KV-2/939-Sittig-Paasche

Which is the prelude to our current file; as two mysterious key figures were: Lothar Sittig and Nils Paasche, both of German descent, but were already living, before the Second World War had started, in the Union of South Africa.

The next page reproduction shows us, that this file was not considered of essential significance in the early post-war years in England.

However, understanding of what is essential and what not, is also changing during the course of time.

We luckily can get an inside vision, upon what was kept outside the scope of the regular Press in the UK, for decades.

AOB: genuinely, the British Service relied on PF (AOB: I suppose: Personal File) xxxxx; already operated before the initiation of World War One.

Luckily: the British Archives is still keeping the PF serials within their database system.

There is a great advantage in using these PF serial numbers: as by this means, all related PF numbers being connected onto the KV 2/xxxx serials; which had been introduced, I suppose, somewhere in the 1950s; maybe even earlier.

For assessing a single file it is of no relevance; but important files do often refer to a wide range of various documents; having all in common - carrying the same PF reference number!

I discovered - that these PF numbers on its own might provide some information. Such as on a connected subject groups of persons and that like. But there does not existed a certain guideline for it, but was growing by the circumstances. I am now about 10 years heavily engaged in this historical context, and discovered quite some curiosities.

KV 2/939-1, page 4 (minutes 10, 11 and 12) The next subject was dealt with in our foregoing KV 2/907-3. Though as Sittig was in quite an extent the central subject.

In the late 1950 and 1960s, many documents had been weeded and cleaned off un-essential information.

Though, because we can get an impression about what had been weeded, these minute copies being rather informative.

. . . At the London end (AOB: the opposite end was in South Africa), some agreement must be reached with Vivian or Cowgill (both members of S.I.S / M.I.6) concerning the collection of all information bearing upon the Felix organisation. Since Felix is established in the (S.A.) Union and the conspiracy is directed against the (S.A.) Union and the conspiracy is directed against the Union (AOB: the South African P.M. Field Marshal Smut is not agreeing to these perceptions pointed in London by the Secret Services), I submit the B. Division (AOB: M.I.5 for instance B.1.a or B.1.b) of M.I.5. should be the centre of all enquiries pursued from this end that any other organisation interfering itself in the matter should should turn in their results to the B. Division. In the present circumstances, it is the other way round - Section V (S.I.S./M.I.6 counter-espionage section) are keeping the detailed reports which they receive from Lourenco Marques to themselves and asking us to make various enquiries in the (S.A.) Union which have a bearing on the information they have thus obtained. This is not satisfactory, and I think we must make the claim to see all reports bearing upon this subject.

. . . I would particularly draw your attention to para 2. of Mr. Luke's not at 8a. I do not agree with the last sentence of this para. As far as I know Muggeridge was asked to keep a close watch on the movements of Paasche who was, thought to be visiting Felix in the (S.A.) Union. It seems, that in carrying out these instructions he has heard from one of his informants that Paasche is going to visit Sittig, and without reference has been making the necessary arrangements with the South African Police. In discussing this case with S.I.S. we had come to the conclusion that any attempt to follow Paasche (please notice→ (W2166 W2166return) would only lead to disaster and that it would be far better to let the transmitter run and eventually to liquidate it through D.F.ing process (AOB: Major Ryde was strongly engaged in these, by the way, unsuccessful operations). There would now seem to be a certain danger of the whole thing being blown. (AOB: British illegal operations within South Africa Union, without explicit permission on behalf of the South African Government)

I have read and discussed this case with Mr. White (M.I.5.). We agree that the best thing - as first step - will be for you to discuss at Glen Almond tomorrow, and agreed line as to investigation is particularly desirable. I have told Brigadier Harker that it would be a good thing if you were to coopt (cooperate?) Major Luke for tomorrows meeting and for some time after.

You might also notice that S.I.S. operated in the South African Union, partially illicit (without a sound legal status);

particularly in respect with our foregoing visions expressed within the foregoing minutes 10, 11 and 12.

To understand the circumstances - it is quite essential to have considered the course of the file series of KV 2/907.

You will by now have studied the last summary put out by Section V (S.I.S. counter-espionage) on German Espionage in the Union of South Africa. C.S.S. is now considering how much of his information could be passed to Field Marshal Smuts and, meanwhile it seems to me important that we should have a meeting attended by D.G.S.S., D.B. myself and Courtenay Young and Col. Vivian, Col Cowgill (S.I.S.), Major (name deleted) and Capt. (name deleted) of Section V. It would probably also be probable for Mr. Oliver to attend this meeting. The purpose of this meeting would be to decide what means are available for us for keeping some sort of coordinated control over investigations into the Felix case after Field Marshal Smuts has been informed of the matter. (please notice: (X2168 X2168return))

It will probably be necessary to take up a careful watch upon Sittig, van der Merwe (~~Moewe~~) and van Rensburg to start with and, it this type of enquiry is to be conducted without disaster (AOB: wishful thinking?) it may be necessary not to use the South African Police. It is for consideration therefore, whether the Field Marshal would accept a special Commission of Enquiry consisting of Webster, Ryde, Muggeridge, Oliver and certain picked South African Officials who could be entirely relied on. (AOB: this was unacceptable for P.M. Field Marshal Smuts) Such a Commission might be able to provide watchers from among S.O.E. (Special Operation Executive) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Operations_Executive) and S.I.S. agents or specially selected South African policemen. The pivot of such a Commission on these lines after the Field Marshal has had time to consider the information he is given (AOB: supplied) by Oliver, than we shall have to send some sort of instruction could not be taken by hand of Oliver.

I suggest that a meeting on the lines mentioned above should be called at an early date.

I think you will be interested in the letter filed at 46a which is Ryde's account of South African enquiries into the Felix case (Sittig's). 47a shows such progress as has been made in identifying various individuals in the Trompke Organisation. (AOB: I is astonishing that the British Secret Services did not grasped the true German state of affairs: Trompke was an old type diplomat not really engaged in espionage, but diplomatic matters. Though, it was all dealt with was the German Consul Dr. Werz instead.)

I have today been informed by S.I.S. that Oliver has reached the South African Union and has had an interview with Field Marshal Smuts who was not, as yet, expressed any views on the memorandum which was handed to him by Oliver. He has apparently passed Oliver on to Forsyth who, I understood, to be one of Smuts' confidential advisers (think of a "cul de sac").

Seen. Thanks. I have been interested to read the progress made in identification. The cooperation of the South African Police does not seem to be of an asset to us.

By the way, it is necessary to clutter up this file with the rather long photostat (old type photeocopy) document at 101a? From the last para on p.3 onwards of the first one appears to be all that is very relevant to this case. They take a lot of time to read and would seem to me to be better placed on the O.B. (Ossewa-Brandwag) file.

Major Courtenay Young and his secretary should note their unusual spelling of "Derric" at the beginning of the letter 100a. Errors of this sort, even if minor, do the office no good in the eyes of the recipients of letters that have obviously have been not been read through after typing. (AOB: the British Secret Services did gave a damn about correct spelling over the entire Wartime Period, and beyond. It is so often evident, that no post-corrections being a habit of these British Secret Services - for many decades at all! Even British post war historians take over these apparent incorrectness, like does Nigel West)

Little telephoned to state that Oliver had reported that Bennet had replotted (took bearings) transmitter GOR (call-sign) for nights with six (HF/DF) stations namely Capetown, Johannesburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Bleomfontein and Bulawayo, and had located transmitter within a 25 mile area with centre at 24.20 degrees South 23.10 degrees east →

Please notice the tiny black spot in south/West Botswana land there is about 23.40 South and 23.10 East

This is only to give you an impression of the vast country and the nearly impossibilities to catch an illicit transmitter.

→ He was checking again on the night of 10.8.1943. He suggested that the next stage should be use of M.Us? 50 miles away disguised as commercial vehicles. The area in question is scarcely populated and there can be only a few farms there. Little said he would send over a copy of the telegram.

I consulted D.B. (Dick G. White) and the draft telegram at 71a was amended and sent to (H.A.R.) Philby (M.I.6; one of the Communist "Cambridge Five spies") for approval.

Please see Rothschild's (AOB: Rothschild was always kept informed about sabotage materials) note at 88a on the sabotage aspect of the Felix (Felix was a cover-name of Sittig) case. This is a recent aspect of the matter which I do not think we should take too tragically. Felix shows himself a complete amateur in regards to technical problems involved, and there is nothing new or particularly formidable in the instructions that his Berlin Office have given him on the manufacture of explosives. None the less, since it is clearly material to the decision which Field Marshal Smuts must take as to action in the matter (AOB: all in vain, Smuts is not supporting British initiated endeavours), I think it might be well to mention it in general terms. that there is now a sabotage angle of this case to be considered.

I have accordingly written Vivian (S.I.S./M.I.6.) as at 88a, asking for his agreement to this and his answer should arrive in plenty of time for our consideration before your interview with the Field Marshal on November 4th.

We have of course, informed (Major) Ryde (whom is mainly engaged in HF/DFing), giving him as careful guidance as possible and the draft telegram which was prepared in this office has been given to Section V (S.I.S. counter-espionage) for transmission over their line (channels) to Ryde (in South Africa) (88a)

You asked me to prepare an addendum to the brief memorandum you are presenting to Field Marshal Smuts at your interview on November 4th. This addendum at 91a deals with the sabotage angle of the case as briefly pointedly as possible. You will note from 92a, that I have sent S.I.S. a copy of our addendum which is, of course, based on their special BJ (Blue Jacket) material.

As regards further enquiries by Ryde in the (S.A.) Union, I have suggested to him an answer to the various suggestions he has made vide his telegram 240a in PF 65657 (Trompke's file), that he should wait until he hears from us that the principle is decided, before taking any further action. It is not much use our discussing a cover plan for the BJ. (Blue Jacket file folder) material as at 241a if Smuts is not willing for us to take any action at all (AOB: actually a correct assessment).

The proposals at 240a might well be adopted if our proposal to raid the ~~frams~~(?) farms of Wilz and Wild is turned down by Smuts. If, on the other hand, he agrees to the raids, there does not seem such point in any preliminary approach to Marr and indeed I have thought that it would be a dangerous thing to do.

Mr. Duff Cooper, accompanied by myself and Captain Courtenay Young, called on Field Marshal Smuts this morning. Mr. Duff Cooper explained the stage that the inquiry had reached and the decision that had to be made in regard to the taking action; possibly in view of the negligible amount of actual harm caused, the political excitement aroused might make to the game? scarcely worth the candle.

The Field Marshal then read the summary we brought, and said that he did not believe that van Rensburg though a fanatical Nationalist, would stoop to any actual crime, though he would not stop short's giving information to the Germans if he thought it would advance his political ends. He thought there was a →

possibility that Sittig and Paasche might present to their employers that their connection with van Rensburg and the Ossewa Brandwag was closer than it actually was on order to enhance their own importance, to their own greater financial profit. he felt it would be advisable to wait and see what could be got out of Hamlet's (= Dr. Elferink Dutch KV 2/202; PF 65880) interrogation, as he will be here for the rest of the month. A copy of the substance of this minute can be handed to S.I.S. and also telegraphed to Major Ryde.

Please see (minute) 107a. On receipt of this telegram I consulted Colonel Robertson (M.I.5. B.1.a.) and sent the reply as at 108a. Before doing so I consulted Philby (S.I.S./M.I.6.) of Section V (counter-espionage) and gave him the gist of the telegram from Ryde and showed him a copy of our reply, which he agreed covered the matter.

As you will see no action has been taken on Ryde's proposal that he should come back for consultation. This, as he says, will take about a month and if he is to leave ought to leave as soon as possible in order that his return should not take too long after that the Field Marshal Smuts. I feel that this is a matter for decision by you D.B. (Dick G. White) and D.G. (= Sir David Petrie, Head M.I.5)

Elferink (Dr. Dutch KV 2/202; PF 65880) shows no sign of breaking and the month is drawing to a close so perhaps it is necessary to consider what action should be taken with Field Marshal Smuts before he leaves if Elferink remains obstinately silent.

The last paragraph of the D.G. (= Sir David Petrie) at 99a stated that? we would keep the Field Marshal in touch with the results of Hamlet's (Elferink's) interrogation. If these are in fact negative we shall be? forced to return to the Field Marshal and ask him which course of notion he would prefer, the alternative being outlined in ?? I myself an of the opinion that the local enquiries based on Masser's (Hans Herbert, KV 2/942 .. KV 2/944; PF 106140) allegation that Sittig is imprisoned near Pietermaritzburg and Paasche is in the environs of Pretoria, would be doomed to failure as they would have to be conducted by the Police and there would almost certainly be a leakage. We are left, therefore, only with a mass raid.

Would it be possible to go to Field Marshal Smuts and get his agreement to the mass raid, subject of course to a last minute change of plan if Elferink provides information of of value? →

→ I feel that the Field Marshall ought to be seen again before ? he leaves, as we have promised Ryde that the Field Marshal will return having agreed to a course of action.

(AOB: how could they promise matters which are quite likely being not acceptable by the South African Prime Minister?)

Please see 114a which is draft for a further note to be shown to Field Marshal Smuts so that he can decide what line of action he would prefer taken over the spies in the South African Union in general and the proposed submarine scheme in particular since Elferink has so far proved obstinate.

The admiralty are not unnaturally concerned over the submarine scheme → (AOB: a typical British phobia, which is not taking in account - what benefit such an endeavour would bring for the Germany cause. These boats mainly directed for about "Penang" (or even beyond) (vice versa) and wasting such large (big) long-distance submarines -for a single agent is simply proving of not grasping the implication strategically in respect to the German objectives) (childish perceptions). → and I have arranged for a meeting between Cdr. Montagu, Philby (AOB: the Communist spy and M.I.6 Servant) name deleted of Section V (counter-espionage) and myself for Monday 22nd (November) to discuss this angle of the case. I should like to put to them the course of (illegal) action outlined in the draft memorandum mentioned above. If the Admiralty agree then Ryde can coordinate action locally with the Commander in Chief.

The Director General (= Sir David Petrie, Head of M.I.5), D.D.B. (= Dick G. White) and myself went and saw Mr. Duff Cooper on 20.11.1943.

The two BJ's (Blue Jackets special secret file collections) (De Sc. at 106a and 112a) referring to the (idiot) submarine landing landing giving Felix's suggestion for the exact (ridiculous) point of the landing, were shown to Mr. Duff Cooper and we left with him a copy of the memorandum as at 114a. Mr. Duff Cooper said that he would go and see Field Marshal Smuts before he left to show him the memorandum and ask him to agree to a plan of action (AOB: which will not mature).

You will also like to see 113a. Most Secret Source of today's date give the suggestion from Felix that he himself should return to Germany in the submarine instead of the Ossewa Brandwag representative previously proposed. I attach the B.J. (Blue Jacket) in question in front of the file in case you would like to see it in full.

KV 2/939-1, page 18 (minute 117) (AOB: next we will encounter the true British Services breaching South African Government and operating rather illegally on South African territories)

A meeting was held yesterday at Ryder Street at which wee present Mr. Philby, Captain name being deleted, Commander Montagu, and myself to discuss the submarine scheme which, from recent Special Sources, appears to be approaching completion.

It was agreed that the Navy should be asked to take no special action to destroy the submarine before it reached the South African Union, though, of course there was a chance that it would be sunk en route in the Atlantic by purely normal anti-submarine tactics. It was considered that the best line of action would be for the arrest of the shore party, which we now know from Special Sources will probably contain Felix (Sittig), to take place after the submarine has surfaced, and the boat containing equipment etc. had pushed off towards the shore, and simultaneously the Navy could take action against the submarine.

The question was also raised as to the ultimate disposal of Sittig and Paasche were they caught. It was felt by Section V (S.I.S. counter-espionage), and indeed myself, that it would be highly undesirable for Sittig and Paasche to come up for trial in the South African Union if this could possibly avoided. I tentatively raised the suggestion that it might be possible for the Navy to have a party on shore (illegally) to do the actual arresting, and that Sittig and Paasche might be kept in Naval custody, either as members of the U-boat crew, or as Naval deserters, or any other covers which might seem suitable locally. Commander Montagu, however, thought it unlike that a Naval party unacquainted with the country, would be able to get into position without arousing the suspicion either of the party or the Ossewa Brandwag inhabitants of the surrounding houses and felt that the Police would be more likely to succeed. This is of course true, but Ryde might find a difficulty in getting thorough reliable policemen (willing to act against South African interest) , and there might be equal difficulty to extract the bodies of Sittig and Paasche from the clutches of the Police once they got hold of them.

I pointed out that any such action by us to obtain possession of the bodies would have to have the prior approval of someone in authority in South Africa, and I myself feel this is a matter best settled by Forsyth. If he is prepared to play, I have no doubt that Ryde, Forsyth and the Commander in Chief could coop up some scheme which would save the face of the Union Police and give us the bodies. There would, of course, be no objection to the police having the smaller fry out of the round up.

It was suggested that after the Field Marshal had given a general approval (AOB: which wasn't actually maturing) to this scheme as outlined in the memorandum as given to Duff Cooper, that Commander Montagu and I should meet again and draft a letter to be sent from here to D.N.I. (Director Naval Intelligence). This letter would in effect ask the D.N.I. to tell the Commander in Chief to get in touch with Ryde on this matter and cooperate with him fully. Simultaneously we would telegraph Ryde telling him that what had been agreed on with the Field Marshal, and ask him to get in touch with Forsyth on the question of the disposal, of Sittig and Paasche, and with the Commander in Chief on the disposal of the submarine. →

→ D.N.I will get into touch with the operational section of the Admiralty concerned to touch with the operational section of the Admiralty concerned to ensure that they take no precipate action over the submarine.

If you like I will prepare drafts of the letter to D.N.I. and the telegram to Ryde so that these could be sent off as soon as we get the OK, from Field Marshall Smuts.

Please see draft letter to D.N.I. at 121a. I suggest that it would be better if it went under the signature of the D.G. (Director General is Sir David Petrie head of M.I.5)

At 121a, please see draft letter for your signature if approved. The plans contained in it have been worked out between Courtenay Young, Section V (S.I.S. counter-espionage) and Commander Montagu of N.I.D. Nevertheless I suggest a copy should be sent to C.S.S.

With reference to 124a, paragraphs 3 and 4 it would appear that Ryde has got over in the most admirable fashion →

→ the preliminary hurdles on the subject of a proposal to ship Sittig and Paasche to this country, (b) the finding of reliable police personnel. I feel myself, however, that Ryde might need additional ammunition before he could get Forsyth's consent for our taking over the bodies (Sittig and Paasche), and Villier's cooperation in dealing with the submarine, and it seems to me, therefore, that it is well worth considering whether the interview with Field Marshal Smuts would not now be advisable. We could show him the memorandum originally prepared, a copy of which was left with Mr. Duff Cooper, as at (minute) 114a with only minor modifications. I am doubtful as to the desirability of telling the Field Marshal that we have doubts of Colonel Goetzee, despite Ryde's frequent suggestions that we should do so. I feel on this point we really should go no further than to say that we would be reluctant to give full information to the Police beforehand owing to the possibility of leakage to the Ossewa Brandwag, and only raise the question of Coetzee if Field Marshal Smuts raises it first.

Please see Minute 126 and telegram at 124a and 125a. I am inclined to agree with Courtenay Young that it would be advisable to secure a further mandate from Smuts (The Prime Minister). I should be grateful for your ruling on this, and for the lines of the telegram which should now be sent to Webster, in view of the paragraph 7 and 8 of the telegram at 125a which answers our to Ryde at 120a.

With regard to paragraph 10, we cannot answer Ryde on this point until we have received the answer to 121a and we ought also to give him a line on the present attitude taken by Smuts, if you agree to a further interview.

Captain Courtenay Young and I saw Mr. Duff Cooper today. He will endeavour to arrange an interview with General Smuts, in the anticipation of which a suitable altered and up-to-date memorandum should be prepared. Meantime telegraph to Major Ryde saying a meeting is being arranged and we will cable again after it takes place.

3.12.1943 Copy of telegram from Pretoria, re escape of Internees from Union to P.E.A. (Portuguese East Africa)

AOB: apparently the conversation with General Smuts, went, most likely, wrong; that is all I can, yet, derive from the references available.

It is intriguing to learn, what happened after they reached Lourenco Marques safely again

Do we have to believe that Sittig and Paasche did return back to the South African Union, later, again?

KV 2/939-1, page 20b (minute 128)

Crown Copyright

AOB: It is rather evident:- something must have went, extremely, wrong for the British Secret Services, on, or shortly after, 30 November 1943;

as there is an abrupt lack of Secret Services "euphoria", about convincing the South African Prime Minister Field Marshal Smuts.

