KV-200-3-Ostro-Fidrmuc-supl

Due to surpassing a certain critical "html" data content which was causing a program crash -

I had everything pre-arranged as regards 1) so that I could start very soon. But before I deal with this, it is perhaps necessary to give a survey of the situation as it was in summer 1940.

Portugal was swept by emigrants from France and Central Europe. Hotels etc. crowded, people in panic thinking that Hitler would march through Spain against Gibraltar and also invade Portugal.

The Portuguese are a soft people, no backbone. Under Salazar (the Portuguese dictator) rule much has changed, but the people not. Their sentiment at heart was for France. French is widely spoken, English not. All their civilisation and culture is based on French principles. Politically they were attached to England, but the dislike the English profoundly. They fear them, and tough reasoning told them to seek protection by England, I have met almost not one Portuguese who - "au fond" did not reveal a profound dislike of England. The feeling against the USA was neutral at this time. Contrary to Spain and Italy, the Portuguese thought America would never go into the war. Commercially they preferred the Americans to the English, because of the English exploitation of Portuguese colonies.

Germany had a growing chorus of admirers there. With France in pieces it was no wonder. But a lot of Portuguese were Germanophile, particularly many women. The rich Portuguese had always → German "Fräuleins" for their girls. For the boys not.

German "Fräuleins" for their girls. For the boys not. Therefore most better classes Portuguese ladies speak German, the men not. But many ideas of Nazism fell on fertile ground in Portugal, particularly in the Mocidade protuguesa (Portuguese youth movement which is an exact copy of the H.J. (Hitlerjugend)) and the Portuguese Legiao. The members of this anti-communist entity were certainly 89-90% pro-Germans.

It was the policy of Salazar to rule by balance of powers. For his collaborators he always chose one who was pro-Allied and one who was pro-German. The rivalry between them was useful to him. He knew what was going on. But besides this he has a sure eye for capable men and his Ministers etc. usually were well chosen, sometimes quite astonishingly capable for such a degenerated rase as the Portuguese.

The majority of the intellectual circles, particularly the business world. The Church (because of Germany's friendship with Russia (24 August 1939 - 21 June 1941) and the anti-Catholic drive in Germany).

Pro-German Powers: A large proportion of the middle classes (which in Portugal are a small community.

The Minister of Public Works, The Minister of Agriculture and Forests. The Secretary of State for the Army.

Those workmen who were not communists were in a surprisingly great part pro-German; the artisans.

Neutral : The banking world, the peasants, the Minister of Commerce and Industry.

Portugal was a good place to work from, certainly much better than from Spain, and I never could understand why the Abwehr concentrated its forces in Spain and not in Portugal. (AOB: Spain is boarding the Atlantic Ocean as well as the Mediterranean sea; and due to the Spanish Civil war - the Germans possessed far better contacts with Franco's Government. In particular Admiral Canaris possessed essential contacts and influence at the highest military levels) The reasons why Portugal was a better field than Spain were:

1) Portugal had no restrictions on currency export and sale on gold (coins and bullion).

2) It maintained shipping connections with most countries in the world, for example even Ireland.

5) The society was mixed. In Spain it was "depurated", whereas in Portugal all nations of the world met and mingled.

6) It was the way through which everybody travelled who came from East Africa, South America, even North America and wanted to go to England.

The Portuguese KO (KOP = Kriegsorganisation Portugal) was established - if I am not mistaken - in September 1940 (AOB: in my perception earlier). The same mistake was made as everywhere. Berlin centralized the KOP in one building, together with the Attachés and every member was known at once.

(AOB: It wasn't that simple as Fidrmuc expected: Very significant was - that the KOP was situated at an ex-territorial place, as the premises belonged to the Embassy diplomatically. In 1944 they made a mistake in Madrid, and separated the KO Spain offices from the Embassy premises. Now Spanish jurisdiction came in force. For instance, demanding employment licenses for each one working in the KOP office building. Transmitters were now to be situated in hostile environment. In Madrid they finally solved this nuisance, due to their good friendship with military leaders; but much damage had been done in the meantime. However, I have to be honest; it were the diplomats who insisted of the separation of the Embassy and the KOP offices, firstly.)

In one of my first "situation surveys" I made the following suggestions. Let the KOP work openly, drag attention of the enemy CI (Central Intelligence) but install some good men apart. Appoint as the head of the KOP a feebled-minded ~~arteriasklerosis~~ (arteriosclerosis) man and let the others do the work. Width Obstlt. Frederici (Obstlt. d. Luftwaffe Dr. Rudolf - they chose such a man; @ Forros) but only in (May/June) 1944. Otherwise they let the KOP proceed with IS and the result was, I think, very little satisfactory, if the number of persons employed and the money spent is taken into consideration.

