on 6 December 2022
Current status: 10 December 2022
Chapter 2 (8 December 2022)
Chapter 3 (10 December 2022)
Mochi Marcello (Mocchi?)
Formerly Vice-Consul at Tangier
KV 2/951 Page 2
Name Mochi Marcello
Status Occupation Former Italian Vice-Consul in Tanger.
(Dr. of Medicine until 1940)
Activities Has been actively collaborating with the Germans before and after the Italian Armistice. (8 Sept. 1943; after Badoglio's coup; when Italy was about to change sides)
German agent. (AOB: might it have been that this engagement was part of the Italian concept?)
KV 2/951 page 4 (minute sheet)
Serials Delt (deleted) authorised EBD/R8 5.8.60
18.9.43 M.S.S. (Most Secret Source ) R.S.S. (RSS) History sheets for Mochi (AOB: the most striking thing the British accomplished during World War Two was the solid way they decrypted almost all German secret communication. Manual codes were designated isos; and the machine generated codes, like Enigma related, were designated isk. Isos code messages can be found since early 1940s, and Isk decrypts since the course of 1941. (1x)
22.3.44 From S.I.S. re Mochi (1a)
1.4.44 To Home Office re Mochi (2a)
1.4.44 Note from B.1.b/ to B.1. reg. re Mochi (3a)
3.4.44 Home Office re Mochi in reply to 2a (4a)
Minute 5 refers most likely to what had been discussed between M.I.5 acting on behalf of S.I.S. and the legal consequences which the Home Office (H.O.) did not want to be involved with.
Note for file.
The Home Office (Mr. Prestige) rang up to say that he trusted that we did not intend to kidnap Mochi or inveigle him improperly into British territory (this was just what they indented to accomplish) in circumstances which might involve us in some incident with the Spaniards. I assured him that it was not our (= M.I.5) intention to do anything of the kind. (This was, partially, a lie! As actually outside British territory S.I.S. were in charge; and they just accomplished what the Home Office did not wanted to happen!)
B.1.b. 4.4.44 Sgd H.P. Milmo
7.4.44 To Home Office re Mochi (Please notice - that at this time Marcello Mochi was not yet taken into custody) (6a)
7.4.44 To S.I.S. re Mochi, in reply to 1a (7a)
12.4.44 From S.I.S. re Mochi. in reply to 7a (8a)
12.4.44 From Home Office re Mochi, in reply to 6a and with reference to Minute 5 (9a)
KV 2/951, page 5
22.4.44 E.6 (Foreign Office or Home Office?) to B.1.b (M.I.5) enclosing cable from D.S.O. (Division Security Office) Gibraltar dated 22/4 re Mocchi* (10a)
24.4.44 Cable to D.S.O. Gibraltar in reply to 10a re Mocchi (11a)
24.4.44 To Home Office re arrival of Mocchi in Gibraltar (12a)
24.4.44 From S.I.S. re Mocchi (13a)
26.4.44 Cable from D.S.O. Gibraltar dated 25/4 re Mocchi (14a)
27.4.44 B.1.b (M.I.5) to D.4 (likely S.I.S.) re Mocchi's arrival in the U.K. (15a)
27.4.44 To Oratory schools re arrival of Mocchi in the U.K. (16a)
27.4.44 To Camp 020 enclosing file on Mochi and not derived from MSS (towards the end of this document we will encounter these MSS / R.S.S. pages) (17a)
(interrogation camp 020 where normally military personnel had been interrogated; they lived in isolation and underwent some quite dubious methods of frightening humans. Complains were noticed by: Walter Schellenberg and Herbert Wichmann, but they weren't the only ones; internally the British designated some prisoner Camps as "goals")
28/4/44 Telegram from D.S.O. Gibraltar re Mochi's departure for U.K. (17aa)
29.4.44 Night Duty Officer's Report giving information at 17aa (17ab)
29.4.44 Minute from O.C. to B.1.b. Mr. Milmo re Mochi, with receipt for property (17b)
29.44.44 From Camp 020 returning file on Mochi (17c)
30.4.44 Memorandum from Camp 030 to B.1.b. re Mochi. (17d)
1.5.44 Extract from Monthly summary of current cases at 020 & 020R re Mochi (19z)
2.5.44 From Camp 020 giving list of Mochi's property (19a)
2.5.44 From S.C.O. Whitchurch re arrival of Mochi https://wartimememoriesproject.com/ww2/pow/powcamp.php?pid=2833 Prisoners of War are only military personnel no civilians (20a)
* British Secret Service servants didn't dare about correct spelling of names.
KV 2/951, page 6
5.5.44 From Camp 020 enclosing personal particulars of Mochi (21a)
7.5.44 From Camp 202 enclosing Progress report on the case of Mochi (22a)
9.5.44 To Camp 020 re further material discovered on the case of Mochi (AOB: found most likely a the vicinity of Tangier (Tanger) (23a)
9.5.44 To R.I.S. (Radio Intelligence Service?) enclosing Progress report see 22a (24a)
9.5.44 To American Embassy (London) enclosing Progress report see 22a (25a)
11.5.44 To Camp 020 enclosing original papers received from Gibraltar (maybe the last place of transit) (26a)
11.5.44 From S.I.S. re discovery of W/T transmitter in Italian baggage from Spain (27a)
12.5.44 From Camp 020 enclosing report on interrogation of Mochi re names & alias (28a)
13.5.44 To Camp 020 re discovery of W/T transmitter and Mochi (29a)
13.5.44 From Camp 020 returning Gibraltar papers enclosed at 26a (26b)
KV 2/951, page 7
14.5.44 Not re information from Most secret Sources (R.S.S, RSS) (B.1.b) (30a)
14.5.44 From Camp 020 report re Mochi (31a)
15.5.44 From Camp 020 reference 29a mentioning Mochi (32a)
17.5.44 From Camp 020 enclosing description given by Mochi (33a)
20.5.44 B.1.b. Summary on the case of Mochi (see identity envelope) (34a)
20.5.44 To Camp 020 enclosing Look-up Summary report at 22a (35a)
22.5.44 To Camp 020 with ref. to 28a re Mochi (36a)
Apparently the minutes weren't completed yet.
