KV-2/1499-Klatt-Kauder

Please bear always in mind: The purpose of this historical contribution is for studying purposes only, therefore, do not multiply it, as still Crown Copyrights being valid, partially!

All this is good recognisable You will doubtless recall the Max Moritz reports sent by the Abwehr station in Sofia to Vienna (Wien) in 1942/43. The Abwehr officer (AOB: Richard Kauder was being a Jew never an officer and/or soldier) concerned was Kauder (@ Klatt) whose source for the Max/Moritz reports was Ira Longin. The latter was almost certainly an R.I.S. (Russian Intelligence Service) agent and we are reasonably sure that the Max reports were supplied to Longin by W/T (not valid) from the Soviet Union as part of a Soviet deception operation. The source of the Moritz reports which concerned military dispositions, supplies, etc. in the Middle East behind the British lines was never satisfactorily explained despite the interrogation of Kauder and Longin at end of the war. (AOB: 1945 .. March 1947, but almost only on behalf of the US Forces) Generally speaking they were inaccurate though very plausible and it has been suggested that they were fabricated by Longin.

AOB: All this is curious that the British Secret Services lost, in not yet a decade, so much expertise. All this the regular reader (follower) knows now far more than those Crown Servants in 1954. Longin did not operate by W/T means but used particular channels provided via the regular Russian Legations. Which existed in Sofia, because Bulgaria was not at war with Russia. The British during the course of the war, likely correctly, concluded that the information had been provided via the Russian N.K.W.D. (N.K.V.D.). The regular readers of these historical files will have been aware how the various historical parameters interacted.

2. S.I.M.E. (Secret Intelligence Middle East) have now sent us their files (which they would otherwise have destroyed) on their investigation into the Moritz reports made available through Isos at the time. The S.I.M.E. files also contain consolidated appreciations of the situation. It seems to me that we should retain these files as part of our records for the following two reasons.

a) The source of the reports, possibly an agent behind the British lines in the Middle East, has never been identified.

b) It the reports were a fabrication, then they reflect the skill practised by Longin, as R.I.S. agent.

3. Longin (Ira) is probably at liberty in the West, having been released from custody in Austria following his interrogation in 1948.

4. If you agree I will have the S.I.M.E. files turned into a supp volume to Kauder's PF (602358) and held at R.5. restricted to E. List personnel only. I will also have a cross reference placed on Longin's file (KV 2/1630 ... KV 2/1631; PF 602370) to show that this supp volume exists.

b) A total of eight bodies only were flown to Serbia throughout the whole month of August.

c) Where the report is in a way correct is that of the eight bodies flown into Serbia three were, in fact, British officers and two were Intelligence Officers, and of the remaining three, two were Serbs and one was a Pole.

2. M.O 4. suggest that it is just possible leakage is occurring in the first case through Yugoslav "Packers" whom they have been employing at Derna and Tocra. It is known that the enemy have been dropping agents in that area, and it is possible one or some of these packers, most of whom are ex-prisoners a wireless set in the Benghazi or Cyrenaica area. In order to be as safe a possible Yugoslav packers are being removed from Cyrenaica.

We spoke about CQ 43 of 31.8.43 and I understand that M.O.4 has reported verbally that this report was true. You ascribed it to indiscreet talk in Yugoslavia (AOB: the essence is - that the British intercepted Klatt messages which content was too often true or nearly relevant. In this context they were trying to imagine as to how the Germans caught such information, as in someway or another, there must exist a leakage. This is what KV 2/1499 series is mainly about) You ascribed it to indiscreet talk in Yugoslavia, but I pointed out that it comes from source "B" and therefore, either you are right and Source "B" is in, or in touch with, Yugoslavia, or you are wrong and the indiscreet talk was in North Africa.

I should therefore, be grateful if you would get as full a check as possible from M.O.4, or let me do so, as the result of it may throw considerable light on the identity of Source "B"

1. Your 12789/R/22 (AOB: CX 12789/R/22 is pointing clearly onto M.I.6 in England) of 8.6.43. A check-up has shown that paras 1,2 and 3 are all true. As Calveston pointed out paragraph 3 is of particular interest, but R.A.F. say that no such instructions were sent or could have been intercepted on or about that date.