AOB: ! Their structural mistake was of a different nature. The Abwehr, was officially designated: OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr. Consequently, it was ultimately commanded and stood directly in function of the "Oberkommando der Wehrmacht" thus the German Military High Command. Therefore its personnel were (mainly) regular military! They were, for whatever reason, placed in the Abwehr Intelligence Services. Also their career planning and payments were commenced within the German military structure (hierarchy). Only the Head of the Abwehr Admiral Canaris' rank was exceeding the rank of an Obst. (Colonel). All those favouring to become a General had to quit their function in the Abwehr first; as did, for instance, Piekenbrock and Bentivigny. Admiral Buerkner, was not directly be connected onto the Abwehr, but heading the more (obscure) politically guided "Ausland Organisation" (AO); who were controlling (politically) Germans living abroad. The criteria for becoming engaged in intelligence (Section I) or counter intelligence (Section III) was an organisational matter; and no pre-selection was, generally, taking place. German intelligence was becoming to maturity during the First World War (Nikolai). Whereas the British M.I.5 employed Crown Servants; whom (most) got, in my perception for practical reasons, also a military rank - as they had to cope or deal rather often with military personnel; their history might, in my perception, going back far before 1900 and beyond; and they relied on long standing structures and tradition.

My relations with KOP. Strict orders given to me and to the KOP, that I should meet the members as little as possible. The KOP should act always through one member only as my post-box, i.e. receive (my) reports for W/T transmission on to Berlin, give me letters from Berlin, make payments to me, or to my assistance "in case of need". Nothing else. The KOP was not the meddle of my affairs and I not in theirs. We were not to exchange information. I was not subordinated to the KOP, but entirely independent. The Military Attachés (Heer, Luftwaffe, Marine) were not to be informed of my activities, or that I worked for the Abwehr.

During my four and a half years of activity in Portugal I was personally connected with the following officers:

Obstlt. von Karsthof(f) (nome de Guerre : Ludovico) (AOB: not correct as also von Karsthof(f) was an alias Ludovico's real name was: Obstlt. d. Luftwaffe Ludwig Cremer (Kremer?) von Auenrode)

Oblt. der Reserve ~~Korer~~ Kurer (nom de guerre : Kamler and @ Heribert) exceeded by↓

Major, later Obstlt. Dr. Alois Schreiber nom de guerre unknown to me (AOB: Harry)

The other members I knew particularly by name. Lisbon / Estoril is a small place, the German colony is small in a few month everybody knew everybody at least by name (AOB: However, generally, Fidrmuc kept quite some distance to the German community!) Besides this there is no such place in the world as Lisbon for rumours. It is a Lisbon saying that the Portuguese are the only people in the world who can live without food, because they satisfy their hunger and thirst with rumours.

Ludovico contacted me in September (1941 or 1942?). Money and letters had arrived (see finance section and connections with Berlin). He had been informed where I stayed. I went to his house in Estoril (also Fidrmuc lived there). The house had a garden with a backdoor opening into a little forest. Nobody came there after dusk. I used this entrance ordinarily.

I got on with Ludovico on very good terms. He is from Trieste. By chance we found out that one of my uncles was his professor at the Trieste Gymnasium, and as we both had the same tastes, were Austrians and agreed on many other things, we came very friendly. We met often. Later on I brought also my wife Ragmor with me and came to us when we rented a house in the Rua Afonso Henriques, the Chalet Igloo. (T2082 T2082return) It was only 5 minutes from Ludovico's. Ludovico had a secretary who was his mistress (Mausi Sauermann). He was divorced and married his secretary later on. (after he left Portugal August 1944, somewhere in Austria) The girl was very clever and efficient. In her presence he never spoke with me of his work. I think he assumed something of the role of a governess in the KOP and that certainly was not good. The example of the KOP Leader was soon followed by other members of the staff and it was like a dove cage, that was the great weakness of Ludovico. He was also too soft with his subordinates I think. Furthermore he certainly spent too much money an let the KOP expand itself too much.

But he was a clever brain. I never told him (or the others of my work. He never asked. My reports were handed over to him in 2 envelopes, closed. Whether he opened them or not I do not know exactly, but I think he did not. He was not that kind (so war Er nicht). Whereas Kamler did, I know it. I never discussed my work with him. He (Kamler = Oblt. Otto Kurer) however, did so and took me into his confidence in the following details :

Of other things I knew nothing, except here and there a word, or the other, of which I could draw my conclusions and guesses. I never told anybody in Berlin that he had confided in me.

Ludovico was a first class expert in army affairs. Of the Air Force he knew less. Excellent memory and a very good ability to judge the situation and scrutinize reports, whether they were correct, might be correct, or must be wrong. he had an amazing way of winning the Portuguese to himself. And that was the main explanation of his success. He spoke Portuguese mixed with Italian, but he was charming with the plump ladies of the Police officers and if he wanted he made every Portuguese his friend in a few days.