KV 2/951, page 8
24.5.44 From Camp 020 enclosing Interim report on the case of Marcello Mochi. (37a)
25.5.44 Loose minute from (Mr. S.H.) Noakes / B.1.b. to (H.P.) Milmo/ B.1.b. with ref. to with ref. to 37a (37b)
26.5.44 To S.I.S. enc. copy of 37a (38a)
27.5.44 To Camp 020 enclosing Look-up summary on the names mentioned by Mochi and on the addresses found in his property. (39a)
27.5.44 From Camp 020 enclosing 18 descriptions handed in by Mochi (40a)
29.5.44 Loose minute from Mr. Milmo/B.1.b. to Mr. Noakes/B.1.b. in reply to (41a)
30.5.44 Receipt from American Embassy for copy of 37a. (42a)
30.5.44 From S.I.M.E. (Secret Intelligence Middle East) giving report on Marcello Mochi (42b)
1.6.44 From Camp 020 with ref. to 35a and returning photo of H.P. Schulze (PF 603358 does not longer exist) (43a)
2.6.44 From Camp 0202 enclosing petition from Mochi (for being released, or being allowed to correspond with his relatives?) (43b)
3.6.44 To Camp 020 enc. enc. letter from S.I.M.E. re Mochi (44a)
6.6.44 From Camp 020 returning letter from S.I.M.E. at 42b (45a)
KV 2/951, page 9
6.6.44 Internal memos between Capt. Noakes. B.1.b. amd Mr. H.P. Milmo/B.1.b. (46a)
8.6.44 To Camp 020 in reply to 43b (47a)
20.6.44 To Camp 020 enclosing Look-up summary Mochi (48a)
24.6.44 From Camp 020 re Mochi (49a)
1.7.44 B.1.b. note re Mochi and Calean (50a)
1.7.44 Extract from Monthly Summary of Current Cases at Camp 020 and 020/R re Mochi (51a)
17.7.44 From Camp 020 re Mochi (52a)
25.7.44 To S.I.M.E. enclosing interrogation report on Mochi (53a)
Capt. Noakes, B.1.b.
Please see 51a. I should like in due course to send a copy to 020's liquidation report on Mochi to S.I.M.E. - or at any rate that part of it which relates to his Middle East activities - so perhaps you will be kind enough to let me have a copy when it becomes available.
B.1.b. / A.J.Kellar 25.7.44 Sgd. A.J. Kellar
KV 2/951, page 10
In discussion with Mr. Kellar it was agreed that it was unnecessary to send to S.I.M.E. the Interrogation report on Mochi's interrogation as so little in it related to the Middle East.
B.1.b. 8..8.44 Miss J.A. Grant
17.10.44. Copy of letter from H.O. giving formal instructions for internment of Mochi (56a)
19.11.44 Copy of letter from Rome to F.O. (Foreign Office) re Mochi (57a)
3.12.44 Note from B.1.b./Capt. Noakes to B.1.b./Major Blunt with extract from F.O. file re the Italians wishing for news of Mochi (58a)
5.12.44 To F.O. (Foreign Office) in reply to their letter at 58a re Mochi (59a)
7.2.45 From Home Office enclosing copy of Brit. Red Cross letter re - (60a)
11.2.45 To Camp 020 re state of health of Mochi, with reference to 60a (61a)
KV 2/951, page 11
14.2.45 From 020 enclosing medical report on Mochi (62a)
16.2.45 Note from Capt. Noakes to Mr. Milmo re 60a (Red Cross letter) (63a)
22.2.45 To H.O. (legally in charge, though neglected by the Secret Services) (64a)
5.3.45 From the Home Office in reply to 64a re Mochi (65a)
8.3.45 From Camp 020 forwarding petition from Mochi (likely calling for, at least, contact with his family) (He actually was kept in sole captivity separated from others) (66a)
9.3.45 To Home Office forwarding petition from Mochi (67a)
6.4.45 From H.O. (Home Office) enclosing answer to petition (negative decision) at 66a and enquiry re possibility of deporting Mochi to Italy. (67b)
9.4.45 To Camp 020 enclosing answer to Mochi's petition at 66a. (68a)
13.4.45 From F.O. (Foreign Office) copy of letter re release of Mochi. (69a)
14.4.45 Note from Miss Stiebel to Mr. Milmo regarding deportation of Mochi. (70a)
18.4.45 To S.I.S. asking their views on possible deportation of Mochi to Italy. (71a)
23.4.45 From S.I.S. in answer to 71a (of course, negative response) (71b)
KV 2/951, page 12
24.5.45 To F.O. (Foreign Office) interim reply to 69a (72a)
2.5.45 Letter from Milmo to C.P. Hill (Home Office) (73y)
3.5.45 From H.O. re removal of four Italians. (73z)
12.5.45 From F.O. re 72a (73a)
18.5.45 Draft letter to F.O. in answer to 73a (73b)
19.5.45 To. F.O. re 73a (76a)
KV 2/951, page 13
Please see 76a. Would you kindly let F.O. know when Mochi leaves? D.B. 19.5.45
1.6.45 Memo from 020 enclosing retained document of Mochi (77b)
1.6.45 Details of & receipt for property (78z)
4.6.45 To F.O. informing them of Mochi's departure (78a)
8.6.45 Internal Memo re Mochi's luggage (79a)
11.6.45 To Foreign Office re disposal of Mochi's luggage (80a)
18.6.45 Receipt from FSP Italy for body (person) of Marcello Mochi (dated 1.6.45) (81a)
28.7.45 Letter to F.O. asking for a reply to 80a (82a)
4.8.45 Letter to F.O. attaching Mochi's suitcase (Please bear in mind, all be it not yet dealt with, that Mochi had been kidnapped from a ship held at Gibraltar) (83a)
KV 2/951, page 14
18.10.45 From Colonel Stimson (Camp) 020 enclosing wireless belonging to Mochi (85a)
22.10.45 To Foreign Office enclosing wireless to be forwarded to Mochi. (86a)
31.1.47 From Liaison Section American Embassy, requesting information about Mochi. (87a)
B.2.a. (M.I.5.) (Miss Glass)
Please see 87a. D.B. (Brigadier D.G. White, M.I.5.) would you like to prepare for his signature a draft reply to Cmdr. Scott.