They all were really behaving childish and naive!

They played, as if Britain possessed still the 'legal authority' of overruling the South African Union Government, at will.

Why all this?

Please reconsider what Field Marshal Smuts stated on last - 4th November 1943:

(Y2169 Y2169return)

After the 30th November 1943, all lively conversations, about their partially illegal machinations overruling the South African Prime Minister, vanished abruptly; at least, for the time being.

And the two German wireless operators were able to operate again, as at least Sittig was able to move secretly - and likely from Portuguese East Africa again - as well as within the South African Union.

I think you will like you see the final instructions we have sent to (Major) Ryde (M.I.5) for his guidance in the final action against Pedant (= Paasche). We are advised that it may take another month before the final pin-pointing of the transmitter is certain and, therefore, no immediate action need to be expected. My telegrams of 155a, was drawn up at a meeting which I (Dick G. White of M.I.5 B.1.) held here, with representatives of S.I.S. and therefore, embodies our joined views on the handling of the case. You will note that we repeatedly stress that special B.J. (Blue Jacket, a special folder, containing mainly restricted accessible Most Secret Source materials) material cannot be used on any account and we are being ourselves very largely on technical evidence from Commander Benett's Y (signal DF) Organisation, which we hope will be used on any account discoveries in the course of the raid. In view of the fact that we cannot point to any real danger from the Felix (Sittig) organisation, it does seem to me right that we should take no risk in the vitally important B.J. material.

Please see Ryde's telegram at (minute 390a in Trompke's PF 65657). When we first learnt of Dr. Vielliers intention to rush the action against Paasche's transmitter, we considered the possibility of int?ervaning and turned it down-vide telegram 157a (see forgoing page 24) . Obviously the South Africans regard this a primarily a South African matter and, although we can advise and Ryde advised against precipate action, our only real concern in the matter is to safeguard sources. (actually meant: Most Secret Sources)

These now remains the possibility of attacking Wild's and the business but, if Paasche had been warned, one can assume that the chance of catching Wild redhanded are small.

You will be very interested to see telegram 163a and 164a, I think we should be aware of being too jubilant about Wild's disclosures for they have yet to be proved accurate, though we have a certain amount of W.W. material to corroborate Wild's statement in paras 1a & 1b.

The fatal fact that Sittig is on van Rensburg's farm is of course, new, Smut's decision not to arrest him as long as he is there seem a surprising ~~week~~ (weak) one, but is no doubt due to political considerations of which he must be allowed to be the best judge.→

→ The present position seems to me very precarious - Wild has partially confessed but remains at large- nearly all the principal conspirators appear to be aware that the Government has knowledge of their activities and de Villiers seems incapable of conducting a secure investigation.

I suggest you agree, that we reply to Ryde saying that as so much has now come out, the faster the whole matter can be brought to a climax the better & reminding him that, if Paasche and Sittig are successfully arrested, we should like to take custody of the bodies as previously arranged with Forsyth. (AOB: "Oh these children" they haven't learned much, they are fallen in to their forgoing traps again - in trying to 'under-mine' the South African sovereign authority)

As regards para 2.3 and 4 of (Minute) 163a, presumably S.I.S. will now have to be consulted, though obviously Ryde cannot leave until the present emergency has passed,

(AOB: may this state of emergency, being caused by the second confrontation between someone of the British Secret Services and the South African Prime Minister Field Marshall Smuts; about 30th November 1943?)

15.3.44. Draft letter to Brigadier Sir Stewart Menzies ('C'), re proposed recal of Major Ryde. 167a.

AOB: I admire Sir Stewart Menzies critical and pre-cautioned way of thinking, apparently far superior than Sir David Petrie's acting.

AOB: We can see (learn) that - with all the optimistic foregoing message exchanges between England and South Africa - that Sittig and Paasche are still at large and active in July 1944 (203a)

19.8.1944. Copy of letter from S.I.S. re expulsion of Werz from P.E.A. (Portuguese East Africa) and possible reactions from Sittig and Paasche.

AOB: this aspect was extensively dealt with in Kraizizek's file: (https://www.cdvandt.org/KV-2-2639-Kraizizek%20OB-SA-modi.pdf)

Like Kraizizek, they all were provided with a British "free passage" guarantee.

The ship did not landed at Capetown, as to prevent South African investigation, on what the British Secret Services accomplished, after all, illegally and they skipped Capetown and the Portuguese ship went straight to Gibraltar, where the British asked whether Kraizizek would talk to the British; which he refused, similarly occurred with Werz. Werz landed also in Lisbon, but soon thereafter landed, by means of an airline flight, on 24 December 1944, in Berlin.

Kraizizek remained in Lisbon, until the Germans surrendered, on 8th May 1945.

Clear is - that Sittig and Paasche remained, for some time, active in the South African Union.

10.9.45. Extract from Camp 020 Y.P. re Paasche 223c Both reference might indicate that is does not concern both men actually being there - but re is indicating: it is about Sittig and Paasche

11.1.1947 From B.A.O.R. (British Army over the Rhine) South African Police re ~~Isttig~~ Sittig 229a

You will recall that one of the persons sought by Colonel Rein was Lothar Sittig, a German Agent who operated in South Africa during the war but subsequently disappeared. I mentioned in my letter of November 8th, 1946, that we were putting an inquiry to the Soviet Authorities with a view to checking up on Sittig's parents at Dresden, acting in accordance with your wishes in this matter.

We have been very much gratified to obtain a reasonably substantial report from the Soviet Authorities as follows; (the spelling of names may be faulty since it is based on a phonetic translation of the Russian text.)

Lothar Sittig's mother, Germiore? Antonia Sittig, who was born in 1875 at Frankfurt-am-Main, resides at Dresden at 27 Bernhard Strasse. Frau Sittig, when questioned concerning her son stated that Lothar, who was born in 1902, had resided in Dresden but in 1922, after completing his studies at the Colonial School, he left for South Africa where he worked on plantations as a supervisor. Lothar Sittig spent periodic leaves in Dresden, the last one being from January to July 1938. From a letter written to his mother it is known that on4th October 1939 he was placed in an internment Camp by the the British Authorities at Leuken? Pretoria. On June 17th 1941 Sittig sent his mother a telegram informing her of his release (escape) from the Interment Camp, and of his departure to Portugal. (likely sent from Lourenco Marques). Since 1941 Frau Sittig has had no further news from her son.

I hope that this information will be of some value to you. We shall try to obtain from the Russians information concerning the place from which the above mentioned telegram was despatched as this may give an answer to Sittig/subsequent movements.

Sittig, a farmer by trade, by changing his name and noting as a lift-boy in Cape Town on the outbreak of war, had managed to got out of the Union together with Paasche, with the intention of getting back to Germany. On arrival at Lourenco Marques, however, they found that there was no possibility of doing so. As stated shows, Paasche was at first used for listening to the broadcasts in Afrikaans, whilst Sittig did nothing. Shortly after their arrival a man named Andersen, who claimed that he had been a Major in the Ossewa Brandwag Stormjaers, also arrived in Lourenco Marques, and asked the Consulate, for permission to return to South Africa and set up a W/T station, from which he hoped to transmit news to Germany or Lourenco Marques.

Andresen claimed that he had many contacts in South Africa, including van Rensburg. Another reason why Andresen wished to return to South Africa was that he wished to go back to a woman friend of his, who had accompanied him to Lourenco Marques, but had been sent back by the Portuguese authorities because of her Union nationality. Werz did not consider Andresen a suitable person to send to the Union, even had he? AOB: the reproduction quality is so poor, that you have to read it yourself.

Sittig, however, was not so easily put off, and continued his attempts to persuade Werz to send him to South Africa. He quarrelled with Andresen, and suggested he should work in conjunction with Paasche. Werz persisted with his refusals until orders came through from Berlin demanding more information on the (S.A.) Union. At this juncture Werz thought he was perhaps wrong in stopping an undertaking which might be of use to Germany. He therefore asked Berlin for instructions, and was told that it was in order to send Sittig to the (S.A.) Union.

Sittig's route to the (S.A.) Union (the same as that later given to Paasche) was to branch off to the left from the main Lourenco Marques road and enter the bush for a short time, until the river forming the boundary between Portuguese East Africa and South Africa was reached. On the other side of the river he was his way and attempt to contact van Rensburg. In South Africa, Sittig was to act solely in the capacity of a reporter, and not to get mixed up in any groups or parties. Moreover, he would have to make his own contacts to obtain a transmitter and (quartz) crystals.

If possible, he was to join forces with van Rensburg, but if he failed, to get assistance, c.q. from Greya ?? or other Nationalist movements. It proved eventually, however, that Sittig did get involved with the Ossewa Brandwag.

Until such time as Sittig could get strong enough transmitter to broadcast to Berlin, he was to contact Lourenco Marques. From there, Werz was to cable the information to Berlin through official (Portuguese) channels. Sittig was told that all orders to him would come direct from Berlin. For this pre-arranged that Sittig was to listen in at fixed times to Germany broadcasts (AOB: transmitter of Zeesen, the program was called: "Die Heimat Grüßt"), at the end of which times Berlin would send information, in the same code which he ?? to use in transmitting to Lourenco Marques. Werz is unable to state what arrangements were later made between Berlin and Sittig, as it was done without the knowledge of Lourenco Marques.

For this work Sittig was not paid anything beyond a few Union Pounds for travelling expenses to the Union. Werz never saw Sittig again after his departure, and some time later, after cessations of the broadcasts (AOB: the German transmission abroad functioned at least to the end of 1944, in my perception, even long after Werz and the others arrived per ship in Lisbon late 1944), it was rumoured that he had been arrested. Sittig had no training in Lourenco Marques for the work, but told Werz that he had some previous training - where, Werz claims he is unable to say. Please consider also: (https://www.cdvandt.org/felix-sittig-tx-sa.htm)

It was not known beforehand where Sittig would install his W/T set, but later it was believed that it had been placed in van Rensburg's farm. Later Kraizizek confirmed this personally to Werz. A simple code was arrange between Sittig and Paasche (who remained behind in Lourenco Marques, as Werz thought it too dangerous to risk the life of more than one man) based on Edition 38 of the Morse Codem an ordinary German commercial code obtainable German or Afrikander bookshops in the (S.A.) Union. To show that it had arrived safely, Sittig was to put a notice in the "Star" to the effect that a dog had been found. When he was ready to ??? his transmissions, he had to put a notice In the 'deceased' column of the "Sunday Express". About two months passed before the notion appeared, the reason, being that Sittig had been arrested and interned, out later managed to escape.

The notice duly appeared, mentioning times of transmission, dates, etc. and Sittig also informed Werz that he had contacted van Rensburg. This information Werz passed on to Berlin, also sending the code in which Sittig was working.

Sittig later stated that he was trying to make direct contact with Berlin, and gave the hours of transmission and wave-length, which Werz again password on to Berlin by telegram. At this point Berlin said that the code was no good as, for a time, until they quarrelled, the same code had been used with Rooseboom, and was 'blown'. The latter information had also been reported to Sittig.

When the transmissions actually commenced, they were very poor. receiving was done with ordinary set, and it was practically impossible to get (receive) anything. It was, therefore, arranged through the Italian Consulate that the "Gerusalemso? ", an Italian (the ship was interned by the Portuguese Authorities) , should be used, since it had a more powerful (receiver) set (AOB: like the German Consulate, transmissions were not allowed) and the reports should be handed in to the German Consulate by the Italian Consulate, via the Italian Consul, Campini. Assistance was given in receiving by Gianini (he also worked in the Italian Stefani (Press) Agency, later taken over by the Germans (AOB: likely after about September 1943 when Italy changed over, under General Badoglio, to the Allied side) and two W/T operators working on board. The results were, however, still poor, so the consulate communicated with Berlin by cable telegram, asking Berlin to get in touch with Sittig by means of pre-arranged code, to inform Sittig of the fact and suggest he should change the times of transmission. (AOB: so called: propagation is is a phenomenon related with the sun, ionospheric conditions and time of the day; and that like). This code message was sent a night, after "Die Heimat Grüsst" programme from Zeesen (a transmission site in the vicinity of Berlin), this being the normal method by which communications were sent to Sittig.

Before broadcasts came regularly from Sittig, some week elapsed; but eventually they came through about once a week. Information was at first chiefly concerned with technical reports on transmissions, but later, news came through on military matters, shipping, and general conditions in the Union. These transmissions continued for about two to three months to Lourenco Marques.

During this time, Paasche ?? went out to join Sittig, who was in the need of assistance, Werz had refused for a long time to send him out, but there had been trouble between Rooseboom and Sittig, so Werz agreed, following official blessing from Berlin (Auswärtiges Amt).

As transmission got better, Sittig first asked whether he could cooperate with Rooseboom. Werz relayed this to Berlin, who advised Sittig against it, and later told Sittig to dismis? Rooseboom altogether. Sittig was, however, anxious for assistance and asked if Paasche could join him. Werz refused, as he did not wish to risk sending another man. Sittig then asked if he could use Masser, but Werz was advised through Berlin that Masser was unreliable, and refused this request too. Werz then let Paasche go, as stated above.

Sittig transmitted instruction regarding the route of Paasche was to take, which was the same as Sittig had taken on his way out (of Portuguese East Africa). By this means Paasche would be able to find him. Should this fail, Paasche was to go on to a Dr. van der Merwe. Werz denies that he ever met this man. but believes that Sittig and Paasche discussed van der Merwe before Sittig left.

Paasche left Lourenco Marques a few months after Sittig's departure. He took with him a new code, which he memorised and instructions concerning schedule times.

Before leaving Lourenco Marques, it was arranged with Sittig that he was to send information in all points which Werz could not pick up in Lourenco Marques from the newspapers, i.e. political and economic news, as far as was possible, and military information such as troop movements, etc. Werz can only remember definitely that Sittig mentioned a large concentration of South African troops on the frontier near Portuguese East Africa. It is possible that Sittig also spoke once of a convoy of troops to the Far East.

As far as Werz can remember, the first direct transmission to Berlin took place soon after Masser's second arrival in Lourenco Marques in August 1943. These direct transmissions were also heard and understood in Lourenco Marques for about two or three months. Then the decoding of the messages became impossible. On enquiries from the Auswärtiges Amt, Werz learnt that the code with Sittig had again been changed and it was not necessary for Lourenco Marques to listen in any more. If the Auswärtiges Amt considered that information he sent could be of any use for Werz they promised to foreword it. Werz, however, received no information from them.

Four or five months after this (probably Spring or Summer, 1944) Berlin informed Werz that the messages had ceased entirely, and requested Werz to find out what the reason was. Werz was unable to do this and was also unable to pick up any transmission from Sittig in Lourenco Marques.

This movement, according to Werz, originated with Dedek, Georg (later beaten up by Kraizizek). At the time when the Portuguese Government were negotiating to repatriate those Germans who whished to leave Lourenco Marques, Dedek refused to go back, saying that he wished to have nothing further to do with Nazi Germany. As a result the German Consulate General was obliged to disown Dedek, who made several virulent? paper attacks on the members of the Consulate, and take his passport away. Von Alvensleben, a friend of Dedek's took his aid and tore up his passport which he forwarded to the Consulate. Soon the Communist elements joined them, and Andresen who considered he had received a raw deal from the Consulate in connection with his compositions (he composed music) for which he believed he was insufficiently paid, turned to the movement. A number of pamphlets were written by them and distributed.

Werz does not know whether its members were even given cover names, since no steps were taken at first to find out the movement's activities, for the Consulate was ashamed of its members and consequently disowned them. Werz believes that at one time, Trompke asked Kraizizek and Masser independently to act as stool pigeon in the movement. He does not believe that Masser was paid for this work, but certainly received money, which he was always demanding, for his numerous illnesses. The idea of acting as stool pigeon was not really approved by Trompke, but he gave in as the suggestion was made by the two men.

Werz was not certain if Masser belonged to the movement; but said that when orders were given to the German colony not to have anything to do with with its members, Masser still kept up contact with von Alvensleben. Werz also heard a rumour that Andresen was to be used by either the British or American authorities with regard to possible work on their behalf in the (S.A.) Union.

Werz is unable to state the exact amount of money provided for expenses at the Consulate. He states that expenditure was high, on account of the telegrams sent to Berlin, and also that the Consulate was obliged to provide for many Germans left stranded in Lourenco Marques.

No funds were set aside for paying of agents. Elferink (KV 2/202) was the only agent paid by them, and that on instructions from Berlin (Auswärtiges Amt). Sittig and Paasche was not paid, apart from initial travelling expenses already mentioned. Financial transactions were carried out through the Banco Marino.

Werz was paid about £110 a month. He was given about 1,200 RM and (actually) received 1,100 RM, the rest being credited to his account in Berlin. Through a special system of exchange the RM amount to about 11,000 escudos, circa £110. He paid for his own car and living quarters, and in addition gave his his mistress Sousa da Cousta, about £20 a month, for which he received all his meals in her house.

At the Polano Hotel, where he lived for almost five years, he paid 2,000 escudos a month, the rest of his expenses there coming to about 4,000 escudos a month. Although Werz has not directly admitted it, it would appear that he dealt in some peculation of the Consulate funds, since he mentions money drawn for expenses for which he is at a loss to provide an explanation.

It had been Werz' intention to marry Sousa da Costa, but the Auswärtiges Amt, to whom he applied for permission, rejected this request. (AOB: Germans could only marry legally, under German legislation, when it is proved that his future wife is of Aryan descent or being considered this way, being, for instance, Italian end that like.) Werz claims that this woman knew nothing of his espionage activities.

Occasionally Müller brought Werz news which he claimed he had through (Basil) Bathos, and which Bathos had obtained from either a Goanese or a female clerk at the American Consulate. Werz paid little attention to this man, which was of no real importance, since he did not trust Bathos and was convinced that Bathos made up news to please Müller.

Werz had no contact, either direct or indirect, with anyone in the South African Consulate.

From the British Consul, von Alvensleben stole a document which Werz copied and sent to Berlin. to Werz's annoyance this was broadcast from Zeesen in one of 'Die Heimat Grüßt' broadcasts. Werz cannot remember what the document contained. On two or three occasions Alversleben offered to obtain news from the British Consulate; but Werz paid little attention to these offers, as he was sure that Alvensleben was working for the British.

Werz first heard of Masser during the latter's trial in South Africa. Later, through Kraizizek he heard of Masser's escape with Kraizizek and his wish to get to Lourenco Marques. As Werz, who considered that Masser had already caused sufficient trouble, did not wish to have him in Lourenco Marques, he instructed Kraizizek to forbid Masser to come. Kraizizek disobeyed this order, as Masser turned up some few weeks after Kraizizek.

On Masser's arrival he told Werz that, following the failure of his attempts to get to Germany, he would like to establish a transmitter in the in the South African Union to send news to Germany. He brought with him some coded notes justifying his actions in South Africa, which he wished to decode. Since these notes were based on the code taken from Kraizizek by the Portuguese police, this was not possible . Masser also brought some diamonds with him, which he said he had obtained from Vermy, telling Werz that he could get more if needed. These diamonds were later given back to Masser by Trompke (who said he could not get them to Germany) as the result of a stratagem? of von Alvensleben , Werz, who only whished to keep Masser, who he describes as an unbalanced egocentric convinced of his valour and ability, quiet, told him that his unwanted activities had already compromised the Consulate and instructed him to abstain from any further activities. Masser caused further complications by saying that the two pistols which he brought with him had been thrown away on the Portuguese border, whereas in fact they had been brought to Lourenco Marques.

Masser was anxious to return to Germany via Lisbon to take part in the war as a pilot. Much against advice of the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques, he persisted in his efforts of going as a stowaway on a Portuguese boat. He was warned that other Germans had attempted to do the same and had failed, and that Krebs?, who had succeeded in getting away on a Japanese boat, had been arrested in Singapore. Masser persisted in this idea, however, believing that he could be helped by a Swiss? nurse, Alice Wengerm so Trompke let him go and even provided him with money which to bribe the crew.

Masser was handed an envelpe containing letters from members of the Consulate intended for their families in Germany. At that time it was practically impossible to get mail thfough normal channels letters being held up for a considerable while in Cape Town and often being lost en route. When Masser was brought to Cape Town, he was afraid that the letters would be confiscated, so threw them into a coal-bunker. Later he told Werz that he believed that the envelope containing these was lost, but news from Germany proved that by some means or other the letters had, in fact, reached their destination.