He had two agents at least in the USA. Of one I know only the following: residence Washington, communication with Ludovico by short wave transmitter. Reports not very satisfactory. Relations stopped end of 1941 or early 1942. In a separate report I have given my conclusions why I believe this V-Mann had something to do with a Legation and that possibly it might have been the Yugoslavian (Legation).

Of the other I have given a separate report. It is the "Kaul" affair. It was the only case in which Ludovico asked me for advice. I have described the communication and given some details of reports received. see: (U2085 U2085return)

I am convinced that he had agents also in the West Indies. In Caldas da Rainha a few hundred emigrants were entered. Their chief concern was money and to get away. Whoever could get support from two of three charity funds at the same time was always the kind of this community. Among these emigrants were also 50 Dutchman. Otherwise this "raw material" was not worth much. The most amazing financial acrobatics were started there. I have described one in a story published in Switzerland. "Zweimal Caldas". It deals with the ingenious way in which a "brain trust" there swindled the Portuguese Telegraphe administration of nearly 9 million escudos so cleverly that they could not be prosecuted.

Ludovico (von Karsthof(f) Leiter KO Portugal) got into touch with a few of 50 Dutchmen. He met them in 1941 in Obidos, a small medieval town, in a Posada (rest-house) frequently. Most of the 50 went to Curacao (then a Dutch Colony), Jamaica, and Barbados in summer or autumn 1941. I am sure he came to terms with one or the other of them.

As regards the Police, the Police officers ate out of his hand. He could do anything with them, and not with bribes but small presents, invitations, not more. The Police officers visited him 2 or 3 times a week. During the summer (1941-42 he had a land-house rented where the officers of the P.V.D.E. (Policia Vigilanza a defenso do Estado - State Police) came with their families.

I am certain that Lornzo (Lorenzo ?), the chief of Police and the "right hand" of Salazar, did not give very much a way to Ludovico, but his assistant Casella (who had the important of alien surveillance) did so as well as Gaspari de Oliveira and Capktao Amado. Of others I do not know. That he got very valuable information from them is certain. Such information included:

Arrivals and departures of foreigners in frontier stations and airports. Where they stayed in Portugal, what they pretended to do: what information the Police had on them. Members of the Allied I.S. Such foreigners as were known to have other names (as possessed German I.S. personnel too); details of the members of foreign Legations. Connections with shipping, with his (their ?) V-Männer in various positions; shielding of these men; entrance and exit of any person Ludovico wanted in Portugal without visa or even passport (I know that he simply had to telephone to Casella, saying : Please do me a favour, tomorrow I am expecting a gentleman such-and-such a description by aeroplane from Madrid. He has no visa, let him enter - and the Police did it. Connection with the Azores and Portuguese colonies and numerous other cases.

The same thing with Consulates. He had somebody in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - whom I do not know. Through him he got hold of all reports from Consulates and confidential reports also from Ministers abroad. I have only a guess, that it was de Castro, Secretary of War (sub-scretario do Estado do ministero da guerra). I know of one case in which, through the Portuguese Consulate in a port in Wales - either Cardiff or Newport, or was it Bristol (I am not sure which one) Ludovico got a very good report on sailings of a convoy and effect of air raids.

It was surprising that almost nobody knew how intimate he was with the Police. (AOB: Maybe this could have been the reason - why various British approaches (S.I.S.) against Fidrmuc / Ostro failed so often; for example getting him expelled and/or in regard to Mme. Delacerda (de Lacerda) in respect to the legal custody of her daughter Esmeralda when the Fidrmucs were intending to leave Portugal for Barcelona in late 1944 early 1945; the about 16 year old girl joined them nevertheless to Spain) The Police took care that British I.S. (S.I.S.) agents did not spy on his house. In 1942 two were arrested, one near his house, one a Portuguese was sent immediately to the salt mines of the Ilhas Verdes (which are a hell).

The explanation of his success with the Police I will more broadly explain in part V (general).

Of his other connections I knew nothing, except that he had an aviator on the Lisbon-Tangiers (Tanger) - Casablanca lines as a V-Mann.

a) how to make payments in gold to the USA. I have explained this in a special report already. see: (V2086 V2086return)

b) to contact some emigrants of the Monarchist and Communist parties living in excile. I do not know whether he made use of it.

When Ludovico moved to Lisbon in autumn 1942 (1941?), Kamler (Oblt. Otto Kurer) was appointed to maintain liaison with me.

