Richard Kauder was likely the most thrilling mysterious
agent on behalf of the
How he obtained his rather spectacular information -
we don't know, exactly.
However, that in some way or another - the Russian NKWD (NKVD) had been involved -
must be granted.
However, his forecasts were lasting far too long and often being essentially relevant; that it might not always have been in the direct favour of Russian self-interests.
Up to 5th of August 1943 Richard's "Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost" (Dienststelle Klatt), operated from Sofia (Bulgaria).
His messages carried mainly the designation: "Max Meldungen"
His office later was facilitated with his own wireless station, carrying the cover-name: Schwert.
At some stage of the war, there were more than 30 persons employed in his office! Partially sheltering there under quite comfortable circumstances.
In 1943, another Klatt controlled source of information Max and Moritz message
made the British Services nearly mad!
The British concluded that the information provided
from North Africa might likely have been supplied to him via the Russians.
Richard Kauder was born Jewish, albeit that his parents converted to Christianity.
He was born in Austria (6 September 1900)
AOB: I became engaged in this metier due to a simple query of my late, best friend 'Rudolf Staritz' asking me: Have you ever heard of Max Meldungen?
I had to admit that I never before heard of it.
Just a month before Rudolf Staritz asked me this on early April 2015 - a quite extensive research study had been published in
Hitlers jüdischer Meisteragent gegen Stalin
Überlebungskünstler in Holocaust
By the way: 1287 pages!
It took Dr. Winfried Meyer > 10 years to complete his research endeavour.
It is in German language, but because I am bi-lingual Dutch - German, this is of no hindrance.
My English friend Dr. Phil Judkins paved the way to trace, in the British National Archives (Kew), get access to the British HW ... and KV 2/.... serials.
About this time, the NA started systematically - with making these serials accessible in a digital way via the web.
Don't think of OCR - but photographically scanned and converted into PDF.
Albeit, that these folders had been weeded before in the 1950 and 60s, as well as was done about the turn of the century (2004), just before its making accessible for the general public.
Page initiated: 14 October 2023
Current status: 5 November 2023
Chapter 1 (since 18 October 2023)
Chapter 2 (since 24 October 2023)
Chapter 3 (since 27 October 2023)
Chapter 4 (since 1 November 2023)
Chapter 5 (since 5 November 2023)
KV 2/1495-1, page 1
(AOB: seemingly: this jacket is not the genuine one from the 1950s, maybe they have reshuffled it, and/or including its weeding. Please bear in mind - that the only file number used - during and before the war, as well as thereafter, is PF 602358)
KV 2/1495--1, page 3
*Connection with G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) PF 602358 Kauder
Source: Rot PF 65653 (= KV 2/1412 and KV 2/1414)
1941 Leiter of Abwehrstelle Sofia which was founded at the beginning of 1941 and is responsible for espionage in Russia and the Near East. It confines its operations roughly to the area of Mosow (Moskau). According to Rot is a genius and has made Sofia one of the most important Abwehr stations. He is the son of am Hungarian (actually Austrian) (medical) officer and Rot thinks he himself is now an Oberleutnant (AOB: impossible, as Richard Klatt is Jewish he might never have been allowed to enter the German Military Services. But, some exceptions existed, but then such a person had to be declared being actually of the Aryan race. The main reason why Richard Kauder became involved this way, was the constituted dangerous living situation of Kauder's mother in Vienna (Wien); as to prevent her from any form of deportation, Richard Kauder managed to offer his services to the German Abwehr and obtaining a "Sperre" for his mother, at least for the time being). Travels on a Hungarian passport (AOB: after the 5th August 1943 Affair, which will be dealt with later, when Richard Kauder was forced to leave Sofia and become an Hungarian citizen virtually and he lived for a while in Budapest) as an engineer. Has been imprisoned in Budapest for illegal crossing the frontier and currency smuggling. Rot met in Budapest at Pannoniergasse an old woman who announced herself as Frau Klauder (likely Kauder) as and was called Mama by Klatt (thus actually his mother). His subordinates have a very great respect for him and it was the general view that Ast Vienna (Wien = Wehrkreis XVII) was only kept going (nonsense) by the work done by Sofia. Rot (himself also a Jew) believes that the Stelle was organised by Klatt on a half private basis, i.e. permission was granted by the O.K.W. to Klatt to organise a Stelle which he then worked up until he told the O.K.W. authorities that the organisation was completed and the Stelle was then finally recognised.
One of the many journeys to Sofia, G. (= Georgy-Gross. KV 2/130 and KV 2/131 = PF 600052) was recruited by Baumruck, and persuaded to put up a large sum of money for Sofia Stelle (Luftmeldekopf Services Süd-Ost) during July and August (1942) he smuggled for Klatt between Sofia and and Budapest, and they shared the profits between themselves. Subsequently knew him as Leiter Luft I (= military intelligence), Sofia and controlling a vast network of wireless stations in the MidEast, North Africa and South Europe. His Dienststelle is branch of Generalkommando (= Wehrkreis XVII), Vienna (Wien) formerly under Graf Marogna-Redwitz who has now (after the failed assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944, Marogna-Redwitz was even murdered) been replaced by a SD Standartenführer from Wiesbaden; Klatt sends his reports direct to Goering (not correct) and Obst. Ritter von Wahl, Head of Luft I, Vienna (Wien). Klatt now operates from Budapest, owing to personal difficulties with Dr. Delius (his alias) (real name Obst. Otto Wagner, file KV 2/284, PF 601320) chief Liaison Officer (AOB: actually Delius/Wagner was actually the Head of KO Bulgaria, in Sofia) (AOB: in my perception two factors were involved, jealousy between the highly ranked Ost. Otto Wagner and the highly regarded civil person, and additionally being a Jew) (AOB: my best friend Rudolf Staritz told me that this Dienststelle was known as: "der Jude Klatt"; but he didn't realise that the leading person behind it was really a Jewish individual, holding the alias of Klatt, whom actually was Richard Kauder) in Sofia between the Bulgarian and Greek authorities.
Georgy-Gross was recruited by Hungarian C-E to report on activities of al Germans with whom he came in contact and on his next trip to Sofia he was given the mission to spy on Klatt, and he submitted the report to the Hungarian authorities on his return to Budapest.
Klatt asked G. to arrange a contact between himself and the Allies. He told G. to induce the Allies to give him a radio and codes, which he proposed to work himself in secret contact with the Allies. When Klatt was asked to reveal the locations of two or 3 of his W/T stations in Allied territory, in return for which his W/T operators would be allowed to continue their transmission under Allied control, Klatt became furious with the proposal and refused to have anything further to do with Georgy-Gross.
Georgy-Gross severed relation with Klatt when Klatt accused him of working secretly with two of his (Klatt's) W/T operators and of having passed on information to Allies.
Last seen, when he told Georgy-Gross he would probably have to give up his post on account of difficulties with his chief von Wahl, who was, who was intending to take over the Dienststelle. Klatt said he might go to Madrid.
AOB: Please bear in mind, that all forgoing (collected bits and pieces) and following statements were based upon incomplete, and from often hear say derived information.
KV 2/1495-1, page 4 Goetz PF 600802
April 1943 September 1944
Leiter I Luft Sofia and later Budapest, and spy-master of Goetz (= alias Wigo), Abwehr V-Mann. They communicated through a W/T set in the Hungarian Legation in at Istambul (Istanbul). All information was sent to Budapest from Klatt's outstation in a very complicated cross-word, which was decoded in Budapest and forwarded to Vienna (Wien) in a cipher machine similar to a typewriter. Believed in contact with Japanese Consulate in Istambul (Istanbul).
for mission to obtain information on RAF matters in Mid-East, Russia and Turkey,
e.g., locations of airports, construction of new airfields types and numbers of
planes etc., also Military information of a general nature.
He instructed Georgy-Gross
to contact Heidt and Frau Rosenberg, having contacted Alfonso who was in charge
of W/T in the Spanish Chancellery at Ankara. In Istambul (Istanbul)
he was to hand information to Alfonso's cousin Moralles, Spanish Cultural
Attaché, who would pass it on to Alfonso in Ankara. Georgy-Gross
carried out the latter part of the mission for the short time, and
subsequently reported to Press Attaché in Turley. Klatt
recalled him to Budapest in June, but again sent him to Turkey to contact Sami
Saad ud Din. When he first went to Budapest (September 1943)
he insisted that his name should be changed to Karmany (Klatt's
and that his Dienststelle should be changed to Luftmeldekopf.
Klatt's White Russian sources were organised by General Tourkoul (Turkul)
were organised by General
and in 1943 he trained Russian PoW's and planned to send them back to Russia on
espionage missions. (AOB:
death squads, without any chance!)
His Dienststelle was established under cover of Firma
Hugo Adolf Franz)
Budapest (see adds) and he had another wireless station at Rakos Palata.
There is a close connection between Luftmeldekopf (under Klatt) and the Bulgarian Police in Sofia, and much of Klatt's traffic goes through the Bulgarian Police W/T network. (AOB: it is true that Klatt started his services by using the W/T facilities provided by the Police in Sofia. However, later Klatt possessed his own organisation and W/T facilities). It is through this system that Klatt is believed to be in contact with Russian.
Kuebart claims that Klatt did not function under KO Sofia (Headed by Dr. Delius the alias of Obst. Otto Wagner) but was controlled by Ast Vienna (Wien). He worked in Bulgaria, operating against the Russians, as an agent of Eins Luft of Ast Vienna (Wien). Was considered to have obtained information through a monitoring service. Furnished valuable information on Russian troop movements.
End of 1943 (AOB, this happened on 5th August 1943, due to Edgar Klaus' his message that there is a chance of a peace with Russia. When Hitler was informed he became furious and ordered: that from now on no Jews were allowed to act on behalf of a German Service or whatever entity! Klatt was the direct victim of this order, and the German Services managed to get him placed in Budapest under Hungarian supervision but still acting within the German intelligence interest; though less efficient) on Hitler's orders contact with Klatt (and others) was broken as he was a Jew. A request for an exception to be made in this case put forward by Zeissler was refused. As a result Gehlen (FHW), and Hansen (Leiter I of the Abwehr in Berlin) and Marogna-Redwitz (KV 2/3160, PF 601107) concocted a scheme for Klatt to continue his work clandestinely. Arrangements were made for his to disappear from Bulgaria and secretly reappear in Hungary, probably in Budapest, working to Ast Vienna (handled by Obst. Ritter von Wahl) under a new name as a fresh agent, but maintaining his old contacts and information continuing to be passed to F.H.O. (Fremde Heere Ost).
KV 2/1495-1, page 5
AOB: this is an exceptional proof that even, say nearly 80 years after the events did happen, they still considered it necessary to hide matters (something)
The regular visitors of my historical surveys, that now and than the content of some pages being kept hidden to the public.
I can understand that, for example, personal data connected with the American Diplomatic representations being kept hidden when not directly involved names being given.
However, it is most unlikely that this will the case in the first 32 Minute Sheets entirely.
Please consider the next example of a ordinary Minute Sheets; these do not regularly concern single pages for each Minute, but these form an succession index of matters of all sorts, some with abridgements, others with short content notices and that like.
AOB: actually in contrast what may be expected when a minute sheet being concerned, is, that in this exceptional case they apparently did start with a new succession number serial, somewhere in 1946
KV 2/1495-1, page 6
33. (= actual minute number)
T.A.R. (T.A. Robertson) (= M.I.5) (AOB: Robertson was quite leading character at B.1.b at M.I.5)
Colonel Cumming is willing to provide a civilian car and a driver daily to transport Klatt to and from Brixton. (AOB: Klatt was captured by the US Forces, but the British Service was permitted to interrogate Klatt temporarily; because the American virtually ruled their matters, since) He considered the escort should be the responsibility of B. Division and a short roster of B. officers who would be willing to undertake this duty has been prepared.
Mr. Keene has been asked for secretarial assistance and Mr. Sonnex will at at short notice make what arrangements he can for the accommodation of the two interrogating officers during their stay in London. May I suggest that Mr. Ryle (Major Ryle is often connected to RIS / RSS wireless intercepts of enemy secret communications) and Mr. Trevor-Roper (= mostly concerned with secret codes and related communications), neither of whom is now in Government service, be asked that a suitable honorarium be given to these officers for their assistance.
B.1.w. 15.3.46 Sgd. Joan Chenhalls. (secretary/officer at M.I.5.)
B.1.W. Miss Chenhalls.
I have spoken to Colonel Butler who is willing to defray (financing) the expenses of Mr. Ryle and Major Trevor-Roper during the time they were engaged on this interrogation.
A.D.B. (likely Head de Bureau) (might have been Dick G. White). 18.3.46 Sgd. T.A. Robertson.
22.3.46 To Mr. Masterman re visit to German (Germany?) of Major Trevor-Roper to see Klatt.
Lieut. Commander Winston Scott (at the U.S. Embassy) advised us today that Klatt had made an unsuccessful attempt at suicide in prison at Frankfurt. In view of the administrative difficulties of escorting and handling a man in this state, Mr. T.A. Robertson told the American authorities that we would not now ask for him to be brought here. They are, however, willing for his interrogation by British officers, and tentative (hesitating) plans plans were made for Mr. Trevor-Roper and Mr. G. Ryle (or Mr. Hart (M.I.5)) to travel to Frankfurt and see Klatt at the end of the month.