Two or three days before the Allied landing on Madagascar, i.e., beginning of May 1942, a strong, well-build Afrikander arrived at the Consulate to see Werz, stating that he had a message to the effect that an attack on Madagascar was about to be made within a few days. He also brought with him small Leica film, but did not mention from whom it came. Werz, who was always suspicious of people who called on with mission, did not interrogate him, buut after the man left had de film decoded. The message of the film merely confirmed what the man said verbally but as it was written in code used by Sittig, proof was obtained that the man was genuine.

Werz passed on this information by telegram to Berlin, but states that it was then to late for Berlin to do anything.

This Afrikander, whose name was Rockebrandt, had apparently walked a great distance on his way from the Union. On arrival in Lourenco Marques he was arrested and searched by the Portuguese Police. The film was well hidden that it was not found. On giving a false German name and stating that he was a German, Rockebrandt was allowed to go to the German Consulate - the routine procedure with all German refugees. At the Consulate Rockebrandt immediately confessed that he was not German. Wertz never heard of or saw this man again.

Additional news to the broadcasts from Sittig was brought by Müller, who obtained it from the Greek Bathos, Basil. This news was passed to Werz almost daily by Müller. Werz did not regard it as reliable as he would report, for example, that three Allied ships had been sunk near the Cape or off the coast of West Africa. Werz considers that Müller or Bathos was 'sinking' them for the sake of his reports.

During the time of peak sinking by submarines, various Allied sailors, mostly Greek, Norwegians and Dutch, cam to the Consulate asking if they could be helped home. As all their contacts were made out in London and their respective Consuls were either British or pro-British nationals of their own country, Werz refused to help them. These sailors talked freely about their experiences as well as the experiences of others when they met Germans in restaurants or bars. From these sources Müller and Bathos were able to make reports.

Werz claims that his relationship with this man, who was an exaggerated type of Germanophile, were exclusively based on a friendship which arose through Barbosa's friendship with da Costa family. Barbosa never worked for Werz, Eduardo's brother was also a slightly known to Werz.

The only occasion on which Werz made use of his services was when he intimated that he would like to make acquaintance of the Police Officer, Henriques, who had come from Lisbon, in order to find out about certificates needed by Germans to leave the town.

Werz claims that, though he met members of the Portuguese Police, he never used them in his organisation. The following are the names of those he met or knew about:-

Martius: This man first came into contact with Werz when he boarded the train which bore the Consular staff in Ressano Garoia in 1939. Later the man sought contact with Werz in the Polano Hotel, but Werz would not see him. Martius also sought the acquaintance of the Consular Secretary, Jericho, but met with similar refusal.

Consalves, Captain: Werz only met this man at official functions. He distrusted him, as he believed Consalves was in the pay of the Allies.

Heniques, Captain. This man came from Portugal to clear up anti-Salazar movements. When he took his censorship Trompke suggested Werz should meet him, this to be arranged through Barbosa, Eduardo, who knew Henriques. Werz only met him once, as Henriques was suddenly ordered to return to Lisbon. Henriques had previously been put under temporary arrest by the Portuguese Governor, for accusing Consalves of swindle and theft; because of his unmerited experience, Henriques was rather excited and the discussion which concerned censorship got nowhere.

Trompke Paul. Consul General. Except in unimportant matters Trompke had little to do with Werz's activities. he was engaged in normal Consular duties.

Jericho, Rolf. Financial and administrative matters. Secretary to the Consulate.

Pa~~sche~~ (Paasche), Ernst Assisted Jericho. Before Werz obtained other assistants, Pasche "listened in to the Zeesen broadcasts, 'Die Heimat Grüßt'.

Lauahn An officer from the s.s. "Aller" (interned ship). He instructed Kolb, Tiele-Winkler, Müller and Frehse in Morse reception, afterwards working in the coding department until his departure.

Kolb, Hubert. Was head of the Press Bureau and controlled the reception of Trans-Ocean news. Also furnished the communiqués of the German High Command (O.K.W.) to local news papers. Also took part in the reception and decoding of the messages from Sittig.

Tiele-Winkler Freiherr Raabi von. Assisted Kolb in the Press Bureau and in the reception and decoding of Sittig's messages. reported on American and South African broadcasts.

Eckhardt. An officer from the s.s. Dortmund (ship was also interned). Reported to the Consulate the names numbers and cargoes of ships in the prot.

Mutius, Baron von Christof von. Took part in observation of shipping. Was asked in the Ludo Ughetto from the Italian Consulate.

Drachmeyer. Assisted Cianini in reception of the Trans-Ocean news. Occasionally helped Kolb in reception of news from Sittig. By trade a barber.

Gianini Whilst on board the "Gerusalamme" (ship was also interned) he was one of three men who received messages from Sittig. When not engaged in this he took part in dealing with the Trans-Ocean news.

Müller, Alois. Camp 020 case. Wrote daily reports, about German broadcasts in Afrikans and Afrikans reports from the Union. He also brought shipping news received from Bathos, Basil (020 case).

Frehse, Werner. Helped occasionally in shipping observation. Was later caretaker at the German Club since he was unable to learn Morse Code. Later went to the German emergency school at Bdula.

Diekmann. Was in charge of the 'Fürsorgestelle' (assistance for Germans) Had nothing to do with transmissions.

Paasche, Nils. During his stay in Lourenco Marques listened to the German broadcasts in Afrikaans. Later received and decoded Sittig's messages.

Staff of the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques (Contd) (E2175 ↕↕↕↕↕↕ E2175return)

Kellermann Concerned with technical side of the German broadcasts from Zeesen. Also advised as to what material should be broadcast fro Zeesen to the South African Union.

Toenies?? Gustav Assisted Germans before Diekmann. Had nothing to do with transmissions.

Andresen, Olaf. Composed songs for the German broadcasts in Afrikaans. This music was sent to Germany on Leica films. Later, when the war situation became bad for Germany, he wrote a "March of the Liberated Nations" which was bought from him by the Americans and broadcast by them, together with the story of Andresen's conversation.

Alvensleben Offered information to the German Consulate which he claimed he got from a friend, the British Consul Muggeridge. Later according to Werz, who did not trust him, it becomes obvious that he, with his Free German Movement, was working for the British.

Oliveira Translated the communiqué of the German High Command (O.K.W.) from German into Spanish or Portuguese for publication in the Press.

Schuhmacher, Johanna Registar, shorthand-typist. Was asked, partially because Masser's accusation, by really because of an affair she had with a married man.

Hansing, Gerhard Engaged on photographic work. Developed the films sent by Kraizizek from Sittig and Andresen's mission for Berlin.

October. Werz left Lourenco Marques (AOB: together with most of the Consulate staff among it Kraizizek) on the Portuguese steamer "Quanza". (all got British Guarantee of Free passage), which was taken in Gibraltar, where Werz was questioned. He refused to divulge anything. After some days in Lisbon and Barcelona, Werz went to Madrid, where he was ill for some weeks. Following this, he flew to Berlin (on an airline flight) where he arrived on 24th December 1944.

AOB: we know now - that even in early 1947, both, Sittig and Paasche, were at large; thus, the British Services had no idea yet, were they actually were living.

However, this file is, nevertheless, quite extensive because they implemented parts of related personal files in this document series, as well.

Kraizizek is for me an interesting person, and for some time, he was quite involved in the South African Union, and in particular with van Rensburg and his W/T transmission facilitating engagements; and he, as most others had been interned, and escaped twice, as the others did too.

I, therefore, have digested Kraizizek's concerning file sections firstly, again, and believe that it deals with many unknown aspects, that it is really worth going for it.

Compared to Kraizizek's sparkling file series, is Werz's file rather boring.

Thus let us thus go for it!

For a while, you will, virtually, living in another era!

List of places visited and persons met by Kraizizek during his escape March/June 1943 Page - II.

Identity Documents: SS Soldbuch No. 46 for services in SS Jagdverband Nordwest, issued 1.9.44.

Walter Paul Kraizizek, aged 31, German, gave himself up to the American Army and was arrested by them on 9th May 1945. Following interrogation, he was sent to Camp 020, where he arrived on 13th August 1945.

1914: August 6th Born in Berlin. Kraizizek's father and four brother were either killed in this war, or are missing.

1930 - 1934: Served apprenticeship as Stereo-Electrotyper in the Graphische Kunstanstalt, A. Scherl, Berlin, studying at the same time at the Kunstgewerbeschule. Passed final examination with honours in May 1934.

1934: June/July Left the Graphische Kunstanstalt to join the "Freiwilligen Arbeitsdienst". Passed as a Cadet in July for the "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and entered the "Kadettenanstalt" Berlin-

1934 - 1935: Discharged from the "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" following an operation which left him with a temporarily disabled arm (self inflicted) and put on reserve of 67 Infantry Regiment in November 1935.

1935?- 1936: Became Manager of Verlagsanstalt, Berlin, in November 1935. Kraizizek was questioned about this period in connection with the escape to Switzerland of Rudolf Hausler, a friend of his, who was also a member of Adolf Hitler's bodyguard. Nothing was proved against him and he was released.

Later applied for a post in South Africa through I.G. Farben, whose Representatives in South Africa Teuber & Corssen, engaged him on behalf of Fried Newspapers Ltd. Bloemfontein, Orange Free State (Oranje Vrijstaat) left Hamburg to take up this appointment in November 1936.

1938: October. Returned to Germany in October 1938 to study new developments in his trade. Qualified as a metallurgical analyst and took a degree at the Technische Hochschule, Berlin. Before returning to South Africa, he reported to the Wehrbezirkskommando, Berlin, whence he had directed to report to Ufer - this he failed to do.

Met Dr. van Rensburg for the first time on the occasion of a football match between England and South Africa.

Interned in Bloemfontein Prison, 14 September 1939, and afterwards transferred to Baviaansport Camp near Pretoria. With the permission of the Camp Commandant, de Ruik, he spent most of his time in the camp giving physical training lessons.

1940: Following the fight between internees in the camp and South African Police authorities, Kraizizek, suffering injuries, was taken to Pretoria Hospital. He was afterwards transferred to Leeuwkop Camp near Johannesburg.

October. In October, Kraizizek was transferred to the Andalusia Internment Camp, Christiana.

A German, Major Courdt von Brandis, recruited a so-called "Ordnungsdienst" in the camp consisting of about 90 internees. Kraizizek was put in charge of the first company (consisting of livelier and younger elements) which was at the special disposal of von Brandis. The work of this organisation, created according to von Brandis with the approval of van Rensburg, was to train as a military body and to be used as such should the occasion for a rising occur. A tunnel was begun, the object being to get into touch with the Ossewa Brandwag. Kraizizek, however, had the tunnel project stopped as he considered it dangerous both to the Germans at liberty and to the internees, by writing anonymous letter to the Camp Commandant. Following the escape of Major Müller and Werner Lodes in 1942 the "Ordnungsdienst" was forbidden by the Camp Commandant. Von Brandes told Kraizizek that Lodes had left the camp on instructions of the Reich.

1942: April 4th. Kraizizek, hearing that another internee, Volkmann, had succeeded in escaping in a Sergeant's uniform, tried the same bluff and succeeded in getting out of the camp on April 4th,

1942. He intended going going to Lourenco Marques (Portuguese East Africa) and from there, stowing away on a boat for Lisbon, but being short of the time necessary to effect this (maps, compass, etc.) he decided to contact the family of a man named Weiss, whose sons had been interned with him in Baviaansport.

April 5th. Kraizizek arrived in Taungs on April 5th, having walked there. He met Maiboom in his cafe, and told him that he, Kraizizek, had been given his name by Gerard (an Ossewa Brandwag General). This was untrue, but the bluff worked and Maiboom let him have some food and showed him the way out of the town. From Taungs, Kraizizek went to Clerksdorf, still wearing his stolen uniform and, getting a lift as far as Germiston, arrived in Pretoria on the same day. Soon after contacting the Wiess family, the police called to check up on his identity - Kraizizek considers he must have acted suspiciously - and as they were not satisfied, took him to Pretoria and later to Johannesburg where he was shut up in the jail there.

He was later taken back to Andalusia with Volkmann who had also been captured, where he was confined for thirty days. As he was aware that he was suspected of espionage, and wishing to make the authorities believe their suspicions were justified, he wrote a letter concerning botany - about which he knows nothing - deliberately couched in mysterious terms and intirely without meaning, to a mythical professor in Zürich, Switzerland. Kraizizek thereafter resumed his youth training activities, whilst preparing for a fresh escape.

Kraizizek met Herbert Masser (KV 2/942 ... KV 2/944; PF 106140) in the Camp in 1943, the latter having just returned from serving a term of imprisonment in Pretorie for espionage. Kraizizek had previously met Masser in Baviaansport Camp in June 1940. Although their plan for escape was a joint effort, yet Masser was obviously the person who determined the means, and it was agreed that the two should make their way to Angola (also a Portuguese colony by then) via Caprivi Corner. Masser obtained all the necessary information about the outside, maps, compasses, and addresses of possible assistants, whilst Kraizizek fell the task of finding the actual route out of the camp.

Another internee, Georg Kuehirt, was allowed to join them at the last minute in order to upset their plans.

March 17th. On 17th March, according to Kraizizek, the escape took place. The lights had been out off on the outside and inside of the camp, friends had been posted at several points with crackers to distract the guards' attention, and choosing an appropriate moment; Kraizizek out the wire, swept away the barbered wire obstacles, charged the guard waving a dummy pistol. About four miles from the camp, the three trapped and fired on; in the ensuing panic, Kraizizek lost Masser and Kuehirt. Having waited twenty hours where he was, Kraizizek approached a farm described to him by Masser, the name of which Masser had obtained from a man named Banie Basson.

The owner of this farm was nervous because his farm had been searched a short time before, and gave Kraizizek the name of an Ossewa Brandwag General van der Westhuizen - who owned a cafe in Bloemhof.

March 21st. Kraizizek spent the next two nights in the open and reached Bloemhof on the 21st March. There he met van der Westhuizen in his café which went under his own name, and which as situated near the railway station.

Westhuizen did not appear surprised to see Kraizizek and asked him how he know about them, he did not reply. That night, Westhuizen took Kraizizek to another farm near Kingswood which belonged to a relative of his, an old O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) man. Kraizizek remained →

On the farm for the next few days, spending some of his time at a neighbouring farm, where Müller and Lodes were hidden.

1943: March 25th On the 25th, Kraizizek was given a lift to the nearest station, Kingswood, as he had decided to jump a train for Johannesburg. As no train stopped at this station, he walked back along

the line Bloemhof where, on the 26th, he jumped a goods train bound for Johannesburg and arrived at midday on the 27th.

Masser had given Kraizizek an address in Highland North (now forgotten) and he made for this place after dark.

Here, he met a German woman who started crying when he told her who he was. She bagged him to leave at once as her husband, who was interned, had a chance of being paroled, and Kraizizek's presence might ruin everything, although he found that Rooseboom and De Villiers were already there. The woman telephoned Frau Rahdke and told her quite plainly who was with her, whereupon Frau Rahdke invited Kraizizek to come to her house, also in Highland North (exact address forgotten). Frau Rahdke was the wife of the Principal of the German School in Johannesburg, Georg Rahdke, who had been interned with Kraizizek first in Baviaansport Camp, and then in Leeuwkop and later Andalusia. Kraizizek had only seen her once when she visited her husband at the internment camp. She was a good friend of Masser, whom she often visited during his term of imprisonment. Her husband had taken flying lessons from Masser.

Kraizizek told her that he intended to go to Angola and asked her if she knew anyone who could find out something about Masser. She promised to approach Jerling, an O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) general whom she knew, regarding this matter, In the meantime, Kraizizek was to make himself a home.

On 29th March, Kraizizek received a message from Frau Rahdke to go to the house of the first German woman he met. There he found Rooseboom and de Villiers. Although he had never met Rooseboom before, he was well-known to Kraizizek because of the book he had written, "Die Orlog trap my fas", and because of the rumours that he was in the possession of a transmitter. Rooseboom told Kraizizek that he was in a desperate position and asked him if he would help him. He explained that he was a G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) agent and had a mission from Admiral Doenitz (AOB: I highly doubt this), then chief of the U-Boot Waffe (AOB: actually Doenitz was Befehlshaber der U-Boote / B.d.U.) This mission consisted in reporting ship movements in Durban and Cape Town. He had two assistants at first, Smit (an O.B. General of Cape Town, now a Soldana Bay Customs Officer, and a preacher with Dr. van Rensburg, on whose farm he operated the transmitter to Lourenco Marques. This continued until Werz replaced Rooseboom by one of his own staff from Lourenco Marques. Kraizizek claims that he can add nothing further regarding Rooseboom's contacts in Cape Town and Durban.

1943 : March 29th Sittig (AOB: this is actually Sittig's and Paasche's file series), who had escaped from Baviaansport to Lourenco Marques, replaced Rooseboom, but coming from Lourenco Marques with a new code for the transmitter, he was caught without being punished. Sittig was not more than two days in the camp when he again succeeded in escaping. He reported to van Rensburg and operated in Rooseboom's stead, while the latter was slowly pushed out, finally receiving news from Werz by radio code (AOB: Zeesen broadcast: "The Heimat Grüßt") that he was not wanted any more and must no longer regard himself as a G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) agent. Rooseboom was very bitter about this, but considered it his duty to go on with his work despite Werz's message.

Kraizizek asked Rooseboom why he had fallen into disgrace and was told that he had differences with van Rensburg about the military and political character of the news sent to Lourenco Marques. Rooseboom had managed to get a new transmitter with the assistance of a German engineer, Herbert Wild, and actually transmitted from a house situated in a Johannesburg suburb, belonging to Chris Joubert.

Later, Kraizizek visited Joubert's place and found the radio poles still up, and was at least partly convinced that Rooseboom really tried to call Lourenco Marques by air. (AOB: again: at least foreigners weren't entitled to transmit from Portuguese East Africa, including diplomatic services. Thus, even if someone would have picked up and intended to reply, he could not do legally. A similar situation existed in Sweden and Switzerland during wartime days. In the two last cases there might have existed an exception for the US, Japan and the UK in Sweden and Switzerland. Nevertheless, the Germans in Lisbon possessed means of wireless communications legally for their Diplomatic and KOP representation)

With the financial assistance of Marenski of Trans-Ocean Vermy of Johannesburg and Jerling Rooseboom managed to get on with his work. He was never sure, though, whether his news reached Lourenco Marques (AOB: reception was possible, they used mainly ship-stations to receive W/T messages from abroad), because it was never confirmed despite the fact that he was sending under the same conditions as before.

Rooseboom wanted Kraizizek to deliver a new transmitting plan to the first German Consul he met, if possible not the one at Lourenco Marques (whom else?) during their conversation, Rooseboom told Kraizizek that if Masser did not turn upm he would introduce him to a Dutch pilot, Boekersmaar, who was also wanted to get to Angola, and who was then working at Jerling's farm near Alberton, Johannesburg.

Rooseboom then left and returned on the 1st April with the suggestion that Kraizizek should change his address and they then went together to a farm situated between Johannesburg and Pretoria, belonging to Herbert Wild.

This map 'Y' is showing the locations of Pretoria and Johannesburg in the vast map of South Africa

Maputo is currently the capital of Mozambique, in the Portuguese colonial days it was named: Lourenco Marques.

In the evening, Jerling arrived at the farm and spoke to Kraizizek of the arguments he had had with van Rensburg, whom he did not trust, concerning his alliance with ~~General~~ Field Marshal Smuts. He warned up over the Leibrandt case, accusing van Rensburg of giving → him away ..

→ him away, and the van der Walt case (?), and openly accused van Rensburg (KV 2/907; PF 66175)(formerly dealt with) of being a traitor. Jerling was apparently considering giving up his post a General of the O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) and founding a new national party. Rooseboom agreed with Jerling's opinion of van Rensburg and said that he had documentary of roofs of van Rensburg's treachery. Unfortunately for Rooseboom van Rensburg knew this and was awaiting the first opportunity of killing Rooseboom.

April 2nd Kraizizek expressed his doubts about Jerling, who, however, confirmed the serious position of Rooseboom was in and asked Kraizizek never to mention van Rensburg that Kraizizek had met him (Jerling). Kraizizek then asked Jerling about Masser's whereabouts, but Jerling could only repeat a rumour was in the hospital at Kimberley with shot wounds,

Jerling assured Kraizizek that he intended helping him to get to Angola, and invited him to his farm at Alberton, Johannesburg, which Kraizizek visited two days later.

April 3rd. Kraizizek's visit to Jerling's farm: Meeting with Boekersmaar (the pilot).

