

Reference abstracts of

KV 2/140

This document contains materials derived from the latter file

Its purpose: to be used as a kind of reference document, containing my personal selection of report sections; which being considered of relevance.

My input: I have in almost every case created transcripts of the just reproduced file content.

However, sometimes adding my personal opinion; always accompanied by: (AOB, [My comment](#)) Because often is the context- or are cover-words known to almost everyone.

For it I can now rely upon a rather comprehensive data archive, which is still growing.

Please do not multiply this document

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My reflections on Wirsing are an exception in the regular KV 2/xxx series. He operated in the Nazi environment, but later on he created his own more critical point of views. What is intriguing me, is, the fact that he acted within the highest circles of the Third Reich. Since September 1944, with Schellenberg's backing, he published his "Egmont letters". Schellenberg fed him with "Foreign Intelligence Information" on a weekly basis. As to make tracing back the origins - he worked from his Berlin home-address; and got envelopes with all the Mil Amt (R.S.H.A. Amt VI) has got knowledge of; especially brought by a trusted courier. The aim of the "letters" was to inform the upper circles of the Third Reich of the state of affair outside Germany. The way it had been worded was "soft but smart", without too much offending. With some exceptions: Goering and Ribbentrop (not mentioned but surely also Goebbels) were not on the list of addressees. He painted the real state of World Affairs far more realistic than did Goebbels' propaganda machine; on the other hand, Himmler received a copy, as did Kaltenbrunner even Keitel informed Hitler occasionally. The situation becomes at the end of April 1945 "lunatic". I am certain: - that no one of the readers have ever heard of this story. As to emphasise his role, who would ever encounter such most curious events? Please read it yourself.

By Arthur O. Bauer

AGE 248		REPORT 0C916		89/0C0915	
*** SECRET *** MASTER CARD					
THIS PERSONAL PARTICULARS SHEET IS FOR REGISTRY USE AND TO FACILITATE INDEX AMENDMENTS. IT MAY NOT BE CHANGED EXCEPT BY AUTHORISED MEMBERS OF THE REGISTRY.					
B 9 0 0 nat German pob Schweinfurt emp 1932:Journalist 1932:Author		WIRSING, Giselher (Mr) WIRSING, Hans, Karl, Theodore (Mr) born 15.04.1907 1942:GERMANY 1945:BAVARIA			
3 1 2 ref PF602866		(1/ J/GE/) 1944:Member; Intell Serv; Germany (33/ / /) 1945:Detainee (55/11/ / 69) 1989:Current; File Status: RED 05.10.1989 (rep)			
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS					
*** SECRET ***					

Wirsing Hans Karl Theodore
File Status: **CODE RED**

Wirsing Giselher Egmont PF 602,866

(AOB, these kind of notices are, in my perception, related to the fact that they still desired to trace a person; in the changing environment of the “turning down” of the “Iron Curtain” in October 1989. All these forms are originating from early “October 1989”. Quite some individuals had proved in the past “hard nuts” to be cracked)

Wirsing, Giselher Stubaf. (AOB, a more honourable title, maybe necessary to cope with people. It might also originate from the fact, that he once belonged to "Himmler's Friendship Circle" (Freundenkreis))

Wirsing Hans Karl Theodore

Born 15.04.1907

Schweinfurt/Main

1932: Journalist/Author

File Status CODE RED 05.10.1989

1944: Worked for the German Intelligence Service

1945: Arrested by the Americans and interrogated.

PERSONAL PARTICULARS

File No.: P.F.602,866

Name: WIRSING Giselher

@: WIRSING Hans Karl Theodore

NB. EGMONT has been carded in the R.5.Cover Names Index.

*Address: 1942: GERMANY.
1945: BAVARIA.

PF 602,866 (AOB, "Egmont" was his cover-name, under which he published his secret "Egmont letters" in the Schellenberg environment (backing), since September 1944)

KV 2/140-1, page 8

2.12.38. "Nothing appears to be known of Herr WIRSING in TRANS-JORDAN. The C.I.D., however, in consultation with the Military Intelligence, has provided me with the following inf.:
'WIRSING was first heard of in PALESTINE in March, 1937, when an agent reported that he had seen him at the German Consulate-General in JERUSALEM on Feb.25th, and that he had shortly afterwards gone to AMMAN. It was stated that he was a Nazi Agent who had been sent to the East to disseminate Nazi propaganda, instigate agitation for the return of the German Colonies, and take part in a political mission. He was also reported to be an active supporter of the newspaper "TAT".. Neither the Military Intelligence nor CID had ever been able to locate or identify him"

Diplomatic Editor of the "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten".

2.12.38 "Nothing appears to be known of Herr Wirsing in Trans-Jordan.

Wirsing was first heard of in Palestine in March 1937, when an agent reported that he had seen him at the German Consulate-General in Jerusalem on Feb.25th, and that he had shortly afterwards gone to Amman.

21.1.39. Diplomatic Editor of "MÜNCHENER NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN"... Hans Karl Theodore WIRSING... Accompanied Dr. Fritz GROBBA, German Minister to Iraq, on his journey to JEDDAH by air.

21.1.39. Diplomatic Editor of "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten".. Hans Karl Theodore

NEW CARD		AMENDMENT TO SHAEF No.....	
Name:	WIRSING, Giselherr. @ WIRSING, Hans Karl Theodor. @ EGMONT.	Nat.:	German
Status:	SS. Stubaf.	Cat.:	III
Address:	BERLIN.	Ger	BERLIN
Description:			
Misc.:	Editor of "Die Tat" and "Muenchener Neueste Bachrichten".		
Career:	Personnel V-mann to SCHELLENBERG (qv) chief of Amt. VI - RSHA. (1944-1945) Was responsible for the world political situation reports of Amt. VI. Still with Amt. VI. (Apr 45) Arrested by the 3rd Army. (Jul 45)		

Wirsing, Giselher

@ Wirsing, Hans Karl Theodor @ Egmont

SS. Stubaf.

Address Berlin

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Prisoner's role and importance in Nazi GERMANY are hard to assess. There is no convenient category into which he falls easily: his SS rank was of no significance, and even during his most influential period he was a mere Lt in the German Army. Yet Prisoner's political influence has been of significance and has stretched further than the authority normally accorded to a well-known political writer.

Prisoner's role and importance in Nazi Germany are hard to assess. There is no convenient category into which he falls easily: his SS rank was of no significance, and even during his most influential period he was a mere Lt in the German Army. Yet Prisoner's political influence has been of significance and has stretched further than the authority normally accorded to a well-known political writer.



Prisoner's reputation was built primarily on his shrewd analysis of foreign affairs. His constant interest in high policy, and personal knowledge of the politicians and officials who shaped it, showed him how tenuous and potent the manipulation of power can be. There is no doubt that his own political ambitions aimed very high, and that he considered himself a future Secretary or Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In his view titles and rank were unimportant and real influence, especially in totalitarian GERMANY, could equally well be wielded by shadowy men concealed behind the figures exposed to the public gaze. To Prisoner's mind along this way lay the road to high office : it was but one step to emerge from the shadows, and assume the mantle of public power. Such tactics required infinite finesse and a close knowledge of the in-fighting methods among the Nazi hierarchy. After three false starts (RÖHM, HESS and RIBBENTROP), and partial obscurity in 1942 and 1943 Prisoner, but for the accident of German defeat and total occupation, might well have achieved his ambition.