Kamler (KV 2/1962, PF 305470) : Well educated, from a very good family, but unfit for his task. Personally very agreeable, handsome, good sportsman, he was more unreliable then even the Portuguese. 7 o'clock could mean with his 2 hours later or the next morning. He was careless in speech, could not hold his tongue and was a woman-hunter. He fell in love every month with a different girl. He was for some the lover of the English (S.I.S.) agent Mme. de Lacerda (AOB: This latter lady? lived together with the Fidrmucs in Chalet Igloo, in Estoril. She spied on behalf of the British S.I.S. upon Fidrmuc's belongings, books, papers etc.; the Fidrmucs got the legal custody on Mme. de Lacerda's daughter Esmeralda (16). Later in 1944, she fought against Fidrmuc with accusing him to the Portuguese Police, however, every time in vain) and was on very good terms with a Canadian lady piano-player of the Wonder Bar, Estoril. He (Kamler) was very anglophile and preferred in a snobbish way everything that was English. he wanted always to → discuss his work with me and to know what I was doing.

discuss his work with me and to know what I was doing. It would have been the easiest matter to drag out of him everything I wanted to know. That he spoke to Ladies of too many things is certain, besides he took a score of girls to his flat, where he carelessly had things of the KOP lying around. We both (Paul and his wife Ragmor) liked him personally very much, he was a good sport, but that was all. He certainly knew of my reports. He also knew knew that Ludovico (alias of Leiter KO Portugal) maintained relations by "Esquire-bookseller-Portuguese sailors. Once he said to me that he had found a new way to communicate with the USA, and then came the review ( "Esquire") way. see: (Y2090 Y2090return)

He had a very disagreeable time with Ludovico, for Ludovico wanted to have him sent back to Berlin. But somehow he had excellent relations through his family with Canaris (AOB: Head of the entire Abwehr in Berlin, an alias was Senior) I think. Eventually he had to go, because Ludovico ordered it, that he was not to take any further part in KOP work. He often came to me complaining, and it was difficult to stop him. I do not know much of his work, because he confessed himself that he could not come to terms with anybody, everybody cheated him etc. Only with the Count Schuvalov he was proceeding. Eventually he was called back to Berlin.

Frl. Kraas. For a short time Frl. Kraas, the ex-secretary of Kamler who lived in Estoril, brought letters and fetched mail for me. A very nice girl. (the latter was on friendly terms with Fidrmuc's wife Ragmor) Whether she was efficient I do not know. Never discussed anything. She never asked questions. It is however possible that she talked about me to her close friend Frl. von Gronau, a secretary of the Legation. Frl. von Gronau was the mistress of the man ~~Jepsen~~ (Jebsen), who mysteriously disappeared from Estoril one day (https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-560-wrede-artist.htm)! It is to be supposed that ~~Jepson~~ Jebsen (AOB: M.I.5 cover-name Artist) dragged out all he wanted to know from Frl. von Gronau (her father was Military Attaché in Tokyo) and may have known about me, as the girls certainly talked "shop" together (indeed they did). One day (about 30 April 1944) Frl. Kraas came exited to our house (Chalet Igloo) and said: My friend (von Gronau) went to the flat of her boy-friend Jepsen (Jebsen) and she found the flat empty, shirts, stockings, clothes etc. all in the leaps?? lying about, nobody there." (Von Gronau, Johann Jebsen's mistress, possessed the key to the place where Jebsen lived)

One day later Frl. Kraas was gone to Berlin by airplane. (AOB: incorrect, as Frl. Kraas at least remained still about one week in Lisbon as did von Gronau)

Let us now take the opportunity to see what happened in Portugal, in respect to Johann Jebsen, actually an M.I.5 agent; entering the days before Jebsen's abduction (kidnap).

KV 2/201, page 43a partially-Jebsen British RSS intercepts, decrypted at Bletchley Park. After we have finished the entire KV 200 ... serials our attention will focus upon these RSS intercepts.

(2107 indicating that it was handled differently and likely of a different kind of code)

13.4.44 Lisbon → Berlin. 664 current message number. to HIOB (Heer (Army) I (section I = Intelligence) Ost (East) B (= Berlin)) ~~Sebior~~ Senior (= Obst. Hansen) through (via) HIOB I (section I) (AOB: actually nonsense as HIOB is section I) According to a Ballhorn (= cover-name for Hans Brandes; KV 2/3295; PF307718) communication of 11/4 Jonny (German alias to Johann Jebsen: https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-560-wrede-artist.htm; British M.I.5. cover-name Artist; because he operated "double cross") Jonny (German correctly spelled: Johny) is openly trying to find out about Ostro and his communications (AOB: this was accomplished on behalf of M.I.5. whom carries the blame - that Johann Jebsen had been abducted towards the end of this April; and finally murdered in the vicinity of Berlin, in February 1945!) In order to avoid accidents Angestellte Craas (Kraas) has forthwith been forbidden any contact with Ostro (Fidrmuc), because through her connection with Angestellte (Frl.) von Gonau ~~Jonny~~ (= Johny), as proved, again learns everything. Forwarding of all Ostro reports and letters (X2089 X2089return) is still assured and will be discontinued with Erbprinz (= Otto Wolf von Amerongen) (AOB: a very wealthy and important German person) before he leaves by air. If Berlin discussion with Ostro should go against the above ruling owing to the event not having known there, it is requested that the prohibition be confirmed by FS (Fernschreiben) (AOB: Fernschreiben would imply actually a telex line connection, but it is highly probably that the expression FS was meant for a W/T message) Your attention is drawn to our (message number) No. 3944 Leiter I (= Obstlt. Kuebart) of 11/4 concerning Craas (Kraas) at the last conference in Berlin. Sgd. Ludovico (alias of Leiter KO Portugal) Harry (= alias of Dr. Alois Schreiber Leiter I KOP; KV 2/3568)