D.B. (Sec) 12.2.47
17.2.47 Draft letter to Winston M. Scott re Marcello Mochi (89a)
A draft letter to Cmdr. Scott is submitted at 89a. I have discussed it with Miss (Joan) Chenhalls, who has approved it. B.2.a. 17.2.45
21.2.47 To American Liaison Section in reply to re Mochi (available towards the end of this contribution) (91a)
(2) (8 December 2022)
Quoting again from KV 2/951 page 4:
Note for file.
The Home Office (Mr. Prestige) rang up to say that he trusted that we did not intend to kidnap Mochi or inveigle (trick or deceive) him improperly into British territory in circumstances which might (again as in the Hellmuth KV 2/1722 case series) involve us (again) in some incident with Spaniards. I assured (thus lied) him that this was not our intention to do anything of the kind. B.1.b. (= M.I.5) 4.4.1944
Quoting from KV 2/1722-3, page 3
13th November 1943
On 4th November the Argentine Ministry for Foreign Affairs were informed by another Argentine Consular official travelling in the Gabo de Hornos (the same ship as Hellmuth travelled) that Hellmuth had been forced by the British Authorities to disembark at Trinidad (the spot in the middle of the Atlantic in between South America and Africa; comparable with Gibraltar). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wished to protest about the attitude of the British authorities and to ask for an explanation of their motives for detaining an Argentine career consul.
KV 2/1722-1, page 9
21.10 43 To H.O. (Home Office) requesting Order 18BA re Hellmuth (18a) ← M.I.5 and M.I.6 (S.I.S) should have applied, like in Hellmuth's case for an Order 18 B(A). But Hellmuth's case didn't went as was (arrogantly) suspected well; and some time later they saw that their trap didn't go as expected and it was more suitable to apply for an 18A order. Then a great shock was encountered as the Home Office informed them about the legal consequences.:
KV 2/1723-1, page 4
Note for file.
Reference serial 8a, informed the Home Office (Sir Ernest Holderness) of the proposal stating that we (M.I.5/M.I.6) were really neutral in the matter (an evident lie!) but, if it were possible to do so, we would like to assist the Foreign Office (This ministry isn't concerned with keeping according British Legislations) as far as we could. I said that I had warned the Foreign Office that there might be legal difficulties in giving effect to the proposal and that the Home Office would have to be consulted. (Of course, they were the only which matters)
Holderness did not receive the suggestion of the release and subsequent arrest of Helmuth favourably and later rang up to say that he had spoken to Newsam who apparently took the view that it was impossible to advise the Home Secretary to give effect to it. Holderness said that he thought that the best thing would be for the Home Office to which I agreed and told him that Mr. Gallup was handling the matter at the Foreign Office (AOB: The F.O. has no legal powers on inside Britain Legal matters) end. Holderness stated that there was no necessity for us to write him on the on the subject and that he felt that it would be best to leave the Foreign Office to put their own case to the Home Office.
I subsequently telephoned Mr. Bromley (Foreign Office) telling him of my conversation with Holderness.
KV 2/1724-2, page 5 + 6
AOB: we have at least discovered why the British Secret Services (since) did cheat the British legal way of governance. But illegally is was. There existed another severe short-coming in the British Secret Services; which has to be dealt with later, in this contribution.
Let us continue with which we ended the current Mochi file:
Quoting again from KV 2/951 page 4:
Note for file.
The Home Office (Mr. Prestige) rang up to say that he trusted that we did not intend to kidnap Mochi or inveigle (trick or deceive) him improperly into British territory in circumstances which might (again as in the Hellmuth KV 2/1722 case series) involve us (again) in some incident with Spaniards. I assured (thus lied to) him that this was not our intention to do anything of the kind. B.1.b. (= M.I.5) 4.4.1944
Without knowledge of the foregoing Hellmuth's file references, we could no have indicated that with utilising the word "kidnap" the Home Office pointed at comparable illegal matters on behalf of the British Secret Services. An their actually existed a systematic bending of the British legal system. Another case, which we will not go in to details can be found in:
In these cases, you will be confronted with pure human misconduct, on behalf of various Secret Services civil Crown servants.
It has to be noticed though: that the poorest reputation had S.I.S.
However, M.I.5 tried later, often in vain, as to temper the mood of S.I.S.'s misconduct; well documented in the latter three hyperlinks.
The ended with the last minute page with Minute 91a dated 21.2.47
KV 2/951 page 16a
Introduction. 1. Marcello Mochi is an Italian, born on 23rd May 1910, in Tuscany. He is an official of the Italian Consular Service. He arrived in the U.K. from Gibraltar on the 29th April, 1944, and was at once taken to Camp 020.