2. (b) is very interesting but tantalising. How was Source B instructed? if by W/T this would be of exceptional interest as it would be unprecedented. I understand that you have already asked London for further particulars and I should be very grateful if I might see them when they come.

3. It is quite interesting to note that Source B is still considered reliable enough for his information to be passed on, e.g. his report that 3000 men, including technicians and workmen, arrived at Nicosia on the 29th May (1943) to build nine new aerodromes in the west and north parts of Cyprus (paragraph 1 of your CX 12789/R?34 of 13.6.43) was relayed by Salonika to Mytylene on 2.6.43:→

Reconstruction of the major German communication lines in Western Europe (excluding Russia)

Please click at the above drawing as to open it in pdf; allowing you to print it in every printer size you like (when appropriate).

AOB: Notice Saloniki Mytylene. I have once added the information in the centre "Berta" might S.I.M.E. /B having a connection with someone in Mitylene?

However, we deal here with R.S.S. decrypted German W/T communication. The notice: Solonika (Saloniki) - Mytelene concerned the W/T line 7/78.

→ 7/78 (AOB: notice my foregoing comment about line 7/78 at my map reconstruction) /?768; and paragraph 2 of the same telegram reporting that at the end of May large Air Force units were being assembled at Sollum (about the Egypt /Libyan border), Derna, Barce and Tobruk, was relayed by Athens to Khania on 7.6.43: 7/205/9746

4. The report about Sollum. etc. is broadly true, but the report about Nicosia is untrue, although aerodromes are under repair and enlargement in west and north Cyprus. I will let you have these two checks again in a larger list.

5. There is what may be a variant of this Cyprus report which has reached the Japanese Minister (AOB: The highest diplomat in charge of a Legation) at Ankara; your 99989/W of 14.6.43, paragraph E. (1) Have you any more information than that contained in your 37789 of 1, 2 and 3 March about this gentleman's activities, and (2) do you think the reference to the continuance of W/T traffic "through other Legation" in the 7/62/9783 (AOB: Please notice the above map for line: 7/62 = the W/T Klatt link Ankara - Sofia used by Ahmed = Arnoldo (Arnaldo?) Delisme, engaged at the Spanish Legation in Ankara and later also Istambul (Istanbul)) is a reference to the Japanese Legation in Ankara?

Reference your 22638/V (AOB: the way of numbering equals that of S.I.S./M.I.6) of 28th March (1943), these two messages are indeed very interesting, but also very tantalising.

Reference your paragraph 1 you will remember that in August last (1942) Vienna (Wien) sent a directive for continuous observation of the airfield at Burg al Arab, to which we never saw any reply (AOB: likely an indication that these lines were monitored by R.S.S. = Radio Security Service). I think very possibly Vienna (Wien) is not entirely clear about the nature of this source, and so may give directives or ask questions which cannot be answered. It would not then be necessary to assume that the source is sometimes able to give supplementary information.

Reference your paragraph 2 the fact that some of the information is accurate, and the speed with which it is passed, postulates W/T communication, but the inability? to give directives or send supplementary questions questions suggests that the source is not fully under Sofia's control. As you remark in your paragraph 3 and 4, this tends to indicate that the source is very delicate and might even be unconscious or alternatively (AOB: apparently a great deal of guessing?) that he comes by his information by illicit methods or pretends to do so.

I agree with you that I have never been very impressed by the Soviet Legation theory, which seems to me to press the Max analogy too far. The objections to the theory set out in your paragraph 5 are in my opinion cogent (convincing).

i) A Free French W/T transmitter in 8th Army arena is transmitting to the Vichy French Legation at Sofia, notionally on behalf of Vichy but really for deception purpose (I suggest the French because it sees to me they are the only nation who would have people forward with 8th Army and also have an official position in enemy territory; also there has been a certain emphasis on French activities in this traffic).

ii) Klatt (Richard Kauder) obtains some of his material illicitly from an official in the Vichy French Legation, but this official is not in a position to sent back directives or enquiries to the source. (AOB: great nonsense!)

If this were so the mechanism would be parallel to the supposed penetration of the Soviet legation and might account for the twin character of two cover names used.