(2115 indicating that it was handled differently and likely of a different kind of code)

14.4.44 676. To HIOB Senior (= Obst. Hansen) through HIOB I (actually Kuebart's Referat) Ref. our W/T message 664 (above. According to a communication from ~~Jonny~~ Johny has learnt from (his mistress) von Gronau and the latter on her turn from Craass (Kraas), that Ostro has been in the country for 2 days and has also resumed in old activities in Berlin. (AOB: how could they have been informed? Not mentioned, but this information must have been provided by Hans Brandes alias Ballhorn as Johann Jebsen knew the him, to I suppose Dr. Schreiber Leiter Section/Referat I of KOP) Johny asked whether the Ostro connections with England could be ascertained. Johny also knew also knew that HION (typing error as it should be: HIOB) Senior (= Obst. Hansen) had given permission to Ostro concerning connection of Ostro to KO (Portugal) via Craas (Kraas). Johny is equally au fait already with Harry's order to Craass (Kraas) concerning ban on further relations with Ostro and remarked in this connection that Craass (Kraas) (The British services didn't dare about spelling consentingly) has no thought of confirming to this order but was adhering to the instructions of HIOB I via Ostro. As KO Portugal cannot continue to work in such circumstances it is urgently requested that Crass (Kraas) and von Gronau be immediately recalled (AOB: this didn't instantly matured as both girls left Portugal somewhere in early May 1944)., giving routine reduction of staff as justification in order not to give Johny prior warning. Sgd. Ludovico (alias of Leiter KOP) Dias (AOB: he was likely Ii = Leiter W/T connections / communications; maybe used as to de-route this delicate message and keeping it away from those regularly involved. It is evident that it had been decrypted differently) Harry (= Leiter section/Referat I of KOP)

One day later (AOB: think of early in May 1944) Frl. Kraas was gone to Berlin by airplane. She was removed at once and we (Frl. Kraas was friendly with Fidrmuc's wife Ragmor (Rigmor)) did not see her again. She wrote, however, my wife at various times, told her that she was very well and was going to marry. I have learnt that her father is now a "big shot" with the Russian Military Government in Berlin.

Dr. A. Schreiber (KV 2/3568) I have given my opinion on him already in a separate report. I did not think him capable of his work. He did not speak one word of Portuguese, never learnt it. Always used interpreters to converse with V-Leute. We never exchanged one word about his or my work, nor discussed other officers of the KOP. organisation etc. I found him very correct. very punctual, very reliable and personally agreeable. His secretary Frau Krebs, we met only in his company. My wife said that she had never before met a woman so stupid as she was. very badly educated. We called her a ?? ok. With him (Alois Schreiber) I was on good terms.

Concluding this chapter I wish to say that Ludovico (real name: Obstlt. d. Luftwaffe Ludwig Cremer (Kremer?) von Auenrode), when he was called back early 1944 (AOB: he was succeeded about May 1944) to Berlin, left in a terriblerage (factually he left for Austria per airplane about August 1944). He was offended at the way that he was destituted? and he must have had a very bad time with somebody in Berlin (https://www.cdvandt.org/kuebart-kv-2-410-abwehr.htm).. But he did not tell me. He was very often scolded (I too) (= reprimanded) that we did not obey ordered and met in spite strict orders not to do so, but that was not the reason for his fall in disgrace.

Except my reports to Berlin I was asked to see visitors from Berlin at regular intervals. In the years up to the end of 1944 between 18 and 20 persons had seen me in Lisbon. Among them were Canaris (Head of the entire Abwehr = Senior), Piekenbrock (before the end of 1942), Scholz, Kleyenstüber (Leiter I-L Berlin 1943 June /August 1944 thereafter Leiter KO Spain), Kuebart (learnt later that this was his real name), Bayer, von Carnap (Oblt. Wilhelm von Carnap guiding Fidrmuc at Skapura, in Berlin), Obst. Maurer, Obstlt. von Dewitz and two or three other, of which I learned only the nome de guerre (alias). The meetings usually took place in the Legation (Rua Buenos Aires). Some of the persons named above came repeatedly to Lisbon.