Information leading to Arrest (quoting from H.O. letter: kidnap)
2. Mochi was from 1942-1943 Italian Vice-Consul at Tangiers and travelled to Spain early in 1944 en route for Italy. When the other members of the partly left Gibraltar for the final stage of their journey, Mochi was diverted (kidnapped) because of the information in our possession obtained from M.S.S. (Most Secret Source, think simply of "Bletchley Park" decrypts). This showed that he must have been from July to September (1943, after 8th September) in contact with the S.D. Whilst pretending to be anti-Fascist with such success, that on one occasion he was assaulted by the open supporters of Mussolini, he was in fact reporting to the S.D. the Italian position. Towards the end of July he reported, for example, that negotiations for a separate peace were being conducted by the Consul at Tetuan, Badoglio's son, and that the English were in contact with certain Legation officials who planned to oust (overthrow) and take over the Consulate in the event of Badoglio continuing the war. Shortly afterwards Mochi reported to the S.D. that instructions had been received from Rome that the war was to be continued by every means, but he pointed out that there were technical difficulties in the way and that if Germany did not deliver supplies, continued resistance would be hopeless. There was serious demonstration among Italian troops. By the middle of September (1943) it was reported by the S.D. (Amt VI?) that Mochi. under cover of being Anti-Fascist, was in fact working for them as a V-Mann. The S.D. (term not correct, but they didn't know better) were procuring and copying cypher book. It cannot be said →
KV 2/951, page 17b
with certainty that Mochi was the channel through which the cypher book was procured, but since no other V-Mann in the Consulate is mentioned, this seems probable. After report from Mochi referred to the possibility that the Consul-General might, however, be prepared to go over to the Fascist Government with with all members of his staff.
3. Mochi comes from a military/medical family, and himself took his degree in Medicine in 1933. He served as a medical officer in the Ethiopian war (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Italo-Ethiopian_War) (3 October 1935 to 5 May 1936), but then turned to political science at which he also took a degree at Rome University. In June 1940 he joined the Consular Service (Diplomatic Service). In 1941 he was sent to take up a post as secretary at the Legation in Djeddah, and after travelling by train to Bashra made the rest of the trip through the desert, using the opportunity to make a commercial reconnaissance with a view to development of the region by the Italians. The next years he made a similar trip in the opposite direction. He states that he has recently been writing a book based on his journeys. In 1942 he was sent to Tangiers (Tanger) as Italian Vice-Consul, his particular field being propaganda among the natives and the study of political trends among them. He states that in this position he collaborated with certain members of the German Consulate in such matters of propaganda up to the Italian Armistice (8 September 1943), and in particular with Dr. Herman Poerzgen the Press Attaché, and Peter Schulze (file no longer exists), the Assistant Press Attaché. The latter's work was in fact connected with German sabotage in French Morocco. Mochi explains that close cooperation between the Italians and the Germans in the propaganda files was to their mutual advantage because the German machinery was already working when Mochi arrived.
Mochi further says that as far as he knows, the Germans →
KV 2/951, page 18c
in Tangiers (Tanger) did not anticipate the Italian armistice and were taken by surprise. Shortly after the wireless announcement, Poerzgen (file does no longer exist) asked Mochi about the attitude of the Italian officials to this, but Mochi replied that the situation was chaotic and that he did not know what the position was going to be. Mochi alleges that Poerzgen tried to ascertain on which side Mochi himself would be, but he evaded the question.
Although Mochi has given particulars of German officials in Tangier (Tanger) who were connected with the German I.S. he has so far not admitted any activities other than those which he openly conducted in his official capacity.
German I.S. Contacts.
(a) Schulze, chief of the German sabotage organisation in French Morocco.
Army Officer with the rank of Vice-Consul, who is engaged in military espionage
and sabotage, described by Mochi as the most important man in the German
(c) Lotha (Lothar?) Gudjons - officially Police Attaché, member of the Gestapo (Sipo S.D.?) and head of the C/E department.
(d) Goeritz (Herman) (KV 2/283) (Abwehr alias DON III) (real name Goering; KV 2/951 page 24) Vice-Consul and head of the Information Service.
(e) Hans Wiedemann - Junior Consular official. Works with
and is engaged in sabotage operations.
(f) Seydel - junior Consular official, but is Schulze's assistant.
Most of the above are well known from M.S.S. and other as German I.S. (mostly Abwehr related) personnel.
5. The investigation is still in its early stages and no prophecy can yet be made as to its ultimate outcome.
B.1.b. 20.5.44 S.H. Noakes, Capt.
KV 2/951, page 34 partially
Mochi has given the impression of being sincere and has given no trouble during his interrogations, and nothing has emerged during the investigation of the case to show that in reality he was or wished to be a V-Mann in the sense suggested in the sparse (light) information in our possession concerning him.
That the Germans regarded him as such is not unnatural in view of his close cooperation with them (Italians), over a considerable and vital period of time, in doing al that was possible by means propaganda to hinder the Allies.
But it seems clear that after the armistice (8 September 1943), Mochi was playing for safety, or rather for the safety of his family.
AOB: Just after the Germans knew about the Armistice, they occupied Italy where possible*, the Italian troops had been made P.o.W.; with the exception for those remaining on Mussolini's side. Therefore, Mochi was also fearing the lives of his family and relatives)
* According Hitler's Weisung 49 also know as Unternehmen Achse: war der Plan zur Bestzung Italiens durch deutsche Truppen im Falle des italienischen Ausscheidens aus dem Kriege. Order dated 31.7.43 (our reference , pages 227 .. 230) (Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung 1939-1945 Dokumente des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. Bernhard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn (old) ISBN 3-86070-801-5)
His request for a German visa to travel to German Occupied Italy may have been of a two-fold nature: a genuine desire to rejoin his family and an indirect means of keeping in with the Germans, the second, however, being no longer necessary once he had received news of his family's obedience to his instructions. (AOB: what are they (Britain) charging Mochi for? His family received a message from Mochi when he was no longer engaged with the German services, then he was in Madrid at liberty. The German Consulate in Madrid did not cooperate in Mochi's case as to provide a visa for visiting his family in German Occupied Italy. Not directly an indication of being an appreciated (US meaning) V-Mann)
Again, for the same reasons, he may have permitted himself to be pumped by the Germans, or their agents, sufficiently to enable them to draw certain conclusions as to the activities or proposes activities of the Italian consular officials, singly or as a body. (expectations, no proofs)
But the fact remains that Mochi himself insists that after signing the Declaration of Allegiance to his King (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umberto_II_of_Italy), he served all connections with his former German associates (but then he was still settled in Tangier / Tanger) German associates, stating that his meting in the street with Poerzgen shortly after the armistice (8 September 1943) was accidental and non-committal, though the situation was discussed, and that his final call on Poerzgen and Reith (Dr. Kurt von Reith. KV 2/3573 PF 61938) was solely in connection with his request for a visa, and involved no discussion of the situation. https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-3573-kv-2-2657-reith-recke.htm.
