain information from these territories in case of an invasion. Individual instructions were to be given by Amt VI. The order was issued to the Commandants of the Sipo and SD in Paris, Brussels, The Hague (Den Haag) , Oslo and Copenhagen.
During the succeeding period it was the task of Referat VI-B2 (the competent operational headquarters) to see that this order was complied with in full details; that the corresponding operational organisations, i.e. the Amt VI in Paris, Brussels, The Hague, etc., were properly advised, and that the operation of the "I-Netz" (J-Netz) was controlled.
The order was taken very lightly, especially - and absurdly enough - by the BdS (Befehlshaber des Sicherheitsdienstes), Paris, Dr. Knochen, who presented it was completely unnecessary and therefore did not support it. It is known to Steimle that Dr. Knochen, the BdS, Paris, made statement whereby he thought it impossible that an invasion would succeed. he also expressed the opinion that, if Paris were already lost to the Allies, the war for Germany would be lost too. This attitude of the BdS (B.d.S.) was the first great barrier for the formation of an I-Net (J-Netz). Furthermore, Amt VI was lacking in experience at that time. Only after constant pressure did Amt VI in Paris charge a few men with the new task.
The following places were used as training centres: a school in Paris which was very inefficient, a radio school in the Hague (AOB: cover name Seehof and was situated near a part of the Hague near to the Cats Huis (used by the ruling Dutch Government, and particularly known as Sorgvliet. There exist some descriptions what was taught there. In particular the files on Gimpel - Colepaugh https://www.cdvandt.org/gimpel-colepaugh-case.htm and https://www.cdvandt.org/gimpel-colepaugh-v4-mp4.htm (who went in late November 1944 to New York) additionally the file on https://www.cdvandt.org/zuehlsdorff.htm and https://www.cdvandt.org/zuehlsdorf-mp4.htm Actually all men, for some time, joined the courses together; and all were sent on behalf of Amt VI offices, located at the Berkaerstrasse 32-38 building, in Berlin) (Zuehlsdorff's story is quite sad, as after his nearly escape to Argentina he was handed-over to the Americans (F.B.I.) Why? Only because he was at the same time as Gimple and Colepaugh at the Seehof training course in the Hague! Zuehlsdorff never became operational against the Allies!) and in a few instances - a school in Lehnitz near Berlin. The training subjects in all three schools, were radio techniques and procedures. They were not attended successively, but each agent went to only one (single) school (AOB: training lasted several weeks) (it was by god not single military training - but also sports and also training on explosives for sabotage actions, a not unlikely skill for secret agents)
The school at The Hague was an institution of Amt VI-S (Skorzeny), with a subsection for radio training. The greater part of the pupils were trained there. However, too much time was lost there through military training which was not necessary for the commitments of agents of VI-B. Furthermore the classes were too big and too many people got acquainted with each other (AOB: this may be considered a sound argument), (though certain security measures were taken, such as cover-names and undercover contact places) (AOB: the school arranged occasionally some guided tourist tours, to, for instance, Amsterdam)
KV 2/966-2, page 20a
Organisation of the RSHA (R.S.H.A.) in 1945.
1. In 1945, the RSHA consisted of the following departments:
Amt I : High Command, Personnel Organization (Administrative Section)
Amt II : Administration (finance)
Amt III : SD (S.D.) (interior (Inland), "German Sphere of Life")
Amt IV : Gestapo?? S.D.! (political matters, Executive Branch) (SIPO) (AOB: Not inside Germany but in foreign spheres; therefore the Gestapo should not be attached here; as its jurisdiction was mainly limited to German territory), albeit, that the executive borders weren't always strict)
Amt V : Kripo (Kriminalpolizei) (AOB: regular police like for burglary, thieves, and also prostitution ..)
Amt VI : Foreign Political Intelligence Service
(Geheimer Meldedienst - G.M.D.)
Amt Mil : Military Intelligence Service - (most) parts of the former Abwehr (Also designated G.M.D.)
AOB: In foreign countries, such as in Portugal, the representation of Amt IV were also concerned with Amt VI matters.
The Head of each Amt was an Amtschef (Leiter of Department) These Ämter were subdivided into Gruppen. The Gruppen were headed by a Gruppenleiter (Chief of Section). Each Gruppe was composed of several Referate. The Referat was headed by a Referatsleiter. These subdivisions held true in all Ämter with exception of Amt Mil (The successor of OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr), which was organised in Abteilungen and Gruppen.