Rooseboom drove Kraizizek to Jerling's farm where they met Boekersmaar. After listening to his plan for reaching Angola (this was a vague plan entailing jumping a train to Leopoldville (Belgian Colony)

Leopoldville once Belgian Congo, now named Kinshasa the capital of the Republic Congo

and there working in copper mine whilst making further plans to cover the last stretch to Lobito (also visible on the above map) Zimbabwe once was named Rhodesia)

As Jerling was leaving the farm, he instructed Boekersmaar to take Kraizizek to a police officer, who lived with his mother in a suburb of Johannesburg. Kraizizek stayed four days with Victor (who knew nothing of what was going on), and was then brought back to Frau Rahdke's place by de Villiers.

Kraizizek asked Frau Rahdke to get in touch with Hilde Weiss ( sister of the amn with whom Kraizizek had been interned); so that she could bring him some of his identification papers which he had left at her home on his arrest after his first escape attempt in 1942.

On the same day, Frau Rahdke received a visit from a friend of hers, Maria Wilz (Kraizizek's later fiancé), whom together with her mother, had been acquitted in the Leibrandt trial (KV 2/924 - KV 2/925; PF 63905) (https://www.cdvandt.org/robey-leibrandt-(sa).htm). Maria Wilz offered to hide Kraizizek at their home if he did not think it too dangerous because of the family being under house arrest. Kraizizek agreed to go at a later date.

April 8th On 8th April, Kraizizek met Mme. du Toit, wife of a Stormjaer Colonel, arrested during the Leibrandt clean-upn and one of van Rensburg's stoutest supporters. Mme. du Toit told him that he was to meet van Rensburg who wished to see him in connection with a (Leica?) film. Before meeting van Rensburg, however, he was to see his Adjutant, Anderson, an O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) General and a former Captain in the South African Army.

It was arranged that Kraizizek was to wait outside the public library in Johannesburg until Mme. du Toit entered a car which would be Anderson's. This went according to plan, and later, Andersen dropped Mme. du Toit, he and Kraizizek continued together. After satisfying Anderson about his identity, Kraizizek was told by Anderson, who knew that he and Rooseboom were acquainted, the reasons van Rensburg dismissing Rooseboom , but Kraizizek found the reasons very unconvincing. Anderson confirmed that Rooseboom worked a transmitter on van Rensburg's farm, had his own service before, and had been dismissed by Werz. Anderson and van Rensburg thought Rooseboom a danger to the whole cause and said that he would have to be killed one day before he could turn State evidence against the O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) and van Rensburg.

Kraizizek questioned Anderson on Rooseboom's claim that van Rensburg hold back news of a military nature, thus endangering the lives of South African soldiers. Anderson did not deny this, but refused to enlarge on the subject.

Asked about his plans, Kraizizek told Anderson that he wanted to find out what happened to Masser (with whom he escaped) and if Masser did not turn up within fourteen days, he would go to Angola alone. Anderson bagged him not to make any plans with Rooseboom and said that he wanted to take him to van Rensburg's farm at a later date as the present time was not convenient.

Maria Wilz called on Frau Rahdke to next day to tell her that the place where Kraizizek had first met Rooseboom had been searched by the police. Kraizizek thereupon moved to Maria

April 11th Wilz's house where he remained until 11th April, then returned to Wild's farm where he remained until the 15th April.

As he heard nothing more about the proposed visit to van Rensburg, Kraizizek moved to Chris Joubert's house on the outskirts of Johannesburg, near a mine. Rooseboom was still transmitting here and was frequently visited by his fiancé, a telephonist at the City Central Telephone Exchange. Joubert did not think much of Rooseboom's work, and believed that he was playing the fool to get money out of his supporters. He told Kraizizek about a mysterious Durban teacher who worked with Rooseboom.

Meantime, Rooseboom had worked out a plan, concerning the wave-length, kHzm transmitting time and code, and it was agreed that they should make sure that van Rensburg was not getting suspicious so that Rooseboom could be left to work in peace in the future. (AOB: I highly doubt that the dilettantes on Rooseboom's side did possess an understanding about seasonal propagations on short-wave through the various seasons) Kraizizek was to bluff van Rensburg with another plan containing false dates; thus making van Rensburg believe that he was giving Rooseboom away, while the true plan was to reach some German Consulate.

On 17th April, Jerling sent a car and Kraizizek was driven to Pretoria where he met Sittig @ Maier (Mayer?) (location of meeting now forgotten). Sittig told Kraizizek that he had been sent by Werz to →

1943 April 17th Van Rensburg with a new code and instructions for the transmitting. Furthermore, he was to relieve Rooseboom. Kraizizek asked him the reason for this animosity against Rooseboom, but Sittig claimed that he did not know, and was morely acting on instructions, namely, that an order had been received from Werz to the affect that Rooseboom was to be dismissed as an agent.

Sittig then asked Kraizizek if he would be willing to serve his country by taking a parcel to Lourenco Marques from van Rensburg. Kraizizek said he would be willing to go immediately, but mentioned to Sittig that he had promised not to leave Masser in the lurch. Sittig replied that Kraizizek's return from Lourenco Marques could always be arranged.

Contrary to Anderson and Rooseboom, Sittig maintained that most military news of important was being sent to Lourenco Marques, especially reports on shipping movements. He, however, had no say in the relocation of news as van Rensburg undertook the censorship himself.

Kraizizek spent the night in Pretoria at a place unknown to him (the master of the hous-owner was a school-teacher who knew Hilde Weiss), and then returned to Joubert's place with Sittig's assurance that he would be called very soon.

April 18th Kraizizek spent the night at Joubert's place and the next day with Wilz (Kraizizek's later fiancé)

April 19th On the 19th, Anderson drove him by car to van Rensburg's farm, picking up on the way, van Rensburg's wife whom Kraizizek knew well from the Bloemfontein days (please consider the second foregoing map 'Y')

The conversation began with van Rensburg asking Kraizizek if he were willing to take a small parcel containing undeveloped films (he not ask), to Dr, Werz whom he was to meet on the Portuguese side of the border. Van Rensburg added that Kraizizek could return when he liked. He went on to tell him that he had already get four men, but they had either been caught or lost. This referred to Rockebrandt and Steffens who were arrested near the border, and the two Afrika Korps (DAK) officers Major von Lipka and Leutnant von Grawert, who had apparently been lost in the bush. Rockebrandt, when arrested, told the Portuguese authorities, who had imprisoned him near the border, that he was a German, and Werz was called to confirm this. Rockebrandt was thus able to carry out his mission, although in a cell, by handing over things his things to Werz. Both von Lipka and Grawert had spent some time at van Rensburg's farm and the latter said that he was very sorry they had both wanted to go as he would have liked one to remain behind.

It was agreed that Kraizizek should meet Werz near the border and arrangements regarding the date and place were to be transmitted, to Lourenco Marques.

Kraizizek asked van Rensburg about Rooseboom, but he could add nothing new to what Kraizizek had already heard from Anderson and Sittig.

He repeated the threat of having Rooseboom killed in the near future because he was dangerous. Kraizizek then handed van Rensburg both the plans which Rooseboom had given him, instead of only one as had been arranged.

Van Rensburg then told him that he depended on railway officials from Durban and Cape Town, old O.B (Ossewa Brandwag) men mostly, for news of shipping movements. This had little value by the time it reached van Rensburg as it came by rail.

Kraizizek then raised the question of van Rensburg's visits to ~~General~~ Field Marshal Smuts, saying quite openly that people were talking about it. Van Rensburg did not deny it, but argued that his visits were of a strictly private nature as he had known the Field Marshal for a very long time, and added that his last visit had been over a month ago. Kraizizek told van Rensburg that he had heard he (van Rensburg) was regarded as a German Quisling (de (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vidkun_Quisling) (en (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vidkun_Quisling) in South Africa, and also told him that Rooseboom had been accused of playing traitor to him. Van Rensburg refused to admit anything about the broadcasts and only indirectly admitted that he had sent military information. This, he claimed, was more of a political than a military nature, which the Germans were to use in the Press and on the wireless. (AOB: Zeesen broadcast transmission: "Die Heimat Grüßt")

Van Rensburg then spoke of Leibrandt, who had been willing to work with him at first, but he had insulted his O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) officers, particularly Grobler of Bloemfontein. Leibrandt had threatened Grobler with a pistol because the latter refused to hand over the money Leibrandt had deposited with van Rensburg to a man named Erasmus, sent by Leibrandt to van Rensburg. According to Kraizizek, Leibrandt came to Bloemfontein to van Rensburg. According to Kraizizek, Leibrandt came to Bloemfontein with 10,000 American dollars which he had received from German. He deposited this money at Bloemfontein and later sent Erasmus to collect it, but met with a refusal. Erasmus was later killed.

When Kraizizek asked van Rensburg about the police Major du Fliessis with whom he was seen shortly before Leibrandt was denounced by the man, van Rensburg said he only saw him once during a "Braaivis Partie" and did not get good impression of him, because he went off with a bottle of whiskey.

Van Rensburg then told Kraizizek how difficult it was to obtain national unity and that he had appealed to the other party leader, Pirow, to come together on some understanding, but without success. All van Rensburg hoped was that Germany would win the war.

Talking of Masser, van Rensburg stressed the point that he had to thank him, van Rensburg, for saving his life, because if he had not ordered one of his officers, Banie Basson, to shoot Lotter, Masser would have been founded guilty of espionage. Basson, afterwards arrested by the police and imprisoned, later escaping, was never suspected of this murder, according to Kraizizek.

Major Müller had also called on van Rensburg concerning the general use of the O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) in South Africa, but this van Rensburg had refused. Otherwise, Müller had received all possible aid in his escape

Kraizizek mentioned to van Rensburg that Herbert Wild had told him that he would like to join the G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) as he was in the position to help Germany. Van Rensburg, speaking of the difficulties he experienced technically with the transmitter, as he could not get new parts and valves, said that he would be glad to get Wild's services. (Later Werz appointed Wild as an agent, but Wild, influenced by Rooseboom and Masser, and wishing to operate alone, refused to work with van Rensburg).

Van Rensburg then offered Kraizizek money, but Kraizizek refused; accepting nothing from him but the parcel containing the (Leica film cassettes) films. Kraizizek cannot say how much money van Rensburg would have given him.

In the course of their long conversation, van Rensburg said that he did not generally approve escapes from, prison and interment camps, especially where Afrikanders were concerned. as they could not get out of the country and endangered the lives of other people. He had sent an order to the interment camps strictly forbidding attempts to escape. Asked how van Rensburg was able to send this order to the camps, Kraizizek said that anyone was allowed to write to the Commandant and were many O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) men employed in the administration offices and amongst the guards.

Concerning sabotage, van Rensburg said it was childish to do anything at the moment as it would just result in breaking up the whole O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag). It was however, very difficult to reason with the younger and more lively elements of the O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) and he had therefore given an order now and then to have some telephone wires cut or a bomb thrown, causing only a small amount of damage.

April 20th On the 20th April, van Rensburg, his wife, Anderson, Sittig and Kraizizek celebrated Hitler's birthday, drinking champagne and listening to some recorded speeches of Hitler; later they drank a toast to Hitler in which van Rensburg wished Hitler a long life and German victory.

Anderson and Kraizizek left the following day (21 April) after the films arrived. For reasons unknown to Kraizizek, he had to send another (22 April) night in Pretoria with some people whose names he cannot give afterwards keaving with Anderson in van Rensburg's car for Natal.

April 23rd. On the 23rd, they arrived at Pienaar's place. Pienaar was one of van Rensburg's most trusted men and had concealed other agents including Lipka and von Grawert (both men Rommel's DAK men) in his mountain farm 60 miles to the ( May 7th) north. It was at this farm that Kraizizek remained until 7th May.

On 7th May, Pienaar drove Kraizizek to another place a few hours away by car. This farm named "Scheepersaneck" and belonged to a man named Steencamp. This place seemed to be an outpost of the O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag)and Steencamp had strict orders from van Rensburg not to help anyone near the border without receiving permission direct from him. Here Kraizizek heard Jerling had tried to persuade Steencamp to smuggle Kraizizek over the border, but Steencamp refused.

Steencamp told Kraizizek how he had brought the two officers, Major von Lipka and Leutnant von Grawert, to the border instructed them to await nightfall and then move on on. The two officers apparently afraid of wild animals, especially elephants, either get caught during the day or lost, because they never turned up in Lourenco Marques. Later Kraizizek heard unconfirmed rumour that they were caught by the (Portuguese) police.

On 12 th May, Kraizizek again moved to another nearby farm belonging to a Bill Mayer was a Volksdeutscher and not a member of the O.B. This was the first time Mayer had had anyone hiding on his farm.

May 22nd Kraizizek remained on Mayer's farm until the 22 nd when he left with a certain Captain Oppermann near the Swaziland border. It was arranged that Kraizizek be taken by dio inspector to the border where Werz would be waiting. He went with Oppermann on 24th May to Swaziland to wait for this man. He did not turn up, they started walking towards the Ingwavuna River, went over to Lobobo Mountain at night, and crossed the Ingwavuana River, approaching the? border border at Nduau?. It was then obvious, according to Kraizizek that they had been denounced by the dip inspector, or some strange coincidence had taken place, because they saw native troops being moved about. They had to hurry back in order not to be trapped, and arrived on the Swaziland border while Kraizizek waited for him to come back by Farm which eventually did hours later. The car, driven by a person unknown to Kraizizek passed the border unchallenged. As Steencamp was still at Oppermann's farm, Kraizizek spent the night there and went back on the 26th to Mayer's farm.

As Steencamphad received orders to bring Kraizizek safely to the border, he had to think of a new scheme. Werz was informed that Kraizizek would come at a later date, but gave instructions that he was to get straight to Lourenco Marques as Werz could not met him again, his trip to the border having aroused the suspicion of the police.

Steencamp fixed the date of the next attempt at 10 June. For sentimental reasons, Kraizizek wanted to see Maria Wilz again and persuaded Mayer to drive him to Johannesburg. Before this could be arranged, however, they went to Wild's farm, arriving on the

5th June 5th June, where Kraizizek met Masser and Rooseboom. (← D2174 ↓↓↓↓↓ D2174return)

Masser told Kraizizek how he had become separated from him in the trap near to the camp and how he had walked for days round Christiana district, trying to contact the addresses he had received from the O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) in the camp, but they had all proved worthless. Masser dared not visit the farm near which they were trapped, but remembered Kraizizek having mentioned a cafe near the railway station in Taunge, where he could at least buy some food, and would not be given away. As the position regarding food was becoming desperate, →

1943: June 5th he walked from Fourteen Streams to Taungs, afterwards going in the direction of Clerksdorp, where he hid with a friend. Kraizizek thinks the man was named Winter and owned a garage. Masser later contacted Ludorf, Leibrandt's lawyer, to get hold of the Leibrandt dollars in his possession. In this, he got in touch with van Rensburg and asked for his help. This van Rensburg agreed to give, and Masser was moved to a farm in the bush field out of reach. Masser was very angry about this, claiming that it was done to prevent Kraizizek meeting him.

Kraizizek told Masser that he, Kraizizek, would have to go to Lourenco Marques on a mission before accompanying him. He told him that this mission was to take a packet of (Leica , and Masser urged him to show him these films, which Kraizizek did. They were Leica 35 mm film (cassettes) covered with code, and as Masser could make no sense of it (AOB: curious, as in another context it had been noticed that at least one film did not develop correctly, in Lourenco Marques), he (Masser) said he said he thought it foolish to risk so much to take such a trifle all that distance. As they ha dverious lines of communication, he argued that the film could be sent by air, but Kraizizek insisted that he must carry out his mission.

Rooseboom then joined in the conversation and asked Kraizizek if he were willing to take diamonds across the border for the use of the German Government as his friend Vermy, was willing to supply the Reich with a certain amount of stones and was content to wait until after the war for payment. Kraizizek merely agreed to bring this matter to Werz. Word was to be sent back by a relative of Boekersmaar (the pilot), who was shortly going to Lourenco Marques. Kraizizek and this man were to identify each other by the fact that each was in possession of half of a broken button.

Masser asked Kraizizek to present the following plan to Werz. Arguing from the point of view that van Rensburg was not trusted, Masser wanted to get permission from the Reich to operate a new transmitting service with Wild and possibly Rooseboom as agents. Kraizizek understood they had some connections available in Durban, Johannesburg and Solda Bay, in which places transmitters were to be operated. Kraizizek cannot give and details regarding the connections in these three places as Masser did not take him into his confidence regarding them. All he knows is that they were to use the the medium of newspaper advertisements, which were mostly inserted in the "Star"; the type of advertisements used were for iron; corrugated iron and tools of various measurements.

Wild offered to construct an automatic sender for short messages. They had everything worked out in detail about the technical aid of it, such as wavelength (AOB: short-wave propagation is an art of science, and necessitated knowledge and sound experience, as wave-propagation is a highly seasonable phenomenon; think of the angle at which the sunrays do illuminate the ionospheric layers in respect to the signal propagation path, such as between "South Africa and Berlin", regarding the D; E and F layers), code, etc., and Kraizizek was to hand in this over at Lourenco Marques. As he was not clear about the persons working the set, apart from Masse and Wild, and as he had the impression that they were holding something back, Kraizizek asked Masser if it would not be better if he presented the plan direct to Werz himself.

1943: June 5th Masser replied that he could not do this as he had to see van Rensburg on some urgent business and had to go to Cape Town later to see a man in connection with the service, whose name he did not dare to discuss to anyone.

Kraizizek states that the object of the advertisements was to send information of a more private nature to Werz and the system had been worked out by Masser, Wild and himself. He had a list of the advertisement used, but this was taken over by the Lourenco Marques police, being handed back to this later, when he gave it to Werz. Kraizizek states that he never used this system, nor did Masser, although he is not sure about Wild.

Kraizizek spent the 6the June with (his fiancé) Maria Wilz to whom he became engaged; he is most emphatic that she had nothing whatsoever to do with his intelligence activities. Masser had, in the meantime, found out that Mrs. Wilz was in possession of some dollars which she bought from Leibrandt and he urged her to give them to Kraizizek, Kraizizek at first refused to take them and she handed them to Masser, who made it clear to Kraizizek that he needed money when trying to reach Germany. Kraizizek had spent most of the £25 obtained against payment later in Germany, in the Internment Camp from a Fritz Ott, in buying clothes etc. for the trip and had given about £12 to the wives of the O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) farmers who had hidden him; as Masser pointed out that he would not receive much from the Consulate, he accepted $200.

June 7th. On 7th June, Kraizizek left Wild's farm to get back to Maier to the latter's farm. He had to wait until the 13th before he could leave again with Steencamp for Oppermann's farm where they spent the night. On the 14th they moved on to another farm nearby where Kraizizek was met by another dip inspector with whom he and Steencamp finally left by car. Kraizizek cannot remember the name of this inspector; he was not an O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) man, but was a dismissed policeman.

It was intended that Kraizizek should be taken quite close to the border, but the Pongola River was flooded and they could not go far by car. Kraizizek therefore had to find his way alone and got lost in the Kosi swamps, but found his way again and continued his journey by night, hiding during the day.

June 19th. Kraizizek crossed the Portuguese border? near Manhoca on the night of 19th June, arriving in Lourenco Marques on 21 June, where he was arrested by the police.

1943: June 21st His pistol; given to him by Joubert, as well as all his identification papers and code papers, were taken from him. He managed to conceal the films which were sewn inside his trousers, and later handed them over to Werz.

Kraizizek was questioned about his route by a man named Scortia (he later disappeared to South Africa) to whom he gave false information about the code, telling him it concerned German internees, and dealt with matters wee purely personal and of rather a compromising nature. After spending a night in a cell, he was released and all his possessions except the pistol, were returned to him.

Kraizizek states that he discovered that Scortia was a member of the Portuguese Secret Police and was in disfavour with a certain Captain Henriques. He had to leave for South Africa because he was Anglophile.

June 22nd. On the 22nd June, Kraizizek met Werz for the first time and handed the films to him. Werz seemed disappointed that he did not bring more from South Africa, but said that the film was of value to him. He reprimanded Kraizizek for not having turned up at the time arranged, at the border, and said how difficult it was to get there by car; also he had spent the whole night there.

Werz was not interested in Rooseboom, whom he did not like, and merely confirmed that he had been an agent whom he had dismissed. He could, Werz said, have been a valuable information if he had wished.

The news of Masser's radio proposals were not received very enthusiastically, especially in view of the fact that the police had been in possession of the plans. On Kraizizek stating that they were in code, Werz showed some scepticism as to their safety. Kraizizek then offered to make the trip again to South Africa with new plans. This idea was not followed us as Kraizizek had to make the trip to Angola with Masser.