KV 2/951, page 45a + 46b (minute 17a)
To: Lt. Colonel R. Stepohens Camp 020 From: Mr. Milmo B.1.b. (M.I.5)
I send you herewith the file on Marcello Mochi, an Italian national who has been detained (= kidnapped) at Gibraltar (this was no accidental occurrence, but a well in advance planned for operation) and is due to arrive in this country in the near future. (Remember, lacking the necessary legal authorisation on behalf of the Home Office) It is proposed that Mochi should be sent to Camp 020 for interrogation.
The case against this man is derived exclusively from most secret sources (think of Bletchley Park decrypts), a summary of the relevant material will be found in the attached note.
As you will see from S.I.S.' letter of 22.3.44, the principal objective to be aimed at is to obtain information from Mochi which should enable the Foreign Office to make a protest about the activities in tetuan of the Germans and the Republican Fascist Italians who remain there.
It is by no means certain that we will be able to detain (kidnap) this man indefinitely at Camp 020 and this should be borne in mind in de deciding with whom he shall be allowed to associate or what he may be allowed to learn during the initial stages of his residence at the establishment. (Generally, those kept in captivity at Camp 020, were held in sole confinement)
I would be grateful if, when returning the file, you could let me have a complete set of duplicate copies of all documents in it with the exception of this memorandum the attached note of which we are retaining extra copies at this end.
B.1.b. 27.4.44 Sgd. H.P. Milmo
KV 2/951, page 47
On 26th of July 1943, following upon the fall of Mussolini, the S.D. (maybe lacking true understanding but apparently meaning Amt VI) in Tetuan reported that the Italian vice-consul, Mochi, had, on 25th July, reported to them that the Consul-General at Tetuan, Marshal Badoglio's son, was said to be conducting negotiations for a separate peace. Mocchi ? (Mochi?) had apparently also reported that the English were in contact with certain Legation officials who planned to oust (overthrow) the Consul General and take over the Consulate in the event of Marshal Badoglio continuing the war. Mocchi (Mochi) further reported that serious demoralisation amongst Italian troops was inevitable owing to lack of arms.
On 28th of July the S.D. in Tetuan are reporting that Mocchi (Mochi) is a good personal friend of a local official of the S.D. (Amt IV) (AOB: what happened in Lisbon was that the German police representative of Amt IV (Nogenstein - Nassenstein) (KV 2/1326 PF 307090) represented in an additional function also Amt VI matters); but in such an event someone acts on behalf of a different organisation. In my many years of engagements with these subjects: it has become clear - that the Crown servants of the British Secret Services possessed a very limited vision/understanding of the organisations structures maintained on the German side; equally might have occurred in North Africa) known by the cover-name Muh and had reported at 19.00 hours on that day that the (Italian) Consul General had gone to Rome. It also emerges that Mocchi (Mochi) had informed Muh that the instructions received from Rome were that the war was to be continued by every means but had pointed that, if Germany did not deliver supplies, continued resistance would be hopeless.
On 12th of September the S.D. (actually Amt VI) in Tetuan reported that Mocchi (Mochi), under cover of being anti-Fascist, was working for them as a V-Mann. This report (R.S.S. RSS) contains further information about the situation in the Consulate and states that the S.D. (Amt VI) are that night procuring and copying the cypher book. It cannot be said with any certainty whether Mocchi (Mochi) was the channel through which the cypher book was procured but since no other V-Mann in the Consulate is mentioned, this seems probably.
On 14th of September Tetuan reported Mocchi as having informed them of the possibility that the Consul General, Beiro will after all be prepared to go over to the Fascist Government will all members of his staff.
B.1.b. / 27.4.44 Sgd. H.P. Milmo
KV 2/951, page 49 (minute 41a) This latter fact proves, that this entire file had been weeded and later reconstructed. Regularly, with increasing PDF page numbers the minutes serials were decreasing. Not so in this file; as page 45 is connected with minute number 17a whereas this current minute reference being 41a.
I am far from happy about this report because not only do I think that the conclusions so emphatically reached are in all probability erroneous, but because the report as a whole pays scant respect to the accuracy and dependability of material derived from M.S.S. I seem to detect a tendency on the part of the interrogator to discount the material on grounds which are, to my mind, inadequate in the light of experience.
I entirely agree with you that the interpretation given in the fourth paragraph of the page entitled Comment" (albeit, no reference being given: do we deal here with what in our endeavour is constituting page 18c?) is not necessarily correct. I would go further and say that the probability is that it is incorrect. read by itself this particular message would certainly be in Mochi's favour, but when one reads it in conjunction with the message of the following day, it invites precisely the contrary interpretation? (AOB: the down side of post-war weeding; viewing the minutes sheet, it it is after all likely, that the according remaining minutes had been deleted, so that no-one being able to retrieve what it all was about).