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Prisoner did not regard himself as an unscrupulous opportunist. As a journalist he had observed the wrangles of politicians for many years and prided himself on having few illusions; to him Fascism, democracy and Communism were but symptoms of the age-old clash of cultures, part of

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the dynamic struggle between decay and growth, the pattern of history blindly and often brutally groping for fulfilment. Nazism was injecting new vigour into a people forgetful of its destiny. In his youth, he had sat at the feet of Oswald SPENGLER: his was SPENGLER's philosophy brought up to date.

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When Prisoner first came into prominence in the early 1930s he advocated pseudo-Socialism and State nationalism, i.e. the Gregor STRASSER kind of Nazism. Through his writings he persuaded the Conservative element to underwrite Nazism, arguing that the more repugnant aspects were mere teething troubles of a young revolutionary party. This was his first betrayal of the moral integrity on which he so loftily insists.

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Prisoner is a man of exceptional intellectual faculties and literary flair. From then onwards he interpreted Nazi expansion in terms of renaissance of German "Kultur" :- his theme was German hegemony in EUROPE, cloaked in the deceptive verbiage of a "Federal Europe". The mission of German Kultur, the degrading nihilism of "Amerikanismus", the mechanistic barbarism threatening from the East, the decadence and hypocrisy of British Imperialism, all these were recurrent topics in his writings, served up with a seemingly rational erudition in which shrewd historical and social analysis, insidious half-truths and astonishing fallacies constantly intermingled.

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15 Apr 07	Born in SCHWEINFURT/MAIN.
1925	Studied sociology and political science.
1929	Became assistant to Prof BRINKMANN at Institute of Social and Political Sciences at HEIDELBERG University. During the next few years visited Eastern European and Balkan countries.
1930	Took Doctor's degree at HEIDELBERG University.
1932	Asst Editor - "Die Tat". Published his first book: "Zwischeneuropa und die deutsche Zukunft". Went to BERLIN as free-lance journalist; and became an active contributor to "Die Tat".
Sep - Dec 32	Worked in the Infm Sect of League of Nations in GENEVA.
1933	Continued free-lance journalism. Published his second book: "Deutschland in der Welt-politik". Went to ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA.
Oct 33	Asst Editor of Münchener Neueste Nachrichten.
1934	Published his third book: "Köpfe der Welt-politik".
End 34	Became political editor of "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" and editor of "Die Tat". Travelled widely in EUROPE for his papers, during the next few years.
Summer 36	Editor-in-chief of MNN.
Jan - Mar 1938	First journey to the MIDDLE EAST. Publication of fourth book: "Engländer, Juden & Araber in Palästina".
Apr - Aug 38	Visit to USA.
Jan - Mar 39	Second journey to MIDDLE EAST.
Sep 39	Accepted hon position in Infm Sect of Ausw Amt, in addition to his duties as editor of MNN and "Die Tat", now renamed "Das XX Jahrhundert".
Jan 42	Publication of fifth book: "Der Masslose Kontinent".
Feb 42	Voluntarily joined the Army. His position as editor of the MNN had become untenable as a result of several editorial articles favouring a lenient policy towards FRANCE. ("There is no such thing as a "soft" or "hard" policy, only a wise or a stupid one"). Promoted Sdf (Z) in Kriegsberichter Komp.

Born 15 April 07; 1925 Studied sociology and political science; 1930 Took Doctor's (AOB, PhD)Feb. 42 Promoted Sdf. (Z) (AOB, = Zug-Führer/Lt) in Kriegsberichter Komp.



Apr 42	War Correspondent in RUSSIA, attached 56 Pz Corps. There wrote memorandum criticising German treatment of Russians. This memo he managed to give personally to Gen WAGNER, Deputy Chief of GS, OKH. WAGNER apparently passed it on to HITLER, for some months later Prisoner was ordered by BORMANN not to write again on Russian affairs during the war.
Dec 42	Ill: returned to GERMANY.
Jan 43	Attached to OKW/W/Pr (Wehrmacht Propaganda), working on Wehrmacht publication "Signal". Brief visits to FRANCE, SPAIN, ITALY and DENMARK.
Spring 44 1944	Promoted Lt. Publication of sixth book: "Das Zeitalter des Ikaros".
Summer 44	"Das XX Jahrhundert" was suppressed by Propaganda Ministry as a result of an article on Hieronymus BOSCH ("Allegorical invective").
Oct 44 - Mar 45	Wrote EGMONT Reports for RSHA VI, and became SCHELLENBERG's political adviser.
Mar 45	Evacuated with Amt VI staff to BAVARIA.
1 Jun 45	Arrested by American CIC in BAD TÖLZ, BAVARIA.

Apr 42 War correspondent in Russia attached 56 Pz. Corps. There memorandum criticising German treatment of Russia ...Handed to Hitler.

Jan 43 Attached to OKW/W/Pr (Wehrmacht Propaganda), working on Wehrmacht Publication "Signal". (AOB, whether this regard is correct stays open, it was more a successful publication ment for outside Germany, in particular in the occupied countries. A mixture of various topics, but not particularly direct propaganda. However, each issue very well made, containing also colour photos, of which the centre page was always a full-seize colour picture to which one only had to remove the two centre staples carefully! Aiming it for sticking it onto a wall. Was the nucleus of the post war "Paris Match" lay-out).

Oct 44 – March 45 Wrote EGMONT Reports for RSHA VI, and became Schellenberg's political adviser.

March 45 Evacuated with Amt VI staff to Bavaria.

1 Jun 45 Arrested by American CIC in Bad Tölz, Bavaria.

Der Spiegel 18/1952

Der Schriftsteller solcher geistigen Spannweite ist Dr. *Giselher Wirsing*, geborener **Max Emanuel Wirsing** (seinen königlichbayrischen Vornamen tauschte er mit dem deutschen Namen *Giselher*, der ihm als Mitglied einer Studentengilde verliehen wurde), Jahrgang '07. Ehedem war er einer der bekanntesten politischen ..

Quote genuine

Selbstverständlich wurde er im Februar 1950 von der Münchener Spruchkammer als "Mitläufer" entnazifiziert und mußte 500 DM Sühne zahlen. Nach sieben mageren Jahren brachte Wirsing jetzt den new ...

<http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-21976795.html>

Incorrect: Signal was not a "Soldaten" periodical", but was issued by: **Berliner Zeitung am Abend; mainly for sale abroad; last issue May 1945!**

KV 2/140-1, page 28 + 29

Origin of Name

In 1942, Prisoner, while a war-correspondent in RUSSIA, produced a memorandum for AOK IV severely criticising the German adm in occupied RUSSIA. This memo reached HITLER, or, at any rate, his immediate entourage, and Prisoner was considered a carping critic for his remarks. Prisoner, furthermore, had a long-standing disagreement with GOEBBELS and the Propaganda Ministry and had also personally offended RIBBENTROP by refusing to take over the Infm Sec of the Ausw Amt in 1941 (see Appendix B). In order, therefore, not to prejudice the value of the Amt VI reports, it was agreed by SCHELLENBERG that they should appear anonymously as "EGMONT" Reports. EGMONT refers to a quotation from GOETHE's "EGMONT": "It is not meet to oppose the king, yet one must stand in the way of the king who takes the first unfortunate steps along the wrong path". "King" obviously is not a very

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subtle allusion to HITLER, while it speaks against Prisoner's acumen that he should consider that HITLER made the first mistakes in autumn 44.