II. The RSHA has two bases and two completely different functions, according to its history of origin and its Personal composition:
a) The functioning of the state of the Police, in political and criminal police fields: This function was a transformed continuation of the activities of the political police and the criminal police machines of the former Provinces. There existed, for instance, a Württemberg Political Police as well as a Criminal Police before 1933. Even after 1933, the "Maschine" was carried principally by these employees of the former provincial police forces. An example: The former Chief Amt IV, Gruppenführer Mueller (Müller) (nickname: Gestapo Müller) (KV 2/2655), was an employee of the Bavarian political police before 1933; the former Chief Amt V, Guppenführer (Arthur) Nebe was an employee of the criminal police before 1933. (Arthur Nebe was executed later after the assassination attempt on Hitler, of 20 July 1944!)
b) The SD Intelligence Organisation of the SS: Its origin from the "Information Service Himmler" (founded approx. 1931) already points to the "information & intelligence" character of this organisation. Its task until 1933 was the observation and treatment (from an intelligence and information point of view) of the opposing political parties and of the political life in Germany. The accomplishments of this Service are rumoured to have been very moderate. Heydrich is the only one known to Steimle, who still played a part in the organisation later-on. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinhard_Heydrich and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinhard_Heydrich (He was cultural well educated played violin, but one of the most "worst personality" in the entire Third Reich). Heydrich is the only one known to Steimle, who played a part in the organization later-on (before June 1942).
The year 1933 brought the police task completely into the foreground. The SD (S.D.) existed as an unimportant instrument beside the Gestapo (Might Steimle have been aware that the core of the Gestapo counted together 15,000 men only!) , violently attached by latter organization, who saw in it a potential rival The employees of the Gestapo in Stuttgart were allowed to have anything to do with members of the SD. The Gestapo rejected the S.D. as incompetent, and untrained in police duties. (AOB: this is quite correct, but why? The core of Gestapo personnel came (originated) from the Kriminalpolizei (Kripo), and the S.D. personnel came (originated) mainly from the SS (S.S.) reservoir) (also Eugen Steimle lacked police training when he entered the S.D. in the 1930s).
(AOB: for example, the S.D. Police in Paris and the Netherlands, when wearing uniforms (often they wore civil clothes) they carried on one of their arms a "band" with the text: S.D. There hardly existed Gestapo personnel in Paris, and The Hague, in the Netherlands.) (further on worded: a rimmed SD (S.D.) insignia on the sleeves of their uniform)
KV 2/966-2, page 21
The sharp division was also evident in the Organization. The Head of the Gestapo in Berlin, until 1937/38, was the powerful Gestapo Amt of the Gestapo (Stapo) in Berlin. (AOB: the R.S.H.A. and its structure was established somewhere in 1939) besides the S.D. Hauptamt, at that time still very un important (thus also Steimle's job when he entered the S.D. in the 1930s). The Gestapo Amt was an apparatus led by State Officials; The S.D. Hauptamt was an SS Bureau, i.e., a tool of the S.S. Only in the course of the time did an an occasional exchange of officials and SS S.S. leaders take place in the Central Office. According to the methods used by the S.S. all Gestapo (Stapo) and Kripo Officials were given SS (S.S.) ranks (but the foregoing regular Police training remained in their 'life-long luggage'), which corresponded to their official ranks. Up to a few years ago, they could be distinguished as members of the Gestapo from members of the S.D., since the latter wore a rimmed SD (S.D.) insignia on the sleeves of their uniform.
Only in 1938/39 were both offices united in the R.S.H.A.. The difference of functions was, however, still expressed in the title of the Chief, who was called, as is known, "Chef" der Sipo und des S.D" just as his representatives in the Wehrkreise were called "Inspekteure der Sipo und des S.D." There was no merger in the operational work division of the individual Gaue: S.D. - (Leit) Abschnitte, Stapo - (Leit) Stellen, and Kripo-(Leit)Stellen, were working side by side. Their coordination was, in a certain sense, the job of the respective Inspektor , who possessed, however, only supervisory rights. Messages and Reports, on the other hand, went directly to the respective Amt. Thus, an all matters,
Mainly post- or early wartime days
the S.D. Abschnitt reported to Amt III (pre-war)
the Gestapo reported to Amt IV (pre-war)
the Kripo Stelle reported to Amt V
Vice versa, the orders from higher to lower echelon did not go through the Inspektor, who was only informed about particularly important matters.
As to the individual Ämter, Steimle can only give information about Amt III (Inland S.D. matters) and Amt VI, since, as S.S. Führer of the S.D., he did not work either for the Gestapo or the Kripo.
Amt III (S.D. Inland):
A State with a totalitarian form of Government, like the National Sozialist, lacks and public criticism as well as any check of its State Machiney (Staatsapparat), as is generally , as is generally guaranteed in a Demoncratic state by the Press and the opposition parties. This function was taken care of to a certain extent by the S.D. Inland (AOB: in my perception this is painting an incorrect picture; as the S.D. had a Security Function, maybe signalling what might upset the population), but with the limitation that its reports were refused by most ministries, in particular, by the Party Chancellory. Equally important was the fact that the Party fought most strongly any reports referring to Party matters. Thus, Steimle knows many cases where leaders of the S.D. were transferred by request of the particular Gauleiter (rather powerful men),, because the former had reported about irregularities within the NSDAP.