B.1.b. 23.3.46 Sgd, Joan Chenhalls
24.3.46 From S.S.U. (Strategic Services Unit (US)) re. Kauder @ Klatt Held in B.1.B. (post notice from later date)
26.3.46 Cross reference to correspondence previously filed at 36a and 37a
2?6.3.46 From Mr. Masterman (M.I.5) to 34b.
KV 2/1495-1, page 7
AOB: the following Minute Sheet has a more regular looking.
Undated From SCI Unit A Salzburg, Austria, Interrogation report No. 1 of Kauder @ Klatt.
Extract from minute from Major Howard R.S.S. (Radio
to Mr. Hughes re CSDIC (Combined
report on Victor Pan and
Matl (= KV 2/1493, PF 600769) (the
latter was formerly a Prof.
in Slavonic Studies at Graz University)
at 27b (among
the kept hidden to us minute serial)
least we know what it is about)
3.4.46 From B.1.b to B.4.d. (M.I.5) re 40a.
1.5.46 Extracts re activities of Freund (Hans Milo, Leiter Amt VI-Z (formerly III-F) KV 2/413 .. KV 2/414; PF 602286), Klatt, from Bur. de Documentation en Allemagne
2.5.46 Extracts from information provided by Schellenberg about Klatt. (KV 2/94 .. KV 2/99; PF 600651) about Klatt.
Copy of letter to S.S.U. (X-2) re
Klatt @ Kauder
14.6.46 To Mr. Ryle re Klatt
14.6.46 From SSU. re Klatt
18.6.44 From Mr. Ryle re interrogation of Klatt
Miss Chenhalls, B.1.a.
See Freund? at 6a (the latter 6a is among the kept hidden serials at KV 2/1495 page 5)
On page 249 of the French report on Hans Johann (Hans
(28a in PF. 602286 =
there are references to a Russian named Tscherniak, resident of Geneva (CH),
who is alleged to have been the principal Soviet agent in Switzerland.
We have had references to this man from other sources, and I think that the
allegation is probably well-founded. Freund goes on to speak of a certain
Prince Kourakin, a White Russian, about whom there have been previous reports in
connection with Tscherniak. Freund then makes the statement
that Tourakin was also in relations with Turkul and Ira
of the Klatt case, and that Lang's instructions from the Russians came to him,
at least in part, through Kourakin. I should be very grateful
if you could let me know from the your knowledge of the Klatt affair whether
there is any possibility of this having been true, and whether, if so, it is
worth any further investigation. I was not aware myself that
there was any possibility of a link between Klatt and Switzerland, but I do not
know the case well and I should be reluctant, as you can well imagine, to plunge
into a full investigation of it at this stage. (AOB:
in some respect we are just doing so)
F.2.c. (= likely M.I.6) 25.6.46 Sgd. J.M.A. Gwyer
KV 2/1495-1, page 9 partially
Miss Chenhalls, B.1.b.
Thank you for the attached report on Klatt, which I read with great interest.
I think there is no doubt that Gilbert's thesis is correct. I can add nothing to his information about Turkul, but this same technique of penetrating and taking under control the principal White Russian organisations is well known and described at length by Krivitsky.
My only other point concerns the accuracy of the Max reports. I do not think it is necessary to go as far as Gilbert does when he asserts that the NKVD (NKWD) "scarified Soviet soldiers in order to strengthen its own hold over anti-communists in the rest of Europe." In fact no detailed assessment of the accuracy of Max reports, so far as I know, was ever made. Indeed, we ourselves lacked the necessary detailed information from the Russian front to make such an assessment possible. All that we can say is that the Max reports were sufficiently accurate to deceive the Germans and that Max himself was never caught out. The same can be said with equals truth of Garbo's reports which certainly were operational deception.
F.2.d. (M.I.6) 13.8.46. Sgd. J.M.A. Gwyer.
1) Please see Majors Gwyer's comments on the Klatt interrogation report.
2) With reference to the letter to Commander Scott (S.S.U.) (stationed
at the U.S.
Embassy in London)
at 56a, when these papers were handed to him on 13th August he informed me that
Turkul was regarded as a garrulous old man and is at liberty in the American
Bavaria towards the Salzburg area).
It would be comparatively easy, however, to pick him up, and Commander Scott is
of the opinion that he could be made available at any time for interrogation.
He is not clear about the status of Ira
Lang Longin, but he
understands that he is in Salzburg (Austria).
he pointed out that this man had never yet been properly interrogated as there
was nobody with fluent Russian (AOB:
communicated in Russian language with Ira Longin,
or did both latter men communicated in another language?) available and this was
the only language that
speaks. Would you like me to arrange for the meeting
B.1.b. 15.8.46 Sgd. Joan Chenhalls
KV 2/1495-1, page 10
AOB: This page is, apparently a part of Schellenberg's interrogation at Camp 020 in summer 1945
136. Schellenberg asked H. (AOB: Heinrich Himmler head of the entire SS?) his opinion and H. replied that advisable to keep Klatt going for the East but that his reports on other matters should be discouraged. That Klatt should be under the direct control of R.S.H.A. (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) Milamt, and that orders should be given to the S.S. and S.D. in Vienna (= K.d.M.) and Budapest (their jurisdiction there was not ascertained) to keep off and at the same time Abt. 3 (Amt III, responsible for Sipo/SD and Gestapo all inland related) should keep him under surveillance. No positive? action was to be taken. All reports on him, direct to Schellenberg (by then Head of Amt VI as well as Milamt / Amt Mil). Wagner (Obst. Otto Wagner Leiter K.O. Sofia, alias Dr. Delius?) so that Klatt could work in peace and von Wahl (in the days of Marogna-Redwitz; guiding officer to Klatt on behalf Ast Wien (Vienna)) also. Furthermore, the immediate "Aryanising" (declaring him being of Aryan descent) of Klatt.
137. Schellenberg approved this programme (AOB: by the way, at R.S.H.A. the "big boss" was Kaltenbrunner, and the latter certainly had to agree. But Schellenberg was on most friendly private terms with Himmler, we may consider that Schellenberg's judgements will mature) and ordered H. (AOB: this proves that H. is not constituting Himmler) to go to Vienna (Wien) and Budapest accompanied by Lt. Dr. Tiemann (profession Lawyer - Rechtsanwalt) (AOB: this latter dubious person "robbed" about early 1945 Richard Kauder's personal possessions, such as his "Stamps Collection") from Mil C to report on the situation.
138. No new developments ensued.
139. Klatt's real name was Richard Kauder and he was a son of a former D.M.S. of the K. und K. army. He was a Christian (converted to) Jew (R.C. and was approx. 45 years old and had been divorced. He professed to H. to be working against Bolshevism for the Austria and not for the Nazi-Germany. His wish was to become an Aryan so that he might marry and also so that he could be left in peace by the Gestapo. Klatt ?? had his own agents and employed about 50 persons and that included ?? women as interpreters. He refused to give away the names of agents ?? or the sources of his information.
140. He received his reports by W/T and had two stations in Budapest, ?? one in the centre and another in the outskirts. Up to this time ??? he had sent approx. 10,000 messages to O.K.W.. We kept records ?? and card indices of all messages.
141. No concrete evidence was found by H. to support the accusation ?? that Klatt was guilty of high treason but it was known that he ?? was on friendly terms with high Hungarian officers (Klatt's staying in Budapest and possessing an Hungarian passport, does not wondering me of his friendly stand with the Hungarians) who were not pro-German. It is possible that the leakage occurred in this ????
142. Klatt earned a great deal of money through a firm (Kettel / Mittermayer) dealing ???? food supplies for the german and Hungarian Armies. (AOB: Klatt shared with Dr. Kettel the profits; which he necessitated for his activities. When he remained in Sofia, before 5th August 1943, the office was also sheltering the W/T Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost called Schwert was rather dependable upon these profits). This was ??? purely a cover. He refused to account for his expenditure ??? currencies on security grounds.
143. H. met his right hand man, one Dr. Deutsch a former Viennese (Wiener) ??? lawyer.
144. Klatt, who had always had a free hand, refused to work ??? supervision and threatened to stop sending messages. ??? knew him very well.
145. The following Abwehr officers are known to Klatt, an????? worked with him:- Marogna-Redwitz (murdered after the 20th July 1944 failed assassination attempt on Hitler), Boxberg (= Obstlt. deputy commander for Ast. Wien (Vienna)), Hotzel (AOB: Li Obstlt., deputy commander for Ast Wien) Horacsek Spiegel, Kleyenstüber (Arno, Obstl. 1943-August 1944 Leiter I L Berlin thereafter Head K.d.M. Madrid / Spain up to May 1945), Elting, Kamler (= Oblt. Otto Kurer), Bechtle. Also the whole Ast Wien (Vienna) and the S.D. in Budapest ???
KV 2/1495-1, page 13 (minute 55a)
PF 602358/B.1.b/JC (= Joan Chenhalls) 13th August, 1946
Dear Mr. Philby (A member of the well-know "Cambridge 5" spies on behalf of Soviet Union; caught in the 1950s and early 1960),
Professor Gilbert Ryle has recently returned from the American Zone of Germany where he interrogate Kauder @ Klatt on our behalf.
You will be interested to see his copy of his report and we should be interested in your comments on his hypothesis.
You may remember that at one time the Mortiz reports (also supplied by Klatt) were considered so accurate that an investigation into this question of possible leakage was conducted by S.I.M.E. (= Secret Intelligence Middle East) and we may wish to draw their attention to various specific Isos (= manually generated codes) message messages etc. Is it possible for us to send a letter of this character through the (diplomatic) bag now, or should this request be addressed to you for despatch on our behalf through your channels?
H.A.R. Philby Esq.,
S.I.S. (= M.I.6)
(2) (since 24 October 2023)
KV 2/1495-1, page 14.
Dear Miss Chenhalls,
Thank you for your letter. Would you tell Guy Liddell that I'm to come to discuss our friends pretty well any time that he chooses?
It occurs to me that Oberursel (U.S. Interrogation centre in the vicinity of Frankfurt a/M) might put these extra questions to Klatt.
1) As it is on any showing likely that
briefed Klatt what secrets to keep under interrogation (AOB:
highly unlikely, because there hardly would have historically be a chance that
the met towards the end of the hostilities) he might be jolted (shaken)
by the question what secrets was he warned not to divulge, backed by what bribes
or menaces from what organisation which would be alive and operative in the
* AOB: likely phonetically spelled
2) With reference to the three Max or Moritz messages which were seen and reported by the German Military Attaché in Rome (?) on the same day as they were sent into Vienna (Wien) by Klatt, were they Max or Moritz? (AOB: I cannot judge this query, but - as Klatt/Kleyenstüber's doing were off the record, that they hardly would have contacted the German Legation (representing Ribbentrop's A.A. in Berlin)
3) When Klatt and
flew to Rome to extract Turkell
why was Turkul so reluctant to break the journey in Vienna? (AOB:
His coping with Klatt, did not automatically imply that Turkul was pro-German;
and he and his quite wide family also staying in Rome, rejected firstly to leave
their quite peaceful and luxury retirement there) Was the flight a flight
not from the the Allies, but from the Germans? (it
was solely Klatt's
If so, why did Mussolini's fall threaten to get Turkul into a fix with the
4) Didn't Klatt himself decode the original Max and Moritz signals, on the occasions when Ira Longin was away, e.g. when he visited Rome? (AOB: Klatt employed people for these jobs (one of which was Deutsch, but also others) If so, what were the signals like and what was the code (Klatt has denied this, but was, I believe, lying. And it is the point on which he would have the strongest motive for lying.
Longin Ira was certainly in Rome for a few days fairly early in 1942. If we have a consecutive run of Max and Moritz reports during the first six months, say, of 1942, we could press the above questions with some confidence. (AOB: Here Prof. Ryle is not realising - that what he saw were abridged translations from German into English language. And there weren't at all perfect)
Klatt might be asked in what month and week in 1942 Longin Ira was in Rome. (AOB: what a dreamer is Ryle! Richard Kauder had gone through enormous stress, say the last year of the war and beyond. Then failing a suicide attempt; and then expecting someone answering queries about dates when someone was visiting Rome exactly; whereas Klatt ran the business of the Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost, in Sofia?)
Sgd. Gilbert Ryle.
KV 2/1495-1, page 18 (minute 51b)
D.B. (Dick G. White?) (M.I.5)
This is a most ingenious and interesting report and may well provide the answer
to the problem. I feel, however, the we shall never really get
to the bottom of this case until we can see and interrogate
who holds the key with, possibly, Turkul, to the problem.
Turkul, I believe, is in captivity or at any rte his present whereabouts are
known, and it seems to me that it might be worth while having him further
interrogated in the light of this report. This, I think, would
have to be done in conjunction with the Americans (AOB:
because they captured most German intelligence personalities).
In discussing the 'Moritz' reports Ryle states that the greater part of them were untrue but I do remember one which caused us great panic and consternation in about 1942 which gave the disposition of the British Forces in Egypt with considerable accuracy; in fact, it was assessed as being 96% accurate. In order to obtain this information, if we accept Ryle's hypothesis, the Russians must have managed to obtain either documents or access to documents containing the information which was ultimately passed to Klatt. It seems, however, that there is still an unexplained leakage of some seriousness which took place in Egypt. (AOB: during the course of 1943 even more troubles can to light as Moritz forecasted information from the region of Benghazi for a rather long lasting episode) It is also possible that the source which obtained this information may still be at at work, although the Russians decided to send only the first of his reports or, let us say, one of his reports through to the Germans.