Subtle allusion to Hitler, while it speaks against Prisoner's acumen that he should consider Hitler made the first mistakes in autumn 44.

KV 2/140-1, page 30 ++ reconstruction EGMONT reports FIAT EP 324-82 Wirsing

"October 1944

ROOSEVELT's and CHURCHILL's QUEBEC Conference results in the renewed determination for victory in Europe before the Far Eastern victory. Considerable disagreements with RUSSIA as evinced by the decreased lease-lend deliveries. No co-ordination of Anglo-American and Russian conduct of war. This, however, may not be interpreted to indicate that an open conflict between the two groups can be expected before GERMANY's defeat. It means that there will be a race for BERLIN. As the stabilization of the German front in the West has come as a surprise to EISENHOWER and MONTGOMERY, an opportunity presents itself for initiating negotiations with the Western Powers".

“October 1944.

Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s Quebec Conference results in the renewed determination for victory in Europe before the Far Eastern victory. Considerable disagreements with Russia as evidenced by the de-creased lease-lend deliveries. It means that there will be a race for Berlin. As the stabilization of the German front in the West has come as a surprise to Eisenhower and Montgomery, an opportunity presents itself for initiating negotiations with the Western Powers”.

“November 44.

Stalin’s first turning against Japan demonstrates that Russia is sensitive to American pressure in the matter of deliveries (Stalin’s speech at the beginning of Nov shortly before the Roosevelt elections).

KV 2/140-1, page 36

Von PAPAN Ambassador in TURKEY. Prisoner met von PAPAN in BERLIN after the latter's return from TURKEY in autumn 44.

Von Papen Ambassador in Turkey. Prisoner met von Papen in Berlin after the latter’s return from Turkey in autumn 44.

KV 2/140-1, page 42

A few days after Prisoner's return from FLENSBURG, in the first week of May 45, Prisoner's secretary, Frau Hannelore RAHM, went to BAD TÖLZ and learned that the documents had been destroyed. She related this to Prisoner, and it was from her that he first knew of their destruction. * Prisoner insists that when he left for FLENSBURG, he gave NO instructions to anyone what to do with the reports in the case of American occupation.

A few days after Prisoner’s return from Flensburg, in the first week of May 45, Prisoner’s secretary, Frau Hannelore Rahm, went to Bad Tölz and learned that the documents had been destroyed.

Prisoner believes that two reports have been captured. At beg Jun 45, Prisoner was interrogated at FREISING by Capt FLEX, US Army, who told him that the "EGMONT" Report about YALTA had been found among documents seized at SEYSS-INQUART's HQ. Later, in Dec 45, Lt MITTELBERGER told Prisoner in OBERURSEL that another copy had recently been found.

Prisoner believes that two reports have been capturedhad been found among documents seized at **Seyss-Inquart**’s HQ. ...



Prisoner's Relations with KRÄMER

KRÄMER, through his JOSEPHINE Reports, was Prisoner's most important source for the "EGMONT" Reports. Furthermore, KRÄMER was the only int agent personally known to Prisoner. His relations with KRÄMER may therefore be of interest.

Prisoner made KRÄMER's acquaintance in Mar or Apr 43, when KRÄMER called on Prisoner in BERLIN with a letter of introduction from TOGGENBURG. As a political journalist Prisoner always welcomed an exchange of infm with well-informed persons from abroad, although this had become more difficult since the war. Even during KRÄMER's first visit it was evident that he was extremely well informed, especially about political trends in the UK and USA. KRÄMER introduced himself as a member of the German Embassy in STOCKHOLM, and Prisoner asked him to call again on his next visit to BERLIN. KRÄMER afterwards called regularly on Prisoner whenever he happened to be in BERLIN, which was usually about once a month or every six weeks. The two men became personal friends, since they found their political outlook to be very similar, and they had systematic discussions covering all aspects of the international situation, eg the military situation, political trends among Axis and Allied powers, the role of the chief political personalities, Allied intentions, strategy, etc. Prisoner states that before the war, he was accustomed to have many such discussions with other, similarly well-informed persons, mostly journalists or members of the Ausw Amt. Now, however, there remained only TROTT zu SOLZ and Albrecht HAUSHOFER (both executed after the 20 July plot). KRÄMER's infm, for him, was therefore specially valuable, since this infm, especially his knowledge of the UK, was apparently based on facts and not on surmise and conjecture.

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Führungsstab, and about a year after their first meeting, he told Prisoner he was a member of the Abw. Prisoner claims that he studiously avoided inquiring into details or questioning KRÄMER about the sources of his infm.

Prisoner claims that until autumn 44 he made no use of the political int he heard from KRÄMER. He stoutly maintains that as a journalist and political writer, it was his job and ambition to be well-informed; the fact that he was then working in a minor capacity on the propaganda journal "Signal", for which this infm was unnecessary, was irrelevant. KRÄMER's conversations corroborated Prisoner's growing conviction that GERMANY was losing the war, and that an early negotiated peace with the Western Powers was the only way out, a conviction shared by, among others, KRÄMER himself and TROTT zu SOLZ, who was also working towards that end.

When Prisoner began his career as "EGMONT" he told SCHELLENBERG that he knew KRÄMER, and asked permission to make use of KRÄMER directly. KRÄMER told Prisoner that the JOSEPHINE reports came via a Swedish source, and their conversations now included operational and mil questions, on which subject KRÄMER had hitherto shown a certain reserve. But Prisoner still did NOT question KRÄMER about his sources of infm. From time to time, Prisoner asked KRÄMER for confirmation or elaboration of certain political news he had received from other Amt VI sources; these briefs were sent to KRÄMER via Amt VI, and his replies were prefixed "for EGMONT". Prisoner states that KRÄMER was the only int offr with whom he was in contact - otherwise he knew only cover-names of reports. For instance, the identity of OSTRO, the only other source of high political int value, was not known to Prisoner.

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KRAMER was aware of Prisoner's political significance as "EGMONT". Although, for his own sake, Prisoner had not taken KRAMER into his full confidence regarding his political intentions, KRAMER knew of, and supported Prisoner's and SCHELLENBERG's attempt to negotiate a peace with the Western Allies. By 1945, KRAMER was able to discuss German peace overtures openly with SCHELLENBERG when he went to report to Amt VI, and KRAMER kept SCHELLENBERG informed directly of the political situation.

During Prisoner's visits to BEST in COPENHAGEN (see Appendix D paras 30 and 31) he met KRAMER for discussions. These, however, differed in no way from the talks they had in BERLIN.

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Prisoner's Relations with PFLEIDERER

PFLEIDERER fits into the framework of SCHELLENBERG's and Prisoner's overriding interest in SCANDINAVIA as the only remaining German asset. Prisoner and SCHELLENBERG were both agreed that the TERBOVEN-HITLER policy of resistance and scorched earth in NORWAY and DENMARK was mistaken. Meanwhile, KRAMER had become friendly with PFLEIDERER, head of the Consular Dept in the German Legation at STOCKHOLM, who also desired to see better relations between SWEDEN and GERMANY, the more so, since the Swedish Govt would be unlikely to act on GERMANY's behalf in any peace negotiations unless their most pressing demands were sympathetically considered.