You will no doubt have noticed with Nos. 7/23/ (= Wien - Sofia and Sofia - Wien) (message number 3596 and message number 3606 of 19/3)

1. As the sender of the enquiry (= Wien → Sofia) 3596 is likely to be aware of the identity of the source (they were not at Ast Wien nor at I Berlin), we can, I think (in vain), assume that the source is sometimes in the position to give supplementary information. This fact does not preclude a collating centre for intercepts which would not invariably contain each item of information intercepted. Judging, however, from the reply, the source is apparently not an intercepting station, from which an enquiry would never be impossible, though frequently unsuccessful.

2. The two messages do not encourage the believe in a W/T agent or organisation. Source is quite regular with his reports and therefore there would appear to be no difficulty in sending him an enquiry, if he has W/T and is reporting from our territory.

3. The fact that the enquiry was not possible and that an explanation by letter was necessary to give the reason, indicates that the source (or possibility a sub-source) is very delicate and might even be unconscious.

4. It is difficult to make any very astute deductions from these two messages but I feel that my paragraph s., if agreed lends support to the theory that source is at any rate connected with the Soviet Legation in Sofia. (AOB: this was indeed the case, as we know the quite mysterious Russian NKWD (NKVD) were playing their own games. But, what we know veracity was about 80% true, in particular what the Russian Army related intelligence matters concerned. Among these were even in quite many cases strategic and tactical forecasts). The informant there may be, or if he is a double agent and deceiver may pose as being, ill-informed and only comes by this information by illicit methods; in this case he cannot be used as a channel for enquiries for supplementary information.

5. The above are my reactions to the two messages in question, but though I have written that they favour the Soviet theory, I myself do not feel inclined to support this theory unless we first get some pointer as to how the Soviet get the information. Likewise I do not believe in the suggestion that this might be Soviet "smoke", firstly because it would surely be very difficult to convince the Germans that it is normal for a Legation in Sofia to have this information, and, secondly, because the Soviet would appear to have little to gain from the putting across of "smoke" of this nature.

6. In short I do not think these messages have helped us very much and I only wish we could see the letters referred to, which might have helped a lot. I should be very interested to hear whether you consider any deductions are possible.

reference message 87? of 6/3: from where did the report 19 French pursuit plain originate, Syria or Africa? If possible state the unit. Please give interim report. Wagner = Obstlt. von Wahl-Welskirch at Ast Wien.

Reference your number 11 enquiry cannot be answered from this end. According to report it does not concern planes which have arrived but planes stationed there. Inquiry at Moritz's impossible as stated in the letter sent today.

1. Out of these, 29 reports concerned the (British) Eighth Army area directly, 14 of them being military and 15 air information.

2. Of the remaining nine reports, five reported naval convoy movements, as under:-

A report of February 1st gave a list of French formations en route from Syria to the Tripoli (Tripolis) front on January 31st.

A report, transmitted on February 1st gave a list of French formations en route from Syria to the Tripoli front on January 31st.

AOB: please be aware: The German forces had retreated into Tunisia, and fought there heavily, but surrendered at Tunis on 13th May 1943.

3. A report, transmitted on February 10th, stating that a goods-train with military deliveries for Turkey had been blown up in Jerusalem, was clearly nonsense.

4. A report transmitted on 11th stated that a sea-plane harbour had been constructed in Cyprus for U.S.A. This is incorrect.

6. The time-lag between the date of information and that of transmission was normally one day.

7. Owing to lack of success in obtaining veracity checks on these reports it is not possible to make any further suggestions as to the identity of their source.

8. R.A.F. Intelligence does not consider that Moritz air information from North Africa is not of great value to the enemy. They are confined to movements of aircraft and A.A. (= anti aircraft) defence of airfields, which, although the details may have been correct at the time of the report, are constantly changing.

2. Out of these, 1 verdicts were "incorrect", and only one was "generally correct".

The 4 reports which were said to be "Probable" (15 Nov. 43?) or "generally correct" were all reports containing information concerning movements of aircraft. Of the 5 reports on naval convoys mentioned in our previous report, 4 were marked "Incorrect" and 1 was not checked. Two further "Incorrect" reports concerned the construction of a sea-plane harbour in Cyprus and activity of the French Fleet in Alexandria. Thus Moritz Naval information is almost 100% wrong. Three reports on aircraft movement and aerodrome in North Africa were marked "Incorrect" and make up a total of "Incorrect" reports information on North Africa.