It would, therefore, be worth while looking up these fact I think and sending SIME (Secret Intelligence Middle East) a copy of Ryle's report asking them if they could possibly by enquiry throw any further light on this one incident in the light of this fresh information.
If Turkul is at large and if Ryle is right in what he says then Turkul is surely
an extremely dangerous man (AOB:
he wasn't) and some positive action should be taken to circumscribe his future
activities and movements. The same, of course, applies to
but if he is, in fact, dying, presumably there is little we need to do.
I understand that you intend to have a meeting with Ryle to discus his report and presumably you will be considering what future action should be taken. These few notes may assist in some small degree.
A.D.B. (= Dick G. White) 2.8.46 Sgd. T.A. Robertson (at M.I.5)
KV 2/1495-1, page 19 (minute 50a)
Dienststelle Klatt and the Max-Moritz Intelligence Reports.
From 1941 to 1945 Dienststelle Klatt in Sofia and later (at least after 5 August 1943) Budapest sent a daily supply of operational intelligence to the Abwehr in Vienna (Wien) for the German Higher Command (actually designated O.K.W. Amt Ausland/Abwehr). These intelligence reports were of various types, the two main types being the so-called Max Reports" and "Moritz Reports". The Max Reports dealt with Russian naval, military and air dispositions, chiefly between Smolensk and Caucasus. The Moritz Reports dealt with Anglo-Saxon dispositions in the Mediterranean theatre and the British Middle East. Over 5,000 Max and Moritz reports were passed to the Germans in about 3½ years.
We were aware of the existence, nature and distribution of these reports from the end of 1941 (AOB: British RSS (Radio Security Service) did intercept systematically German Abwehr related communications. We have to deal with this aspect in due course), but, though we knew a great deal about Klatt's Dienststelle (Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost), his staff, his agents in Turkey (AOB: likely obtained via Georgy-Gross), we remained completely mystified by the following three problems:-
1. By what channels and from what sources did Max and Moritz reports get to Klatt?
2. What organisations, operating from what motives, collected and communicated Max and Moritz intelligence (or misintelligence)?
3. Was there a W/T leakage of operational intelligence (or misintelligence) from the British Mediterranean zone and if so how was it constituted or concealed from us?
As a result of my interrogation of Klatt on July 17 1946, reinforced by study of the admirable results of the American interrogation of Klatt and others, I venture to think that a highly probable solution of these three puzzles can now be given.
I. The Communications Puzzle.
Although from late 1941 we had excellent reason for supposing that the Max and Moritz reports were transmitted from their source or sources by W/T, the attempts of R.S.S. to identify these transmissions were completely unsuccessful. (AOB: Considering the propagation distance between say south of Russia / Bulgaria and, say, London, they must also have possessed the opportunity to HF/DF upon Sofia via Istambul (Istanbul) or Ankara, nowhere mentioned but not impossible, in my perception, Cyprus and/or Egypt)
The following information given in or suggested by Klatt's interrogations may enable us to make a retrospective identification of them. It must be noticed that Klatt was shifty in his answers to several of the questions put to him on this matter, particularly when he began to realise their import, so some of the clues given may be false.
1. The first W/T communications from a source in Russia to Klatt in Bulgaria came between 18th to 23rd of June, 1941, i.e. either just before or just after the outbreak of the Russo-German war. The source was a W/T operator in Tiflis. Hius signals were received and decoded by a Bulgarian police station in Burgos, whence they were forwarded to a Sofia police station (AOB: Klatt's first period in Sofia/Bulgaria, he did not yet possessed a W/T station facility. But he used the Services of a Sofia Police W/T station. Later Klatt, an official office including a complete W/T station facility), two functionaries of which were already in the pay of Klatt. Klatt passed these reports to Vienna (Wien) first by → telephone from the German Naval Command in Sofia
KV 2/1495-1, page 20b
telephone from the German Naval Command in Sofia and then by W/T from Sofia police station to some corresponding W/T station (Wera) in Vienna (Wien). Klatt's own W/T link with Ast Vienna (Wien) did not function until November 1941.
Klatt thought that the messages were Russian. He had not provided the Burgos police with cipher instructions but he thought that the cipher used was a figure-cipher, since the Burgos police complained of the difficulty of the receiving figures as distinct from letters. This W/T link ceased to function in July or August 1941, allegedly because the Tiflis W/T operator became scared when follow-up queries were sent to him (presumably from Burgos) in connection with some report which he had sent.
(Klatt was vague or evasive in his replies to questions about the initial creation of this link and about the provisions of cipher and signals-plans for the Tiflis operator and the Burgos police. He spoke of a 'Macedonian organisation' or of a member of such an organisation as the creator of the link. The story of the decoding being entrusted to the Burgos link. However we have independent evidence that Klatt did have agents in Burgos in 1941 and that there was a Tiflis W/T operator who was an early source of Russian Intelligence. A more plausible hypothesis will be suggested later to explain the cessation of the Tiflis transmissions).
2. On July 15 1941 Klatt's White Russian collaborator Ira Longin came to Klatt with Intelligence-reports very similar to those of the Tiflis operator. From then until early in 1945 all the reports of the Max and Moritz categories came to Klatt from Ira Longin. came to Klatt with intelligence-reports very similar to those of the Tiflis operator. From then until early 1945 all the reports of the Max and Mortiz categories came to Klatt from Ira Longin. It is not until 1942 that the titles "Max" and "Moritz" were coined to distinguish the Russian from the Mediterranean intelligence.
So the problem is how and whence did Ira Longin get his Max and Moritz messages.
The following (alleged) facts may help to identify the W/T traffic between Ira Longin's source and Ira Longin.
a) The cipher was a 'combined cipher', i.e. mixed letters and figures. (Klatt's story does not rule out the Tiflis operator's cipher from having also been a 'combined cipher').
b) The transmission time was some time between about midday and 3.30 p.m. (Central European Time). Klatt gave two discrepant accounts.
(1) Klatt's first story was that Ira Longin used used to bring the day's Max and Moritz reports to Klatt's residence (where also was located his W/T station "Schwert") from his own, some 20 minutes walk distant, between 4.30 and 5.00 p.m. They were already deciphered. Further, when Klatt was in Budapest arriving there between 1.0 p.m. and 2.0 pm. He was still able to bring the day's reports, deciphered, to Klatt between 4.30 and 5.0 p.m. Allowing an hour for deciphering, copying out and walking to Klatt's residence, this would fix the transmission time between, say 2.0 p.m. and 3.30 p.m.
KV 2/1495-1, page 21c
(2) In his second interrogation Klatt said that he thought that the transmission time midday and 1.0 pm "since Ira Longin would never come out to lunch". Ira Longin normally brought the reports by hand between 2.0 p.m. and 3.30 p.m. I believe this second story to be an attempt to lead us away from the real transmission time. There is an extra reason for thinking that this second story was an afterthought. When asked in another connection whether Ira Longin was himself a W/T operator, Klatt denied it. Yet his second story assumes that Ira Longin had to be present during the transmission time. If Ira Login had had only to decipher messages and not himself to receive W/T signals, he could have postponed his decoding unit after lunch.
4. Both Max and Moritz messages were brought round by Ira Longin together. When in 1942 it was decided to head the reports "Max" and "Moritz", they were distinguished purely by their contents, i.e. from the geographic areas referred to in the text of the messages. Both were in the Russian tongue. It follows that Max and Moritz messages issued from the same W/T source and were sent in the same transmission. We have a little evidence (not from Klatt interrogation) that this W/T station was not in the Novorossisk area.
5. There were nearly always exactly six Max reports. Occasionally a seventh was added if of special importance. Occasionally a seventh was added if of special importance. There were usually two or three Moritz reports and sometimes none. When Klatt said that the cipher was a combined-cipher he volunteered the information that at a late stage in the war German Funkabwehr was trying to identify the Max-Moritz transmissions. On hearing Klatt's suggestion that the cipher was a 'combined-cipher', the investigators were delighted and said that this confirmed their own hypothetical of the wanted traffic. Since Klatt volunteered his story, we should expect it to be false, unless he supposed that we had access to the Funkabwehr's records or had interrogated or could interrogate its officers. (Such an interrogation should be made, if possible. (AOB: we have already encountered some of the methods of simply lying and/or bluffing)
6. The deciphered text were in Russian Schlagwörter, i.e. in high compressed 'headlines'. These had to be translated into German and expanded into intelligible prose before Klatt could send them on the Vienna (Wien Funkstelle Wera)
(L2110 ↓↓↓↓↓↓ L2110return)
Arthur O. Bauer
AOB: This map is an expanded reconstruction of a brief British concept; it took me some years to widen the scope from singly Balkan and expanding it towards the west even up to Buenos Aires; but also further to Teheran and Iran (Persia).
Please feel free to copy this map, as long as proper reference is provided.
Please look for Wera (Wien) and then find Sofia
Klatt's communication link was represented by link: 7/23
As to open it in pdf, please click at this map.
That is, each Max or Moritz report in its original condensed form would consist of only plus minus a dozen words. (this is my (M.I.5 Servant) estimate Klatt wrote out some typical specimens of the original messages in their condensed form, together with their expanded renderings in German prose. These are appended ??)
Note. Miro Roth (Rot) (KV 2/1712 ... KV 2/1714 and KV 2/1922; PF 656535) (AOB: a recent check provided a negative result, but a file once did exist of which we possess photographic copies) (AOB: I myself, do not trust Mirko Rot's statements, as, in my perception, a great deal of resentment between Rot and Klatt existed) stated that he had overheard Klatt telephoning from Budapest to Sofia. Sometime was read out to him from Sofia which Klatt then construed out of his head. It is clear from what Rot said that Klatt was given the German equivalent of certain code-expressions; he was not merely giving prose-expansions of 'headlines' phrases.
Klatt was interrogated on this point. He admitted without hesitation that when he was away from Sofia he did often construe over the telephone Max and Moritz messages read out to him from his Sofia Dienststelle (AOB: before or after 5th August 1943?) in their original → condensed form.
KV 2/1945-1, page 22d
condensed form. But he denied that any code-expressions were used. I think that he is lying. Any German-speaking clerk could have expanded into German prose the condensed messages described by Klatt without telephoning to Budapest for help.
If this hypothesis is correct, then Max and Moritz messages as transmitted might have been very brief indeed, especially if, as may follow from Rot's story, the code-expressions consisted of single or perhaps coupled letters or figures.
7. It was always possible for Klatt and Lang to put their own queries or those of, say, Luftflotte IV to the source or sources of Max reports. Klatt thought that he needed never arose over Moritz reports. Replies to these queries never took less than 3 - 4 days to come back and often they took 8 days.
This suggests but does not prove that
(1) Max and Moritz reports were transmitted 'blind', else anyhow some replies to merely textual questions would have been got within 24 hours.
(2) There was a W/T link available to Ira Longin working to the source or sources of Max-Moritz reports, but a link which worked only once or twice a week. (These transmissions need not have been made from Sofia or even from Bulgaria. Lang had transactions, including cash transactions with Turkey and he said - so it is probably false - that he controlled a W/T station at Samsun. If so, the delay in getting replies may have been due to the slowness of Ira Longin's communications with this transmitting station in Turkey).
8. Klatt tried hard to sell us 'his own ideas' that Ira Longin availed himself of the W/T facilities of a consulate (? Soviet) in Sofia and later in Budapest. But if the Max-Moritz transmissions were made 'blind', Ira Longin need not to have had daily access to the transmitter at all. He could have received the transmissions in his own home on an ordinary radio set. It cannot be supposed that Ira Longin could have eluded for 3 years the vigilance of the inquisitive Dr. Delius (alias of Obst. Otto Wagner, head of K.O. Bulgaria in Sofia) either in working a transmitter from his own residence or in making daily visits to some other establishment equipped with a transmitter.
9. There are tenuous reasons for thinking that the Max-Moritz transmissions were regularly intercepted without the recipient being able to 'break in'. This suggests that the Max-Moritz signals were powerful. The same conclusion would follow from the assumption that the Max-Moritz transmissions were made 'blind'.
10. I think that there was only one W/T station involved in the transmission of Max-Moritz signals. Klatt said that though there were a few days on which nothing could be received, there were no days on which a half ration of Max messages was received. Either these were the standard six of the Max messages plus two the two or three Moritz messages, or there were none. When transmission on one day did not occur, eight or nine Max messages would be sent on the following day or two of the normal six.
KV 2/1495-1, page 23e
II. The ostensible roles of Ira Longin and Turkul.
A. Ira Longin (Activities and their ostensible motive).
Ira Longin was a former White Russian officer. In July 1940 he offered his services to his chief (Turkul) in Rome, and thus became a member of his chief's anti-Communist White Russian organisation. On the occasion of this visit to Rome he was given authority to collaborate with the German Abwehr. He was to create or exploit links with Russia, procure operational intelligence about Russian dispositions and convey his results to the Abwehr. He was not himself an Abwehr employee, and used Klatt, who was an Abwehr employee, as his middleman.