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At beg Mar 45, KRAMER reported to Prisoner that PFLEIDERER, an expert on Scandinavian affairs, had had some unofficial talks with Danish and Swedish personalities on the subject and regarded with deepest dismay the present German policy.

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Towards end Mar 45, whilst PFLEIDERER happened to be in BERLIN, he went to see Prisoner at KRÄMER's suggestion and discussed the whole Scandinavian question very openly. The substance of this conversation has been fully reported in CSDIC(WEA) Final Report 21 on PFLEIDERER, Appendix E, paras 6 - 10 and has been confirmed by Prisoner. Prisoner asked PFLEIDERER to let him have a memorandum on SCANDINAVIA; PFLEIDERER wrote this on his return to STOCKHOLM, and sent it to Prisoner through KRÄMER. This memorandum was incorporated in another "addendum" to an "EGMONT" Report, stressing that unless SCHELLENBERG could bring HIMMLER to take immediate action to reverse or at least soften HITLER's Scandinavian policy, peace negotiations through SWEDEN would inevitably fail.

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KV 2/140-1, page 53

Evacuation of BERLIN

Towards the end of Mar 45, Prisoner had a long conversation with SCHELLENBERG in BERLIN, in which he pointed out that their joint efforts to arrange a negotiated peace with the Western Powers had come to nothing, since the pre-requisite for such a move - the liquidation of HITLER - had not been fulfilled. Nor had HIMMLER had the courage to begin direct peace negotiations with the Allies. The time for peace negotiations, in Prisoner's opinion, was now past. He considered, therefore, that his usefulness had come to an end, and did not propose to await the Russian attack on BERLIN; he informed SCHELLENBERG that he would leave BERLIN with the Amt VI staff which was then evacuating to BAVARIA. SCHELLENBERG did not share Prisoner's pessimism, but asked him to remain in touch with Standf SANDBERGER, in charge of adm of Amt VI, who was also going SOUTH.

Evacuation of Berlin

Towards the end of March 45, Prisoner had a long conversation with Schellenberg in Berlin, in which he pointed out that their joint effort to arrange a negotiated peace with Western Powers had come to nothing, since the pre-requisite for such a move – the liquidation of Hitler – had not been fulfilled. Nor had Himmler had the courage to begin direct peace negotiations with the Allies. The time for peace negotiations, in Prisoner's opinion, was now past. He considered, therefore, that his usefulness had come to an end, and did not propose to wait the Russian attack on Berlin; he informed Schellenberg that he would leave Berlin with the Amt VI staff which was then evacuating to Bavaria. Schellenberg did not share Prisoner's pessimism, but asked him to remain in touch with Standf. Sandberger, in charge of adm. of Amt VI, who was also going South. (AOB, [confirmation can be found in Sandberger's file, albeit not so much in such details, but, of course, considering it from a bit different perspective](#))



Prisoner left immediately afterwards with SANDBERGER's party, and arrived some days later at TEGERNSEE, where Ast MUNICH had put a house equipped with a WT station at their disposal. Finding the accommodation too crowded, Prisoner moved to another billet in BAD HEILBRUNN, in which town Ostubaf PÄFFGEN and four or five others of Amt VI were also living. During the next few weeks, Prisoner maintains that he did nothing and was NOT in communication with Amt VI, but he was visited from time to time by SANDBERGER, who kept in touch with the RSHA staff scattered about the district.

Prisoner left immediately afterwards with Sandberger's party, and arrived some days later at Tegernsee, where Ast Munich had put a house equipped with a W/T station at their disposal. Finding the accommodation too crowded, Prisoner moved to another billet in Bad Heilbrunn, in which town Ostubaf. Päßgen and four or five others of Amt VI were also living. During the next few weeks, Prisoner maintains that he did nothing and was not in communications with Amt VI, but he visited from time to time by Sandberger, who kept in touch with RSHA staff scattered about district.

WT Messages from SCHELLENBERG

About 25 Apr 45 SANDBERGER visited Prisoner and told him that a WT message from SCHELLENBERG had just been received, requesting Prisoner to fly to LÜBECK for discussions. Prisoner was at first inclined to refuse, since he was loath to leave BAVARIA again, and, in any case, SANDBERGER could not obtain an aircraft to take Prisoner NORTH. He therefore ignored the message.

W/T Message from Schellenberg

About 25 Apr 45 Sandberger visited Prisoner and told him that W/T message from Schellenberg had just been received, requesting Prisoner to fly to Lübeck for discussions. Prisoner was at first inclined to refuse, since he was loath to leave Bavaria again, and, in any case, Sandberger could not obtain an aircraft to take Prisoner North. He therefore ignored the message.

A few days later SANDBERGER, in a state of great excitement, again called on Prisoner and told him that a second WT message from SCHELLENBERG had just been received, and that an aircraft was now standing by to take Prisoner to LÜBECK. Prisoner was still reluctant to go, but says he allowed himself to be persuaded by SANDBERGER's argument that Prisoner could not know whether SCHELLENBERG had succeeded at the last moment in entering into more concrete peace negotiations. SANDBERGER handed Prisoner a memorandum for SCHELLENBERG on the reorganisation of Amt VI in the SOUTH, undertaken by KALTENBRUNNER, which virtually amounted to a dissolution of Amt VI. WARNECK and SKORZENY were to be in charge of what remained of the GIS in the SOUTH. SANDBERGER urgently requested Prisoner to obtain written instructions from HIMMLER to rescind KALTENBRUNNER's order.

A few days later Sandberger, in a state of great excitement, again called on Prisoner and told him that a second message from Schellenberg had just been received, and that an aircraft was now standing by to take Prisoner to Lübeck. Prisoner was still reluctant to go, but says he allowed himself to be persuaded by Sandberg's argument that Prisoner could not know whether Schellenberg had succeeded at least the moment in entering into more concrete peace negotiations. Sandberger handed Prisoner a memorandum for peace negotiations. Sandberger handed Prisoner a memorandum for Schellenberg on the reorganisation of Amt VI in the South, undertaken by Kaltenbrunner, which virtually amounted to a dissolution of Amt Vi. Warneck and Skorzeny were to be in charge of what remained of GIS in the South.

Sandberger urgently requested Prisoner to obtain written instructions from Himmler to rescind Kaltenbrunner's order.

KV 2/140-1, page 54

Prisoner flies NORTH

After some trouble SANDBERGER found an aircraft which would take Prisoner to LUBECK. Prisoner left in a Ju 88 at 0330 hrs on 30 Apr 45 from AIBLING airfield (nr ROSENHEIM) and arrived at LUBECK at 0530 hrs. In LUBECK he contacted SCHELLENBERG's secretary, who told him that SCHELLENBERG was in SWEDEN in connection with the BERNADOTTE negotiations, but would arrive that evening in FLENSBURG. Prisoner left instructions to wire SCHELLENBERG of his arrival, and in the afternoon flew on to FLENSBURG. There he heard that CHURCHILL and TRUMAN had issued a communique on HIMMLER's peace negotiations with BERNADOTTE, categorically refusing to entertain offers directed solely to the Western Allies. Prisoner concluded that further negotiations were futile, and gave instructions to his aircraft to stand by to take him back to BAVARIA that night.