Can you tell me whether the W/T transmitter of the Vichy French Fleet at Alexandria is being efficiently monitored, and if so whether this traffic has been examined by experts for the plain language code? It has been suggested to me that this channel might be one for which we have been looking, by which information about 8th Army etc. has been and is being passed.

Minutes of a meeting to Consider Outstanding Triangle Problems, held in the office of B. Section I.S.L.D. (Inter Service Liaison Department) at 1145 hrs, 17 Feb. 43.

(a) Objections to the Intercept Hypothesis - intercept of cipher (high or low grade, ham-chat (among German Abwehr wireless personnel quite briefly practised), or R/T.

(iii) These considerations, and the fact that a source had been named, had disposed of the Interception Hypothesis in the case of Max.

(iv) Though veracity checks have been inadequate, the low coefficient of veracity is against the hypothesis of the interception of cipher traffic. If it were intercepted of hamchat or R/T we should not expect the amount of spurious material to be so great.

(v) The Bulgarian Y at Sofia had handed some material to Cuno (K.O.- Bulgaria W/T station cover name) : why not to Klatt, if he also was engaged in Y?

(vi) An interception unit must discriminately gather army, navy, airforce, and political information over a large area, as Moritz has done.

(b) Hypothesis of an agent, either working for the enemy or controlled by an Allied organisation.

(i) No traffic going to Sofia has been intercepted. Can it be on an authorised channel not examined in M.E. (Middle East) or London?

(ii) Max is Russian diplomatic cipher from Kuibishev to Sofia Moritz also? (AOB: quite likely, but W/T from Kuibishev??)

(iv) Possible that Max is a Russian double-cross, and that Moritz and Ibis are used as cover for the more valuable Max material/

(vi) Max had revealed that Capt. Samoilov of the Russian G.S. (General Staff) was a traitor. The Russians were discretely informed (by the British?) and made no immediate response. ten days later they asked à propos of nothing whether we were making any progress in breaking the German S.S. cipher. The Russians have run a double-agent who gave the enemy information about British territory, and told us about him when we showed signs of arresting some of their personnel. It might be possible to make further negotiations with the Russians about Max and Moritz.

(vii) Not Ast Varna's (Bulgarian Black Sea coast) contact with Russian merchant-captains? Moritz connection via Turkey and Varna?

(viii) Information given by Rath to Lisbon that Luftmeldekopf (Klatt) Sofia's is coming from the Counsellor of the Soviet Legation. But would not the German G.S., who think highly of Max, not suspect the ease with which a mass of information not necessary to the Soviet Legation could be passed clandestinely to the Counsellor? Note however that Klatt's station also passes Bulgarian police reports; it is possible that the Bulgars are also intermediaries for Max; and that the German G.S. (General Staff?) is one stage removed →

(AOB: please also bear in mind: that the KV 2/xxxx series do run in a counter succession. Consequently: with increasing PDF page numbers you are running backwards in time; with the exception of the succession of the so-called Minute Sheets; which, by the way, in the Klatt serials most rarely being reproduced)

(d) General tightening up of signals or other security. Under this heading it may be noted that Moritz was not the only source affected by this period of stagnation.

6. Veracity:- The variations in veracity may depend upon the type of W/T evidence used : for example, the repetition of a wild rumour by an operator, to his friend at the other end of a link would account for some of the reports which are hopelessly wrong. (AOB: most Abwehr operators knew each other as in particular Abwehr "Funker" (= spark) were radio amateurs, think here of DASD members possessing a DE allowance. For which they pass an exam and when an opportunity occurred they possessed the bases becoming a real HAM. DE amateurs were entitled to operate DASD club-stations. https://www.cdvandt.org/dasd-cq_1937.htm and https://www.cdvandt.org/dasd_1939-44.htm and https://www.cdvandt.org/dasd-cq-43-44.htm and https://www.cdvandt.org/dasd-rufzeichen-1941.htm) Some reports suggest rumour based upon fact.