Kraizizek then explained to Werz the advantages of the plan, with these sets transmitting information, especially shipping movements, and said that he would, apart from that, receive all political news he wanted and could thus form his own opinion instead of receiving only the censored new from van Rensburg. He told Werz the opinions of the Afrikanders who did not like the German propaganda since it merely reported on the O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) and van Rensburg activities, and since van Rensburg was considered a German Quisling, they did not wish to be rid of the British just to become another 'Gau' of the Germans with van Rensburg as Gauleiter. (Kraizizek later reported this to Berlin).

1943: June 22nd. Meeting with Werz that he need not to drop van Rensburg entirely out could get all the necessary information from other source. He also told Werz that he had heard from van Rensburg and Anderson, but Werz laughed and said that Kraizizek had been bluffed. Werz did add, however, that he would consider it but it was impossible at the moment because Kraizizek was not going back to South Africa as Werz had just sent a man from the Consulate over. Werz enquired if Kraizizek had met him at van Rensburg's farm. This man was Nils Paasche, but Kraizizek had never heard of him before.

Werz was aware of the difficulties van Rensburg had with the transmitter and accepted Wild at once, giving an order to the effect to van Rensburg, Wild, however, as stated above, did not want to work with van Rensburg.

Kraizizek reported to Werz, Masser's anxiety about the documents he had been ordered to take from the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques to the German Legation in Lisbon (AOB: think of the KOP = K.O. Portugal) Masser had got as far as Cape Town when he was detected, but he managed to stowaway aboard a Portuguese steamer with the help of the Germans. Werz replied that the document reached the German Legation in Lisbon safely.

Their further conversation consisted of political matters, and Kraizizek tried to make Werz understand that he was making a mistake in backing van Rensburg and thus hampering unification of the South African nationalists. He said he considered it would be better merely to conduct national propaganda as far as Germany was concerned, and leave it to the Afrikanders to choose their leader. Werz replied that van Rensburg had been chosen by the Reich, which personally Kraizizek doubted, as he had heard through the Consul-General Trompke, that Werz, as Vice-Consul, had an absolutely free hand as far as Africa was concerned.

Kraizizek remained in Lourenco Marques from June 21st until 10th October 1944 (AOB: when almost all Germans diplomatic personnel (AOB: guaranteed with a British 'safe passage') had been forced to board the Portuguese steamer Quanza heading for Lisbon) He lived (in Lourenco Marques) at Frau Derfuss' house in the Rua Bartolomea Diaz.

At first, he assisted Leidenberg with the sporing and social activities of the German community, and for this was paid £13 a month, free board and medical treatment included. From February 1944 until October 1944m he worked in the Press Bureau under Kolb. His work consisted of typing the pamphlets and monthly supplements to the Military Summary, obtained from Tiele-Winkler, and a political report from Kolb on world affairs. This work took Kraizizek about four hours a day, and he was paid £25 a month free board and medical treatment included. He took over this work from Jutta von Erdmannsdorf, and protested to Trompke about this comparatively unimportance; he tried to get a better job, but was given no change of employment.

Kraizizek maintains that this was the only work he was engaged in during his stay in Lourenco Marques, and that his entire time was spent in the routine manner briefly outlined above.

On receiving a message from Boekersmaar's uncle to go to Lournco Marques, Masser set out, being supplied by Mayer with a native boy from Portuguese East Africa to assist him in crossing the border, as he was carrying papers with him concerning code, and also Vermy's diamonds which he handed to Werz on his arrival. He was armed with two heavy pistols, and was driven by Mayer into Swaziland to the farm of another German, von Wesselen (? spelling). From there he he set out on foot, crossed the Usutu River, went over the Lembobo Mountains, and walked to Goba. Here he spent the night in a hotel belonging to a Jewess who appeared suspicious of him. In the morning, he left the pistols and some other things in the hotel telling the proprietress that he would call for them later or send someone to collect them. He was driven tto Lourenco Marques by car, and went first to the German Consulate. He met Kolb, who took him to the place where Kraizizek was boarding - a house belonging to the German, Liesel Dettingen, who also used the name Frau Derfuss. As there was no room vacant, Kraizizek offered to share his with Masser.

Masser had already had his luggage examined and the code papers and the diamonds had not been detected.

Plot to blow up the Italian liner "Jerusalem". (AOB: In Autumn 1943, Italy changed sides over to the Allies and were at war now with the Germans)

In the evening, when Masser opened his suitcase, he found a slip of paper with a confusing text, some of which Kraizizek remembers to be: "Jesus Lui, Camp Cons, Dyn, and part of his own surname". Masser assured Kraizizek he knew nothing of this, and had the paper sent to Werz, who at once made sense of it, explaining it as follows: - "Jesus meant the Italian liner 'Jerusalem" which had been confiscated by the Portuguese authorities' Lui was the abbreviation of his Christian name Luitpold; "Camp probably meant Campinim the Italian Consul; Dyn, dynamite. The complete sense of the message was to blow up the Italian liner "Jerusalem".

Masser was of the opinion that Werz had contrived, with the help of Kolb, to put this slip of paper in the suitcase, but Kraizizek never understood why Werz should have done so. The next day, the house was searched by the police, and again later, the police appeared and seemed to be looking for something, but Kraizizek can throw no light on what this might have been.

(AOB: being now engaged, for a decade on daily basis: in historical research, particularly in respect to the contents of the KV 2/xxxx serials - we should not exclude a British implication. Why? The British did everything possible, to bring the Germans in discredit, and "such a finding" would have been a "dream" discovery (they did so always - by means of friendly police officers). They acted also in Portugal, but ultimately - were there not successful; but Britain gained a success, but had to wait more than a year to come before they forced the Portuguese Authorities, at least in Portuguese East Africa (as well in Turkey), to expel the German official representation (on board the s.s. Quanza, omitting landing at Cape Town due to - the danger that the South Africans would discover what had been initiated illegally by British Services in South Africa). However, a sound indication is the fact - that the police apparently were searching for something "to be expected" in an initiated 'set-up') AOB: This document is following the Camp 020 interrogations. They would hardly dare to acknowledge the true circumstances!

Having learned that he could not be repatriated, Masser spoke to Werz and Trompke about the transmission proposals, but the outcome of their talk was rather negative.

Masser kept up his connections with his friends in South Africa through a Mrs. Meredith, who was English by birth and had no German relations, The first time Kraizizek saw Mrs. Meredith was in the middle of 1943. He was invited to dinner by a German named Starke who was employed on one of the Lourenco Marques new papers.

The upper floor of this man's house was let to Walter Galle of the German Consulate. At about 9 in the evening, this Mrs. Meredith called to speak to Galle. She handed Galle a message from Masser, and Kraizizek later learned from Galle, that she had already been at the Consulate to try to get in touch with Galle who often did night duty there. (Someone always had to be on duty at the Consulate while the Secretary Jericho, who lived there, was away). What this message contained, Kraizizek does not know.

Later, in September (1943) Masser asked Kraizizek to accompany him to the Club Hotel in Lourenco Marques where he again met Mrs. Meredith. A Frau von Plessen, who at that time boarded in the Club Hotel, was induced to act as intermediary to Mr. Meredith. Mrs was then asked by Masser to come to the residence of a Frau Bidder, the mother of Jutta von Erdmannsdorf and the divorced wife of the Ambassador von Erdmannsdorf.

Masser worked out some message for South Africa, addressed, Kraizizek thinks, to Wild. Mrs. Meredith spent some two hours in the house and then left by taxi with the messages, Masser giving her a sum of money for the expenses of the journey. Kraizizek does not know whether Masser ever met her again.

In order to get pistols again, Masser induced Liesel Dettingen to go to Goba by taxi to fetch left at the hotel there. She managed to get hold of the parcel but had to throw it away as the police were suspicious of her. At a later date, however, Masser ?duced a taxi driver, a Portuguese, to fetch the parcel. This man, whose name Kraizizek has forgotten had his taxi-stand fro March until te end of 1943, at the Hotel Cardoso.

He deposited the pistols later with Frau Bidder who, after the police had searched her house as well, handed them to the Consul-General (Trompke). Kraizizek played some part in this as he feared that Masser would one day be careless regarding these pistols and would cause harm to the Germans in the Colony.

Kraizizek, along Werz, Kolb, Arco, von Sinneberg, Müller and von Mutius, were deported from Lourenco Marques on 11th October 1944

Nov. 10th and arrived in Lisbon on 1oth November 1944. (AOB: by the Portuguese s.s. Quanza). Werz was permitted to continue on to Germany, The others were interned (in theory rather than in fact, since all the above mentioned spent most of their time in Lisbon) in Curia. Kraizizek made various contacts here (see below) before leaving for Barcelona on or about 16th February 1945, accompanied by von Zinneberg, von Mutius and Masser - the last named arriving in Lisbon at the end of January (1945) with Frehse.

Whilst in Lisbon, Kraizizek was approached by a Dutchman who said he was a British agent. Kraizizek claims he refused to discuss anything with the man. (AOB: Kraizizek had already been approached when the s.s. Quanza was waiting at Gibraltar (Nov. 1944), though, he also refused to talk).

KV 2/939-2, page 24u (AOB: This page might be of value for future historians; I therefore have it implemented as well)

Wolf: General-Major Headed as head in Buenos Aires until medio 1944. (KV 2/1487 ... KV 2/1490; PF 66891)

Glock Gustav: Believed by Kraizizek to be chief agent in Portugal of the G.I.S. (AOB: more likely: K.O. Portugal at the end of the war)

Nassenstein Adolf: Chief of S.D. in Portugal and SS Sturmbannführer (made frequent visits to Spain) (KV 2/1326; PF 307090)

Gaiger Hans: German Consul. received information from a Dr. Oehmen of Cape Town re van Rensburg and Ossewa Brandwag

Reaching now the new era in Nazi Germany, towards the end of hostilities in Western Europe.

Kraizizek, with Masser and von Mutius, arrived in Berlin (AOB: there still existed an airline (Lufthansa) connection with the Iberian Peninsula). on 5th March 1945, Kraizizek going to his home in Berlin-Adlershof. Here, through Heitmann and Brinkmann (two men whom Kraizizek knew in the internment camp in Andalusia (South Africa, or in Spain?), repatriated in August 1944) Kraizizek met Bohle Gauleiter and Chief of the Auslandsorganisation. (AOB: quite curious, it belonged genuinely to the O.K.W. Amt A.O.; what happened after the merger with R.S.H.A. Amt VI - I don't know (Springtime 1944).) Kraizizek gave Bohle details of his activities in South Africa, and asked to be sent on active service. Bohle said he would get Kraizizek into the best fighting unit - Sonder-Einsatz Abteilung of the Jadverband Nordwest of Skorzeny (Amt VI-S) (KV 2/403; PF 600544). He spoke of the liberation of Mussolini de (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Skorzeny) en (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Skorzeny) and blowing up of the Nijmegen bridgehead and convinced Kraizizek that he would meet the 'best of the German youth'. He warned Kraizizek against possible attempts by the Army and S.D. to obtain his, Kraizizek's services, and said he (Bohle) would arrange a meeting between Kraizizek and Skorzeny.

March (1945) 20th On about 20th March, Kraizizek received a letter of instruction from Bohle to Skorzeny. This meeting, after some hitches, was affected about the end of of Mrch in the Adlon Hotel (five Star Hotel; near to the Brandenburger Tor), Berlin. Present were also Hauptsturmführer Radl (Skorzeny's Adjutant) and another SS man (name unknown).

Skorzeny said he had in mind a French venture for Kraizizek, but this was off as Kraizizek did not speak French. Skorzeny mentioned his intension to kill General Eisenhower and his staff, against whom he inveighed with considerable bitterness because of bomb damage done to Berlin. The whole conversation did not last more than half an hour and Skorzeny appeared rather vague and disinterested. He dismissed Kraizizek with a comment to the effect that he would let him know when he was wanted.

1945 April 9th On 9th April Kraizizek received instructions from Skorzeny via Standartenführer Strauss to report to Neustrelitz, where Kraizizek met two other ex-internees from the Andaluisa Interment Camp - Werner Lodes and Franz Roosemann. These two men, who had been repatriated in August 1944, on the understanding that they would not participates in the war (AOB: this was a common condition, also from South American Germans whom went via the US, were exchanged under similar conditions. This arrangement was fully accepted and kept by the Germans. Albeit, that when people themselves enter Secret Services the matter was not preliminary interviewed for) appeared in the Jagdverband under the aliases Sturm and Hoffmann respectively. Both Lodes and Roosemann claimed that they had been told to prepare for a mission in Portugal in connection with the sabotage of Allied vessels, but this venture had fallen through. Kraizizek disbelieved their claims that they undertaken to do this work, they would have carried it out, believing that they would have found this an exdust? to return to their families in South West Africa. (AOB: this would have caused a direct expelling of all Germans being in Portugal!)

Kraizizek received a Soldbuch made out on his own name in Neustrelitz from the Adjutant (an Untersturmführer name unknown) in the SS Barracks, and met Hartstang, a N.C.O. (= Uffz.) who was to be in charge of the group. Kraizizek believes that this group was to have carried out the attempt to assassinate General Eisenhower, but claims that this was only hearsay, although he was to have taken part in it. (Later, when Kraizizek was interned by the Americans, he met a men named Wagner →

who confirmed that an attempt to murder General Eisenhower was to have been made.) Hartstang demanded a transmitter, dynamite, car and g??s from the Adjutant as part of his equipment. His group was to consist of about ten men, amongst them Roosemann (rank unknown), Preuz, a Swiss with the rank of Feldwebel (AOB: the highest in charge among N.C.O. = Uffz.) from the Luftwaffe, a German named John Smith @ Messerschmidt (a Warrant Officer in the German Navy, who had spent a considerable time in England before the war) and Kraizizek.

Neustrelitz is about half-way Berlin and Rostock, not to far from the now Polish border

Arrangements were made for the above to go to Berlin to see the Chief (a SS Hauptsturmführer (= Hptm = Captain) who was attached to Schellenberg's office (Amt VI) , after which they returned to Neustrelitz. The same day, Kraizizek received orders to report at Nordhausen (AOB: the place where V2s had been assembled, by mostly Jewish prisoners; it was located on the North side of the Harz area), where a new plan was to be drawn up (nature unknown to Kraizizek) of which Smith was to take charge. Smith then left for Nordhausen giving instructions for Kraizizek. ?? Roosemann to follow, but to report first to Hauptsturmführer (= Hptm. / Captain) in order to obtain papers first to Hauptsturmführer ?? in order to obtain papers in false names. Of this second group, Kraizizek can only remember the names of the following:-

April 14th Roosemann and Kraizizek went to see Radl (Skorzeny's Adjutant). Hartsang left by car with three men, whilst Preuz want on alone. Before leaving, Hartsang told them to report at a certain house in Nordhausen, giving them a plan of its position.

The location of Nordhausen is clearly visible, it was situated on the North part of the Harz

Kraizizek claims that he does not remember the address, but states that when John Smith was interrogated by the Americans he gave it to them. Whilst visiting Radl, Kraizizek found out that with three exceptions, all had fled from the Auslandsorganisation (Bohlen's A.O.) to Komotau in Sudetenland (now Czech territtory) . Radl gave Roosemann and Kraizizek RM 100 each, and wrote out on paper stating that they had a secret "Reichsmission" (geheimer Reichsauftrag?) by order of (R.S.H.A.) Amt VI. Radl also gave Pipansky an identification paper made out in the name of Willi Geyer which stated that Geyer was a repatriated German from American whose passport had been lost in a fire. (AOB: Rudolf Staritz told me - that it was utmost essentially 'life saving' always to possess sufficient stamped documents, because when caught by the GFP (Geheime Feldpolizei) or simply an SS patrol, without relevant papers, someone's instant execution such as hanging up on the most nearby tree ('Heldenklau') was imminent!)

Roosemann, Kraizizek and Pipansky who had apprised each other of their intentions to desert, decided to visit an old friend of Roosemann's - Major Hoehne - who had estate in Dresden.

The three thereupon went to Dresden. Due to an unimportant incident when their papers (which stated that they were to report to Norhausen) were scrutinised by the Gestapo, Kraizizek decided to take immediate action as he was afraid lost he be seized as a deserter (and likely instantly be executed). He therefore went to the Gestapo to find out the position of the American lines. As the Gestapo could give him no help, he went to the Chief of the S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst, a section of R.S.H.A. Amt III) in Dresden, Sturmbannführer (Major) Schulz, from whom he managed to obtain papers for Roosemann, Pipansky and himself for Dresden, Leipzig and Chemnitz.

Kraizizek called on Mutmann, Gauleiter with his H.Q. in Dresden, and obtained a lift in a car with the latter's Adjutant, Vogelsang, in the direction of Chemnitz where he hoped to give himself up to the Americans. Kraizizek spent the night in Floeha (Flöha) near Chemnitz →

→ and, hearing that the Russians had broken through, decided to return to Dresden to help a woman named Frau Donath (staying with Frau Hoehne) whom he had succeeded in making his mistress during his short period there, and her two children. This he managed to do, and went on from Dresden, where he saw Pipansky and Roosemann for the last time, to Ober-Schlema near Hue/Erzgebirge.

May 1st (?) The next day, (?) 1st May, Kraizizek went to surrender himself to the Americans but was unable to do so as the American guard had orders not to allow anyone to pass. Kraizizek therefore went to the Kur Hotel where some of the civilians learned of his attempts to surrender. Shortly afterwards, the Mayor (Bürgemeister) of Aue arrived and asked Kraizizek to take him to the Americans so that he could surrender the town. This was effected, and the town surrendered to a Major Fayhey (? spelling). To this officer, Kraizizek handed over all his papers, spoke of his connections with Skorzeny, and the attempt he believed was made on General Eisenhower's life. Kraizizek, who claims he wished to make up for the cowardly behaviour of his countrymen, represented himself as an old member of the Nazi Party and took the rank of Sturmbannführer (Major) on his own initiative.

September 1939/ March 1943: .. £2. 2. -. per month from a Friend Newspaper Ltd.

June 1943: £40. -. -. From the German Consulate, Lourenco Marques (Portuguese East Africa)

February 1944 October 1944 £40.-. -. Salary and expenses for voyage to Portugal , from German Consulate, Lourenco Marques.

December 1944: £10. -. -. From Regierungsrat Dr. Schroeder (Gestapo ?? - Christmas present.

January - February 1945: £50. -. -. Leidenberg, Lourenco Marques (brought present for Frau Leidenbergm his mother and Jutta von Erdmannsdorf

Febr. 16 March 4 1945: approx. 3 d?? per day private allowance from German Consulate General Barcelona

End February 1945: £5. -. -. Present from Gustav Glock via Lessing (Consulate Barcelona).

(AOB: it is almost certain - that Kraizizek received in most cases money in another currency than British Pounds, but they (Camp 020 interrogators) converted it, for British minds, in the equivalence of British pounds)

This disillusioned-in-defeat and shabby ex-Nazi thug (criminal) is a man of mediocre intelligence and confused ideals. (AOB: how do we judge this, say 80 years, thereafter? We have, therefore to digest such kinds of documents with suspicion, as opinions often were formulated without having had - time and room - to take distance and knowing circumstances more soundly). He has shown himself throughout as willing to divulge all he knows, though in his sycophantic efforts to please, he has often blended truth with imagination, and made statements which he calculated we were anxious to obtain. Due to this desire to please, Kraizizek, who is nearly a pathological case, has caused? possibly not wittingly, considered confusion during first interrogation and has got himself hopelessly muddled when connecting dates with events.

He cannot be shaken on his Werewolf activities, which it appears were of a negative character and as short of duration as he would have us believe. It is probable, and confirmation has been possible on many of his statements from Masser and Werz, that he has in the main told the ??truth?

Masser was born in Kottbus (Cottbus?), Silesia, in 1913. Having matriculated (AOB: for the British readers - he obtained his A-Level and could study everything he favoured at any University in Germany and likely beyond), he entered the German Army in the signal Corps, where he took several courses in intelligence work. After satisfying the authorities as to his ability, he was given the rank of a Leutnant and went with other German officers to Abyssinia as a member of the so-called "Swedish Military Mission" in (?) 1935. Following Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, Masser was ordered to leave Addis Ababa and reported back to Germany. He considered, however, that his duty lay in carrying on his work of instructing the natives, and refused to leave, Later he returned to Germany,

At the beginning of 1937 he was given a mission to go to (?) England where he spent six months, but disagreeing with his superior officer, he sought and obtained release from ?? Army and was allowed to go to South Africa.