Prisoner flies North

After some trouble Sandberg found an aircraft which would take prisoner to Lübeck. Prisoner left in a Ju 88 at 0330 hrs on 30 April 45 from Aibling airfield (Nr. Rosenheim) and arrived at Lübeck at 0530 hrs. In Lübeck he contacted Schellenberg's secretary, who told him that Schellenberg was in Sweden in connection with the Bernadotte negotiations, but would arrive that evening in Flensburg. Prisoner left instructions to wire Schellenberg of his arrival, and in the afternoon flew on to Flensburg. There he heard that Churchill and Truman had issued a communiqué on Himmler's peace negotiations with Bernadotte, categorically refusing to entertain offers directed solely to the Western Allies. Prisoner concluded that further negotiations were futile, and gave instructions to his aircraft to stand by to take him back to Bavaria that night.



Prisoner meets SCHELLENBERG

Prisoner met SCHELLENBERG at 2200 hrs. SCHELLENBERG asked Prisoner to accompany him in his car to HIMMLER's HQ at KALKHORST nr TRAVEMÜNDE. During the journey SCHELLENBERG gave Prisoner a resume of his negotiations with BERNADOTTE and von POST. HIMMLER's dilatoriness had delayed negotiations until it was too late (he gave SCHELLENBERG his authority on 23 Apr 45) and in the last analysis HIMMLER must bear responsibility for the senseless destruction of German towns and the heavy German casualties in the last few weeks. SCHELLENBERG was now going to report to HIMMLER on his talks in COPENHAGEN and he asked Prisoner to be present at the interview to strengthen his, SCHELLENBERG's hand in case of HIMMLER's further vacillation. Prisoner then told SCHELLENBERG of the official Allied communique and bluntly stated that further negotiations with the Western Powers alone were impossible. SCHELLENBERG until then had been unaware of the communique; nevertheless it appears that he still had hopes of arriving at some agreement with the Western Powers, using the German occupation of NORWAY as his trump card. Prisoner then declared his intention of returning to BAVARIA as soon as possible. He told SCHELLENBERG that he was not facing up to the grim realities of the present situation, and added that the recent Werwolf propaganda and concentration camp atrocities had been incredible political blunders. SCHELLENBERG said that HIMMLER was aware of this, but appeared powerless against BORMANN and GOEBBELS, and went on to discuss possible members of an interim govt headed by HIMMLER. In the course of the conversation Prisoner handed SCHELLENBERG SANDBERGER's memorandum on the reorganisation in the SOUTH. Prisoner stresses, however, that both SCHELLENBERG and he were concerned with high policy, and took little interest in what KALTENBRUNNER might be doing in BAVARIA. SCHELLENBERG obviously considered Amt VI as a thing of the past, but clearly regarded KALTENBRUNNER's action as unauthorised. He would, he said, take it up with HIMMLER.

Prisoner meets Schellenberg

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Bavaria. Schellenberg obviously considered Amt VI as a thing of the past, but clearly regarded Kaltenbrunner's action as unauthorised. He would, he said, take it up to Himmler. continuing + page 55

SCHELLENBERG's Talks with HIMMLER

They arrived at KALKHORST early in the morning of 1 May 45 and learned of HITLER's suicide that night (SCHELLENBERG merely said: "Thank God for that") and of DÖNITZ' appointment as head of the State. (According to the O20 Final Report on SCHELLENBERG, HIMMLER had already seen DÖNITZ earlier that morning and persuaded the latter to dismiss RIBBENTROP immediately. Prisoner has no knowledge of this meeting.)

At about 0900 hrs SCHELLENBERG was called for a few minutes to HIMMLER, who informed him of the situation, and said that he intended to place himself under DÖNITZ' orders. He was driving over to PLÖN, DÖNITZ' HQ, immediately, and asked SCHELLENBERG to accompany him to report on the Swedish negotiations and to outline his ideas for the future. Prisoner followed in another car with HIMMLER's adjutants.

Schellenberg's talks with Himmler

They then arrived at Kalkhorst early in the morning of 1 May 45 and learned of Hitler's suicide that night (Schellenberg merely said: "Thank God for that" (AOB, [Gott sei Dank](#))) and of Dönitz's appointment as head of the State. (According to the Camp 020 Final Report on Schellenberg, Himmler had already seen Dönitz earlier that morning and persuaded the latter to dismiss Ribbentrop immediately. Prisoner has no knowledge of this meeting)

About 0900 Schellenberg was called for a few minutes to Himmler, who informed him of the situation, and said that he intended to place himself under Dönitz's orders. He was driving over to Plön, Dönitz's HQ, immediately, and asked Schellenberg to accompany him to report on the Swedish negotiations and to outline his ideas for the future.. Prisoner followed in another car with Himmler's adjutants.

Conference at DÖNITZ' HQ

At about 1200 hrs the party arrived at PLÖN. There Prisoner learned that RIBBENTROP had been dismissed and SCHWERIN-KROSIGK appointed Foreign Minister. DÖNITZ immediately drew HIMMLER into conference, and asked SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner to work out meanwhile a short memorandum on the next German move in the light of HITLER's death and the TRUMAN-CHURCHILL communique of the night before.

Conference at Dönitz's HQ

At about 1200 hrs the party arrived at Plön. There Prisoner learned that Ribbentrop had been dismissed and Schwerin-Krosigk appointed Foreign Minister. Dönitz immediately drew Himmler to a conference, and asked Schellenberg and Prisoner to work out meanwhile a short memorandum on the next German move in the light of Hitler's death and the Truman-Churchill communiqué of the night before.



SCHELLENBERG told Prisoner that he (SCHELLENBERG) was to be KROSIGK's deputy and that the memo was required mainly for KROSIGK's infm. (Contrary to the 020 FR on SCHELLENBERG, Prisoner disputes that KROSIGK was at PLÖN at the time; he remembers that there were several telephone calls to EUTIN, where KROSIGK was staying. Nor does Prisoner remember seeing KEITEL or JODL.) SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner then drew up a short memorandum containing the following points:-

Schellenberg told Prisoner that he (Schellenberg) was to be Krosigk's deputy and that memo was required for Krogisk infm. Contrary was at Plön at the time; he remembers that there were several telephone calls to Eutin, where Krosigk was staying. Nor does prisoner remember seeing Keitel or Jodl) Schellenberg and Prisoner then drew up a short memorandum containing the following points:-

x

x

Final Conversations with SCHELLENBERG

SCHELLENBERG left PLÖN at about 1500 hrs. He was to travel via FLENSBURG to COPENHAGEN, and Prisoner accompanied him as far as FLENSBURG, where his aircraft was waiting to take him back to BAVARIA.

Final Conversations with Schellenberg

Schellenberg left Plön at about 1500 hrs. He was to travel via Flensburg to Copenhagen, and Prisoner accompanied him as far as Flensburg, where his aircraft was waiting to take him back to Bavaria.