In 1940 and early 1941 Ira Longin succeeded in inserting some bona fide White Russians into Russian units; line crossers were bringing back dispatches from these volunteer-agents before the outbreak of the Russo-German war (before 22 June 1941). Against just this contingency Ira Longin had, in March 1941, conveyed to these agents in Russia signal plans and cipher instructions. On about July 15 1941 his sources in Russia began to send their intelligence reports to Ira Longing by W/T. Ira Longin 'who knew next to no German' and Klatt 'who knew only the Russian alphabet' collaborated in rendering the Russian texts of the messages into German. This they did with the aid of an ordinary Russian-German dictionary and a Russian-German military word book.
What came later to be designated as "Max reports" were headed in Ira Longin's original Russian texts "from R 1" or from R 2" were outlying radio-agents (? cover name), who at one time ran a Russian Army Signals School in Kubischev. Ira Longin himself was known as "02".
Ira Longin spent most of his time in Sofia and even when Klatt removed to Budapest (after 5th August 1943), Ira Longin refused to do more than "commute" between Sofia and Budapest. He had no trade or profession, but he had some authority over various circles of White Russians in Sofia and Bulgaria. His residence was 3 Sixth of in Sofia and Bulgaria. Ira Longin had some White Russian agents working in Sofia, some of whom he had managed to insert into Dr. Delius' (Klatt's great enemy! an alias of Obst. Otto Wagner) Ast Sofia.
For a long time Ira Longin would not disclose the identity of his "chief" in Rome (Turkul), but soon after the entry of U.S.A. into the war he revealed that he was General Turkul.
For a long time Ira Longin refused to become a member of the Abwehr and rigidly insisted that his contacts with that organisation were to go through the sole mediation of Klatt. His personal remuneration and the much larger payments for the upkeep of his organisation came through Klatt, and Klatt had to negotiate with the Abwehr on all questions of permits, passes etc. for Ira Longin.
If Ira Longin's remittances were delayed, he threatened to cut off his intelligence supplies; and any attempt by the Abwehr to investigate his methods, organisation, contacts etc. were successfully resisted by the threat that Max and Moritz reports would cease to be delivered. It is not clear whether Ira Longin was the head of Turkul's White Russian Secret Service remained un-penetrated. It is not clear whether Ira Longin was the head of Turkul's secret service or only of its Balkan and Russian wing. Ira Longin's dominant motive was to destroy Bolshevism.
KV 2/1495-1, page 23f (partially)
C. Max and Moritz. (Ostensible (supposed) story)
Thus the Max-Moritz reports constituted a genuine leakage of operational intelligence; it was the White Russians' contribution to the Axis struggle against Communism.
- - -
This whole picture was, at least for the greater part of the war, accepted by the Abwehr, the S.D., the German High Command (O.K.W. = Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) and probably Klatt himself. Any doubts about its genuineness was allayed by the salient fact, that the Max intelligence (though not Moritz intelligence) was constantly corroborated by aerial observation and the results of operations in the field. The information was of direct tactical and strategic value. Minor inaccuracies were often detected but, during at least the greater part of the war, there was no trace of tactical or strategic deception. The bona fides of Turkul and Ira Longin were proved by veracity of the Max-intelligence. Enquiries into the Turkul - Ira Longin organisation were vetoed on the score that it was duly laying its golden eggs.
III. Arguments against the ostensible story.
The following points prove, in my opinion, that the ostensible story given above is false.
1. Klatt is eager to disclose everything he knows about the Abwehr, The SD., the Bulgarian police, his own agents and contacts → in Turkey etc.
KV 2/1495-1, page 25g
in Turkey etc. But when questioned about Ira Longin and Turkul he lies, hesitates, 'forgets', steers the conversation away and looks uneasy. He has either much to hope or, more likely, much to fear from whatever organisation Ira Longin and Turkul serve. He knows that Soviet agents attempted to kidnap him from the Americans and he has been overheard to say that when released he will work for the Russians. The interference is that he now identifies the Ira Longin-Turkul secrets with Soviet secrets, and is right in doing so. (I think that during the war he did not seriously suspect this. He would have been too much of a danger to Ira Longin if he had had any good reasons for such suspicions. Moreover Klatt was well aware of the military value to Germany of the Max reports and, like everybody else, could not reconcile this fact with the notion that the Max reports were Soviet controlled. Doubtless Ira Longin, during his five-year intimacy with Klatt, was occasionally unguarded, so there may have been a number of minor clues which together with the kidnapping attempt Klatt probably swallowed the ostensible story and assumed that Ira Longin's secrets were the secrets of a bona fide White Russian Secret Service).
2. In 1938(?) the White Russian leader General Miller was kidnapped from Paris and smuggled away to Leningrad. The organisers of this exploit were one Skoblin and his wife. Skoblin immediately reported his success to Turkul, then in Berlin, who dropped everything and hasted to Paris. Skoblin got away. His wife was caught but died, conveniently, in a French prison be fore she could reveal anything. If this story is true, it almost proves that Turkul was not a bona fide White Russian loyalist, but a Soviet spy or agent provocateur, presumably an employee of the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.). If he was, then Ira Longin was too.
I shall argue that the hypothesis that Turkul and Ira Longin were - and are - agents of the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) explains every mystery in the Max-Moritz matter, including the biggest mystery of all, namely the general veracity and military importance of the Max reports.
3. When the Abwehr accepted the collaboration of Ira Longin, the Hungarian Secret Police were astonished. They were convinced that their former goal-bird Ira Longin was a Soviet agent. (AOB: likely an expectation, but no proof) Dr. Delius (the alias of Obst. Otto Wagner; Head of K.O. Bulgaria seated in Sofia) had similar suspicions. (AOB: I highly doubt this: There existed a severe animosity between Wagner and Klatt: an Oberst (Colonel) versus a civilian - and a Jew - whom never has served military duties, but whom was highly regarded by the Abwehr up to Berlin. The matter exploded after Klatt even managed to get an official connection onto the German Wehrmacht telephone (in Sofia) Service and his office was even noticed in the Wehrmacht telephone index! Delius was furious, but was backed-down by the Abwehr in Berlin!)
4. It is incredible on general grounds that a bona fide White Russian spy-network could have operated daily from July 1941 to February 1945 without the Russians discovering it. And we can be sure on special grounds that the Russians had some knowledge of the apparent leakage. (AOB *: somewhere in 1943, after due secret conversations (also with PM10!) in London, to inform the Russians, off the record, in Moscow, about Klatt's spying network; by the way, eventually without great results) Yet the Russians never stopped to look ?? and Ira Longin never seems to have felt the qualms proper to a bona fide White Russian lest the intelligence which he was selling to the Germans might have become deception material.
* AOB: This subject will be dealt with when it becomes part of the according file succession. Because I have studied Klatt's file series several times integrally before, I know what it is about)
5. The W/T procedure and the cipher-type of the Max-Moritz transmissions (according to our speculative reconstruction of them) are of fairly standard Russian secret service patterns.
6. The cover nomenclature 'R.1' and '02' etc. have a similar flavour.
Supposing that at least in the beginning the sources of Max reports were bona
fide White Russians, working as spies from devotion to the anti-Communist
cause, it is hard to explain the existence of Moritz reports. For these
reports were of poor quality and were fairly soon recognised by the Germans to
be operationally worthless. Klatt was actually permitted to feed → the Spanish
Ambassador in Ankara,
KV 2/1495-1, page 26h
Ambassador in Ankara,
with Moritz reports. Klatt himself volunteered in
interrogation his belief that he himself could, from study of newspapers and
public broadcasts, have concocted reports as good as the Moritz reports, though
he denied ever having done so.
Now if he supposed bona fide White Russian sources of these reports had no intelligence source in the British Middle East, they could have had no motive for concocting Moritz reports. For they could not have wished Ira Longin to receive or pass on misinformation. If on the other hand they had a source in, say Egypt, in W/T communication with themselves, this source would have been able and presumably anxious to send a fair amount of good information.
8. Turkul and Ira Longin have never yet been the victims of kidnapping or liquidation attempts. They dwell apparently without qualms in the cauldron of 1946 Salzburg (Austria). These supposedly inveterate and active crusaders against Bolshevism enjoy charmed lives - or else unjeopardised lives. (AOB: these men show an attitude of someone never have been really desperate. The daily struggle of life in a devastated Central Europe in the 1946s, with no visible prospect of a foreseeable improvement of life; they do not realise from their office desks at St. James street in London! Turkul lived then in very great poverty!)
9. For all his anti-Bolshevist fervour, Turkul never succeeded in getting his White Russian legionaries into actual battle against Soviet armies. True, he is said to have despatched three or four score White Russians to help the Spanish Falange against the Reds. They perished almost to a man.
IV. The real story.
Turkul had for many years been an agent of the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) Ira Longin had been so at least since 1940. Both are still agents of the unostentatious organisation. The pre-war function of Turkul was to penetrate and steer White Russian anti-Soviet organisations. He was more than a spy; he was an agent provocateur. He was probably in contact with, if not in control of, a bona fide White Russian Secret Service, i.e. one for which convinced anti-Communists were ready to work. They certainly needed to secure themselves against penetration and treachery and there exist other grounds as well for thinking that they had a counter-espionage organisation. Besides this Turkul had an inner secret service of his own, the one which executed the wishes of the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.). Ira Longin was high up in this inner service and was probably also high up in what may be called the official White Russian Secret Service.
The Russo-German war only slightly modified Turkul's assignments, though it considerably modified his methods.
He had still to supervise and hamstring the bona fide White Russians, but as the Axis (Politically Germany - Italy and Japan) powers would inevitably try to mobilise White Russian sympathies, intelligence and perhaps battalions, Turkul would have not only to keep the confidence of the White Russians but also to win the confidence of the Axis Secret Services as well as his fellow White Russians; to make himself seem indispensable to the Axis (in casu Germany) in order to be useful to the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) and Soviet Russia. (AOB: please don't take what is being written down on paper for granted, as it reflects the set-of-mind of a British civil Crown servant; with a high level of wishful imaginations)
Moreover he would need money, the money which the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) could no longer get to him. (AOB: purely imagination; as the Russians maintained diplomatic representation in Sofia, thus Bulgaria. And, it wouldn't have been too difficult to travel from there into Europe with some smartness) (We may guess that Turkul's staunchness in continuing his work for the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) derived less from ideological sympathy then from love of money plus fear of ultimate reprisals,).
KV 2/1495-1, page 27i partially
Were Max reports 'smoke' ?
It was no part of the concern of the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) to assist Russian generals to win battles or campaigns. Its business was to penetrate and tamper with anti-communist organisations. Its enemy was not the Axis Powers but, inter alia, the White Russians. Consequently while the Max-system was indeed a double-cross, it was not a method of leading the Axis general Staff astray in tactical or strategic matters; it was a method of consolidating its agent, Turkul's control over White Russian activities.
It is conceivable that the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) did not at the start or perhaps ever take the Soviet military authorities into its confidence about the Max-leakage. Doubtless care was taken that no obviously crucial military intelligence should be given in Max reports; but the major consideration was that the Max information should have a high reputation for truth - a reputation which it certainly got. It is also possible, though I think unlikely, that the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) did take on the extra non-commitment of penetrating Axis Secret Services. If so, Ira Longin and perhaps Turkul had to be put into a strong enough position to find out what was wanted about the Abwehr etc.(AOB: please bear in mind: that actually the Abwehr was part of: O.K.W. Amt Ausland/Abwehr thus a military intelligence and counter-intelligence organisation) But by guess is that this duplication of tasks was not imposed on Ira Longin and Turkul, save insofar as it would be expedient to know what knowledge the Abwehr tec. had of their secrets. Ira Longin admitted to Klatt that he had agents planted in Ast Sofia (AOB: K.O. Bulgaria in Sofia and Klatt were existing in a stage of accelerating competence to one-another), thorugh whom he, Ira Longin, had discovered what Dr. Delius (the alias of Obst. Otto Wagner; head of the entire K.O. Bulgaria) was planning against himself. It is quite natural, therefore, that the most suspicious Germans never found a trace of strategic or tactical deception in the Max reports. Had the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) allowed any grounds for such suspicions to appear in the Max reports, the ostensible Ira Longin-Turkul story would have been 'blown'. It is also quite compatible with the single-minded ruthless of the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) that it should deliberately have issued Max-reports which were likely to lead the sinking of a Russian convoy, the bombing of a new airfield or the destruction of a Russian division. When Ira Longin confessed to Klatt that he hated to think of the thousands of Russian whose death he had brought about, beginning to swerve from the White Russian hatred of the Soviet regime but that he deplored the price paid by Russia for the build-up that the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) had given to him and Turkul.
What of Moritz reports?
The Moritz reports could have been fabricated in Russia.
KV 2/1495-1, page 28j
The actual incidents reported in them were generally fictitious, though the designations of the larger army and airforce units tended to be correct. On the vasis of published communiqués war reporters articles, and perhaps Military Attaches appreciations, an intelligent student could have produced most of the Moritz without having a source of his own in the area. Some of his guesses would be correct.
Had there been a sensible eye-witness in the area, he could hardly have achieved such a percentage of errors or maintained so high a level of vagueness. Moreover he would have found out how the English commanders' surnames are spelled. What motives could have led the source of Max reports to concoct the Moritz reports?
(a) Axis forces were engaged on more fronts than one. So the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) may have thought to secure more money and credit for Turkul's organisation by giving him Mediterranean intelligence to sell than he could get if restricted to intelligence from the Eastern Front.
(b) But a more likely hypothesis is this. Turkul himself was in Rome until just after Mussolini's fall (July 1943). Perhaps Turkul was himself in receipt of Max-Moritz reports and was selling Moritz and/or Max reports to the Italians behind the backs of the Germans. There is some slender evidence to support this theory.