I was called to see the Commercial Attaché on business. I often had to go to the Legation on various commercial matters. These meetings in the Legation had the purpose to hear my opinion on current affairs, ask me questions and usually also to soothe (pacify) me. I was getting more and more tired of the Abwehr and said in letters that I did not want to continue. (AOB: he is not expressing the real reason: his believe in Germany's victory had vanished. According their mutual agreement, that it stood Fidrmuc free to quit his engagement; the Abwehr leaders, such as Obst. Hansen advocated that he should remain on duty, against Fidrmuc's own desire)

Sometimes I had to speak for hours. For example at the end of 1943 to Obst. Hansen (then Leiter I Berlin) on the necessity to wihdraw as soon as possible the German troops from North Africa (AOB: This cannot be true, as the German Armed Forces surrendered in North Africa in Tunis on 13 May 1943) and not to send more troops there. (I headed my lecture with the proverb "Man soll schlechtem Gelde kein gutes nachwerfen" i.e. Don't throw good money after bad) (AOB: This was supposing that the Wehrmacht was free to respond, though, it was Hitler whom ruled everything in Germany!) Disaster would be the consequence.

von Dewitz brought me large diagrams with everything the OKW knew of the RAF/USAAF in GB, so that I could see where open gaps remained. Maurer was more for politics, and Canaris (Head of the entire Abwehr) just let me talk, did not say anything, etc.

That I was "Ostro" I did not know, just as my agents never knew what nome--de-guerre I had given them. I never knew I was I was Ostro. I was not addressed by this name and I do not know who invented it (perhaps Ludovico, as Ostro is a wind blowing in the Adriatic, or it might be the other part of Ostrogote, because "Gote" was my camouflage name before the war.

Before Kamler (Oblt. Otto Kurer) left Portugal he told me that I was called "Camoes" (Luiz de Camoes was Portugal's great poet). (AOB: we will encounter sometimes this latter name in the KV 2/201 serials, in due course) Since I learnt this name by chance through an indiscretion of Kamler I sometimes used this pseudonym to sign general reports (such as plans etc. If there exists such a nomenclature as Ostro I to X (AOB: not that I know of) this can only be a different numbering of my country letter code ...

In Berlin my reports were distributed from 1942 on by Wilhelm von Carnap. I know only that he distributed what came from me to the different "Auswerter". Who those Auswerter were and how the whole organisation worked, I have no idea and as it did not interest me, I also never asked.

Wilhelm von Carnap came about 3 times to Portugal. He had also dealing with Baron von Knigge (armament imports into Portugal and Wolfram (tungsten) and with the Otto Wolf company.

In Berlin he was engaged to see that business between Germain Brucker-Traus Ltds and the Reichsfischstelle worked smoothly. He did not interfere with the business himself. With all other business connections of the Ltda he had nothing to do.

von Carnap never told me anything about the OKW organisation (German Military H.Q), the Abwehr organisation (a sub section of the OKW) etc. I also never told him anything about my work (AOB: according their mutual agreement 13935-1938, Fidrmuc wasn't obliged to do so) , connections, how I did it etc. We were very good friends and I appreciated him ver much. He was a bit slow and pedantic, but extremely reliable and did everything he could to "keep me going". I often regretted his position, because it was a difficult job to cooperate with me. I was impatient, used language in my reports which could not be brought to the eyes of the Auswerters, but nevertheless he never became angry with me.

The worst row I had was when he wrote me that Obst Hansen (AOB: it depends just of the date, he might by then still have been Leiter I, in Berlin as we have to think of January .. early February 1944) had awarded me the Iron Cross (EK I) (I class). I replied that I would not accept it. The iron cross was a medal for "bravery during action" and not for a "Bürohengst" (office mail horse) like me. I wrote to Obst Hansen and von Carnap did not hand him my letter. Eventually I heard from Obstlt. von Engelhorn (Karl Heinz) (AOB: executed after the failed assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944) I got it from Hansen in berlin March 1944. Besides this they showed me in Lisbon the Kriegsverdienstkreiz mit Schwertern DE (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kriegsverdienstkreuz_(1939) EN(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Merit_Cross), later on (he received) on 1 Klasse (Ist Class) and also the document of award (Urkunde). The medals and document was sent back to Berlin. I do not know where they remained.

As regards money received I want to sign a separate affidavit (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affidavit), affirming under oath the sums I gave stated in my statement concerning finances.

In 1940 I entered Portugal with approx. 100,000 Escudos and and got another 160-180,000 Escudos.

In 1940 I had only little income in Portugal, but from 1941 I had a very good one, for business flourished. My share in (Brucker-Traus Ltda) profits amounted to some 200,000 Escudos annually ($8,000) and in 1943 230,000 Escudos. Perhaps half of it is due to business done by → influence of the Abwehr with the Reichsfischstelle,, the other half from business with Belgium and other German buyers.

influence of the Abwehr with the Reichsfischstelle, the other half from business with Belgium and other German buyers.