During the journey SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner had their last exhaustive discussion. SCHELLENBERG once more pressed Prisoner to remain, but the latter declined on the grounds that he thought all further efforts to save GERMANY doomed to failure. He considered his usefulness had ended and did not wish to be publicly associated with the liquidation of the Third Reich. (At the time Prisoner still had political ambitions for the future. A reputation untainted by the "shame" of having been responsible for the armistice negotiations, would have been a valuable asset. Similar charges had ruined the careers of the WEIMAR politicians after the 1914 - 18 war.) Nevertheless, he intimated that should the interim government develop into a government of some stability, he would be available. Privately, Prisoner claims, he anticipated the worst, although he did not state this to SCHELLENBERG.

During the journey Schellenberg and Prisoner had their last exhaustive discussion. Schellenberg once more pressed Prisoner to remain, but the latter declined on the ground that he thought all further efforts to save Germany doomed to failure. He considered his usefulness had ended and did not wish to be publicly associated with the liquidation of the Third Reich. (At the time Prisoner still had political ambitions for the future. A reputation untainted by the "shame" of having been responsible for the armistice negotiations, would have been a valuable asset. Similar charges had ruined the careers of the Weimar politicians after the 1914 - 1918 war.) Nevertheless, he initiated that should the interim government develop into a government of some stability, he would be available. Privately, Prisoner's claims, he anticipated the worst, although he did not state this to Schellenberg.

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In the course of conversation, KALTENBRUNNER was briefly touched upon. SCHELLENBERG mentioned that, should Prisoner happen to see SANDBERGER or anyone else of the Amt VI staff, he was to tell them that neither HIMMLER nor himself recognised KALTENBRUNNER's orders. Prisoner believes that SCHELLENBERG also said that HIMMLER would countermand KALTENBRUNNER's orders by W/T. He states emphatically that no more was said, and that he carried back no other instructions, especially since he stressed to SCHELLENBERG that it was doubtful whether he would see SANDBERGER or anyone else. The course of events had overshadowed the internal politics of the RSHA.

In the course of conversation, Kaltenbrunner was briefly touched upon. Schellenberg mentioned that, should Prisoner happen to see Sandberger or anyone else of the Amt VI staff, he was to tell them that neither Himmler nor himself recognised Kaltenbrunner's orders. Prisoner believes that Schellenberg also said that Himmler would countermand Kaltenbrunner's orders by W/T. He states emphatically that no more was said, and that he carried back no other instructions, especially since he stressed to Schellenberg that it was doubtful whether he would see Sandberger or anyone else. The course of events had overshadowed the internal politics of the RSHA.

Memorandum for SCHELLENBERG

In FLENSBURG Prisoner bade a solemn farewell to SCHELLENBERG, and wished him success in the future. SCHELLENBERG asked Prisoner to leave him another more detailed memorandum on German policy after the unconditional surrender, which he proposed to submit to KROSIGK on his return from COPENHAGEN. This document Prisoner drew up that evening; he left it with SCHELLENBERG's secretary in FLENSBURG. It contained the following points:-

Memorandum for Schellenberg

In Flensburg Prisoner bade a solemn farewell to Schellenberg, and wished him success in the future. Schellenberg asked Prisoner to leave him another more detailed memorandum on Germany policy after the unconditional surrender, which he proposed to submit to Krosigk on his return from Copenhagen. This document Prisoner drew up that evening; he left with Schellenberg's secretary in Flensburg. It contained the following points:-


x

Return to BAVARIA

Prisoner left FLENSBURG by plane at 0200 hrs on 2 May 45. After a dangerous flight during which he was repeatedly chased by British night-fighters, he landed early in the morning in PRAGUE. In the following night he flew on to SALZBURG and continued from there by car. American troops had already overrun BAD TÖLZ, and Prisoner had to walk the last 30 km. Prisoner claims that after his return he saw none of the Amt VI staff, and did not even attempt to pass on SCHELLENBERG's verbal message. He remained in BAD TÖLZ until his arrest on 1 Jun 45.

Return to Bavaria

Prisoner left Flensburg by plane at 0200 hrs on 2 May 45. After a dangerous flight during which he was repeatedly chased by British night-fighters, he landed early in the morning in Prague. The following night he flew to Salzburg and continued from there by car. American troops had already overrun Bad Tölz, and prisoner had to walk the last 30 km. prisoner claims after his return he saw none of the Amt Vi staff, and did not attempt to pass on Schellenberg's verbal message. He remained in Bad Tölz until his arrest on 1 June 45.



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
Intelligence Bureau

CCG (BE)

Bad Oeyenhausen

Tel: 2842/12

KV 2/140-1, page 91



Giselher Wirsing, subject of Shaef Pink Card 14206, who is 'Egmont' the writer of the Amt VI reports, **has been interned at DUSTBIN but has not yet been fully broken.** ...

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KV 2/140-2, page 1 Pfeiderer (PF 603041 deleted) interrogated on Wirsing

Prisoner states that as RIBBENTROP would have been most annoyed about any liaison with the SS or with any other Reich high authority without his permission, Prisoner did not feel that it would have been right to worry his superiors with the knowledge of what he had done. Prisoner then returned to SWEDEN where he prepared the memorandum on SCANDINAVIA (see para 8) and went through it with KRÄMER, who then had it sent secretly to WIRSING in BERLIN, via a Maj WENZLAU of the Luftwaffe.

Prisoner (Pfeiderer, AOB) states that that as Ribbentrop would have been most annoyed about any liaison with the SS or with any other Reich high authority without his permission, Prisoner did not feel that it would have been right to worry his superiors with the knowledge of what he had done. Prisoner then returned to Sweden where he prepared the memorandum on Scandinavia and went through it with Krämer, who then had it sent secretly (AOB, [someone took it with him when he travelled to Berlin](#)) to Wirsing in Berlin, via a Maj. Wenzlau (I-L) of the Luftwaffe. (AOB, [it went, in the case I know, a bit differently, and an envelope had been left at the desk of Schellenberg's secretary; who should hand it over to Wirsing; notice the Krämer files](#))

KV 2/140-2, page 2

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2

461 (GBI/CIB/Ops)

(Main) APO 757
31 August 1945

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Report.

TO : Counter Intelligence War Room, c/o UK Base, APO 413.

Forwarded herewith is copy No. 19 of Special Interrogation Report No. 2 of the Third US Army Interrogation Center, regarding the EGMONT reports. Document is classified Top Secret.

For the AC of S, G-2:

DUPRE SASSARD
Lt. Col., GSC
Executive

... Counter Intelligence War Room

Regarding the "Egmont" reports. Document is classified Top Secret


For the AC of S. G-2

Sgd. Dupre Sassard
Lt. Col., GSC

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3. In early April PFLEIDERER sent a memorandum to Giseler WIRSING based on their discussions in Berlin (see para.1), which was left at SCHELLENBERG's office by the courier Von GINANTH for WIRSING.

In early April Pfleiderer sent a memorandum to Giseler Wirsing based on their discussions in Berlin, which was left at Schellenberg's office by the courier Von Ginanth for Wirsing. (AOB, [actually left at the desk of Schellenberg's secretary "im Vorzimmer"](#).)



The Egmont Reports

Shortly before the outbreak of war in 1939, Wirsing accepted Ribbentrop's offer of a job in the propaganda section of the Kulturpolitische Abteilung of the Foreign Office under Altenburg. But internecine strife between this department and the Ministry of Propaganda largely nullified his efforts, so that he resigned his position and returned to München.