7. With reference to the detailed reports of the number of planes on aerodromes, it is not known with what degree of accuracy the number and type of aircraft can be ascertained, but the R.A.F. should be able to help here.

8. It is not improbable that insecurity on the part Free French operators, or ciphers, account for the proportion of information which relates to French matters.

9. As Moritz messages are first heard from Sofia (sent from Schwert thus: LMK Klatt to 'Wera' the W/T station of Ast Wien), it is not unreasonable to assume that the interception centre is situated there. This location does not clash with the fact that military information relates to Divisions and Brigades but not to lower formations (see Note 3.) (AOB: In my perception, most understandable, the German High Command (O.K.W.) was of course, mainly interested in the great picture of the Eastern War Theatre)

The foregoing notes do not preclude the existence of an agent who is in a position to obtain such information, but the evidence which points to a W/T interception Organisation in Europe is certainly material.

(ix) Deductions from Internal Content of Moritz:- Correct information of our operational intentions, e.g. at Buerat, must have originated either at 8 Army or in Cairo. Possibly and Allied H.Q. Rather more emphasis on French material than one would expect. Note form of reference to places by distance and bearing from other place. (AOB: French citizen tended more to possess Communist sympathies) This suggests someone working from map. Would not someone on spot say "X in Y area?" But this is not conclusive: the form of reference may undergo editing in Sofia (AOB: from earlier files in Klatt's series, we know, that the Max reports possessed a certain format of a particular number of words. This demanded some consideration as to formulate what the actual information or message should be).

(x) Can information be obtained in M.E. by a genuine Russian agent, and then passed on by the Russians to Sofia as "chicken-feed? No Russian diplomatic channels in Egypt or Palestine.

(AOB: here we encounter a "blindness in the British attitude believing their own superiorities. Think of "Sonja" born Ruth (Ursula) Kuczynski married Beurton, whom conveyed spying information to the Russians in London. And, what to think of Klaus Fuchs, the atomic spy whom was send on behalf of the British Government to support the US Atomic program in the Manhattan Project? (KV 2/1245 ... KV 2/1270!! and KV 6/41 Ursula Maria Beurton née Kuczynski and https://www.cdvandt.org/rote_drei_espionage.htm and https://www.cdvandt.org/rote_drei_espionage.htm#Roessler and KV 2/1611 Foote; think of the British Cambridge Five: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Five incorporating Philby of M.I.6. Apparently: Britain had an obsession for German matters, and being blind for the rather successful Communist spying in Britain, and beyond!)

(xi) The material provided before the El Alamein battle of Oct. (1942) conformed broadly to our own deception policy, to an extent which sometimes alarmed Galveston, and was thus harmful to the enemy. This suggests a deception scheme, but a clumsier one than Galveston.

(xii) Rath's story that a British subject in Cairo is transmitting direct to Sofia may well be the official German cover which would be known to a junior official.

(i) Cairo to undertake continuous and systematic veracity check. In London each of the Directors of Intelligence has appointed an officer to study Triangle material. In M.E. (Middle East) it is suggested that Chairman of I.S.S.B. (Intelligence Service Special Branch?) should recommend Joint Operational Staff to appoint an operational contact in each of the services for making the veracity check.

(ii) In London a joint committee has cabled for more regular and complete veracity reports. It is agreed that while Section 5 (= V = counter espionage) of S.I.S. are studying the material over the whole field, M.I.5 is responsible for its closer investigation in M.I.5 areas. It is suggested therefore that M.I.5 should provide S.I.M.E. (= Secret Intelligence Middle East) with trained analyser from the point of view of further investigation; would be in close touch with the B. Sec. I.S.L.D. analyser. S.I.M.E. would carry out the veracity inquiry through the operational contacts (i above); I.S.L.D. would consolidate these veracity checks and report to London.

(iii) Major Hester to be asked whether the Signals Board can provide information or inquire about the times of transmission and links of known Allied W/T transmitters in M.E. (Middle East).