The rent of the Chalet Igloo was 2,000 Escudos monthly, with another 10,000 Esc. monthly we lived very well. I earned thus more than we spent for ourselves.

The costs of representation (invitations) presents etc. for my Portuguese friends I can estimate to have carried between 3-5,000 Esc. monthly. From this money I had in excess from business income we bought household belongings etc., as all our things had been destroyed in Germany (Hamburg?) by bombs. Furthermore I bought stamps for my collection and bought foodstuff parcels for our relations and friends in Germany.

The representation money I naturally charged to the Abwehr accounts. Except small annual presents, which I have enumerated in the affidavit I paid also the rent of our summer house in Galamares (mountains of Sintra near Estoril) from Abwehr money. This were only 5,000 Esc. annually. I met there frequently a) Portuguese visitors, who did not want to be seen too much with me in Estoril, and b) Ludovico, Kamler and later on Dr. Schneider (Schreiber??), who came there by car. It was better to meet there than in Estoril. Dr. Schneider, however, came a few times times also in our office (Brucker-Traus Ltda?) (which was in a much frequented office building and first floor was a tailor, where Dr. Schneider occasionally bought some thing.

I had thus at my disposition most of the money I received from the Abwehr, for payment of MOS/TOR.

Tor was expensive, probably because he had to divide funds with the Secretary and maybe others too. But Berlin always urged that I should pay him far more and that they would permit me any reasonable sum. However, I do not think much of overpaying agents. One spoils the quality of reports far more often by overpaying than by underpaying. I had to find the right balance between demand and necessity and to value the report correctly.I do not think with 100% more money I would have got better results.

Besides income from business and Abwehr I gained some money from contributions to Iron Age (periodical) etc. up to 1941 (from industrial Diamonds, see following and other reviews, and from a concession of oil shale (Schieferoel) (AOB: nowadays in many countries still a hot topic). By chance I found oil shale deposit in Portugal, interested the Portuguese Government, and sold the concession in 1943.

What I earned from articles sent through Dr. I. Tiedtke to German Reviews was paid to me in Reichsmark (RM).

I visited most parts of Portugal, but to Germany we went only once. My parents died in 1943. Berlin never wanted me to leave Portugal. I should nit interrupt my work. Finally I succeeded. In February 1944 we went first to Barcelona, in transit thereafter to Berlin by plane. from Berlin to Hamburg, where my wife remained; I went to Austria (Lündenburg) (Sudetenland), back to Berlin, met my wife there and back to Barcelona-Lisbon. We stayed a fortnight in Germany. As a matter of curiosity I would mention that I have not heard one gun fired nor siren blown nor experienced any air-raid.

In Berlin I met von Carnap, von Dewitz, my wife and I were invited to the house of Obst. Hansen (von Engelhorn was there too) in Rangsdorf (Grenzweg 1) Obst. Hansen showed me the lake (Wannsee?), where there were two flight of seaplanes by which agents were sent to enemy countries, or communications were kept up with them. But at that time I think this kind of Abwehr activity had come practically to an end.

Obst. Hansen never tried with one word even to sound me whether I would join the plot against Hitler. At that time everything must have been already in preparation.

Christmas 1944 we went again to Spain for personal reason (see separate report Lacerda case).

Left definitely Portugal 16.3.45 for Barcelona (AOB: together with his wife Rigmor, and Mme de Lacerda's daugther of which the Fidrmuc possessed legal custody Esmeralda)

1. Business of Brucker-Traus Ltda had come to a standstill in the autumn 1944. new opportunities offered themselves in Spain for trading with Portuguese colonies.

2. In the winter 44.45 it could be expected that Portugal might at any time decide upon hostile measures towards Germany, beginning from sequestration up to internment. I had to prepare the ground elsewhere.

3. After establishment of Madrid-London air route and other facilities I could continue operating from Barcelona, where I knew many people and had business connections. Our company had an agency there.

4. IN February 1945 I received instructions to drop gradually all reports dealing with troop movements, production, armament and similar lines and to concentrate more and more on "Militaerpolitische Entwicklung". For this purpose I wanted to have two bases, Portugal and Spain.

The changeover from military to "military-political" reports was not difficult for me, as a matter of fact much of my work was in this line.

From Tor I received 2 reports (?) to Barcelona (one in the winter, one after arrival), then it stopped. It was no use to continue - end of March '45 - with the armies pressing upon Berlin. I sent two or three reports to the KO Madrid to Obstlt. Kiekenbusch (Leiter I KO Madrid), and stopped in April. The airmail traffic with Germany had come to an end 4 - 6 ? weeks before the capitulation.