I do not agree that the case against Mochi rests upon the two points referred to in the third paragraph of the interrogators comments at page 10. It is true that one can and should excuse almost everything which Mochi did in collaboration with the Germans as long as Italy and Germany were allies, but even on the most tolerant view it is in my opinion quite impossible to reconcile with the action of a genuine Italian patriot, Mochi's action in informing the Germans after the fall of Mussolini of the negotiations which were being conducted for a separate peace. This can only mean that Mochi placed his loyalty to Germany first and to Italy second.
It does not appear very clearly from the report whether the interrogator favourable to Mochi, or if such suggestion is to be read into his report, on what grounds it is based. I think that the suspicion which the material raises that Mochi was to be employed to procure the cyphers on the 12th September is dismissed much to airly particularly when one finds the individual who is to benefit is the same man who claims a good personal friendship with Mochi.
(AOB: at least one should consider - did the Germans pay any benefit or pecunia to Mochi, or did he contribute emotionally and/or did he so without personal benefit?)
there is a very clear distinction between a legitimate Allied collaborator and a
V-Mann. (essential is,
was paid for or acted
he as an idealist?)
I do not think that the
would be likely to confuse one status with the other.
Two other matters occur to me. In the first place it is not clear why Mochi should have gone to Madrid since he himself makes the point that the Consulate at Tangier worked direct to Rome and did not come under jurisdiction of Madrid. Secondly, I am not entirely convinced by Mochi's explanation for being found in possession of Hoppe's Madrid cover address.
I think that this is a case in which, to use Stephens' expression, we do not want to embark upon paper warfare, but I think it would be well to have a talk with d'Egville on the above points, assuming of course that you do not disagree with them.
B.1.b. (M.I.5) 29.5.44. Sgd. H.P. Milmo
KV 2/951, page 50a + 51b (minute 42b)
Middle East Forces
1. We learn from A.F. H.Q. that Marcello Mochi, who was until October last (1943) Italian Press Attaché and Vice-Consul at Tangiers (Tanger), was recently sent from Gibraltar to U.K. for interrogation. I am sending you what information we have on his previous activities in the Middle east.
2. It appears from recent Censorship intercepts that he and his papents had visited Cairo before the war, but eventually did not come unfavourable notice here. They made friends of the German-Swiss family of Max Jaeger of the Pyramids Brewery, Cairo, who were suspected earlier in the war of pro-German sympathies, though this was never confirmed.
3. Mochi arrived at Baghdad from Italy on 17 Jan 41 in the company of George Marcos, a Christian Arab who was formerly Italian Vice-Consul at Jaffa and was Actively anti-British during the Palestine rebellion. After about a month in Baghdad, Mochi left for Jedda on 5 Mar 41 and arrived there on the 14th to take up the appointment of First secretary at the Italian Legation in Jedda.
4. Subsequently CX Cairo made the following report (No. 812 of 4 Aug 41, repeated to London) on Mochi's activities during the Rashid Ali rebellion (Uprising against British occupiers of Iraq):
(a) "According to an Iraqi, Dott, Marcello Mochi, Italian First secretary, took the opportunity offered by the Rashid Ali upheaval to make the acquaintance of two young Iraqi diplomats, Suleiman Ishan, acting Chargé d'Affaires and the Attaché Muammar Hussein.
(b) During the early stages of the insurrection, when it was expected that German (Airforce General Felmy) and Italian help would be forthcoming, Ihsan, who is pro-German and a supporter of Rashid Ali, threw discretion to the winds and expressed his sentiments freely to the Italians. (AOB: Hitler was just invading Russia, and didn't want to divert his military forces between the invasion of Russia and the Iraqi uprising) (therefore General Felmy did not receive sufficient re-equipment) According to Muammar, who is a supporter of the regent, Mochi on the crest of a wave of optimistic enthusiasm, had frequent and lengthy discussions with him, Huammar, about the possibilities of stirring up the Hejaz tribes against Ibn Saud and asked him whether he could contact influential Sheiks and religious leaders. he also requested Nuamar to supply him with a list of anti-Saudi Hejazi notables who might support such a movement. Muammar, allegedly not so optimistic or enthusiastic, advised him to proceed with caution, for although the Hejaz tribes disliked IBN Saud and his Wahabis they feared him an had not forgotten the wholesale slaughter by the Wahabis of Ibn Rifada and his rebels. It seems that the discussions were still at this stage when Rashid Ali decided to retire to Iran, and the reconstituted Iraqi Government served relations with Italy (opposed by Britain, though sustained for some time).
(c) Muammar and Mochi subsequently met during an evening stroll when the latter expressed regret that the Iraaqis had been forced to sever relations would continue to be friendly. On this occasion, Mochi showed a reluctance to continue the discussions mentioned above. In view of the recent events he thought the time inopportune. he was, however, loquacious in his condemnation of the Italian Minister Sillitti, whom he referred to as an old fool who until recently had repeatedly misled Rome to believe that Ibn Saud had distinct leanings towards Italy."
5. Mochi presumably left Jedda with the rest of the Italian Legation in Feb 42, though we have no direct confirmation of his.
6. He did not come to our notice again until he was re-opened his correspondence with the Jaeger family on 27 Jan 44, apparently after a very long interval. he was then writing from the Italian EWmbassy at Madrid, and claimed to be a supporter of the Kind and waiting to join the Italian Government in South Italy.
Sgd. G.E. Kirk
KV 2/951, page 52a (minute 50a)
I discussed with Major
the case of Mochi when I visited Camp 020 on Thursday last, 29th June. I
stated that quite frankly we were of the opinion that he had treated Mochi much
too kindly in his report and that this attitude on his side had perhaps been due
to his lack of appreciation of the strength of the Isos (decrypted manual
codes). Major d'Egville
on his side suggested that the Isos was not extremely clear in that in
that it did not state to whom Mochi might have said, perhaps indiscreetly, but
not necessarily to the S.D. (why
do they use this term which does not cover the real facts?)