In spring 1941, Wirsing wrote an article in the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten in which he expressed the opinion that Franco-German relations were bound to deteriorate unless a formal peace treaty between the two countries was signed. Although this was also the opinion of Abetz, Wirsing became quite unpopular and found it necessary to join the Army.

He was posted to a War Reporters' Company (Kriegsberichter Kompanie)(AOB, [PK Kompanie](#)) and served on the Eastern Front until the end of 1942, when he was mustered out of service.

Returning to BERLIN, WIRSING continued the publication of Die Tat until a government order prohibited it. In 1943 and 1944 he paid short visits to MADRID.

Returning to Berlin, Wirsing continued the publication of Die Tat until a government order prohibited it. In 1943 and 1944 he paid short visits to Madrid.

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In June 1944 he attended a one-month refresher course for officers, given in POTSDAM, and credits this circumstance with his not being involved in the events of 20 July 1944. One of his closest friends, Legationsrat Dr Adam von TROTT of the Foreign Office, was one of the chief conspirators.

In September 1944, WIRSING met SCHELLENBERG and from this meeting came the EGMONT Reports.

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September 1944, Wirsing met Schellenberg and from this meeting came the Egmont Reports.

His Books. Besides his newspaper and magazine work, WIRSING has written several books, which deserve some mention.

1. In 1934 WIRSING wrote a book advocating a rapprochement with the SOVIET UNION.

2. In 1941, his book about AMERICA - Der masslose Kontinent - was published. In it he compared AMERICA's claim to world domination with the German principle of spheres of influence and arrived at the conclusion that the UNITED STATES is hopelessly shackled to the past. This book is reputed to have become the first source book for anti-American propaganda.

3. Following his release from the Army in 1942, he wrote Das Zeitalter des Ikaros, in which he advocated that the Union of EUROPE be carried out by peaceful means rather than through the use of force.

4. Writing in April 1944, under cover of a dissertation on the fifteenth century Dutch painter Hieronymus BOSCH, WIRSING condemned allegorically the amoral atmosphere of the era of German history just then coming to an end.

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
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The Genesis of the EGMONT Reports. About the middle of September 1944, SS Brigadefuehrer SCHELLENBERG, chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, and WIRSING met at the former's office to compare notes on the international situation. SCHELLENBERG, whom WIRSING had never met before, explained that he had followed WIRSING's political line closely, having read his analyses of foreign affairs in the Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten, Die Tat and its successor, Das XX. Jahrhundert. In ranging over the whole complex of questions raised by GERMANY's political and military situation at that time, SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING substantially agreed on the following issues:

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The EGMONT Reports (continued)

- a that Germany's position was hopeless, both military and politically,
- b that it was imperative to terminate the war at the earliest possible moment,
- c that peace negotiated on an equal footing with Germany's opponents was out of the question,
- d that it might be worth while to try to ascertain whether unconditional surrender as conceived by the Allies left room for a change in German government which would make the government acceptable to the Allies as a bargaining power, and
- e that the formation of such government would mean shelving Hitler.

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The Proposal. With the above understanding, SCHELLENBERG proposed that WIRSING should write reports on GERMANY's political situation abroad, giving an unvarnished picture of the hopelessness of the situation and proposing specific measures designed to save GERMANY from total ruin. SCHELLENBERG offered to put at WIRSING's disposal all the material reaching Amt VI from its intelligence agencies. The reports were to come out at two or three week intervals and would have a very small and select distribution.

WIRSING accepted and became an agent (Ehrenamtlicher Mitarbeiter) of the RSHA. He wrote the reports at his private residence where the Amt VI material was delivered by messenger. The only person in Amt VI with whom WIRSING had contact was SCHELLENBERG, who occasionally passed on to him Top Secret material which was not to be committed to paper, and by an exchange of ideas contributed materially to the final form of the reports. So as not to detract from the value of the reports, the identity of the author was to be kept a secret known only to the inner circle of the RSHA, because WIRSING's background as a prominent member of the Tat Circle would hardly be acceptable to the die-hards of the Nazi Party.

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Distribution. At his first meeting with Schellenberg, Wirsing emphasized the necessity of a strictly limited distribution, which was not to include Ribbentrop and Goebbels in particular. The actual distribution as ordered by Kaltenbrunner was as follows:

- a. to SS Gruppenfuehrer FEGELEIN, HIMMLER's liaison officer at HITLER's headquarters, who would submit it to HITLER,
- b. HIMMLER,
- c. SEYSS-INQUART, close friend of KALTENBRUNNER and slated to take over the post of Foreign Minister if HIMMLER and his RSHA gang should come to power,

a to SS-Gruppenführer Fegelein, Himmler's liaison officer at Hitler's headquarters, who would submit it to Hitler,

b Himmler

c Seyss-Inquart, close friend of Kaltenbrunner and slated to take over the post of Foreign Minister if Himmler and the RSHA gang should come to power,

continuing KV 2/140-2, page 14

d. Botschafter HEWEL, who was made to sign a declaration promising not to give copies of the reports to RIBBENTROP nor to mention their existence to him. The Foreign Office at no time availed itself of the information produced by Amt VI. RIBBENTROP had a very deep-rooted aversion to intelligence-gathering services, which he shared with HITLER. HEWEL represented RIBBENTROP at the Fuehrerhauptquartier.

e. Probably GOEBBELS (in spite of WIRSING's objection, because WIRSING learned that the pessimistic vein of the reports was criticized in circles close to the Propaganda Minister).

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KV 2/140-2, page 15

The EGMONT Reports (Continued)

After the abortive ARDENNES offensive, SCHELLENBERG's influence on HIMMLER increased to the extent that HIMMLER made another attempt to induce HITLER to conform to the EGMONT line. This time HIMMLER's reward was the command of Army Group WEICHSEL.

A last attempt to reduce HIMMLER to political impotence was undertaken around 12 March 1945, when HITLER suggested that HIMMLER take over the military command in HUNGARY. Somehow HIMMLER managed to dodge this assignment.

The End. At the end of March 1945, WIRSING told SCHELLENBERG that he considered the EGMONT reports to have failed in their objective of bringing about HITLER's resignation and that all was lost. SCHELLENBERG concurred and the EGMONT reports were discontinued.

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Nero information from the Iberian Peninsula (AOB)

(According to HOETTL, NERO stands for Hungarian sources located in MADRID and LISBON. The informants are to be found in circles close to the Hungarian Military Attache in MADRID and his representative in LISBON. This connection had been developed by HOETTL and turned over to Amt VI. The chief of VI D (SCANDINAVIA, BRITAIN, UNITED STATES) got most of his information from this source. Channels ran from LISBON and MADRID to Department II, Hungarian General Staff (Oberst KUTHY), and from there to either HOETTL or his representative (SS Hauptsturmfuehrer NEUNTEUFFEL) in BUDAPEST.)

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The Sources for the EGMONT Reports (Continued)

HASSO (or HECTOR) was an exceptionally good source in STOCKHOLM, which conveyed detailed and intimate reports on English trends of thought as they prevailed in the inner circles of the main British parties.

A line existed to PORTUGAL's SALAZAR via his Father Confessor, the Archbishop (or Cardinal?) of LISBON.