On the outbreak of war he hid, and following an abortive attempt to escape by means of a stolen aeroplane, be gave himself uo to the police. He was interned in Leewkop Camp, where following? an attempt to escape in 1940m he was transferred to Baviaansport? Camp. Kraizizek believes that it was from this camp that Masser attempted to smuggle a lengthy message in book form written in invisible ink to Werz in Lourenco Marques., with the help of a German named Hennig, and a Portuguese railway worker named Pa Crux. The 'book' contained, amongst other things, information on the interned affairs of the camp and an accusation against Johanna? Schu???macher?? to the effect that she was a British agent. It was, however, detected on the way to Lourenco Marques and Masser was put in prison, the general belief being that he would be tried for espionage. Pa Crux was also imprisoned, but later released. When Masser had been nine months in prison, the main witness against him , a German named Lotter was shot. The case against him was dropped, and he was returned to Baviaansport Camp.

Trompke and Werz later told Kraizizek that through this incident the German Consulate in Lourenco Marques was nearly ?qsd?? incident by the Portuguese authorities. They managed to avoid this by pointing out that any "agent provocateur" (= the British agent in the Baviaansport Camp) could produce such evidence in order to get the Consulate closed; (AOB: A British long lasting frustration - which paid off in October 1944, but the "Free passage" for all Germans onboard s.s. Quanza brought no-one to defect to the British side, when met at Gibraltar, before landing at Lisbon), and claimed they could hardly help it if a fool like Masser wrote such nonsense.

Later Masser ?onoged to escape to Lourenco Marques. Werz then sent him on a mission to Lisbon, where he was to deliver some documents (nature unknown to the German Consul. He was smuggled on board a Portuguese vessel, helped by a Portuguese named 'Noguaire (?spelling) some days some days before before it was due to sail?. It was also arranged that Masser's fiancé, a girl named Alice Winiger, a nursing sister, should leave with him en route for Germany; but this was not found possible and the girl left some months later.

Details of ? what an example of poor typewriters employed on the British side. (AOB: I strongly doubt - that transcription is really possible)

Masser had in the meantime met Wild, Rooseboom, Mrs Wilz and Maria Wilz (Kraizizek's later fiancé). He did not see van Rensburg again.

Kraizizek met him by chance at Wild's farm in June (1943) whilst returning from Natal after paying a visit to (his fiancé) Maria Wilz. Masser then gave Kraizizek a new transmitting plan which Kraizizek was to hand over to Werz. Masser had further worked out a code to keep in touch through the medium of newspaper advertisements appearing in the Johannesburg "Star" and the "Rand Daily Mail". It was further arranged to send a message with the uncle of a Dutch pilot, Boekersmaar, who was to spend his honeymoon in Lourenco Marques.

Kraizizek left Masser on 7th June (1943). Masser in the meantime spent most of his time at Mayer's farm and spent one of two days at the Wilz's and Joubert's.

On arrival in Lisbon (AOB: when in 1943 or 1944?), Masser was interrogated by the Police Attaché to the German Legation there, mainly about South Africa and Portuguese East Africa. Masser wrote reports accusing high German Army officials of plotting against Hitler and Nazi Germany.

When Kraizizek met Masser in Germany at the beginning of April 1945, he was about to become an officer in the S.D. (AOB: Sicherheitsdienst a police-like entity of Amt III and IV) He lodged with a SS Sturmbannfüher (Major) in Berlin. This was the last time Kraizizek saw Masser.

Kraizizek met Rooseboom on the 28th or 29th March 1943, Rooseboom introduced himself as a member of the G.I.S. (German Intelligence Service) and named two Abwehr officials, Glass (Glas?) and Bielefeld, whom he wished Kraizizek to see on his behalf, should Kraizizek go to Germany, in order to explain the difficulties Rooseboom had met with. Rooseboom neither gave details of the nature of the news he had to transmit, nor the sums of money received from the G.I.S. Kraizizek believes Rooseboom started transmitting almost immediately he escaped from the internment camp in 1940. (AOB: All did possess rudimentary understanding of transmissions and schedules of propagation between South Africa and central Europe)

Rooseboom was extremely friendly with van Rensburg and made several holiday trips with him and his family. Rooseboom knew van Rensburg long before the war when he, Rooseboom, was a (shorthand) typist in the South African Parliament.

Rooseboom had many quarrels with van Rensburg over the character of the news sent out and accused van Rensburg of holding back → information, particularly shipping news.

information, particularly shipping news. With the arrival of Sittig, Rooseboom was dismissed and wrote down a defence of his activities in South Africa since his arrival (1940). Van Rensburg was aware of this document, which seriously implicated him; and wished to get hold of it as he was afraid it might fall into the hands of the South African police. Rooseboom told Kraizizek of the fears he had for his life and that van Rensburg had threatened him.

Rooseboom, feeling himself responsible to Glass (Glas?) and Bielefeld then started work again with de Villiers, also discharged by van Rensburg. In their new transmitting undertaken, Rooseboom received financial support from Marknsey, Vermy and Jerling - the last named was anxious to get a position similar to van Rensburg's.

Rooseboom told Kraizizek that he knew Doenitz long before the war, also having visited Doenitz when the latter paid ?? to Cape Town with his ships. Doenitz held the rank of Captain at the time (AOB: do we speak before Hitler came to power? By the way: the Kriegsmarine officer ranking is quite confusing as it uses two ranking combinations; such as: Fregatten-Kapitän or Kapitän zur See ... ) After the Polish Campaign (September 1939), he again met Doenitz following the decision to send Rooseboom to South Africa. He received orders from Doenitz to report on shipping movements in South African waters and port defences. Rooseboom could not tell Kraizizek how he was supposed to transmit the information he obtained to Doenitz, Kraizizek considered the whole scheme so fantastic that he did not believe it, and considers that, since Rooseboom never mentioned his Doenitz Mission whilst working for van Rensburg, the mission never existed.

According to Kraizizek, Rooseboom based his accusations against van Rensburg on the following evidence:-

(ii) Nearly all the sabotage carried out in South Africa was done by O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag) men, yet van Rensburg, who was in some cases given away in Court by some of his own men, was never arrested.

(iii) During the Leibrandt (https://www.cdvandt.org/robey-leibrandt-(sa).htm) round-up, the B.J. (Storm Jaers) was liquidated and most of the leaders were interned yet van Rensburg, the chief of the S.J., was allowed to carry on his activities.

(iv) All those connected with Leibrandt and sent to South Africa or brought by submarine (AOB: no-one was ever brought-in!), were arrested by the Police. Leibrandt had visited van Rensburg spoke to Kraizizek in connection with this, saying that the Chief of the C.I.D. (?) had questioned him concerning his victims, but he managed to satisfy the Police, He was quite pleased that he had not been summoned to the Police, but questioned on his farm.

(v) A former General of the O.B. (Ossewa Brandwag), Johannes van der Walt, was mortally wounded by the Police whilst attempting to evade arrest. Before dying he issued an affidavit (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affidavit) accusing van Rensburg of being a traitor.

(vi) Everyone in South Africa knew of the transmitting net on van Rensburg's farm (AOB: by the British Major Ryde especially sent over to pinpoint these transmitter but apparently in vain, albeit all the efforts put in. However not all transmitters used all the time van Rensburg's farm), yet van Rensburg was never arrested. (AOB: he actually was, but survived all the nuisance)

Felix (the cover-name of Sittig's W/T station) reported on 15th March that he had information that the secret Police, stay strong, were looking for the wireless station in an easterly direction. He added that failure was guaranteed. He stated that in his experience, one occasional long transmission was much less dangerous then frequent short ones, and that therefore transmission would be made by wireless on Mondays only, and if necessary on Wednesdays as well, but not on Fridays. Felix's own transmission would be made as possible on Fridays only, if possible on Wednesday, but no longer on Mondays. B.J. (Blue Jacket secret folder) 129472 No. R 141 of 15.3.44)

On 23.3.44 Felix informed Berlin in a message dated 12.4.44 that "our opponents" had discovered that Friday was the transmission day but did not know about the other days. In these circumstances Felix stated that the procedure given in the previous message should be reversed so that Berlin would transmit principally on Fridays, and Felix on Mondays. "Our opponents" had out (cut?) the ground wave and believed they would get Felix shortly (they were already hoping for more then a year in vain). Felix guaranteed, however, that they would not do so for a long while. If it should become necessary to close down for a short while, they would come back again. Felix personal was continually on the move, always prepared and quite beyond praise. He added that "our opponents" had wrongly assumed that the call sign was PAJ(?). He added that for his part his call sign had only used once during tests, and in order to mislead the enemy Felix asked Berlin to use his call sign on Friday for a few minutes, coupled with a limited number meaningless figure code groups. Felix also thought it was desirable that the day and time should be changed in future, and awaited suggestions. On Felix' side he he would try to change the wave (frequency). The message ended with the poignant and do occur "a Kingdom for a really modern set". He also asked whether the "business friend" (Lourenco Marques?) was still a?? to listen in daily at 9 o'clock. (B.J. 130441 No. R 143 of 24.3.44. R 146 of 7.4.44 and R 147 of 8.4.44) It is perhaps of interest here to give the recent history of Felix call signs. On 21.12.43 Berlin stated that the following call signs would be used with Felix. from Berlin CIR, from Felix WIM. (B.J, 126575 No. 293? of 21.12.43) At the beginning of February (1944) Felix stated that after the first of March the call sign would be altered to PAM. Felix added that he asked Berlin's opinion as to whether a variable schedule of call signs such as was in use "business friend" would also be satisfactory with them. (B.J. 128240 No. I 89 of 6.2.1944) To this Berlin replied that they suggested a change in call sign daily. (B.J. 128419 No. 15 of 15..2.44) To this Felix replied that as suggested he would change the call signs in future daily as follows - The middle letter was always to be the initial of the day of the week in English, before or after this was to come always one of the three letters NOT. The third letter of the group was to be chosen at random. (B.J. 129431 No. R 136 of 3.3.1944).

In reply to Felix's request that a spoof message should be sent, Berlin despatched on 28.4.1944, a spoof message of 48 groups with the call sign PAK do →

May I please ask you to digest the content yourself, as it is for me extremely exhausting: reading these fuzzy contents (lines) and transcribing it?

Since the short memorandum on Axis Espionage in the Union was compiled on 3.11.43 the situation was regards the actual German spies in the Union, namely Sittig and Paasche, has remained unchanged, but the question as to how the case is to be handled in order to produce a satisfactory liquidation of these agent must be somewhat modified.

Elferink, the German (nationality Dutch. KV 2/202; PF 65880) agent of longer standing than Sittig and Paasche, is under interrogation in this country (Camp 020) . but has so far been obstinately silent. It is still hoped that he will confess in time, but it is unpredictable when this will occur.

The scheme for the landing of sabotage and wireless equipment from a submarine, has now been put to Berlin in the hope of definite proposals. Sittig has specified a place for landing (AOB: there never landed a German submarine for supplying German espionage in South Africa. Why should they? as a submarine coming this far south must have been on his way to the far east, such as Penang or Singapore. But they (M.I.5. and that like) believed their own fairytales) ...

Major Ryde (AOB: factually failing during his commitments during the entire rest of the war), who is jointly our (M.I.5) and M.I.6. representative, has been in consultation with mr. Foreyth over the latest developments on Axis espionage in the South African Union , and the following tentative decisions have arrived at:-

(a) The agents should be left untouched and allowed to gather at the rendezvous and only be arrested when they have taken delivery of the equipment (which factually never occurred) It seems highly probable that Paasche will accompany Sittig to the rendezvous as, if Sittig is leaving, it seems unlikely that Paasche would be willing to leave the reception of the equipment in the hands of sub-agents.

(b) The (British) Navy will deal with the submarine in a suitable manner when the equipment has been delivered , and the agents caught red-handed. (AOB: all sweet dreams; and they weren't aware of it).

(c) Simultaneously there should be (1) the arrest (without legal jurisdiction) of Wild and all persons on his farm which should also be searched for W/T transmitters. (2) The search of any farms which may be pin-pointed by the D.F.ing vans which are shortly going out again, and the arrest of all the persons in such pin-pointed localities, (3) Special vigilances of all escape routes into Portuguese East Africa.

(b) The destruction of the submarine. (AOB: Do they really believe, that the Germans would spoil a submarine for supplying a transmitter to a South African group; which would have been "lunatic"?)

(c) The capture of one and possibly more of the secret W/T transmitter (worth a few thousand RM only). The watchers on the border might pick up any of the remnants of the cabal who attempt to escape to neutral territory.

It is suggested, therefore, that if approval is given to the above scheme which has been tentatively agreed upon by Major Ryde and Mr. Forsyth, that these two should work out the final details in cooperation with the Commander in Chief, South Atlantic, and Colonel de Villiers in charge of the Coastal Area. This is Mr. Forsyth's own wish.

If the submarine scheme proves abortive, we are thrown back on the mass raid a result of D.F.ing. It is, of course, possible that Elferink may break, and if any information of value regarding the whereabouts of Sittig and Paasche is produced. (AOB: in early 1947 they were still at large!), it will be communicated as it might lead to modifications of the plan suggested above.

Names (in full), Camp No. DIC file No., Date of Brth, Date of Escape, Camp from which escaped, nationality, names and addresses of relatives and associates in the Union, and latest information of their present whereabouts known or suspected.

Paasche. Nils, Olof (or Olaf) LK 203/39, L.583, 3.11.1913, 4.5.40 from Leeuwkop, Reich German, Aunt Mrs. F. Witting, P.O. Holmepark via Nylstroom, Waterberg District; in January 1940 a Mr. E. Tamsen, P.O. Box 20, Van Ryn, applied for a visit to this internee; Paasche has a sister in Switzerland; in December 1941 the Chief Control Officer stated that "his arrival at Lourenco Marques has been confirmed"...

Sittig, Lothar, B.5/42 B.645; born 2.4.1902: escaped from Baviaanspoort on 7.4.42; Reich German; mother Toni Sittig, Bernhardstr. 75 Dresden A.27, Germany; one F.W. Ward, 41 ?turdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg, applied for visiting permit on behalf of self and wife in Oct. 1939; interee? worked on farm Pelukskraal, O.F.S. (owner H.R. Sharp) with one Miss Duncan who is Feb. 1940 was at Marieling Mansions, West St. Durban, in May 1940; one A. Krebster, Box 8191, Johannesburg, applied for visiting permit for self and wife; on December 1941 internee reported in Lourenco Marques following his previous escape from Leeuwkop ...

Sittig, alias Felix, alias D is the most important of Trompke's agents in the Union, as not only is he in the possession of wireless transmitters, but also is in close contact with van Rensburg in particular and the Ossewa Brandwag in general.

Sittig is a German national was born at Frankfurt ? Germany, on 19.4.1902. On leaving Germany he went to Angola and Portuguese East Africa where he resided for a considerable period, and ultimately worked his way into the Union arriving at Port Elizabeth in October 1925, He obtained employment with a Mr. H.R. Sharp on the farm Gelukskraal in the Wolwekoek Police area. where he farmed for about seven years. Sharp sold the farm in 1938 and Sittig then decided to return to Germany giving the following reasons for his desire to return:-

1) That he had extensive knowledge of tropical countries, and in the events of Germany regaining her lost colonies, he would be able to fill a responsible position in the German Government.

2) For the purpose of visiting his mother, Frau Stoesel? Sittig of Münchenplatz No. 1, Dresden.

His proposed to Germany did not materialise, and he was employed by Mr. van der Walt Hartebeesfontein 98, Vereeniging, and his address was given as P.O. Box 83 Vereeniging Hartebeeste-Fontein, Mr. Vaalbank Dam.

On 4.5.1940 Sittig escaped from Leeuwkop with Paasche (see below). He was re-arrested on 13.1.1942 when crossing the border from Portuguese East Africa into the Union on the Komati river. It was reported from a fairly reliable source that Sittig, after his escape had been harboured by Mrs. B.K. Hening, Trickenham Avenue, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, who is presently the same as Bertha Hening, who was tried for high treason, but whose conviction was quashed on a technicality, and who was subsequently interned.

The Union Police suspected that Sittig's return to the Union was for some "ulterior purpose", which conclusion the details are given below appear to bear out.

Trompke stated that his contact with van Rensburg had been broken and it was because of this that he wished to send a messenger. He added that it would be advantageous if the messenger could again convey to van Rensburg a German offer of assistance. Van Rensburg had not yet stated this requirements as regards arms, but Trompke thought that Berlin could perhaps state his requirements as regards arms, but Trompke thought that Berlin could perhaps state approximately what arms could be delivered and where "on the strength of the experience gained during the (U-boat) landing (371 of 3.10.1941. Gerdi 0500) this presumably refers to the landing of Leibrandt)

(AOB: nonsense! This proves that the British whom prepared this document, ill remained believing that the Germans send submarines! Leibrandt was brought by the French/German sailing ship (20 m long only Leibrandt was landed by the Kyloe in a two month lasting sailing trip! (https://www.cdvandt.org/hans-karl-scharf.htm) and (https://www.cdvandt.org/robey-leibrandt-(sa).htm)

Following is a most interesting chapter, as we now get an inside vision about the actual messages exchanged with Trompke in Lourenco Marques and the beginning of the direct W/T traffic with 'Berlin'.

To this Berlin replied that the considered signal in the Greetings broadcast (Zeesen (transmitter location) shortwave broadcast "Die Heimat Grüßt") was not possible before Saturday (AOB: the reason could have been - that the programs were pre-recorded on tapes; a technique only maintained by the Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft or RRG), and in future place with names like Frankfurt (which was given as the Address of the notional persons mentioned in the Greetings broadcast) were understandable from security grounds, and also that the repetition of the Greetings messages was inexpedient as it was unusual and might arose suspicion. (90 of 8.5.42 Gerdi 0327)

Trompke replied that exact verbal repetition of the broadcast greetings including Frankfurt, was indispensable, but on the other hand, it was read slowly the repetition could be omitted altogether. (316 of 9.5.42. Gerti 0327)

Meanwhile Trompke had been obliging enough to give us Felix's real name in response to a request from Berlin, and an enquiry as to whether the wireless link mentioned above emanated from van Rensburg or other opposition groups. (94 of 11.5.42. B.J (Blue Jacket) 116117). Trompke replied (AOB: please bear in mind: all Trompke's communications went via the regular telegraph lines controlled by the Portuguese, thus not by W/T, and were apparently tapped by the British Services) that Felix's name was Lothar Sittig, and that the wireless link emanated from van Rensburg (KV 2/907: PF 66175). (326 of 13.5.42, B.J. 116117) (AOB: please remember: that Trompke was, as a Consul General, thus a diplomat, and as in most countries - diplomats abroad are employed by the Foreign Offices. This ministry is most often not directly related to the business of Secret Services. When communications had to take place, at least in Germany, the special offices had to maintain message transfer (by means of telex) between both Services)

Felix began transmission on 16.5.1942, but reception was unsuccessful as there was no operator on the set at the time. Trompke asked for another message to be sent to Felix in the Greetings from Home, (337 of 18.5.42 B.J. (Zeesen short- wave broadcast "Die Heimat Grüßt")

Regarding the transmission Trompke reported that it had been clearly heard on 30.5.42. His acknowledgement by other means had failed, so Trompke asked for it to be acknowledged by another Greeting on the next Saturday ("Die Heimat Grüßt"). (396 of 8.6.1942 Gerdi 0396)

Felix continued to report and these reports were re-transmitted (by means of Portuguese telegraph lines) from Lourenco Marques to Berlin. On 27.6.1942 he gave certain shipping information which has been checked and was not accurate. (466 of 27.6.1942 Gerdi 0168) Trompke asked for his information to be acknowledged by Berlin in the usual Greeting broadcast (shortwave transmitter Zeesen in the broadcast for personnel abroad "Die Heimat Grüßt"). (469 of 29.6.1942 Gerdi 0191) (AOB: where stood 'Gerdi' fore? Was this a running decoding number, or was it, maybe, related to the genuine Portuguese message serials?)