I agreed that although this might be so in some instance, we had the very
specific reference to Mochi as a V-Mann (AOB:
but was he paid regularly,
or was he actually
providing information voluntarily without any pecunia
If the information had reached the
VI) in circumstances
at all similar to those suggested by Major
one would have expected reference to some such origin as "source". On the
other hand, if Mochi was, as stated and as there is no reason to disbelieve, a
V-Mann, he would have reported directly to his masters in the S.D.
From this point discussion ranged generally round the case but that he was not
at all convinced. However, I made plain to him the various aspects of the
case which have struck us and which are referred to in your note of the 29th May
I then asked Major d'Egville for his ideas as to the appropriate means of disposing of Mochi. Major d'Egville stated that in his opinion Mochi should go the the Isle of Man (On this Isle were kept civilians; though mainly, not entirely legally without means of essential communications to abroad; think of by means of the Red Cross) He was rather a slippery Italian and should not be released, but he did not think that Caamp 020 was the proper place for him. (AOB: we will learn that this was just what occurred with Mr. Mochi) When I saw Colonel Stephens (head of Camp 020) later I discussed this part of the case with him also. Colonel Stephens, however, very pertinently to my mind, pointed out that if Mochi were detained in an establishment where he had communication with the outside world we should soon have a very great deal of trouble from him in the matter of petitions, letters to public persons etc.
We have no reason to be especially sympathetic with Mochi and I would, therefore, suggest that he should remain where he is at least for the time being.
I discussed the case of Calean with Lt. Henderson and Major Wall-Raw. I told them that I did not think that further enquiries along the lines suggested in the report would really carry the case any further. There was no doubt that Calean had approached S.I.S. shortly after the arrival in the Peninsula and thereafter had also approached the Americans.. What where the precise details of the story he told these persons did not seem to matter very much from the espionage point of view since he had certainly told the S.I.S. in the first instance a story which, although much abbreviated, was substantially the story he was now telling. I did not think that if application were made to the S.I.S. representative abroad there was much likelihood of his being able to recollect more fully the details of the information given to him by Calean other than those set out in the letter he had sent back here. As regards S.O.E. bearing in mind the methods of recruitment sometime adopted by that organisation, I did not think that it would be of →
KV 2/951, page 53b
much value to ask for further information or their views on Calean. Presumably unless the representative in the Peninsula (Iberian Peninsula) had though well of Calean he would not have tentatively recruited him.
The Camp 020 officers agreed with this view and we then proceeded to discuss the merits of Calean's case with a view to forming tentative recommendations as to his disposal. Lt. Henderson stated that Calean had favourably impressed him and had shown himself industrious in the Camp with the result that he had been promoted to be head gardener. Henderson agreed with my suggestion that if Calean were to be trusted it would seem better that he should use his physical capacities with a more direct value to the war effort. It was explained to me that Calean had had very little association with other persons in the Camp and certainly with none who were particularly dangerous. (AOB: the latter word 'dangerous', often implied someone being smarter and more competent than they themselves were) Moreover, his mentality was not very great and he would regard this establishment merely was not very great and he would regard this establishment merely as another prison. There was very little likelihood that he would break his promise of non-disclosure if he were released since he would wish to avoid prison again at all costs. Lt. Henderson saw no reason why he should not be sent to sea again. On the other hand, when I mentioned the case to Colonel Stephens afterwards, the latter thought it undesirable to allow such a man to go outside the country in view of possibility of indiscretion or further contact by the Germans, and he strongly pressed that the man should be given work in a factory in this country, though he had no objection to Calean's release in principle.
B.1.b. 1.7.44 Sgd. S.H. Noakes, Capt.
KV 2/951, page 54 (minute 52a)
Report dated 20/7/44
17th July, 1944
Will you please refer to B.1.b. (Captain Noakes') enquiry of 3.6.44.
The reply was held up owing to operational commitments.
Mochi has now been seen and the information he has given is forwarded for what it is worth.
Mochi does not show up well in particular part of his investigation. He considers he owes allegiance to the Italian Government, and he is not anxious to give information on this subject without their (on behalf of his Italian Government).
It is possible that his attitude had clouded other parts of the investigation.
KV 2/951, page 58 (minute 73a)
Secret. 12th May, 1945.
Dear Guy (Liddell) (M.I.5),
I would draw your attention attention to Milmo's letter to Hebblethwaite of this Office, PF 66338/B.1.b./HPM of April 24th regarding the case of the Italian Vice-Consul Mochi.
We have been anxious for some time past that this man should be repatriated (and not being kidnapped). In October last we were informed that repatriation of Mochi would be both dangerous and undesirable. However since the "C's" (Sir Steward Menzies heading the XX Committee) organisation have changed their views and have expressed the opinion that Mochi should be repatriated to Italy to face the charges awaiting him in Rome. In this letter under reference, Milmo wrote that, whilst your organisation are anxious to get off their hands as soon as possible the not inconsiderable number of special cases now detained in this country, amongst which must be included that of Mochi, we should appreciate that a decision cannot be reached on such a matter on such a matter without making a number of enquiries some of which may take a little time. I am not fully initiated into all the mysteries of security enquiries, but it does seem to me that, as Mochi was brought back to his country in April of last year, and the information available to us regarding his misdeeds was at our disposal prior to that date, it should be possible to reach a decision without further delay.
Now that the war in Europe is over, I cannot see why this Italian should be maintained longer in this country at the expense of the taxpayer. Incidentally, the Italian Embassy have the same difficulty as ourselves in the understanding why, in the present circumstances, we continue to refuse to hand over Mochi to them.