(1) Klatt volunteered the statement that on one occasion the German Military Attaché in Rome passed to Berlin three reports which turned out to be verbally identical with three Max or Moritz reports sent in by Klatt to Vienna (Wien station Wera) on the same day. The Abwehr was suspicious but as usual dropped its investigation. If this story is true, it implies that someone in Rome was able both to intercept and decipher the Max-Moritz transmissions. This someone would have to be Turkul or one of his trusted staff. But Turkul sole obvious motive for talking Max-Moritz reports would be be that he could get something by doing so. He may therefore have been getting money and/or standing from Mussolini by selling to him what Ira Longin was concurrently selling to the Abwehr. If so, he would have to have been selling his goods to a purchaser on a level higher than any at which intelligence exchanges took place between the Italians and the Germans.
(2) Immediately after Mussolini's fall (July 1943), Klatt, at Ira Longin's instigation, prevailed on Kleyenstüber to fly both of them from Sofia to Rome to fly both of them from Sofia to Rome in order to extract Turkul from Italy. The pretext given to the Abwehr was that it was imperative to prevent the Max-Moritz secret from becoming known to be expected British and American invaders of Italy.
But this pretext is incredible. The Italian mainland was still un-invaded; German commands and Abwehr officers felt no fear about their present safety in Rome or their future withdrawal from it. (AOB: don't forget that Marshal Kesselring's military strategy caused that the Allied progress in Italy was delayed for 7 months, in central Italy at Monte Casino! de https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abtei_Montecassino en https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Cassino Either, therefore, Ira Longin was in an irrational panic or there was some immediate danger to Turkul quite other than the risk of Turkul falling into Anglo-Saxon hands. Perhaps it was Anglo-Saxon landings but the fall of Mussolini that jeopardised Turkul and his work.
KV 2/1495-1, page 29k
Klatt's own story unintentionally supports this theory. When he and Ira Longin met Turkul was vehemently opposed to the project of flying to Vienna (Wien). (AOB: Vienna (Wien) was a must, as Klatt's guiding officer Ritter von Wahl and the head of and Ast Wien (Wehrkreiskommando XVII) was headed by Obst. Marogna-Redwitz. There had in someway or another much to be organised, all sorts of essential papers and that like; that there was hardly a way around Vienna (Wien)) Either Budapest or nowhere was his (Turkul's) and only with the greatest difficulty was he persuaded to halt at Vienna (Wien), and under the strongest assurances that his further flight to Budapest would quickly follow. For some reason Turkul did not wish to be where the Abwehr or the S.D. (?) could get him, and that he expected them to wish to get him because Mussolini's fall was likely to result in the exposure of what had been literally his double-dealing (No such exposure actually occurred).
(3) Almost as soon as Turkul reached Budapest, the Abwehr had to pay more for their Max-Moritz reports, for 700 dollars per month had now too be found for Turkul himself. Who had subverted him before and for what return?
The suggestion is therefore that the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) concocted Moritz reports so that Turkul should have something to sell to Mussolini in which Mussolini would be interested - and that Mussolini was interested enough to pay Turkul perhaps 700 dollars a months for them. Here again the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) would have had no motive for trying to make Moritz messages the vehicles of the strategic deception. It was probably regretted by the N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) that the veracity-level of Moritz reports was so low. Probably they consoled themselves with the reflection that the Italian Intelligence Services were unlikely to discover how low this level was. (AOB: The Italian Secret Services SIN weren't so stupid as being pained here)
Note 1. If this hypothesis is true, it confirms the theory that the Max-Moritz transmissions were made 'blind'. For either Turkul's or Ira Longin's operator would have to be receiving 'blind' and if one could, both might.
2. The hypothesis would also explain why R.S.S. (= RSS = Radio Security Service) was unable to detect any suitable unauthorised W/T transmission taking place in the British Middle East. For according to the theory, no such transmissions occurred.
KV 2/1495-1, page 30L partially
1. According to Klatt and to inherent probabilities Ira Longin was the only person in Sofia or Budapest who could decipher the Max-Moritz signals. Yet when asked whether Max and Moritz reports ceased to be passed to Vienna (Wien) on the occasions when Ira Longin was away, e.g. on a visit to Rome, Klatt showed the greatest hesitation and uneasiness. He finally said that this was so and that Ira Longin's return back messages were deciphered and those those that not lost their utility were passed on to Vienna (Wien) in addition to the current day's report. (This suggests that Ira Longin could not, or would not, tell the source of Max and Moritz transmissions to suspend traffic during his absences, which slightly corroborates the view that these transmissions were 'blind').
Please read the next paragraph yourself, because it is, in my opinion a bit chaotic.
For one thing, Klatt tripped up both in asserting that Ira Longin knew next to no German and that he, Klatt, knew no Russian, save the alphabet. For, forgetting this assertion, he gave a circumstantial account of how he and Ira Longin collaborated in translating the Russian texts into German - a collaboration which would be difficult on the "Jack Sprat" basis. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Sprat) Moreover when asked at another time in what language he and Ira Longin conversed, Klatt unguardedly said "German". I am sure that in fact Klatt knew Bulgaria language quite well and enough Russian at least to be able to read it. He also admitted that when he, Klatt, was away from Sofia, his W/T operator (NCO; = Uffz. Eduard Kuehnle, was one of them - up to the bitter end in February 1945, KV 2/1969; PF 602511) was able to deputise for him in producing the German text, though he (I think) knew no Russian or Hungarian. (The question whether there were gaps in the forwarding of reports to Vienna is one that we may be able to check for ourselves. If there were no such gaps, we shall have to assume that Ira Longin allowed either Klatt or one of his own subordinates to decipher Max-Moritz signals. Klatt's embarrasment would then strongly indicate that he and Ira Longin had taken the great risk of sharing a cardinal secret of the organisation for which Ira Longin worked.
2. Klatt asserted that on nearly every day there were precisely six Max reports, plus a very occasional seventh when of special → importance.
KV 2/1495-1, page 31m
importance. On subsequent reflection it occurs to me that the explanation for this fixed number may have been as follows. According to his own account the Max network consisted of 5 W/T spies known as "R 1"- "R 5". I suggest that each of these sent in one report daily and that the boss of the central station, probably "05", added one of his own. (AOB: in my perception a too much fantasy is becoming to light) It makes no difference whether this network was notional or real, or whether if real, the W/T spies were bona fide or were N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.)'s pseudo spies. Klatt might be asked whether there was always one message per day for each of the "R" sources.
3. There is a conflict of evidence about the date at which Ira Longin entered Turkul's service. According to one account Ira Longin went to Turkul in July 1940 only to get permission to collaborate with the Abwehr via Klatt; he had already been in Turkul's service for an unknown length of time. According to another account he first became a member of Turkul's organisation in July 1940. The former seems the more likely. The N.K.V.D. (N.K.W.D.) would hardly have given Ira Longin such and important mission had they not tested his capacities and reliability over a lengthy period.
4. Klatt has fairly satisfactorily cleared up the question of the connections between his Dienststelle (Luftmeldekopf Süd-Ost in Sofia) and and the W/T system of the Bulgarian Police. From June 20 to August 1941, the Burgos police station received the signals of the Tiflis W/T operator, and forwarded them or the decodes of them to Sofia Police W/T station, whence they passed to Klatt. (I have doubts about parts of this story, namely about how the Tiflis-Burgos link was created and how the Burgos police got their W/T and cipher instructions). After August 1941 the Bulgarian Police had nothing directly to do with security W/T traffic from Russia. They continued to assist Klatt, first by letting him pass his own messages to Vienna (Wien) over their W/T link with some W/T station (?police station) in Vienna (Wien) (The W/T station of Ast Wien was name "Wera")
(AOB: practically these kind of cover-names; the first letter had always a relation to the first letter of the place or town where a station was situated: Klatt's station in Sofia got code-named Schwert, though KO Bulgaria/Sofia got Sepp, and Ast station in Wien got named Wera; other examples were: Hamburg got cover-name Hafen, Berlin got first Burg but later (also) Schloss and Palais, Paris got Parkstadt, Athens got Adolf, Stuttgart got Sonja, Wiesbaden got Wilja, Istambul got Ida, Bordeaux got Bordstadt, Madrid got Metro and Media, Lisbon Lisa and Lina, Barcelona got Banca and Oslo got Otto, .... . notice also: (L2110 L2110return)
These arrangements have nothing to do with the Max-Moritz transmissions, norm as we might have expected, did Ira Longin entrust any of his secrets to the venal Bulgarian police.
5. Klatt also explained satisfactory the nature of his "Ibis" reports. These were secure by the friendly and venal harbour-master of Varna, one Sarapow, from a ship's captain who usually plied between Varna and Istanbul (Istambul). Consequently Ibis reports tended to deal chiefly with Turkish coastal matters. This captain announced once that he had been chartered to sail from Istanbul (Istambul) to Aden and offered to send information by W/T to Varna while enroute. It is not clear that he actually did so. Only one Ibis report was of any interest. It announced an impending landing at Dunkirk on the day on which that landing occurred (19 August 1942)
Klatt confessed that he had been accused of heading as 'Ibis reports' what were really Moritz reports, in order to get more cash for having a new active source. He denied having done this.
6. Klatt first rented his house in Boulevard Ferdinand in July 1940. This suggests that preparation for his war-work were well advanced nearly a year before the German march into Russia. It also suggests that Ira Longin's plans were ripening by this date. If so, he cannot have begun his espionage work only after his visit to Rome in July 1940.
KV 2/1495-1, page 33 (minute 49a)
Strategic Services Unit
Mission to Great Britain
United States Forces, European Theater
9 July 1946
Mss Joan Chenhalls
Subject: Richard Kauder
This is to confirm our telephone conversation of 8 Jly 1946 concerning Mr. Gilbert Rile's (Ryle's) trip to the American Zone for the purpose of interrogating Klatt.
Our people in the American Zone inform that USFET has sent a cable to the Military Permit Officer, London, clearing travel of Mr. Rile (Ryle) to Amzon (American Zone).
They suggest that a pass for Gilbert Rile (Ryle) should be picked up from the American Military Permit Officer, Passport and Permits Division, War Office.
It was further suggested that you might wish to begin the interrogation prior to 22 July 1946. Reasons they gave were: first, Klatt is to be taken off "Preferential Treatment" as of 8 July; and, secondly, the interrogator who has handled him is to depart on 17 July.
Our representative also said that, in case after preliminary interrogation, you wished Klatt, G-2 (= Military Intelligence even in the Nato still nowadays usually maintained), USFET had promised to surrender the body (a typical denigrating expression used for suspects or equally handled persons) to you.
I shall be glad to assist in any way possible in arranging transportation to the American Zone. (AOB: most of these people were still kept under direct U.S. control)
Winston M. Scottt
Lt. Commander, USNR
Chief, London Station
(AOB: Liaison at the U.S. Embassy in London)
cc: Lt. Col. T.A.Robertson M.I.5
Mr. H.A.R. Philby (nick-name Kim) (M.I.6) (AOB: one of the Cambridge five, Russian spies!)
AOB: next an extract bases on Walter Schellenberg interrogation in London (KV 2/94 ... KV 2/99; PF 600561) Not every statement is entirely correct, but being the Heading RSHA Amt VI and Amt Mil (Milamt) one hardly will become engaged in grate details.
KV 2/1495-1, page 40a (minute 41c)
Extract for file P.F. 602,358 Name : Kauder Richard
Original in file PF 600561 Schellenberg vol. 6
Original from Final report on Schellenberg
Extracted on: 3.9.46
Extract from the Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg, compiled by Squadron Leader Harrison R.A.F.
Note. Schellenberg provided a large amount of information on personalities, some of which has been omitted from the list given below, as it was either already well-known or too vague to be of any value.
9. Klatt Richard @ Kanders (or Kauders) (Source 'Max') Budapest.
This agent was run by Vienna (Obst. Wiese) (AOB: I suppose, Schellenberg notice the era after the failed assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944. Consequently also many Abwehr personalities had been removed from office and likely being killed sooner or later. Among it the Head of Ast Wien Baron Obst. Marogna-Redwitz and I suppose also Ritter von Wahl Klatt's former handling officer whom was replaced by Obst. Wiese) and worked in the first instance for military intelligence. His reports on Russian Army matters (dealt with in the foregoing chapters) were good and were classed as 'important to the Wehrmacht (Heereswichtig)' and the General Staff 'Frende Heere Ost' (FHO) throught highly of him. On air matters they were weak, and on political → questions sometimes good and sometimes bad.
KV 2/1495-1, page 41b
sometimes good and sometimes bad. He was
Jewish and the case was very complicated owing to Hitler's strict order (5th
that no Jews must be employed on intelligence work. One of his
personal enemies was Obst. Wagner (Delius) (Heading
Bulgaria in Sofia
formerly a Sofia lawyer, in Stuttgart, who alleged that he was working either
for the Russian or for the British. Klatt ran his organisation
very successfully; he had the advantage of working with Ast
Vienna, which supplied deception and play-back material.
Finally he became too independent and started working with Hoettl (Dr.
Wilhelm, KV 2/412;
and Wanneck. At that time Schellenberg asked Obstlt. Ohletz (KV
of Milamt VI-C)
to have a look at his 'shop' in Budapest, which was suspected of covering all
sorts of Black Market (exchange and other) illicit deals, but after spending
five days on investigations Ohletz could not find anything suspicious.