On the first of July (1942), Trompke again reported that Felix transmission every Saturday was good, whereas the station "probably connected with Hamlet" (= the Dutchman Elferink KV 2/202; PF 65880) had →

→ only been heard once when it was weak and unintelligible. (AOB: this is an apparent example - that they suffered from insufficient knowledge of seasonable wave propagation. Mainly being caused by the latitude of the sun. The wave length (frequency) schedule as well as the time schedule, had to be adapted for accordingly; predictable propagation was a special art of science)

Trompke was still suggesting that direct communication between Felix and Berlin (Seehaus) should be attempted. Felix stated that he was at his set every Sunday, Tuesday and Thursday at 23.15 hours, South African Time. (AOB: roughly Berlin was about due North of South Africa)

Trompke added that as Felix's messenger sent to Lourenco Marques had been captured recently in Swaziland (likely by someone crossing the Portuguese East African border) it was impossible to communicate in the Rose code to Felix, therefore the Mosse? (Morse) code would still have to be used to begin with. →

In modern days - Swaziland is known as eSwatini; for your orientation Maputo was named in the Portuguese days: Lourenco Marques

It is quite understandable that Swaziland was favoured as the border between South Africa and Portuguese East Africa, as it was more difficult to control.

(AOB: as my laptop is operating in Dutch language, Google translates Cape Town automatically in the Dutch language spelling Kaapstad; as the Dutch have named since the 17th century)

→ A transmitter which was sent by Felix via Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) to Beira was being put in order there, but that transmissions by, it from Lourenco Marques to Felix would have to be limited or renounced as the Portuguese Post Office Authorities had a D.Fing van. →

(AOB: in contrast to Lisbon Portugal, foreign diplomatic representations, such as in Portuguese East Africa, were not entitled to transmit themselves) (AOB: Werz noticed somewhere that the "telegram expenses" took a great deal of the Consulate's budget! The Germans, and likely other nations operated quite a powerful W/T service from their KOP offices annex to Rua Buenos Aires, in Lisbon)

→ (477 of 1.7.42 B.J. 116117) To this Berlin replied that they had attempted to contact Felix direct, but got no reply. They added that later on if contact was not successful by the small W/T sender, the main W/T transmitter would be used for transmission of telegrams to Felix. As no contact had been made, transmissions were presumably going to be blind. (145 of 14.7.1942. B.J. 115372)

This message crossed one from Trompke stating that he had no means of communicating with Felix direct (AOB: there did not existed telegraph communications between the South African Union and Portuguese East Africa) and he urgently requested Berlin to instruct Felix to prepare the way for a messenger to be sent from Lourenco Marques with the Rose code system or to arrange that it should be picked up in Lourenco Marques. He added that a fugitive from the (South African) Union presumably the messenger mentioned above, was captured just before reaching the frontier of Portuguese East Africa. (536 of 13.7.1942 Gerdi 0183)

Throughout the next two months a series of messages passed between Berlin and Felix through the intermediary of Trompke (The German Consul General) on transmission procedure. In this exchange of telegrams there were angry expostulations from Trompke who stated that, at the end of September and again on 3.11.1942 acknowledgements to Felix were made in plain language and as to avoid compromising the Rose code. (800 of 21.9.1942 B.J. 117697 and 985 of 4.12.1942 B.J. 116117)

Berlin paid no attention to Trompke's protests as on 5.11.1942 they again acknowledged Felix in plain language. Trompke again protested and added that the name he had with great carelessness been given over the wireless undisguised several times. He pointed out that this dangerously compromised his liaison with the (South African) Union and gave the enemy information, not only of his work in Lourenco Marques, but also of his secret agents in South Africa. (1000 of 6.11.1942 B.J. 116117) Berlin replied by stating that in their opinion open confirmations transmitted to Felix (via the Zeesen shortwave broadcasts) in a completely harmless form did not compromise the traffic. (266 of 7.11.1942 Gerdi 1200)

In November Felix told Trompke that occasionally reports could be sent in secret ink in letters externally recognisable as from natives as these were not censored, and gave as a cover address: - Chipohrle Maljate, Rua Princessa Patrica 25 (1034 of 16.11 1942 B.J. 116117) (This name has been put on the I.B. List, but no such letters have been intercepted.)

When Hamlet (= Dutch Dr. Elferink) arrived in Lourenco Marques in July 1942 he brought with him a missive from Felix which van Rensburg had given him encyphered in Felix's own code (AOB: using a commercial German business Morse code book) In this report Felix asked, inter alia whether Hamlet (= Dr. Elferink) was trustworthy, and whether the Rose code could be given to Hamlet for him. (558 of 19.7.1942 B.J. 117070) Trompke announced later that Hamlet (= Elferink) would take with in encyphered form their instructions to Felix (Sittig) and also the Rose code and deliver them to van Rensburg (AOB: Sittig operated mostly on the premises of the latter's farm) (658 of 14.8.1942 B.J. 117070) Hamlet ultimately left and, according to Trompke, apparently delivered the material entrusted to him to van Rensburg. (718 of 31.8.1942 B.J. 117070)

In the middle of August there was am abortive attempt by Berlin to obtain "Boort" i.e. diamond splinters, from the (South African), and Trompke suggested that Felix should be instructed direct using the Rose system with special reference to the quality desired. (178 of ??.8.1942 B.J. 119024)

In September we learned that the name Felix was only known to Trompke → and Berlin,

→ and Berlin, and that Felix himself used the cover-name "D" (749 of 7.9.1942 Gerdi 0036)

With regard to the squabbles over Rooseboom's retention and asked Trompke to instruct him that it had been decided that Rooseboom should restrict himself to military reports, principally echoerning? shipping, under strict (? supervision) of Felix. This message was to be sent if possible without the intermediary of Felix or Hamlet (the Dutch Dr. Elferink). The O.K.W. (AOB: the German military High Command) assumed that Rooseboom could transmit independently of Felix as collaboration between the two was not desired. Rooseboom was not to concern himself with internal political matters. (This presumably being left for Felix to do with his closer political contacts with van Rensburg) (234 of 5.19.1942 Gerdi 0035)

Apart from political and shipping information Felix occasionally sent industrial items as for example in October (1942) when he gave a formula for the making of plates for ships, (911 of 17.10.1942 B.J. 118184) and when he gave figures for the production of .303 cartridges in the Pretoria Mint and stated that the steelworks were making 3 inch and 7 inch tank weapons. (951 of 26.10.1942 Gerdi 0233)

In the middle of December Felix made another attempt to get into direct communication with Germany. (1137 if 14.12.1942 B.J. 117409) On December 20th (1942) he stated, however, that the two-way wireless communication with Germany would not be in preparation for a long time for the lack of suitable equipment and reliably trained operators. (1163 of 14.12.1942 B.J. 114981) (He had presumably lost confidence in establishing absolutely reliable wireless communication with Germany with the inferior equipment available to him at the time) In January (1943), however, Felix again passed instructions to Berlin through Trompke for another attempt at two-way transmissions. (38 of 11.1.1943 B.J. 113470)

On 19.1.43 Felix sent in the Press code a secret document in English which was in fact a report from the Belgian Congo authorities to the Defence Headquarters, Pretoria, regarding aviation fuel. (68 of 19.1.1943 B.J. 113504) and 70 of 19.1.1943 B.J. 114350)

In the middle of March Felix stated that the station would be in order in the future. (301 of 15.3.1943 B.J. 115413)

At the end of this month Trompke reported that only fragments of Felix's transmissions were decypherable from which it would appear that Felix had to broadcast as little as possible because the situation at the moment was dangerous (AOB: HF/DF operations against illicit transmissions) (330 of 24.3.1943 B.J. 115732) Again on the 27th March Felix stated that they had to proceed very cautiously in view of an energetic swoop of the criminal police and Rooseboom was threatening to make a declaration to them. (360 of 5.4.1943 B.J. 116208) (This was presumably a reflection of the police action taken with regard to Paasche and van de Merwe when the former entered the Union.)

On 19th April (1943) Felix transmitted stating that he was using the new sending station and asked Trompke to report to Berlin as to its reception. (411 of 19.4.1943 B.J. 116753) On the same date he stated that he was hoping to send Trompke a reporter in person. (410 of 19.4.1943 B.J. 11682?)

Felix announced on 20th April that with the cooperation of O ('O' = Paasche) (see below) he was in the process of building a wireless station on which be ? as strong as possible, and on the 21st May Felix informed Lourenco Marques that he was transmitting on a "new station for direct transmission service was very clearly audible, and that they would now listen in after their transmission on the wavelength 41.6 metres (ca 7,211 kHz) for the call sign COR and would attempt to ?? up coming traffic. (139 of 23.5.1943 B.J. 118140)

On 27th May Felix transmitted that he was attempting by every means? his power to institute a special Press News Service fro a second station. (521 of 28.5.1943 B.J. 118393)

The first attempts for direct transmission (South Africa Berlin) appeared to have been abortive as Felix stated on 8.6.43 to Trompke (conveyed by W/T as was done since more than a year) he had transmitted direct on 25th, 27th and 30th May, but had received no reply. (AOB: As the Consulate was not allowed to communicate by means of W/T) He added that from 8.6.1943 he would transmit regularly until 22.6.1943. (115 of 8.6.1943 B.J. 118734)

On 10.6.1943 Felix transmitted (AOB: considering all the many receptions, this strongly confirms - that the British R.S.S. or R.I.S. possessed interception sites in South Africa and, likely, in Lourenco Marques as well) stating, that valuable links in this organisation had been arrested so loss of time was unavoidable. According to this information his second station? (message?) had reached Germany. (This information was not received (intercepted) by us) He added that the second station worked under 'O' (= Paasche) "far away from here" →

AOB: Please notice the tiny black spot in the south of Botswana Land as this spot had been noticed before somewhere in August 1943

(AOB: as my Laptop is using Dutch language standard, GoogleEarth is therefore providing Dutch language names as: Zuid-Afrika instead of South Africa)

→ and was to send chiefly a Press service. The first station under Felix would send chiefly internal political and military information. He stated that from 8.6.1943 the "business friend" (likely Trompke's service) should listen in every Sunday, Tuesday and Thursday at 20 hours G.M.T. Trompke asked that this transmission time should be changed as there were several other transmitters working on the wave length (at 7211 kHz?) that time, and that from 23 hours to 12.45 would before suitable for transmissions. (558 of 11.6.1943 B.J. 118045)

Germany apparently heard Felix's second station on 10.6.1943 that they had been in touch with Germany for the first time (386 of 19.6.1943 B.J. 118312)

The second reporter from Felix did not arrive (AOB: 'O' Paasche might have become on the air some time later, which would match with the first reference of this map previously), nor did Hamlet's (= Elferink's) reporter with Felix's document about the Ossewa Brandwag and as a result this was not sent by the wireless by Felix. ((562 of 12.6.1943 B.J. 118897) The messenger had had to turn back owing to the presence of disproportionally large military forces at the frontier between Swaziland and Mozambique (= Portuguese East Africa) He (likely Paasche) tried again on 7.6.1943 but the results are unknown. (591 of 21.6.1943 B.J. 119314)

The second station with message sign (call sign?) DOT as opposed to the first station with messages sign DOR or D (= Felix - Sittig) or O (= Paasche) and Felix (Felix = D) and O (= Paasche) were not responsible for any of these transmissions (AOB: in my perception - the latter conclusion is incorrect and wrong) (1 of 23.6.1943 B.J. 119404) (For the sake of convenience the two stations will be referred to as DOY and DOR in future, though these are only the messages signs and not the call signs. DOY apparently transmitted direct to Berlin, though messages were occasionally relayed on by Trompke (AOB: how? By illicit transmissions from the Lourenco Marques Consulate or by means of the expensive Portuguese telegraph system towards the German Embassy/Consulate Lisbon and from there by means of the regular W/T facility with Berlin?) to Berlin, presumably as an insurance; while DOR (= Paasche) transmitted only Lourenco Marques.)

During June, July and August, a considerable amount of transmitting time was occupied with Sittig's finances. He felt that if he was to carry on without the support of Ossewa Brandwag he would need at least £3,000. He added that the sole possibility of effecting transfer was by U-boat (AOB: which never will mature and thus commence), and he needed only South African currency, £1 and 10/- notes in all cases. (591 of 21.6.1943 B.J. 119314)

Four days later Felix again asked Berlin for funds to construct a news? service or to render himself independent of the Ossewa Brandwag (thus of van Rensburg?). Berlin asked Trompke his views on this proposal and also whether it would be possible to send Felix funds from Lourenco Marques in South Africa £1 and 10/- notes unostentatiously and possibly instalments. (154 of 25.6.1943 B.J. 119??) At the beginning of July, Felix stated that he had to rely wholly on the Ossewa Brandwag for protection, money, news, transmitting stations and organisation. He added that in consideration of the fact that frequent? there was not sufficient funds available he wanted to make his organisation independent, at least financially, and that he could dispose of well for? £1 and 10/- notes of the local currency. (635 of 5.7.1943 B.J. 119809) →

(AOB: passing on sufficient amounts of local currencies, was the common 'bottleneck' was playing in those cases remote from the German direct influence. The Iberian Peninsula was, in this respect, not remote as direct traffic quite freely occurred, between occupied territory and Germany directly. Differently was it, for instance supplying money outside Europe, such as in the Goldschmidt case (https://www.cdvandt.org/goldschidt's-fbi-file.htm) The consequence was, that spies send-out like were Gimpel and Colepaugh who were supplied with quite amount of dollars) (https://www.cdvandt.org/gimpel-colepaugh-case.htm) and (https://www.cdvandt.org/gimpel-colepaugh-v4-mp4.htm)

→ On the 5th (15th?) July, Berlin asked asked again for Trompke's attitude regarding ? proposal and added that Felix demanded at least £3,000. (170 of 15.7.1943 Gerdi 0520) To this Trompke replied that in his opinion any further activities should be undertaken in collaboration with the Ossewa Brandwag (thus also van Rensburg's commitment) had it its disposal were .. and consideration that Felix was very short of money should be taken account. Trompke added that as there was no possibility of getting ??→ to him from Lourenco Marques.

→ to him from Lourenco Marques, it might be advantageous to consider once more the sending of a U-boat (see below) which could take off industrial diamonds and Rooseboom and Masser as well. (681 of 17.7.1943 B.J. 120341)

Felix was still apparently short of money as at the beginning of August he stated that £100 was being offered to him in the Union on condition that the equivalent was paid out in German currency to Frau M.M. Naude, Serawastrasse 18 (Serawagasse?), Wien (Vienna). Frau Naude was to be warned not to mention this in letters to relatives. Felix also asked that also should be told that both her sons had gone over from the Army to the Ossewa Brandwag. He recommended that these transactions should be carried out as he had slender means. To this Trompke added a rider that Felix's request should be seceded to and and that Felix should be informed as soon as possible. (764 of 11.8.1943 B.J, 121131) Berlin informed Felix direct on 23.8.1943 that the equivalent in RM was being paid to the address in question. (181 of 23.8.1943 B.J. 121964)

Walter Kraizizek arrived in Lourenco Marques towards the end of June and Trompke (Werz?) asked Berlin to inform Felix of his arrival and that he had delivered reports. Trompke also asked Berlin to inform Paul Kraizizek his father at Adlershof 22 Waldstrasse, Berlin, that his son was well and escaped to Lourenco Marques. (603 of 26.6.1943 B.J. 119436)

DOT, second station transmitting direct to Berlin, stated on 27.6.1943 that as soon as they had established a satisfactory system of communication with Berlin they would take over the regular transmission of political and press information. DOT (Paasche or Sittig?) told Berlin to spy to "our business friend" (Werz / Trompke in Lourenco Marques) for the usual abbreviations and cover addresses. (? of 27.6.1943 B.J. 119617) Direct transmission was still apparently unsatisfactory, but a higher mast was being built. (614 of 29.6.1943 B.J. 119618)

Very detailed written reports brought by Kraizizek to Felix were decoded by 5.7.1943 (AOB: by whom?) Trompke (AOB: actually Werz?)S considered that Felix's work was so good that he would be very glad if he could receive due recognition by Berlin as, through his personal efforts, he had established a regular system reporting news, and also at last, established direct communication with Germany. Trompke (Werz?) recommended him for the War Service Cross (Kriegsverdienstkreuz = K.v.K.) (AOB: those not directly engaged in combat, got some form of a K.v.K., as they were not entitled for an EK II or EK I) if possible with Sword or First Class. He added that news of the award and other award to Paasche, would no doubt be very powerful form of moral support for both of them, especially as up to that time Trompke (Werz) had been unable to give them any material help whatsoever. (AOB: hampering might have been, that Trompke as Consul General was a Diplomat, and they all were employed by the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), and I don't know whether they possessed the same decoration system as was maintained in the German military Intelligence (Abwehr)) In the written report Felix added that he and O (Paasche) were trying in every way to obtain military information, but the most important thing at that time was the accumulation of wireless parts. (AOB: think of valves and capacitors, maybe resistors and fuses as well) (633 of 5.7.1943 and 635 of 5.7.1943 B.J. 119809) Among these reports from Felix was a "report of Lietnant B,J, Oliver" on political tendencies among South African Troops, and also observation by the South African D.M.I. Colonel Malmerke , on the same subject (640 of 5.7.1943 B.J. 120074) (If these reports are genuine it would se? to show a serious leakage to Felix somewhere and may link up with the earlier? case whom Felix got hold of the document on aviation fuel sent to Defence Headquarters Pretoria.)

Felix in a direct transmission to Berlin, stated on 13.7.1943 that as soon he had achieved reliable communication with Berlin, he would try ? connect Johannesburg, Capetown and Durban to their chief station by radio telegraphy. Meanwhile they would send chiefly propaganda material, ?? prevent discovery of the secret station they had arranged that propaganda material sent to Berlin should be published in the official organ of the Ossewa Brandwag and Felix asked Berlin to quote it occasionally (presumably? to give cover of these reports). (12 of 14.7.1943 B.J. 120165)

Owing to Masser's proposal (see below) being blown, Felix stated ?? 16th July that station 1 (which is presumably the station which transmits?? from the Union (Felix's or Paasche's?) to Lourenco Marques only) would have be closed down for a few days. Trompke (Werz?) apparently picked up Felix's transmission in two places on land and on board of the German ships in Lourenco Marques harbour → on passing on the above information to Berlin. (AOB: the ships possessed far better receiving gear than does the Consulate)

→ on passing on the above information to Berlin he stated that the transmission could only be picked up by the "ship stations". (AOB: due to their superior equipment compared to the regular broadcast receivers employed at the Consulate) (678 0f 16.7.1943 B.J. 120169)

The fact that the station with the message sign DOT was Felix second station in direct touch with Germany was confirmed on 30.7.1943 when Trompke (Werz) passed on a Felix report under under the number DUT 15, that Germany did not seem to listen to them if there was no telegram for them at the Berlin end. (AOB: Zeesen short wav broadcast "Die Heimat Grüßt") with Germany (AOB: bear in mind that all knowledge this was telegraphed on Portuguese postal lines, and in some way tapped by the British Services!) (723 if 30.7.1943 B.J. 120850) On 2.8.1943 Trompke (Werz) announced that the night before he had been able to follow for the first time the exchange of traffic between Felix and Germany, and picked up telegrams DOT 12, 13 and 14, (734 of 2.8.1945 B.J. 120956).