1. This analysis has been called for as a result of No. 2571 of 11th January, 1943: "Staff of Eighth Army received report on 9th January that the preparations at Buerat Al Hsun for offensive will be completed between 11th and 15th January. Reports are from Air Force and Southern Armoured Group." This report is considered much too near the truth in such an important matter; and it is therefore required to discover by analysis and investigation the nature of the Moritz messages.

2. It must be remembered that when we see the Moritz messages they are being relayed from Sofia to Ast Wien (on W/T line 7/23, see map above). The interval between the ostensible date of their information and the date of transmission from Sofia is very short: in the period under consideration, usually one day, occasionally two, rarely three. It follows that transmission to Sofia is by W/T; but we have never been able to intercept it.

As long as Moritz was concentrating on Lower Egypt, Palestine, and Syria it was reasonable to suppose a W/T link source Turkey- Sofia, parallel to the link from Ankara and Ahmad to Sofia (= W/T line 7/62). It appeared possible that the |Moritz material might be collected in Turkey from sub-sources and transmitted to Sofia from there. But Moritz's hypothetical move to Libya (Section C below) strains this line of communication beyond endurance. The logical W/T link would be via Greece, of which we have no evidence, either internally or from intercepts of the Aegean services. This, may, however, be due to the fact that the Wagner (Ast Wien Obstlt. von Wahl-Welskirch) Klatt link is apparently independent of the Abwehr network.

3. We intercept no traffic between Sofia and Moritz. Moreover, the return traffic between Vienna (Wien) and Sofia is scanty and consists chiefly of enquiries about past messages. Only once, in the summer of 1942, has Vienna (Ast Wien) passed to Sofia a directive for Moritz; and as far as our evidence goes, it was not carried out.

4. Whereas "Ahmad" (W/T line 7/62) is a substantial figure (= Arnoldo Delisme employed at the Spanish Legation in Ankara, sometime also in Istambul (Istanbul), and our own deception-agents transmit detailed accounts of their notional activities, Moritz remains a wraith. The material at our disposal concerning him is severely restricted to the military, etc, information he gives, and such geographical and factual →

→ significance as we can squeeze out of it. It will be agreed that the prospects are not good.

Experience has shown that the traffic that gives most substance to our knowledge of an enemy intelligence organisation is not the information they pass about us, but the ephemeral organisation and administrative traffic that tells us who, what, and where people are. This is what we lack in Moritz's case.

5. We were first allowed to receive Moritz and Co. in the Middle East in July 1942. During the "El Alamein period" his interest centred largely on the delta but also frequently extended to Palestine, less frequently to S. Syria and Upper Egypt, occasionally to Iraq and Persia (Iran). This geographical diffusiveness persists in the early part of the period now under consideration. He reports on Persia (Iran) and Iraq in early November (1942), on Gibraltar on 28th November, on Basra on 4th December. In the five weeks 5.11.42 - 9.12.42 there are a number of reports on the Egyptian Delta, chiefly Alexandria; but the majority of reports are concerned with the battle area, and after 9th December material from all other areas comes completely to an end, except for two reports from Chad region, which of course, bears fairly closely on Libya.

either (i) Moritz is a coordinating centre, who has in the past controlled a number of geographically widely distributed sub-sources; because their time-lag is so short, they must communicate with him by W/T, e.g. Sofia - Moritz.

or (ii) Moritz is Sofia's name for an organisation comprising a number of sub-sources, similarly scattered, e.g. Sofia = Moritz. (AOB: nonsense!)

This hypothesis is a difficult one; our own deception schemes restrict their material, visual and verbal, within reasonable geographical limits in order to be notionally plausible. It seems to be unnecessarily rash to scatter one's net so wide as Moritz, if he is a deception agent, has done in the past. Whatever his nature, it is evident from paragraph 5 that there has recently been a probably deliberate restriction of his sphere of interest.