Then Schellenberg, who had to act quickly before Klatt's collaborations with
Hoettl and Wanneck became too close to prevent successful investigations,
summoned Obst. Wiese from Vienna (Wien)
and asked him to investigate. The latter found out that the man who in reality
provided intelligence for Klatt's racket were a Slovak Lawyer and Prince Turkul.
The latter had a White Russian line to Moscow. These lines also led to Istanbul
and Bratislava (Preßburg).
Wiese arrested Klatt together with twenty-eight small agents, who formed a
motley crowd, containing all sorts of nationalities and even a Gestapo man from
After only a few days it was possible to resume work through Klatt's
organisation, however, and although for the first week the intelligence declined
in value it gradually improved in the end became excellent. Schellenberg
transferred Turkul to Berlin to serve as a watch on Vlassow.
(4) (since 1 November 2023)
KV 2/1495-1, page 46 (minute 40a)
Extract from Minute from Major Howard, R.S.S. to Mr. Hughes, M.I.5. referring to CSDIC/CMF/SD.103 103 report on Victor Pan and Josef Matl (KV 2/1493; PF 600769)
. . . .
Page 34 ff. The evidence in the report for the existence of W/T links by which Klatt received his intelligence is based solely on statements made by Klatt to Matl. These may have been true, but they may equally have been fairytales designed to cover Klatt's own inventions or other sources of information which he did not wish to disclose. Klatt after all is one of the great mystery men of the war and he would not have been likely to retain this status for long if he had been in the habit of discl0sing the inner secrets of his organisation to persons with whom he had such comparatively slight dealings as he had with Matl.
These W/T links may have existed. As you know, the most diligent research by R.S.S. in the light of all evidence available at the time failed to identify them; this is evidence, but not a proof that they did not exist. Clearly the final verdict must await the full interrogation of Klatt himself. When this is available the details evidence of R.S.S. records can be applied to fill in the picture.
. . . .
Signed J. Howard
Major Intelligence Corps.
R.S.S. (Radio Security Service) 23.3.46
KV 2/1495-1, page 47a (minute 39a)
?? Salzburg, Austria LSX 41
Interrogation Report No. 1 of
Richard Kkauder @ Klatt @ Karmany (← cover-name provided by Hungarian Secret Service after about 5 August 1943)
A. Personal History
1) Name: Kauder Richard
Alias: Klatt Richard (given by Ast Vienna (Wien))
Karmany (given by Hungarian Abwehr)
Born: 6 September 1900, Vienna (Wien).
1900 - 1905 Sarajevo, Jugoslavia (AOB: by then part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire)
1905 - 1910 Miskolez, Hungary
1910 - 1918 Kremsmünster, Austria
1918 - 1919 Schwartzerstrasse, Vienna (Wien)
1919 - 1926 Praterstrasse 70, Wien
1926 - 1932 Berlin
July 1932 - June 1938 Turnburgerstr. 3 Wien
July 1938 - Feb. 1940 Szeherstrr. 24, Budapest
Feb 1940 - June 1941 Travelled Balkans - Wien
June 1941 - Sept 1943 Skoboleff 55, Sofia
Sept 1943 - Nov. 1944 Pannonia Strasse 13, Budapest
Nov. 1944 - Feb. 1945 Hauptstrasse ?71-73, Csorna, Hungary
Citizenship: Austrain (AOB: between March 1938 and say May 1945 actually Richard Kauder was "Reichsdeutscher")
Religion: Subject's parents on both sides are of Jewish origin. In 1904, parents and Subject (only child) were baptised in the Catholic Church order that subject's father could retain his rank and advance in the Austro-Hungarian Army. Subject has attended Catholic Church since 1904.
Martial status: Married Vela Roessler, born Opponitz, Austria (married?) in Dec. 1922. divorced in 1928
Description: 1 m 70 tall; 82 kg; stout bulgy figure; smooth grey hair; full round face; slow gait; friendly face and disposition; very intelligent; speaks fluent German and Hungarian, some French and Bulgarian; fair reading knowledge of English.
2) Financee: Kalman, Ibola (Violet)
Born: Pest-Szant, Erzsabata 13, Budapest.
Addree: Pannonia Strasse 13 Budapest
Engaged to Subject since Feb. 1942; went from Budapest to Csorna with Subject (= Klatt) in Nov. 1944; arrested 14 Feb. 1945 by Gestapo, Vienna (Wien). Subject has not heard of her since.
3) Father: Kauder, Gustav, Dr. Oberstabsarzt.
Born: 27 Feb. 1865 in Hohenmaut, Czechoslovakia
Citizenship: Austrian (was Colonel in the Austro-Hungarian Army).
KV 2/1495-1, page 48b
4) Mother: Kauder, Laura, nee Neumann
Born: 23 August 1974 in Radvanitz, Austria
1906 - 1910 Attended private Volksschule, Miskolcz, Hungary
1910 - 1918 Attended Gymnasium, Kremsmünster, Austria Catholic Monastry). (AOB: actually it was the Monastry school at Stift Melk)
1919 - 1922 Technical High School, Vienna (Wien), Graduated as Mechanical Engineer.
6) Early Career:
1922 - 1924 Apprentice salesman in Mundos Chair factory, Vienna.
1924 - 1926 Salesman and buyer for Vienna (Wiener) Furniture re Co. at the Arsenal, Vienna (Wien)
1926 - 1932 Salesman for various Sporting Goods firms in Berlin.
Mar. 1, 1932 Left Berlin on account of Nazi influence and returned to his Mother's home, Linz.
June 1932 - August 1938 In charge of selling three large estates in Vienna area, and consequently building them up (under State direction) as small rural settlements. These estates belonged to Austrian Aristocrats Baron Tavonat (principal owner), Fürst Khavanhueller and Graf Draskovitsch. Salary was 1500 - 1800 marks monthly.
B. Flight from Austria:
7) In July 1938 (Hitler's Anschluss took place in March 1938), Subject (Richard Kauder) fled to Budapest with an Austrian Travel Pass in order to escape the increasing Nazi persecutions of Jews. Here, Subject met an engineer Engelhardt (Hungarian Jew who had likewise fled from Vienna (Wien)). Together, they published a travel atlas for Hungary. This proved to be a successful venture and the work continued to Dec. 1939 when Subject was arrested by the Hungarian Police for lack of necessary residence permit. On 1. Feb. 1940 Subject was handed over to the German Border Police at Hogyeshalam (AOB: most dangerous could have ended lethal as being a Jew in captivity in Nazi Germany!) Hungary (Hungarian-Austrian border) from where he was transferred to the Gestapo prison in the Metropole Hotel (Hitler's favoured Hotel in Wien; I therefore consider it strange) on Morzingplatz which was also the Stapo Hqs. Subject was briefly questioned on entering by Kriminalrat Preiss.
C. Contact with the GIS (German Intelligence Service in casu the Abwehr)
8) During the summer of 1939, Subject's mother met a Herr Panzierer at the Austrian War Archives, Vienna (Wien). Upon discovering that her son was living in Budapest with improper papers, Panzier offered to help Subject (Richard Kauder) Panziere thus contacted Subject in Budapest in September 1939, and after identifying himself as a agent of Ast (Abwehrstelle) Wien asked Subject if he would offer his services to the Ast. Subject was not interested in working for the Ast in Vienna (Wien) but simply wanted to obtain the necessary papers to remain in Hungary. Panzierer then suggested Subject come to Vienna and talk with Ing. Wagner (whom Subject later discovered to be Ritter von Wahl (later Kauder's guiding Officer) before making a financial → decision.
KV 2/1495-1, page 49c
decision. Subject agreed to this as it offered him an opportunity to see his mother. While in Vienna, Subject met Ing. Wagner (Ritter von Wahl his later guiding officer at Ast Wien) once and again turned down the proposal for employment. As a result, Subject received no assistance in obtaining a Hungarian residence permit and was therefore arrested in December (in Budapest).
On Feb. 4, 1940, Marogna-Redwitz (Baron von Marogna-Redwitz the Head of Ast Wien) had subject called from (Stapo) prison by Ing. Wagner (= von Wahl) for an interview at his office in the Parisergasse No. 4 or 6. Here, Subject agreed to work directly for Marogna-Redwitz with the latter's assurance that he would do everything possible to save Subject's mother from persecution in return. (AOB: It worked out positively for quite some time to come) Subject was then issued a Reichsdeutscher Reisepass in the name of Richard Klatt, valid for travel anywhere in the Balkans. Subject was prohibited from entering Turkey and was also prohibited from working in Roumania.
9) Subject was directed to work for the I Luft Section under Lt. Col. (Obstlt) Rohland Wahl (Ritter von Wahl). However, von Wahl was to be his Chief only insofar as the routing of reports was concerned. On all matters requiring executive action, Subject reported directly to Marogna-Redwitz. Subject explains this was done in order that Marogna could offer him protection for Gestapo persecution.
Subjects first assignment came on 1 May 1940 when he was sent to Sofia for six weeks to establish contacts and potential agents for obtaining information concerning Bulgarian airfields, numbers and types of planes, etc.
10) Contact with Ira Longin:
On our about 13 June 1940, Subject returned to Budapest where he met Ira Longin. (Longin and Subject had been imprisoned in the same cell during the latter's term in Budapest. Longin had been arrested as a political suspect concerning Pan-Slav activities) Subject approached Longin on the subject of obtaining positive air intelligence on the Red Air Force for him. Following several meetings, in June, between Subject, Longin, Obstlt Seidl (I-L Ast Wien) and Marogna-Redwitz, Longin declared he would have to see his Chief in Rome to obtain approval for working with Ast Wien, Longin travelled to Rome during the later part of July and returned with his Chief's approval, (later known to be General Turkul).
Longin was issued a German Travel Pass in the name of Ilya Lang in August (1940) He than began preparing his I.S. network with Hqs (Headquarters) at Budapest. Although his immediate superior was Subject to whom he channelled all this information, his genuine boss remained Turkul.
In October, Subject and Longin travelled to Sofia for 14 days when Longin met several White Russian contacts while Subject flew on to Athens (Athen) for about on week on a sightseeing tour, (This was Subject's one and only visit to Greece.
D. Organisation of the Luft Meldekopf Suedost (Klatt Bureau):
11) Subject spent most of his time from October 1940 until the Spring of 1941 travelling between Sofia, Vienna (Wien) and Budapest establishing offices, billets and prospective agents. Luft MK (= Meldekopf) Sofia ac→tually began functioning about May 1941.
KV 2/1495-1, page 50d
actually began functioning about May 1941. Although Subject was in charge von Wakl was the nominal Chief of the MK (Luft Meldekopf) and visited it once a month. Hqs. were located at Boulevard Ferdinand 93a Sofia. Subject used the W/T facilities of the Sofia Polizeidirektion. The cover-name of the LMK (Luftmeldekopf) Station was "Schwert" (AOB: remember that the first letter of the town concerned being the first letter of the code-name; thus Sofia and Schwert). This station station maintained communications with Ast Vienna (Wiena) station "Wera", Istanbul (Istambul) station station "Islam" (Willi Goetz's) (= Istambul KV 2/387, PF 600802) station station "Ilona" (belonging to the Hungarian Military Attaché), LMK station at Varna (in office of Harbour Police. W/T operators were Stimmelmayer and Sturm.
12) LMK Personnel - as of 22 June 1941:
Kauder, Richard @ Klatt
Stimmelmayer, Wilhelm Ing. (W/T operator from "Wera" (= Funkleitstelle / Fulei, Wien)
Wallenstein (former agent of Abw. I Berlin; did financial and secretarial work; transferred to KO-Bulgaria Oct. 1941; later to Budapest with KO-Bu).
Longin, Ira @ Ilya Lang (White Russian)
13) 15 July 1941:
Haslinger, Gregor, Nazi Party Member, drafted and inducted into Wehrmacht Aug. 1942; captured by Americans in Tunisia (since 13 May 1943).
14) 8 August 1941:
Zintler, Dr. Hptm (= Captain) @ Haller. Sent by Obstlt. von Wahl (I-L Wien) to Sofia to head the LMK (Luftmeldekopf); transfer back to Ast Vienna (Wien) (III-L (counter-espionage) in Oct. 1941; transferred to Ast Brussels in 1942.
15) 10 October 1941:
Piancentini, Gerti, Austrian secretary; married Arnoldo Dalisme, W/T operator of Spanish Embassy in Turkey; remained there as codist until this station was discontinued (summer 1944); returned again to the LMK where she remained until 12 Feb. 1945; (AOB: impossible, as in the Summer of 1944 Rumania and Bulgaria had been occupied by the Russians; we therefore should thinking of Wien and not Hungary) speaks German, Bulgarian, Roumanian, French.