On 6.8.1943 Trompke (Werz) reported that again he had picked up the two-way traffic and added that the two way would continue to be picked up in Lourenco Marques in the future. He requested instructions as to whether Berlin required a telegraphic report on it on each occasion. (AOB: this With reference presumably to the given would mean wasting money, as the telegraph charges between Lourenco Marques and Lisbon, where the highest expenses of the entire Consulate!) With the reference presumably to giving to the War Service Cross (Kriegsverdienstkreuz; K.v.K.) to Felix and O = Paasche, he added that should Berlin 's appreciation for Felix and Paasche be further delayed, he would be glad if Berlin could now send the suggested acknowledgement of Felix's written report, together with the appreciation of his business friend (Werz/Trompke of the Consulate in Lourenco Marques) and greetings. (748 of 6.8.1943 B.J. 121012)

Despite the fact that Felix had stated that station 1 (presumable the one with the message letters DOR) might have to close down owing to Masser's indiscretions, it was still transmitting on 5.8.1943 (747 of 6.8.1943 B.J. 121148) In reply to Trompke's (Werz's) enquiry as to whether he should listen in to two-way traffic, Berlin replied that a report of the exchange traffic listened to was necessary only when traffic did not take place and certain telegrams for Berlin were able to be picked up by Trompke (Werz).. (Presumably picked up by Trompke (Werz) only.) (186 of 10.8.1943 B.J. 121330)

Felix in his direct transmission on the 16.8.1943 stated that that there was no ground for anxiety if they did not transmit for several periods. 'O' (Paasche) was often on a journey with a view to discussions or organisation, while 'D' (Felix /Sittig) continually in political circles, usually far away from the wireless station. (24 of 16.8.1943 B.J. 121967)

A Felix report on 23.8.1943 picked up by Trompke (Werz) and relayed on stated that station 1 to Lourenco Marques had had to be closed as the danger was too great (AOB: did the Consulate breach Portuguese legislation by transmitting W/T?). . It added that the business friend (Werz or someone representing him) should listen daily as agreed and a new station would make trial transmissions as soon as possible. (201 of 28.8.1943 B.J. 121967)

The idea was apparently to take over Masser's set which was on Wild's farm. The set was capable of reaching Germany and it was proposed to cease transmitting to the business friend (Werz or the Consulate) The chief difficulty was apparently that Wild was a friend of Rooseboom's and was thus not reliable. Felix was attempting to get the st handed over unconditionally but so far had been unsuccessful. (61 if 29.8.1943 B.J. 122483) Felix had made reference earlier in the month to the Wild set when he stated (is a very corrupt message) that it had been installed in case Lourenco Marques had to close down as it could be used for direct traffic to Berlin. (764 of 11.8.1943 B.J. 121333)

The most recent developments in Most Secret Sources concerning Felix have been with regard to the Italian collapse. (AOB: The Italian State and Army did go over to the Allied side. Mussolini had been made prison and most went over, though some remained on the German side. The German Army occupied most of the Italian mainland territory and quite some of the Italian Army went as P.o.W. in German camps) Felix asked Berlin on 19.9.1943 if he could be wanted immediately if as a consequence in developments of Italo-German relations his, Felix's work was liable to become known the Union Government through any indiscretions on the part of Campini (the Italian Consul General in Lourenco Marques) only knew that the Germans had a transmitter in the Union and knew the former times of transmission (AOB: because the Italian ships interned in Lourenco Marques harbour were also involved in wireless reception of Felix signals) but, even if he wanted to betray the Germans, which Trompke (Werz) doubted, he knew too little to be able to harm Felix, (6, of 19.9.1943 B.J. 122894) (AOB: when I remember well - Campini did not change sides)

Details concerning the Felix/Berlin and Felix/Lourenco Marques → transmissions

→ transmissions were passed out to South Africa. As result on 27.7.1943 and 29.7.1943 a station calling COR (one of Felix's call signs) was heard and was tentatively placed at 26 degrees 20 south by 31 degrees 25 East which is about 15 miles north-east of Mbebene in Swaziland. Later pplots however placed it within a radius of 25 miles with a centre at 24 degrees 40 South by 23 degrees 10 East, i.e. in the area of the Bechuanaland border. The district is sparsely populated and the finger of suspicion points to the farms owned by K, Wilz on the south side of the Malope River at 25 degrees 20 south by 23 degrees 20 east. Wilz's wife and daughter are violently pro-Nazi, were implicated in the Leibrandt case and are now interned. It is only fair to say, however, that Wilz is separated from his wife. Wilz himself has been long suspected by the Bechuanaland Police.

Mobile Units are proceeding to the area and with their help it is hoped accurately to locate the transmitter and arrest the operator. Simultaneous action will be taken with the the transmitter on Wild's farm.

AOB: all their attempts were a complete failure, they did not catch an operator. Sittig and Paasche were even, in early 1947 "at large". All resulting in a great disaster! Even their actual existence was illegal in the South African Union.

To start with Felix apparently only had the Mosse code (commercial code book) and the Press code. This is apparent from Trompke's (Werz's) message in July 1942 when he states that the Mosse code would still have to be used as it was impossible to communicate in the Rose code to Felix. (477 of 1.7.1942 B.J. 117070 and 773 of 14.9.1942 Gerdi 0034)

There was another code system, the Rosemarie system. In November Trompke stated that the Rosemarie code was not intended for use if the Rose code was compromised, but was to be set to Felix's through the secret agent in Lourenco Marques in case of a hostile attack on the town, in order to make it possible for Felix to send telegrams which could not be read by van Rensburg as the former might have communicate the Rose system to the latter. (1062 of 28.11.1942 Gerdi 0387)

On 20.4.1943 Felix required a new code suitable for wireless as the Press code was insufficiently secure. The new code was to be suitable for foreign languages and as far as possible not too complicated. (462 of 5.5.1943 B.J. 117360) Trompke (Werz), presumably in reference to this, reported that the Press cod had been in use for a long time, but it was useful for transmission of the secret documents in foreign languages, so Trompke (Werz or someone on the latter's behalf) recommended that the necessary information be passed on to Felix. (450 of 30.4.1943 B.J. 117157) In reply to this Berlin stated that Felix had been given the Windrose system which was suitable for communication of secret documents in foreign languages. The first telegram encyphered in the Windrose system was to be announced to Lourenco Marques by Felix in a short telegram encyphered in the Rose system. (125 of 21.5.1943 B.J. 118314)

Felix (Sittig) and O (Paasche) were the sole possessors of the Rose, Windrose and Press system as it appeared inadvisable to them to hand over these codes to the Ossewa Brandwag. On the other hand, they were anxious to deposit the Rosemarie system with the leaders of the Ossewa Brandwag in case of Felix and O fell out. They assumed that Berlin agreed to this unless the contrary was telegraphed at once. (Which instructions Berlin never gave) (1 of 23.6.1943 B.J. 119404) On the same date Felix stated that the use of the Press code was inadvisable. (597 of 25.6.1943 B.J. 119466)

In July (1943) Felix stated that the Windrose system seemed to be the best for newspaper articles. (12 of 12.7.1943 B.J. 120165) but next month he stated that the Rose system was not secret enough for newspapers, while the Windrose system was for technical reasons too long. He asked for a similar system in the Press code, but one which was more secure and simpler. he also asked whether newspaper reports were required in the original language or not. (24 of 19.8.1943 and 25. of 18.8.1943 B.J. 121660) Berlin replied that they wished press reports in the language of origin and a suitable code would be sent as soon as possible. (182 of 23.8.1943 B.J. 121965)

At the end of the month Felix stated that he would use Rose and Windrose system principally and the Press only when the former were unusable for the purpose. He again asked for a new code similar to the Press one. (64 of 24.8.1943 B.J. 121883)

Paasche, aged about 26, is the brother of J. Ernst Paasche of the German Consulate General in Lourenco Marques. He is a great friend of Sittig's and indeed escaped with him on 4.5.1940. He has been described as being anti-Nazi, half Jew (this is confirmed by Most Secret Source) and like Sittig fond of music. While in Lourenco Marques he was responsible for conducting, in collaboration with the Italians, a waterfront information bureau which collected shipping intelligence from conscious and unconscious seamen agents of various nationalities.

His next of kin is sent, Mrs. F. Wittig of 1072 Windburg P.O. Holmpark Waterberg district. His cousin, Miss Wittig, is employed by Municipal Office , Milstrom.

Paasche first appears in Most Secret Sources in July 1942, when referring to the sending of the Rose code to Felix, Trompke (Werz?) asks Berlin to instruct Felix to make all preparations to receive the new system or, if possible, to be collected from O (= Paasche) (536 of 13.7.42 Gerdi 0183) In September of the same year (1942) Felix was informed that O (= Paasche)" an associate called for by him" could not be sent. (773 of 24.9.1942 Gerdi 0034)

In January, however, Trompke (Werz) changed his mind and stated that he proposed to send O (= Paasche) the German (on? group) who is a great friend of felix's and has proved himself absolutely reliable", from Lourenco Marques to the (South African) Union. He asked Berlin (via Portuguese telegraph channels) to inform Felix (AOB: in those days, the only means was the Zeesen short-wave broadcasts "Die Heimat Grüß") on this and to ask Felix whether fund were needed for O's (= Paasche's) journey and whether he was capable of taking with him (2 groups) for the Stormjaer (Militant Section of the Ossewa Brandwag). (AOB: all sounds so simple, but: there not existed a mutual: mail and telephone/telegraph exchange in those wartime days) He also asked whether directions for use were available for the "secret transmitter Tino", and whether O (= Paasche) could be taught how to use it and if he could take it with him. (20 of 21.1.1943 B.J. 113163) The next day Trompke (Werz) asked Berlin (thus by means of an additional telegram) to pass to Felix his questions about the journey of O (= Paasche) 11.1.1943 (40 of 7.2.1943 B.J. 114003)

At the beginning of February Berlin instructed Trompke (Werz, or a specialist around Werz) that if O's (= Paasche's) mission was successful, we was to find out discretely whether Hamlet (= Elferink, KV 2/202; PF 65880) was on our side (yes he indeed was), and also what he was doing (Dutch Dr. Elferink actually was an academic). (40 of 7.2.1943 B.J. 115374)

It was planned that O (= Paasche) should leave Lourenco Marques on 26.2.1943, and Felix was expecting him in the last week of February (1943), and by 5.3.43 O (= Paasche) had arrived safely (AOB: crossing the borders between Portuguese East Africa and the South African Union illicitly directly or via Swaziland additionally) (119 of 16.2.1943 B.J. 115449 and 172 of 5.3.1943 B.J. 115008) Trompke (Werz) had apparently some qualms as on 10.4.1943 he asked Berlin to pass Felix from Berlin on 13.4.1943. (121 of 13.4.1943 B.J. 116818) To this Felix replied on 20.4.1943 that O (= Paasche) was in safety and police action was slightly diminishing, and went on to state that it was with the cooperation of O (= Paasche) that the new wireless station was being built, ($62 of 5.5.1943 B.J. 117360)

The facts regarding Paasche's journey in to the (South African) Union ???? follows:- It was learnt that before he left, he had on him a plan of route he was to follow and two names one being Sittig and the other being Dr. Gert van der Merwe (see below).

Paasche was followed of the when he crossed into the Union and was seen boarding a bus in Pretoria. He was followed out of Pretoria and was last seen at one of van der Merwe's farms. (AOB: by someone on behalf the British Services; this was later considered being an ill undertaken in the South African Union!) (see among Z2170 Z2170return, and C2172 C2172return) The farm was raided (illicitly) as were all the other van der Merwe properties, but no trace of Paasche has come from Most Secret Sources.

It was no doubt this action by the police (initiated by means of British pressure) which led to Felix's statement that "police action was slightly diminishing (failing)".

In July (1943), at the same time as recommending Felix for the War Service Cross (K.v.K.), First Class with Sword, Trompke (Werz) recommended that O (= Paasche) should be given the War Service Cross, Second Class without Sword. He described him as being equally enterprising and though one quarter Jewish through his grandparents, absolutely reliable. (633 of 5.7.1943 B.J. 119809)

In Felix long written report brought in by messenger in July, he stated that O (= Paasche) was delivered "here" withut incident, and it was described by Felix as a magnificant achievement by the Ossewa Brandwag. (635 of 5.7.1943 B.J. 119809)

Berlin promptly asked for Christian names, place of birth and profession which Trompke gave, correctly, as Nils Olaf Paasche born in (Berlin) Charlottenburg on 3.11.1913 and his occupation as that of a colonial farmer. (163 of 9.7.1943 and 699 of 12.7.1943 B.J. 120038)

Later Berlin asked for his nationality by which was given by Trompke (Werz) is German (177 of 27.7.1943 and 722 of 30.7.1943 B.J. 120800)

O (= Paasche) was obviously working in closest possible touch with Felix as the latter stated that he and O (= Paasche) were trying in every way to obtain military information, (636 of 5.7.1943 B.J. 119809) and similar stated that there would be no grounds for anxiety if there were no transmissions for several periods as O (= Paasche) was often on a journey with a view to discussions or organisation. (24 of 16.8.1943 B.J. 121660)

On 13.9.1943 Trompke stated that 19,943 escudos had been paid in Lourenco Marques to Paasche as a special payment. It is not clear whether this refers to Nils Olaf who, being in the Union presumably could not get hold of it (though it may have been banked there against return), or to his brother Ernst (engaged at the Consulate in Lourenco Marques). (836 of 13.9.1943 B.J. 128830)

Doctor Gert van der Merwe was one of the two persons, the other being Sittig, whom Paasche was to contact on his arrival in the (South African) Union.

Van der Merwede is a doctor, a gynaecologist, with consulting rooms at 90 Salisburry House, Pretoria. He lives at a farm about nine miles from Pretoria called Derdepoort. He also owns a farm at Beggerat, some seven miles from Dundee on the Dundee - Ladysmith? Road, Grootpen in the Harrismith district and Toronto in the same district.

Van der Merwede is described as pro-Nazi and a nationalist and opposed to the Union Government's war policy. He studied in Germany for approximately nine month - December 1834-35, and spent some time in holland and London before returning to the (South African) Union. He was medical officer at the Bavianspoort interment camp from about January 1940 until his resignation in July of the same year.

Paasche was followed on his arrival in the Union, but was lost in the vicinity of one of the Merwede's farm. It was in the same area that the murders of Lotte, one of the principal witness in the Henning ? case, went on ground.

Early this year (1944?) van der Merwe sold part of his property at Derdepoort to the proprietors of the subversive newspaper Vaterland. (AOB: and rented the property back) It is perhaps not without significance that this farm is only a few miles away from van Rensburg's (farm).

Van der Merwe has never appeared in Most Secret Source, but it is clear from the fact that Paasche only had his name and that of Sittig's on him when he entered the (South African) Union that he must play some part in the Sittig organisation. That all van der Merwe's activities are not completely legitimate is shown by his connection with a certain Stephanus Boshoff (Boshof?), alias Frankie Boshoff (Boshof?). This youthm about 21 years old, is an insurance clerk of Arcadia Street, Pretoria. Van der Merwe and Boshoff (Boshof?) are reported to have been seen in earnest conversation on several occasions, .. A police Constable from Durban on leaving Pretoria reported that he had been approached by Booshoff (Boshof?) and asked to provide shipping information from Durban. This information was to be sent to Boshoff (Boshof?) at his address in Arcadia Street by means of code telegrams. The police recommended Boshoff's (Boshof's?) internment, but this was turned down by the Minister of Interior and as an alternative it was recommended that he should be severely warned.

At the end of May (1942) Georg Tellides, a Greek ... been known ... the German Consulate General when he had been in Portuguese East Africa, called at the Consulate General. He stated that he had been commissioned to establish broadcast communication in the (South African) Union by means of a secret transmitter. His principal gave him no name, but Trompke (Werz?) thought it possible that he was Hamlet (Dutch Dr. Elferink KV 2/202). Tellidis stated that the first broadcast to Lourenco Marques would take place on 1.6.1942. Details of transmission would be given. Trompke stated that Tellidis made a good impression and requested that his family be told that he was well. His father is Chrysostomos Tellidis, Synopis 27, Safranpolis, Nwa Ionia, Athens. Trompke also recommended that his request should be treated sympathetically , and also that news of his family should be sent to him in South Africa. (354 of 26.5.1942 B.J. 116435)

On the 1st of July 1942 Trompke (Werz?) stated that the station "probably connected with Hamlet (Dr. Elfering) (AOB: which he was not) had only heard there once when it was weak and unintelligible. It is assumed that this station refers to Tellidis' (477 of 1.7.1942 B.J. 116117) As stated above Hamlet (= Elferink) denied that he was the employer of Tellidis. (615 if 3.8.1942 B.J.117070)

In September Berlin asked that Felix should use only the cal signs K.B.W. as the call sign D was that Tellides' transmitter which was no longer wanted as the suspicion that he was an agent provocateur would persist until it was known for certain who his principal was (215 of 12.9.1942 Gerdi 0028) No such information was received from Trompke, and the matter was apparently dropped.

It is possible that he was an agent provocateur sent by the (South African) Union authorities.

The most surprising fact was ... the whole organisation is that despite its close affiliation with the semi-legal organisation Ossewa Brandwag, with a Union-wide ramifications, Sittig and his agents have produced little information of any real value. It is almost inconceivable to believe that anywhere else in the world, german agents as wellplaced as Sittig and his associates, in close contact with an opposition leader of high standing, would not produce information which could be of vital interest to the Abwehr. Sittig produced occasional inaccurate shipping information and political gossip which could be from the columns of any South African newspaper. The only items of information of real interest are the secret document concerning the Belgian Congo, and possibly by other document regarding morale among South African troops.

The theory has been advanced advanced that Sittig, Paasche and Elferink are not really in contact with van Rensburg at all (AOB: I myself strongly doubt this hypothesis) It was suggested that they were using his name to add lustre of their reports and that their position, and that of van Rendburg himself was in total ignorance of their existence and activities. In support of this it was stated that Field Marshal Smuts had been in contact with van Rensburg through a cut-out, a certain Coltzee, a journalist now in this country (England), and had in effect come to an misunderstanding that if Smuts did not close down the Ossewa Brandwag in general and van Rensburg in particular, he van Rensburg, would not indulge in any activities which would embarrass the South African war effort. This theory hardly holds water. For the German agents in the Union to work this gigantie bluff they would have had, all of them, to have been in the closest possible contact so that their stories should tally. We know, on the other hand, from Most Secret Sources that Elferink is unaware of Sittig's identity as Felix though he may know of him as ab escaped German internee hiding. Similarly Rooseboom would have to be on terms of ??? ?mity and cooperation with Sittig and Elferink, when we know again that they are on the worst possible terms. I fairness to the person who advanced this argument, it must be stated that he was unaware of the mass of evidence in our possession.

van Rensburg is in the organisation up to his neck and cannot but be fully aware of its implications and ramifications. It is possible, however,→ that van Rensburg

→ that van Rensburg is insuring against a victory by either side. Should the Germans win he could point to the great services he performed for their organisation in South Africa and should the Allies prove victorious, he could point to the fact that he had an agreement with Smuts. In either case he would be perfectly safe. Even if the evidence in our possession could be produced in an open court of law, van Rensburg could and wood deny all knowledge of it and be certain, feeling in South Africa being what it is, that he would almost certainly be acquitted with the added advantage of having acquired a martyr's crown. (AOB: South Africa white population, was to a great extend, not pro-British; as the latter country engendered two wars against the Boer population, say 50 years ago!)

The answer to the question as to why the information produced by the Sittig organisation su insignificant may be a question of psychology. Germans like Sittig and Paasche and Master must have found life in Lourenco Marques, living on £12 a month, intolerably dull. On the other hand, they knew that if they returned to the (South African) Union, they would have certainly more fun, and gain a great deal of prestige, living a life agreeably spiced with a little excitement and ??? If they were caught they would incur no more serious penalty than internment which existence would only very little duller than life in Portuguese East Africa. They would not be prepared to risk their necks by sending really vital information which might galvanise the Union police into action and, if they were proved to be the authors, might incur for them the death penalty , or at least imprisonment. By sending comparatively innocuous information they ensured on the one hand that the authorities would not take a serious view of their activities and on, the other, build up for themselves prestige, both in Lourenco Marques and Berlin.

This report gives most of the information in our possession in one document. It is hoped that it may be of some use in giving background to any information which may come into our possession if Sittig or any of his friends should fall into our hands as a result of the present activities in the Union.

(AOB: When an office is judging the German failing espionage efforts in and around the South African Union; one may also return the ball and make an assessment of what the British Secret Services really gained. They did not catch (even not initiated) one of the German actors; but what had been the expenses and efforts on the British sides, between, say, 1940 and 1946 for M.I.5 and M.I.6?

M.I.5 and M.I.6 did not achieve practically anything in and around South Africa, in respect to German espionage! Major Ryde was a failure with his DFing group, and his efforts to manipulate some of the South African authorities. They gave their aims quite some boosts without gaining noticeable results. What Mr. Courtenay Young did not know, yet: Sittig and Paasche were still at large in early 1947! All diplomatic tricks that had been played, with some of the South African Police partially supporting British efforts not legally. Then the blow suffered against the attempts to get Field Marshal Smut as to support British desires (early November 1943), resulting in a complete set-back! We may consider - that financially the British prestige concerning South Africa, after all, suffered a blow.

An additional remark: Sittig's and Paasche's engagements were connected mainly, with establishing wireless communication abroad, and not concerning gathering intelligence.

Firstly: Is there enough interest in the KV 2/939 on Sittig and Paasche? Apparently yes, as the statistics indicate there truly is.

Secondly: Might Masser's file series also be so attractive? I will have to access the Masser: KV 2/942 .. KV 2/944; PF 106140

AOB: I am a bit intrigued by this uncommon PF 106140 reference serial number. This might, in my perception, indicate that he had been under observation for a completely different historical episode. I went quickly through Masser's file series and discovered that it goes into great details on his time in South Africa as well as the various places in Portuguese East Africa.

I doubt, however, that these many bits and pieces are really attracting your attention.

However, the next pages being, in my perception of interest as in this file section Nasser is describing his life during interrogation at: No 5 Civilian Internment Camp, B.A.O.R. (British Army over the Rhine), Germany.