7. From the material available it is possible tentatively to deduce approximately an idea of Moritz's location, actual or notional:-

8. From 21.12.42 - 1.1.43 there is a complete break in Moritz messages. Major Crichton had suggested that this might be connected with the Free French move from Hassiat to Marble Arch on 20.12.42, on the hypothesis that Moritz might be a Free French deception scheme. On the other hand, there have been no comparable breaks at other periods in Moritz's advance from Alamein, and we must seek another explanation. A count of messages in 10-days periods is very significant:-

Periods. Total No. of All Reports Total No. of Moritz reports. Moritz Percentage

Thus far, the variation has been confined to narrow limits, but in the next twenty days we have: -

A stagnant period followed by a compensating period of unusually heavy traffic. Although Moritz is more seriously affected in the stagnant period than Sofia's other sources, it is clear that the stagnation is not confined to him, and cannot therefore be ascribed to →

* AOB: 21 December 1942 was a Monday; and Thursday 24 December was, in the German understanding: Heiligabend, when ever possible a family time (the annual gathering). Of course, 25 and 26 Christmas also to be spend in the family time and on the front-line to be joined by their comrades and "a 'Tannenbaum". And Thursday 31 was "Silverster". When possible, they tried to get a bridge between these days. Not to forget on 24 December with the unique Ringsendung: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weihnachtsringsendung (AOB: the Nazi aim was 'propaganda'; but it was nevertheless a technical achievement without foregoing precedent).

→ his changing his position (AOB: the Moritz message focus is moving accordingly towards Tunisia).

About two years before - Rommel's successful DAK campaign started to employ about from here.

9-11 Jan. Widely scattered between Benghazi (please notice the map above), Sirte and Bu Ngem.

10. Veracity reports are unfortunately very meagre, although they become more frequent as we approach the present. A careful check on the veracity of every new Moritz message might ultimately provide important clues to his identity, and should be made through I.S.S.B. (Intelligence Service Special Branch??). Because of their paucity, the deductions made in the following paragraphs are only tentative.

11. We strike a crop of fairly accurate reports about 6-11 December, when Moritz is hypothetically in the Jedabya area:-

No. 2151 8th December. According to report of 6th December, greater part of the British shock troops, including heavy armoured formations, artillery and air forces, moving to coast in order to make push along Gulf of Sirte.'

No. 2143 18th December. According to report of 7th December, one N.Z. (= New Zealand) brigade (No. 6, two armoured battalions, and two engineer Coys., left Jedabya for southern sector of front.

No. 2149 8th December, Remainder of all N.Z divisions and two brigades of Scottish infantry from North Cumberland arrived in area between Zuetina and Jedabya 6th December.

No. 2164 9th December. According to report of 8th December two armoured divisions, 3 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades are on their way to sector of front north of El Agheila. Every night more troops and ammunition come, a large-scale attack is being prepared.

No. 2213 11th December. According to report of 10th December staff of Jedabya has received news that all preliminary work in the front sector has been completed, and that whole of 8th Army is ready to attack.

(a) It is highly improbable that analysis and theorizing in Cairo can provide the clue when the centre of interest has moved so far away (thousands of km westwards).

(b) Now that the material is almost entirely localized in Libya, it is clear that the veracity check can best be made with 8th Army (its Commander was Montgomery) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_Montgomery . There only can an officer investigate the means by which accurate and important information could reach whoever is operating Moritz. (AOB: most likely again the N.K.W.D. (N.K.V.D.) was supplying information to Klatt's organisation) Since the veracity of information can best be checked, and the leakage of information best investigated, whilst it is still fresh in people's minds, it would be desirable that forthcoming Moritz material should be sent to an investigating officer by the quickest means.

(i) Comparison of the dates of Moritz's hypothetical itinerary (see D.) with the moves of Allied units and other possible harbourers of the Moritz organisation.

(ii) Closest attention in future to veracity reports and to reports purporting to know our intentions (see E. and F.). Where these latter are proved to be accurate, careful investigation of the diffusing of this information.

(iii) Attention to Moritz's hypothetical location over short periods (a week is a convenient unit; c.f. sketch-maps in Appendix. Whenever his information becomes well localised (e.g. 2 - 16 December, c.f. paragraph 7), D/F should be used to try and catch Moritz/transmitting (AOB: too simple imaginations) but to do this the material must be available immediately at 8th Army.