16) 15 October 1941:
Sturm-Schneider, Dr. Was trained as agent in Sofia; primarily used as substitute W/T operator. Went to Turkey for 2 weeks in July as W/T operator with Spanish Spanish Embassy (Ambassador Prat Y Soutzo (KV 2/1465; PF 67200), in order to continue W/T contact W/T contact until a new arrangement could be made. Following his return from Turkey, Subject intended sending him to Switzerland to check on Heymann's sources but this was never carried out. Was arrested Sept. 1943 by Delius (Dr. Leiter, K.O. Bulgaria; Klatt's severe enemy), sent to Vienna (Wien) where he was inducted into the army and assigned to "Wera" (= Funkleistelle / Fulei Süd-Ost). Returned to LMK, May 1944 as W/T operator and remained until 12 Feb. 1945 (likely operating from Wien until Klatt/Richard Kauder had been arrested in Wien) When sent to Obing Station "Vroni". (AOB: According to my notes: VRONI Cover name of K.d.M. Vienna W/T station “Wera” after January 1945)
KV 2/1495-1, page 51e
Hammernyk, Maria @ Eva
Fiancée of Sturm-Schneider; employed in the LMK (Luftmeldekopf) as codist; W/T trainee but never became an operator; Speaks German, French and Hungarian; studies Geography and History at the University of Budapest; Hungarian citizen; with LMK until 12 Feb. 1945 then to Obing (K.d.M. Wien) with Sturm-Schneider.
17) Mid-December 1941:
Kahlen, Eberhard, von Major. Sent by I-L Ast Vienna (Wien) to Sofia as Leiter LMK (Luftmeldekopf); became ill in Mar, 1942; on sick leave until early June then transferred to KO-Bu; early Sept. transferred to station "Baun" (= likely Walli I in Warschau / Warsaw) early September.
18) Sept. 1941:
Following Agents dispatched to LMK from I-L Vienna (Wien):
"Renee" (name unknown); Viennese (Wienerin) Jewess. Never produced an intelligence report; reported to have been sent to LMK to control Subject; left August 1942.
"Jack" (name unknown): Dutch Air Corps Officer. Spent 6 weeks in Sofia during which time made a trip to Turkey as a wood merchant; returned without information; made another trip in Feb. 1942 returning with several I-L reports; transferred back to Holland in Aug. 1942; belonged to I-L Berlin.
Pawlik, stationed at Varna; arrested Jan. 1942 by Obst. Delius (= Leiter K.O.-Bulgaria) and sent out of Bulgaria.
19) Nov. 1941:
Dalisme, Arnoldo, Spanish citizen (We might encounter him again more in detail); assistant to the Spanish Press Attaché at the Spanish Embassy in Turkey (but operated also from Istambul); sent by Ambassador Pratt (Prat Y Souzo) to LMK (Luftmeldekopf) Sofia in Nov. 1941 to receive a W/T training; Mar. 1942 was sent to Ankara as W/T operator to station "Islam" in the Spanish Embassy; after disbandment of the station, returned to LMK and employed there until 12 Feb. 1945 (AOB: of course not in Sofia, likely via Budapest ending up in Wien); later whereabouts unknown to Subject; speaks German, English, French, Turkish, Greek, Spanish.
During 1941, approximately 600 intelligence reports were forwarded to Ast Vienna (Wien) by W/T.
20) LMK personnel - As of 1 January 1942:
Kahlen, Eberhard von
KV 2/1495-1, page 52f
21) 15 Jan. 1942:
Baumruk, Josef. Austrian half-Jew. Employed as codist; liaison with Bulgarian Police on passes, etc. Remained with LMK until 12 Feb. 1945 (Hungary and Wien)
22) Feb. 1942
Romanov, Georg (AOB: related to Turkul; KV 2/1453, PF 603457) White Russian of the Turkul organisation; lived in Belgrade; sent to Spanish Embassy in Istanbul (Istambul) as liaison officer; later worked directly with Turkul; reported to Subject as agent in Belgrade by Ira Longin in order to protect him; worked with Matl (= KV 2/1493; PF 600759) in Serbia; left the LMK during winter of 1943-1944 following a misunderstanding with Turkul.
23) April 1942
The control of the LMK was taken over by Obstlt. von Wahl, I-L Vienna (Wien). von Wahl came to Sofia about once every six weeks and remained 10 days.
24) May 1942
Sturm-Schneider, Johann, Sr. Half Jew, father of Hanns; office clerk and codist; remained until 12 Feb. 1945 inspite of periodic illness.
Kuehnle, Eduard (AOB: Maybe already being a DE-amateur of the DASD, and after the war lived in Bamberg and, like Rudolf Staritz, he was also a HAM and both were personal friends) Officer (likely N.C.O. UFFZ.) Came from station "Fulei Wera", as W/T operator to Stimmelmayer; remained until 12 Feb. 1945 the day of Klatt's arrest in Wien), then moved to Obing with control station "Vroni" (= K.d.M. Wien).
25) 1 July 1942:
LMK (= Luftmeldekopf) Hqs. moved from Boulevard Ferdinand to Skobeleff No. 55. W/T station "Schwert" also moved from Polizeidirektion to this new location.
26) 1 Sept. 1942:
Dostal, Grete. Austrian, residing in Sofia; husband with Donaudampfschiffahrtgesellschaft and in Russia at this time; worked as codist; remained with LMK until 12 Feb. 1945; later whereabouts unknown.
Kolarowa, Olly. Bulgarian. Employed as office clerk and codist; remained until Feb. 1944 but only in Sofia; speaks Bulgarian, German and French.
. . .
Approximately 3000 intelligence reports were sent via W/T to Vienna (Ast Wien) during the year of 1942.
KV 2/1495-1, page 53g patially
30) Feb. 1943:
Deutsch, Hans, Dr. Austrian. Tried by the Stapo (Gestapo) on account of his Jewish origin; had many difficulties in Vienna (Wien); came into LMK (Luftmeldekopf) Rest station (AOB: thus there remained some brief organisation in Sofia until the Russians occupied Rumania) until the capitulation of Bulgaria to the Russians, then came to Budapest; no definite job until left behind again in Budapest to run the LMK Rest station (in Budapest) until Jan. 1945 when he withdrew? to Alsolenava?. Not employed after 12 Feb. 1945.
KV 2/1495-1, page 54h partially
32) Transfer of LMK (Luftmeldekopf) to Budapest:
In July 1943 (AOB: 5 August 1943) the Führer (Adolf Hitler) issued an order to the effect that all non-Aryans (actually Jewish people) must be discharged from the Abwehr. Marogna-Redwitz immediately had discussions with Subject (Klatt) concerning the possibility of continuing the LMK insite of the order, decided that the only way in which the organisation could function without continual interference from the Stapo and SD would be to operate under the cover of the Hungarian Intelligence Service in Budapest. Sept 3 (1943), Subject flew to Sofia to discuss this matter with Hatz (then Hungarian Military Attaché to Bulgaria) whom he had previously known. On 7 Sept. Subject flew to Budapest for a meeting with Col. Kkadar, Chief of the II Bureau Anton Merkly, Chief of III F (counter espionage?) section of II Bureau and Major Kern, Chief of Defence Intelligence. Following detailed discussions, Kadar obtained approval from Field Marshall Lt. Szom-Bathely, Chief of Staff for Subject to operate as an integral part of the II Bureau, directly responsible to Kadar. Subject, however, was to continue to receive his salary and operational funds from Ast Vienna (Wien) as heretofore. Marogna approved this arrangement and ordered the LMK to Budapest with the exception of a small stay-behind (Rest) station, cover name of which was "Schwert" (AOB: curious, as the letter S of Schwert is pointing at the S of Sofia. One therefore should expect the B would be now a logical choice) maintained at Skobaleff 55, Sofia and which functioned until the Bulgarian capitulation in Sept. 1944. This station was to forward Ira Longin's intelligence repoorts to the Budapest Hqs, (Longin spent about half his time in Sofia and the other half in Budapest).
33) During October 1943, the LMK offices and residence were established in Budapest (Pest side) (AOB: is following the river flow, is on the left-hand river-bank side) at Pannonia Strasse 13 where they remained until 1 Nov.; then transferred to Bajza Str 44 until 2 Nov. 1944; then to Hermann Otto Str. (Buda side) (right-hand side of the Donau (Danube) river bank). The W/T station "Bully" (AOB: a logical choice - as Bully's B is matching the B of Budapest) was set up in Oct. 1943 in Szeher Strasse 24 (Buda side) (AOB: Right-hand river-bank side, and GoogleEarth is showing us the it is situated more to the out-skirt of Budapest) and remained there until 2 Nov Nov. 1944 when it was likewise transferred to Herman Otto Strasse 18.
W/T station "Bully" was used for contact with Goetz's station "Islam" In the Hungarian Consulate (wasn't it the Spanish Consulate in Istambul?) and with the stay-behind (Rest) station "Schwert" in Sofia.
KV 2/1495-1, page 55i + 58j partially
Ast Vienna (Wien), von Wahl made arrangements to establish a separate W/T station "Bock" in Budapest, Erwinstrasse 3. Thus, Subject prepared 4 copies of all his intelligence reports - 2 for the Hungarian Abwehr, 1 for LMK (Luftmeldekopf) files and 1 copy was encoded at Hqs then sent to station "Bock" via Bergler for transmission to Ast Vienna. The W/T operators Franz Weniger and Ing. Bergler ran this station which maintained contact only with Ast Vienna (Wien) and Berlin "Burg" (AOB: some consider Burg being connected with the W/T station at Belzig; but I wouldn't wonder when such a link wasn't strictly maintained) (maybe when we reach the R.S.S. intercepts or HW intercepts that we will find a hint in what the actual line-number of Budapest connection with Fulei Süd-Ost in Wien once constituted)
35) In Jan. 1944, Marogna-Redwitz had a meeting in Vienna with Obst. i.G. Georg Hansen (Leiter Abwehr I in Berlin), at which time, Marogna expressed his dissatisfaction with Berlin's order that Subject (Jewish Richard Kauder @ Klatt) be prohibited from having direct contact with Ast Vienna (Fulei Wien) Hansen then gave his approval for any working arrangement with Subject that Ast Wien should wish. As a result, Subject was to be subordinated directly to I-L Wien (Vienna). This station station was known as "Bully II", located at Rakos Keresztur Batori Srt. 15. Simultaneously, station "Bock" was liquidated and W/T operator Weniger transferred to "Bully II" until March when he was returned to Vienna (Wien) as W/T operator for Kowalewsky in Roumania. Bergler was also sent to Roumania as chauffeur for Kowalewsky.
36) W/T Contacts in Oct. 1943:
"Bully I" - "Schwert"
(Sofia) and "Islam" (
accordance other references,
has to be connected to the place of transmission,
therefore it has to be Istambul instead)
"Schwert" - "Islam"
"Bully II" - "Wera" Wien and Burg (Berlin)
"Schwert" - "Wera"
Approximately 3700 W/T reports were sent to Ast Vienna (Wien) during the year of 1943.
37) LMK (Luftmeldekopf) as of October 1943:
In Budapest Hqs. Kauder, Richard
Sturm-Schneider, Hanns Sr.
Kittel, Hugo Dr.
Stay-Behind Deutsch, Hans, Dr.
Station Sofia: Kolarowa, Olly
Station Sta,: Goetz, Willy
KV 2/1495-1, page 57j
E. Subordination of the LMK (Luftmeldekopf) to Mil Amt - August 1944:
47) Lt. Col. (Obstlt) von Wahl directed the activities of the LMK until 10 August 1944. At this time Schellenberg forbid all contact between Wahl and Subject and prohibited all members of the LMK to travel into the reich; Wahl was relieved of his duties in K.d.M. Vienna (Wien) and posted to some miscellaneous defence job within the city. The travel ban lasted until late September and early the following month, Schellenberg made Subject and his entire organisation directly responsible to Obstlt. Ohletz in Mil Amt-C. (KV 2/106; PF 602765) and as a result the LMK was without instructions since 10 August.
. . .
Approximately 4500 intelligence reports were relayed to Vienna (Wien) during the year of 1944.
KV 2/1495-1, page 58k
50) Ausweichstelle at Alt Aussee:
A W/T station was established in Alt Aussee (Alpenfestung?), Austria where the Ausweichstelle of the LMK (Luftmeldekopf) was to be located following complete withdrawal from Hungary.
F. Arrest and imprisonment - 12 February 1945:
51) Subject was arrested in Vienna (Wien) on 12 Feb. 1945. His entire organisation with exception of Ing. Bergler, Ira Longin and the Sofia station were arrested during the week. False W/T messages were sent from K.d.M. Wien bearing Subject's signature in which the personnel of Bratislava (Preßburg), Alt Aussee, Alsolendva and Budapest were ordered to come to Csorna immediately. Here a bus awaited them as they arrived and were all imprisoned in the police jail at Schiffamtsgasse, Wien.
52) LMK Personel as of 12 February 1945:
Kauder, Richard Weiss, Johannes
Sturm-Schneider, Hanns Jr. Kittel, Hans, Dr.
Hammernyk, Maria Reiss, Julian
Baumruck, Josef Wahl, Erika
Dostal, Grete Nemeth, Tilde
KV 2/1495-1, page 60L
G. Chronological Development of Events Surrounding Subject's Arrest and Imprisonment.
54) Lt. Fritz Tiemann (Dr. profession Rechtsanwalt) was posted to K.d.M. Wien as a representative of Obstlt. Ohletz late Dec. 1944. At this time Subject made weekly trips of one or two days to the station of Bratislava (Preßburg) (located about South-East of Wien) where Ira Longin was located. Subject discovered that Tiemann was also making regular trips to Bratislava (Preßbrug). On 9 and 10 Feb. Subject was again in Bratislava (Preßburg) and ran into Tiemann at noon of 10th (Febr. 1945).