(AOB: Guy Liddell's diary does not contain the name Mochi; thus this might only have been concerned Guy Liddell as an intermediate to someone else (Milmo) at B.1.b of M.I.5)
KV 2/951, page 59 (minute 76a)
19th May 1945
Dear Cavendish Bentinck,
reference your letter on the 12th May regarding the Italian Vice-Consul Mochi, the enquiries to which Milmo referred in his letter to Hebblethwaite were enquiries which we understood S.I.S. wished to make in Italy. Since Milmo's letter of 24th April (1945) however we have heard that they (S.I.S. or M.I.5.?) have no objection to Mochi's release. We accordingly notified the Home Office two weeks ago that we were making arrangements for the repatriation of this man, subject to air transport being available. I am sorry, that we did not let you know this earlier. Probably Milmo; who is away at the moment, intended to let you know as soon as this man had left. We will send you a line as soon the departure has been notified.
Victor Frederick William Cavendish Bentinck, Esq. C.M.G.
KV 2/951, page 64 (minute 87a)
71 Grosvenor Street (an Office of the US Embassy)
January 31, 1947
Brigadier Dick White
Subject: Marcello Mochi.
We have received a report stating that the above-named person has just been appointed Italian Vice Consul in Seattle, Washington.
This report also states that Mochi was reportedly working for the German Intelligence Service in 1943 (the report originated with the British Consul in Tangier). After the Italian Armiistice, Mochi is said to have gone to Lisbon, where he was repatriated to Italy. (not correct)
It is further stated that Mochi was detained in the U.K. in August 1944 (also not entirely correct).
It would be appreciated (the latter US meaning differs from the British) if we could have any information which might have resulted from his interrogation while in the U.K. and any information which you may have in your files.
Winston M. Scott
Attaché, American Embassy
Chief. Liaison Section.
cc: Brigadier C.D. Roberts
KV 2/951, page 65a + 66b (minute 91a)
21st February 1947
You wrote to me on the 31st January in connection with the above-named man, asking for any information which we might have about him.
Mochi, who was Italian Vice-Consul in Tangier (Tanger), was detained at Gibraltar on his way from Madrid to Southern Italy, and arrived at Camp 020 for investigation on 29.4.44. I see from our records that copies Nos. 7 and 8 of the Camp 020 report on the case were sent to O.S.O. and the F.B.I. respectively at the end of 1944. When the case was reviewed, a rather more serious view was taken on Mochi's collaboration with the Germans at the time of the Italian Armistice (8 September 1943) than is expressed by the interrogator in the Camp 020 report. It was recommended that he should remain in detention in Camp 020.
Late 1944 enquiries were made about Mochi through the British Embassy in Rome by Signor Prunes of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who in November 1944, asked that this case should be reconsidered and that he should be allowed to correspond with his relatives. We did not feel able to accede to this request, but Prunas was informed that the relatives could be told that Mochi was alive and well.
AOB: this typical British Secret Intelligence Services attitude, after the war caused embarrassment on the British side. Such as in a similar case with Franz Mayr. Please notice:
You will notice similarities in their attitudes; also resulting in an ultimate loss.
In April 1945, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs again requested that Mochi should be released, stating that he had been suspended from office and that the proceedings instituted against him by the Italian Epuration commission in Rome were held up owing to his absence. They asked that he be put in a position to defend himself, and added that in view of the serious charges laid against him he would not be leniently dealt with.
It was agreed that Mochi could now go back to Italy to face his investigation, and he left by air on the 1st June, 1945.
We have no record of his fate at the hands of his own authorities, and as you state in your letter that he has been appointed Italian Vice-Consul in Seattle, it seems that he must have been treated with considerable more leniency then we were led to believe would be the case when we returned him to Italy.
Winston M. Scott, Esq.
Attaché American Embassy,
Chief, Liaison section
71 Grosvenor Street
KV 2/951, pages 72 and 73
RSS / R.S.S. (Radio Secret Service collected intercepts; covering what has become known as: MSS (M.S.S.)
Reconstruction of a Deutsche (German) Funklinienkarte
Please click at this map and it will open on a different way being more enlarged
The line-numbers might have been of British origin (designation)
The collected intercepts, in this case, were starting on 26.7.43
My experience tells me: that what was noticed in one of the letters that they dealt with Isos decrypts was not entirely correct, as the serial number of 7248 is pointing at a special ISBA (Intelligence Service British Agent) code message. We deal here thus by a local means of gathering inside information.
Line XIII/31: XIII = Roman 13. The regular military Abwehr used lower serials like II/3 or that like. Though XIII (13) is clearly pointing at an Amt VI W/T link. Which I already did stress upon frequently.
26.7.43 Tetuan to Berlin (an Amt VI station situated at Havelinstitut) Muh (most likely not meant Mochi!) (as nowhere else is an agent's-name used directly in regard to a V-Mann) to Erbe (AOB: name at least found in respect to the line Tetuan Berlin; in regard to an Amt VI operation) Time of arrival 1300 hours. All pictures of the Duce (= Mussolini) from the Weichsellaendische school (AOB: maybe Wechsellaender?) No Weichsellaender (Italian) is any longer wearing the U badge. This was the orders from Badoglio, Consul General here, son of the Marshal (Badoglio). Weichsellaensich Vice-Consul Mochi reported that serious demoralisation among Weichlaendisch* troops could not be avoided on account of lack of weapons. Mochi also reported on evening of 25/7 that Consul-General Badolglio is said to have been conducting negotiations with the English about separate peace. The English were said to be in touch with the legation officials Marcheggiano who, in the event of the war being continued by Badoglio was to take over an emigre Consulate in place of Consul-General Badoglio.
* The way the British decrypt Service handled the German-language words, is showing that they actually did not understand the essence of the German colloquial language.
AOB: I would like to suggest to you - please digest the collected RSS decrypted intercepts above yourself.
By Arthur O. Bauer