The fields covered by the S.D. Inland were approximately the following (in the occupied and friendly representations, the S.D. function was more like that of the Gestapo; maybe mixed-up with some form of intelligence)
1. Law and Administration (General situation)
2. Volkssturm and Public Health
3. Cultural life. (Amt VI-A)
Current weekly so-called Lageberichte directed at Amt III (S.D. Inland, and that like) of the R.S.H.A. concerning these branches or Lebensgebiete (which was the official designation), were written and submitted for information purposes to the ministries concerned with internal affairs and to Party Chancellory.
KV 2/966-2, page 22c
The reports did not deal with questions of personnel. but the object of its contents was existing conditions and issues. The first general paragraph was concerned with morale and the situation. In it the mood of the people was recorded in a truthful form, particularly after important events of military, political, or other nature. It was attempted Goebbels, workers in the streetcar approved. Thus, the object was not to ascertain the approval or disapproval of the regime, but to explore the real mood and opinion and their material causes of the people. It may seem unbelievable, but it is a fact that the S.D. Inland exercised the severest criticism of life in the Nat. Soc. (N.S.) State, and was consequently treated with particular distrust, in fact with downright disapproval, by the NSDAP. Dr. Goebbels (so Steimle heard during the time of his activities in Berlin) was supposed to have read very carefully the contents of the Reichslageberichte, and his editorials in the "Reich", as far as they were concerned with innerpolitical questions, were obviously based on the S.D. reports about general morale.
The four jurisdictional divisions mentioned above were concerned in a similar manner with the corresponding arteries of public life. They were taken care of by S.S. leaders trained in the respective professions, e.g. Law and Administration by lawyers, Economy by economists (Wirtschaftler), etc.
The Aussenstellen subordinated to the Abschnitte collected the material for the reports. They were mostly manned by salaried personnel, although there were also honorary Aussenstellenleiter. These, in turn, obtained their information through confidence men or other sources.
Only during the time of its foundation from 1937/38 was the S.D. concerned with personnel problems; after that time it confined itself exclusively to reports on the situation.
/s/ George G. Charig
Special Agent CIC
KV 2/966-2, page 25a (minute 19b)
Subject: Jebsen (see: https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-560-wrede-artist.htm)
To : Major Forrest, CI War Room, London
1. S.S. Standartenführer Steimle, Gruppenleiter VI-B and Mil
B, has never been officially concerned with Jebsen's case. At the time
Steimle succeeded Obstlt.
i.G. Wilhelm Kuebart as Leiter of Mil
B, shortly after 20 Jul 44 (the date of the attempted
assassination of Hitler), the case of Jebsen, as far as the Abwehr was
concerned, had been closed. In compliance with a brusque ultimatum served
Obergruppenführer Heinrich Mueller (Müller), chief
of Amt IV; Obst. Hansen, chief Mil Amt, had turned Jebsen over into the custody
of the Gestapo (Johann Jebsen was a German citizen).
(See Camp 020 report on
Kuebart; KV 2/410).
May or June 1944 (Jebsen's
abduction took place in the evening on 30 April 44
after the offices were closed; within the KO office
in the Consular premises, managed by Dr. Aloys
Schreiber Leiter I in Portugal) (see
https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-560-wrede-artist.htm), prior to to
Jebsen's being surrendered to the Gestapo, (what
follows is nonsense: Jebsen was abducted and
conveyed in a box together with a colleague (Moldenhauer)
in a special civil car and was brought that very night via the Portuguese
and later the Spanish/French border to Biarritz.
From there he was flown from Bordeaux to Berlin.
Kuebart's and Hansen's
first aim was to bring Jebsen for a Military tribunal.
Whatever happened, as what is
known isn't accurate enough,
under Amtsleiter IV Heinrich Müller, the
O.K.W. Wehrmacht High Command,
was forced to hand-over Jebsen to the S.S.
controlled authorities. Jebsen had been in the past
so stupid to cheat some of the S.S.
officials and now he as a highly and rightly suspected person -
finished in the Concentration Camp of Sachsenhausen. From here,
somewhere in early 1945, he was removed,
and his trace being lost for ever since) let us
skip the nonsense of paragraph 2.
3. AOB. The V-Mann was Popov M.I.5 codenamed Tricycle (see https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-560-wrede-artist.htm)
6. As an aftermath of Jebsen's abduction, Steimle was asked by
the personnel section to give a supplementary report of the "meritorious
conduct" (praiseworthy) of a certain Major
Schreiber the CO (Commanding Officer) Leiter Abt. I
KO Portugal , who had
some part (he
commanded it himself in his own (KO)
office) in the abduction and had been subsequently recommended by Obstlt.
Kuebart for an award. This is how Steimle learned about the methods used
to "recall" Jebsen.
KV 2/966-2, page 26b
Sgd. Henry D. Hecksher
AUS 1st Lt. MI
AOB: I have skipped, in my perception, quite some irrelevant pages, dealing with Steimle's plane crash, which didn't actually happen, and about his early days in the 1930s.
By Arthur O. Bauer