The following Monday, 12 Feb., Subject met Tiemann in front of K.d.M. (formerly Ast), Himmelfahrtgasse and asked him why he was still following him. After a heated conversation, Tiemann went into Wieser's office (remember this was now a R.S.H.A, thus SS controlled, Institution) and reported the incident. Wieser called Subject in and listened to Subject's complaints concerning Tiemann whereupon he said he was happy Subject came to him with such problems and promised to remedy the situation. Then Wieser talked about numerous other miscellaneous matters, keeping Subject in his office for about half an hour. As Subject wanted to leave the buildingm he was arrested in the hall-way by three border customs police with a vague explanation that he was suspected of having sent sums of money to Switzerland and was now planning to escape there with other K.d.M. officers. (AOB: we always should bear in mind, that like Dr. Tiemann, an easy 'anti-Semitic' aspects played in the background) Subject was locked up in prison at the Amtsgericht, Schiffamtsgasse (Wien?).
Interrogation by customs police. Subject received a letter signed by B.d.S. (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitsolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes) Standartenführer (Colonel = Obst.) Miltner releasing him from his oath of secrecy. Subject was again accused of having sent his money to Switzerland and of wanting to drive there himself. Subject declared this to be all false whereupon he was to give proof that it was not true. Subject then demanded proof or evidence of ? the accusation and was told he would have to wait for it. (AOB: Bear in mind, that it was clear that sooner or later Berlin was becoming besieged by the Russians, and Services were preparing for leaving the Berlin area, and were preparing for moving to the south) Concerning his personal possessions, Subject reported that he had 252 gold pieces and 5,800 Swiss francs in the bank of Csorna.
Questioned concerning jewels taken into Hungary by this mother (she was Jewish and perished in - and was buried in Budapest) before her death in Budapest. Was told he should have turned in all her jewelry after her death. (Subject adds that von Wahl (Kauder's guiding officer at Ast Wien) told her at the time to simply wear her jewellery and that he would accept the responsibility) (AOB: in the meantime von Wahl was since also a kind of 'persona non-grata')
Subject was shown three small iron boxes of jewellery belonging to his fiancée Miss Kalman and to his deceased mother, all his money, a valuable three volume stamp collection - all of which was declared as requisition by the Customs Office (Ober. Inspektor Schulz and Sekretär Gruenhardt). Subject was then informed that he would be turned over to the Stapo (= Gestapo) for further investigation concerning "Rassen Schande" (Subject was living with and had applied? →for marriage to Miss Kalman, an Aryan) (AOB: purely an anti-Semitic set-up) The minimum sentence for "Rassenschande" was 7 years.
KV 2/1495-1, page 61m
or marriage to Miss Kalman, an Aryan) (AOB: purely an anti-Semitic set-up) The minimum sentence for "Rassenschande" was 7 years.
Subject was told by Customs Sekr. Gruenhard that he had no way out of his situation and suggested to Subject: "If you are not afraid as a Jew, then hang yourself with your belt."
Subject was told that his letter to Anwalt (lawyer) Derfflinger (written while imprisoned explaining his situation and asking for assistance) would not be forwarded and would be destroyed. Subject was strictly forbidden to maintain contact with anyone.
55) March 15th:
Capt. Klausnitzer appeared at the Zollfahndung and informed Subject that he would carry on an investigation of the LMK (Luftmeldekopf once established in Sofia) on behalf of Mil Amt Berlin. He further informed Subject that all members of the LMK excepting Bergler and Longin had been arrested and investigated.
56) March 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28:
Thorough interrogation by Klausnitzer in Hotel Grande Vienna (Wien). The interrogation covered the following:
a) Activities in Sofia
b) Reason for transfer LMK from Sofia to Budapest
c) Activities in Budapest
d) Reason for incorporating into the Hungarian Abwehr and handing over reports to the Hungarians
e) Organisation of LMK Personnel
f) Relationship with Col. Hatz
g) Relationship with the Swiss Osterwalder
h) Relationship with Bandi Gross (also Jewish, but an Hungarian by then in British captivity; KV 2/130 - KV 2/131; PF 600052)
i) Present contacts and any newly established or contemplated
j) All contacts with Enomoto (Dr. Monotaro Enomoto Japanese journalist)
k) Finance records of the LMK
l) Finances and earnings of the firm Mittermayer (KV 2/1466, PF 74098) of which Subject is half-owner.
Following the interrogation and investigation, Klausnitzer informed Subject that he could find no derrogatory evidence and asked subject if he wouldn't work for him as a Head Agent. Subject refused, whereupon Klausnitzer asked him if he wouldn't at least put him in contacts with Enomoto. himself, but agreed to give him a letter addressed to Enomoto as soon as Klausnitzer returned from Berlin with permission for Subject's release. Klausnitzer went to Berlin on 30 March and never returned. (AOB: Enomoto's existence in Stockholm was well appreciated by Ohlets Mil Amt Office and thus possessed by the Mil Amt) consider: (M2114 M2114return) (AOB: that Klausnitzer did not return might have been caused by the imminent threat of the Russians heading for Berlin, and retreating of all Services out of Berlin; towards South)
Asked by the Zollfahndung (obviously inspired by Weiser and Tiemann) what Klausnitzer's opinion on his case was Subject replied "none".
KV 2/1495-1, page 62n
57) April 3rd (1945):
Zollfahndung official explained that their station was being liquidated due to the advance of the Russians and, that since they had no grounds for holding Subject any longer, they were turning him over to the custody of the RSHA (Amt III). Subject was then transferred to the jail at Moritzinplatz.
Kriminalkommissar Sorger of Stapo (Gestapo) Vienna appeared and informed Subject that he would remain in custody in a special prison.
Thirty-six prisoners were released from jail; all prisoners released with exception of Subject, a Russian parachute saboteur, a Polish parachute agent and a foreign black marketeer.
Sorger told Subject to prepare for departure. Left in the company of four other Stapo (Gestapo) officials via auto to Strebersdorf where he was given over to Kriminal Direktor Coppelt. By this time all GIS (German Secret Service) offices in Vienna (Wien) had withdrawn with the exception of one Rest (stay-behind) Kommando under Sorger. All Gestapo personnel had apparently withdrawn to Strebersdorf.
Stapo Hqs. withdrew to Krems (Subject accompanied it, still being in Coppelt's custody) to the Cigarren Fabrik. Subject was kept under arrest for six days at an Auseenstelle of Krems, at Stain (Stein?)
Transferred to Salzburg to the Stapo jail (new Police jail at Schownerer Platz) via a Stapo truck driven by Ustuf. Broedl
58) May 2nd:
All prisoners, including Subject were released due to the Americans about to enter Salzburg. Subject immediately went to see Kriminalkommissar Eisinger of the local Stapo in an attempt to obtain some identity papers as he had none since his arrest. Eisinger was surprised to see Subject free and alive but had no time to question him so issued Subject the following identity paper:
Nach Verlust der Ausweispapiere
wird bestätigt, dass das beigeklebte Lichtbild
den verheirateten Kaufmann Richard Kauder,
6/9/1900 Wien geboren, Wien wohnhaft, darstellt.
Subject thereafter attempted to find out where the K.d.M. Vienna (Wien) (formerly Ast Wien) was located in the hope that he would be able → to recover at least some personal belongings, etc. Also was anxious to ascertain the present whereabouts of Miss Kalman.
(5) (since 5 November 2023)
KV 2/1495-2, page 19 partially
37) Kuehnle, Eduard Bavarian (AOB: after the war Kuehnle lived in Bamberg, whether he did so before the war I don't know (yet) N.C.O. (Uffz.) operator. Posted to LMK in Sofia 1 May 1941. Remained with and worked for "Schwert" (AOB: the station designation of the W/T station located at the Luftmeldekopf) until the station the station was handed over to Popoff. Afterwards, went to "Bully I", in Budapest. Interchanged his work at Restkommanda Sofia with Reiss. Following the dissolvement of station in Budapest, Kuehnle proceeded to Csorna and later to Alt Aussee the station "Natter". After 12 Feb. 1945 (the arrest of Richard Kauder / Klatt), Kuehnle was arrested and following his release was transferred to K.d.M. Ausweichstelle of 'Vroni' (the successor of Wera of Ast Wien; since January 1945) at Obing, Germany.
ca. 1.83 m tall; 85 kg; very long arms; agile body; broad square face; sparse, wavy hair; clean shaven.
KV 2/1495-2, page 22c + 23d partially
Kleyenstueber Obstlt. of General Staff in the Air Force (GAF).
Former Ic of various air force detachments; came from the naval air section.
From Jan. 1943, Gruppenleiter I Lift with Abwehr Berlin (since
From March 1944, worked in West of Europe and was last
heard of in Portugal where he supposed to have remained.
1944 Kleyenstüber became Head of K.O.
Spain succeeding Leissner;
until the bitter end.
Kleyenstüber and Subject flew Turkul and family from Rome to Vienna (Wien) in
Kleyenstüber's private plane in July 1943.
KV 2/1495-2, page 25e partially
104) Kraemer-Auenrode (Ludovico Karshof(f)) Obstlt. of the air force. Chief of KO Portugal. Recalled in April 1944 (but did not leave Portugal before July/August 1944) and transferred to the Wehrersatz department.
KV 2/1495-2, page 28f + 29g partially
134) Ohletz Obstlt. of the Air Force in General Staff. Head of Mil Amt -C Ost. Joined the Abwehr in autumn 1943 as proposed successor of Kleyenstüber (Gruppenleiter I-L) and took over this position in March (?) 1944. Was the only senior Abwehr Officer who outlasted the Abwehr reorganisation following the 20th of July 1944. (The failed assassination attempt at Adolf Hitler)
ca. 34 years. 1,75 tall; reddish hair; longish red face, freckled/ Suffers from heart ailment. (KV 2/106; PF 602765)
KV 2/1495-2, page 37h partially
196) Tiemann, Fritz Luftwaffe Lt. Reichsdeutscher; lawyer from Bielefeld. Westfalia. Came to Gruppe I-L Berlin in 1943 as am intimate friend of Kleyenstüber. Remained, however, in the same position under Ohletz (Abwehr and the Mil Amt). Sent to K.d.M. Vienna (Wien) in Dec. 1944. Following the events of 13 Feb. (Kauder's arrest) over the LMK (Luftmeldekopf) from Subject. Changed the name of LMK to "Organisation Leo". Fled to Leogang then to Berg Griesen early May 1945.
KV 2/1495-2, page 38i partially
203) Velikotny (KV 2/1656; PF 672282) White Russian. Former resident of Paris where he owned a staionary store. Following the Spanish Civil War (likely on the Franco side) came to the Spanish Legation as Press Attaché. During 1942 sent Subject reports via Pratt (Del Prat Y Souzo). Abwehr Berlin stated he sold his information to 11 different offices! Worked closely with the Japanese. Forced to leave Turkey during summer 1943 on account of two of his agents being arrested by the Turkish authorities. Offered his services to Subject in Sofia, but was refused. Travelled to Budapest, contacted Bechtold and cooperated with him until Jan. 1944. Reported as having worked with KO-Bulgaria in Sofia. ca. 38 years; 1,75 m tall; dark thick hair; clean shaven; broad face; pushed-in nose; well groomed.
KV 2/1495-2, page 39j partially
209) Wahl-Welskirch, (Ritter von Wahl-Welshkirch) Roland @ Ing. Wagner. Obstlt. Leiter of I-L Ast Vienna (Wien) since 1938. With Austrian Naval Air Force during World War I; actor in after-war period. Made Party Member in 1934. His main contacts were with the W/T station of the German Embassy at Athens (Athen), cover name "Socrates", handled by members of the Embassy of the Embassy during the Greek war, with LMK (Luftmeldekopf) Sofia and with Kowalesky. Left Ast 10 Aug 1944 (AOB: likely due to the conversion of Ast Wien into K.d.M. Wien; thus no longer committed to the German O.K.W. controlled since by the SS controlled R.S.H.A Mil Amt) and assigned to Wehrkreiskommando 2 Wien (Wehrkreis XVII). ca. 1.68 m tall; 70 kg; small face; clean shaven; deep wrinkles; long nose; backward loaning for head; grey curly hair; pointed chin; forward stooped posture; quick gait.
KV 2/1495-2, page 81k (minute 10z)
Extract for File No.: PF 602358 Kauder @ Klatt
Original in File No. : PF 601833 = KV 2/410. Serial ...
Original from Camp )20
Conversation with Wagner. (= Obst. Otto Wagner @ Dr. Delius, once Head KO Bulgaria)
Kuebart (Obstlt.) then had a discussion with Wagner, the Leiter of K.O. Sofia, and asked him what he thought about matters generally. Wagner was gloomy and said he did not like the situation at all. The Communists appeared to be making progress in Bulgaria and sabotage was well on the increase in his opinion.
Wagner had been keeping (by means unknown to Kuebart) a watchful eye on Klatt, whom he suspected of being a double agent, and whom he had sent in in long adverse reports, accusing him of embezzlement. This annoyed Canaris (AOB: up to 12th February 1944, the Head of the entire O.K.W. Amt Ausland/Abwehr), and Kuebart considers that it was probably for this reason that Hansen (up to about March/April 1944 Leiter I in Berlin) had instructed Kuebart to order Wagner to desist from this watching of Klatt. Kuebart now imparted Hansen's order in this respect to Wagner.
After a couple of days' stay in Sofia, Kuebart set off for Bucharest.
. . .
Closing the KV 2/1495 series
Please continue with:
By Arthur O. Bauer