Early in 1945 I had shown in an expose that it was no use any more to continue to report, as I did. I drew a plan of what I understood of "Militaerpolitische" Berichte and that was apparently accepted in February. I should keep up this work as long as possible and a sum of 300,000 Escudos quarterly ($12,000) was appropriated for the plan. But it never came to be executed. The last payment I got was signed receipt for was before I left Portugal (16 March 1945). To have my plan working would have taken me some 4 - 6 ? weeks, but not under conditions ruling in March-April 1945.

I have described this broadly in a separate report. Actively I interfered only in purchase of industrial diamonds, for which I had very good connections (Established partially by Dr. Breit emigrated to England 1935) and which were bitterly needed by Germany. Payments for such diamonds were executed generally by Roubaud, and after his arrest by Dr. Eckert. Only in one case at the end of 1943 I bought and paid myself a quantity of some 1,000 carats at approx. Escudos for which I received the money from Dr. Eckert and handed him the stones. The payment was executed via Credit Suisse, Zürich, to my sellers. But I have intervened in the purchase of approx. a total of 9,000 carats. I got 2½ % commission on these purchases. Brucker bought for own account (not our company's) through me for Belgian interest another 1,000 carats.

Otherwise I had once my hand in letting disappear 20,000 woollen blankets, which belonged to Germany and which the English did not want to leave Portugal (threatening that they would stop imports of wheat), and the purchase of a sailing vessel for blockade-running to supply the German fortress on the Atlantic coast (Lorient, Saint Nazaire??) after the retreat from France.

b) an approach by the English I.S., which I have described already. Briefly: in summer 1944 an Englishman visited me, showing me a letter letter I had written to the Ironmonger 3.9.1939 and asked me whether I would not work for the English.. He came by order of Air Commodore (or Group Captain Fuller of the British Embassy. I regretted, that I had no interest for this proposal, and we had a very friendly chat. He parted with the words "think it over". (notice the internal discussions at M.I.5 → (Z2092 Z2092return)

c) the usual small interferences such as overhearing telephone conversations (the Telephone Company was up to 1944 British controlled) and occasional watching by well-known beackcombers ? (for example a street newspaper vendor who was paid by the English as well as by the Germans) and minor incidents, which never bothered me. But my mail was never opened.

d) The Portuguese Police had positively no knowledge that I worked with the Abwehr up to the end of the war, except the ordinary way in which almost everyone casually operated. I know this → from two sources:

(1) from the Police Captain Amado, with whom I had a long conversation in February 1945, when I had my residence card extended;

(2) from Dr. E. Schroeder (AOB: Sturmbannführer Erich Emil, Polizei Attaché (Police Attaché) KV 2/399; PF 96729; Amt IV SS/SD). I spoke with him in the C/Wing. That he knew where I was is certain. I had my passport renewed end of 1943 and he was in charge of all passport affairs. He would not renew a passport without knowing who the German subject was. Ludovico (once Leiter KO Portugal) has told me that Dr. Schroeder had received instrucytion to give me a new passport without asking questions". Besides the SD was watching the Germans in Portugal. The SD must have got also knowledge who I was. Whether I was watched by the SD or not in the sense of controlling me, I don't know. (AOB: Fidrmuc was a NSDAP party member, thus less suspected) I am positive that the Abwehr did not order this. But Dr. Schroeder said to me here in Ober-Ursel: "The Portuguese Police knew very well shop was connected with the Abwehr or not. It is not my business to ask what you had been doing in Portugal, but I might as well tell you that the Portuguese P.V.D.E. has not had your name on their list of suspects working for the German Abwehr."

e) Berlin always wanted a perfect "camouflage". To this I objected. I said: this is impossible. I came to Portugal in summer 1940. Nobody will believe that I came only for business. It is a thousand times better too make the enemy believe that I am working for the Abwehr and to mislead them, than to do everything possible to hide myself and so arouse much more curiosity. I therefore did not hide myself. Quite the contrary, I was known all over Estoril. I met dozens of people every day on the beach, I did everything as broadly in the limelight of the Estoril gossip tongues as possible. If it was necessary, I could of course arrange clandestine meetings, but actually this happened very rarely.

That the American and English IS suspected me is absolutely certain. It is impossible to hide everything. Also it was at any time possible that something in Kopenhagen leaked out. But I am positive that the CI did not suspect who were my agents, how I contacted them and who were my principle informants in Portugal. I know this through Mme. Lacerda (AOB: spying upon Fidrmuc on demand of S.I.S/M.I.5) and she wanted to find out, and mainly from different Portuguese persons I met. I could notice it instantly when one of them had been warned to meet me, if he had been contacted by the English to ask questions. This actually happened in various cases, for example with finance of Paul Falusch, a Swedish girl working in the Swedish Legation and others. I made use of this opportunity always and stressed the point that I was "in some way or the other making reports. I let them question me and drag information from me such as I wanted to tell. But what I reported to Berlin via the KOP if it ever was known to the Allied CIC must have leaked out in Berlin, or one of the girl secretaries amd at that time can not have been brought directly in connection with my person.