In SPAIN an informant regularly compared notes with the Japanese Ambassador SUMA, a very good source.

The coverage of Italian affairs was centralized in MADRID and dealt mostly with routine matters.

The Russian sector was exceedingly well covered by sources located in STOCKHOLM. The information was in part planted material and had to be carefully sifted in VI C.

An important informant on the USSR who called himself BORODIN operated in SHANGHAI, evidently running his own intelligence net. The Abwehr was represented in both MUKDEN and SHANGHAI (by KO).

DUBLIN was a very disappointing source. WIRSING cannot recollect ever having seen a report originating there.

The Sources for the Egmont Reports

Hasso (or hector) was an exceptionally good source in Stockholm, which conveyed detailed and intimate reports on English trends of thought as they prevailed in their inner circles of the main British parties. (AOB, Hasso = Lt. Karl-Heinz Krämer; Hector linked to what kind of information)

A line existed to Portugal's Salazar via Father Confessor, the Archbishop (or Cardinal?) of Lisbon.

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The coverage of Italian affairs was centralized in Madrid and dealt mostly with routine matters.

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An important informant on the USSR who called himself Borodin operated in Shanghai, evidently running his own intelligence net. The Abwehr was represented in both Mukden and Shanghai (by KO).

Dublin was a very disappointing source. Wirsing cannot recollect ever having seen a report originating there.

KV 2/140-2, page 18

Chi-Berichte (Cipher Reports). The Chi-Berichte were transcripts of intercepted and decoded wireless messages and formed the solid core of foreign information, although there was no continuity of coverage and important gaps frequently occurred. WIRSING claims that more or less complete coverage of the traffic listed below was furnished:

- a. the Turkish Ambassador in MOSCOW to his government (complete),
- b. the Greek Ambassador in MOSCOW to his government,
- c. Ambassador HARRIMAN in MOSCOW who reported to the State department on the Polish deliberations,
- d. Ambassador CAFFERY in PARIS who reported to the the State Department on DE GAULLE's visit to MOSCOW,
- e. The Bulgarian envoy in SWITZERLAND who reported to his government on Balkan affairs and was particularly well-informed on the Greek insurrection,
- f. the American representative in BULGARIA who had some trouble with the Russians and told his troubles to the State Department.

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When STALIN delivered his famous address on 7 November 1944, singling JAPAN out as an aggressor nation, WIRSING, in a special report written at the request of SCHELLENBERG, read into this sentence the accomplished fact of a fundamental change of Russian policy towards JAPAN. Again SCHELLENBERG demurred. Then, approximately three weeks later, a report by Ambassador SATO to his government was intercepted in which he related a conversation he had had with MOLOTOV in connection with a Japanese note expressing concern over anti-Japanese utterances by a Russian colonel in a public address. MOLOTOV, according to SATO, availed himself of this opportunity to advise the Japanese Government not to mistake rhetorical exuberance for an expression of the considered policy of the Kremlin. However, MOLOTOV added, the time would come when certain outstanding questions of a more fundamental nature would have to be thrashed out between the two nations.

This report was interpreted by both SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING as indicating that the USSR was not prepared to join forces with the UNITED STATES in the Far East at this stage. All along, the members of the Japanese Embassy in BERLIN were sure that the USSR would intervene on the side of the UNITED STATES.

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Cover name given as Egmont. 6.9.44 received message from Kleyenstüber of K.d.M. Spain referring to one of W's political reports and to his representative in Madrid. Message of 28.10.44 also from Kleyenstüber refers to the good impression made by one of W's reports in Madrid. 17.1.45. message from Leiter KOSpain (Lenz?) (AOB, **he was no longer in charge, albeit remained in Madrid still**) refers to a report which he thinks would be in the interest of the Sofindus purchasing firm.

18.3.45. Kramer, through the Stockholm-Berlin teleprint traffic request that Wirsing be informed that Consul-General Pfeleiderer (C-G in Stockholm would arrive by air in Berlin the following day and wanted to speak with W. To stay at the Adlon. (AOB, [the most prominent , and likely expensive hotel in Berlin](#)) Another message of approx. the same date from Stockholm ways that the representative from the legation there who left by air from Berlin was taking with him a letter fro Ohletz and another for Wirsing. He would deliver both letters to Schellenberg's private secy. A memorandum on the position of the secret reporting service in Sweden was enclosed in the letter to Ohletz, to which PFLEIDERER had added notes intended for Schellenberg. Message signed by Kramer (AOB, [Krämer](#))

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NAME; ADDRESS; PARTICULARS; INFORMATION	pp.	SUMMARY OF TRACES
		<p>7.4.45. from Stockholm to Berlin refersto some misunderstanding over the memorandum from Pfeleiderer to Wirsing which had been delayed.</p> <p>From I.L. 7.4.45. referring to previous message states that Wirsing had been informed but that the I.Luft rep. had again not been informed of Kramer's (?) letter to Schellenberg about Wirsing, (referring to his reports presumably).</p> <p>11.4.45. from I. Luft/Ohlitz to Kramer discusses the speeding of passing on priority matters, with particular reference to one of Wirsing's letters. Wirsing was also to have his reports sent to Kramer via I.Luft and not use his own courier route. Ohlitz requests Kramer's comments on Wirsing's report.</p> <p>From Kramer to Berlin further discusses speeding up of priority matters. Also enquires the whereabouts of Wirsing and the possibility of reaching him and Schellenberg as he and his colleagues had to state their views on W's report the next day.</p> <p>+ 26.1.45. from KdM Spain to Wirsing. Karl von WIEGAND HEARST representative arrived in Madrid a fortnight before from America accompanied by a certain Lady DRUMMON HAIGH. Wirsing is requested to wire a political questionnaire for them.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">eab/W.R.C.3.</p>

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SECRET

WAR ROOM

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Sent 3.8.45 (1645) Reference S-15355
Received 4.8.45 (0025) Case Officer WRC 3
Channel USFET File 602866

FROM : USFET MAIN SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE ETGBI

TO : U K BASE

1. STUBAF DOCTOR GISELHER WIRSING NOW AT UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER INTERROGATION CENTER.
2. WAS SCHELLENBERGS ADVISER SINCE SEPTEMBER 1944.
3. DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC QUESTIONS?

3.8.45 Channel USFET

From: USFET main Signed Eisenhower cite ETGBI

To: U K Base

1 Stubaf Doctor Giselher Wirsing now at United States Forces European Theatre interrogation Centre.

2 Was Schellenberg adviser since September 1944

3 Do you have and specific questions?

KV 2/140-2, page 46

I learn from V/48/F that Stubaf WIRSING has been arrested by 3rd Army.

I should therefore like a personal file to be opened. I remember that there are traces of this WIRSING in the FOCKLER, SCHELLENBERG, and SCHUEDDEKOPF files. I have had these extracted and a summary of traces made, which I attach for his P.F.

Would you please send me the P.F. on completion, together with any other traces which may exist. Note that WIRSING has the cover name of EGMONT on which there are MSS traces, which will follow in due course.

W.R.C.3a. 30.7.45. *997*

N.F.

I should therefore like a personal file to be opened, ... Wirsing ... Egmont MSS traces (AOB, MSS = Most Secret Source; are mainly Enigma related (Bletchley Park related Sources))