(d) The material, although less scattered than it used to be, still shows a considerable diversity in its substance and in localisation. It ranges over Army, Navy and air; it still covers large areas of Libya in a week. The hypothesis of an espionage network cast so wide as secretly to cover this wide field seems too much at the present stage. It is not as if Moritz had suddenly come to life as a post-occupational organisation; on the contrary, he has followed our advance all through from the (Nile) Delta. It would seem more likely that his information is obtained officially or semi-officially, rather than through espionage; (AOB: true, as it all went via Russian Liaison channels, in which at a certain instant the N.K.W.D. (N.K.V.D.) selected what suited their objectives) and that its level of accuracy is determined by the intention to deceive, carried out with less circumspection than our own deception schemes. It is not the less important to try to identify the source (AOB: had this not all the time being their aim?)

21. The suggestion has been made that Moritz might be obtained by enemy's interception of Russian or Polish signals - it is believed that Max is the interception of Russian signals. This theory, however, raises great difficulties:-

(i) The time factor. The Poles appear to have no intelligence near to 8th Army than Cairo, and the nearest permanent Soviet Intelligence is in Turkey or Persia, unless there are secret Soviet Intelligence organisation further south, of which we know nothing. It is surely too much to suppose that information could be gathered from 8th Army material by a hypothetical organisation of this kind, collated and transmitted, intercepted by the enemy, and regularly re-transmitted from Sofia in the text 1-2 days. We know the time-lags that have occurred in the production of our own Triangle.

(ii) The factual content of Moritz's 8th Army material would seem to be an insuperable obstacle to any theory which supposes that it is compiled anywhere except in the forward area (e.g. Major Crichton's suggestion that it might be due to a leakage from the War Information Room) (AOB: this is not unrealistic at all, as in Britain there operated the Cambridge Five spies of which almost all were actually engaged in the Intelligence Services!) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Five). We are once again handicapped by the fact that what we see is not the original material, but what Sofia (Luftmeldekopf Klatt) chooses to make of it; but so much of it is such very localised material that it can hardly be known anywhere except in the forward area. Who, in Cairo for example, would know that an Indian brigade had marched through Sirte, or the number of each type of aircraft on an airfield, on the previous day? And would it interest either our Polish or our Russian allies to know these facts? The essential thing about Moritz recently is that his information would be unlikely to be known within the time outside the forward area; for that reason, it would seem to be in the forward area that we should look for the source.

Following the route of Rommel's retreat from Egypt towards the direction of Tunisia, after the two battles of El Alamein

There is no direct evidence about Moritz's methods either (a.) of collecting his information or (b.) of passing it on to Sofia. It may, nevertheless, be taken as certain that the pas-on to Sofia is done by W/T from Egypt, for nothing else can explain the speed with which the reports are relayed from Sofia to Wien (Vienna). The analogies of Max and Anker (= Velikotny at the Spanish Legation in Ankara towards LMK in Sofia) too furnish a strong argument for W/T communication. It is likely enough that Moritz, like Max, uses the cover of neutral procedure for his transmissions. There can be no serious doubt that this traffic exists, though it is not yet been intercepted or identified.

As for the question of how Moritz collects his information, we can only make a probable guess. Either

b.) He derives his information from local, well-informed quarters, in the manner of Anker.

The first alternative is unlikely, if not impossible. Agents so numerous and so far-flung, operating in the front-line of our armies' advances and retreats in Africa, Palestine and Syria, belong surely to the realm of fiction.

Technical problems of equipments, schedules and staff would surely be beyond the powers of Moritz at his hide-out in Cairo or elsewhere.

→ operates, like Anker (= Velikotny; KV 2/1656; PF 67232 typically a low number; by the way, a quite un-friendly summary), under cover of neutral diplomatic establishment, and his sources of information are the higher diplomatic circles. His agents operate with military and naval attachés, embassy personnel, and well-informed persons of all sorts. The reporting to Moritz by his agents is done principally by word of mouth, perhaps to a certain extent by post.

a.) It is consistent with the facts of the one Luftmeldekopf (Klatt in Sofia) establishment known to us in detail, viz. Anker's party.

b.) It explains, (as I think nothing else can do) the regularity and the speed of Moritz messages - unaccountable. if he depends on his own interception, decipherment and evaluation of W/T reports.

c.) It deposes of the network of super-spies in the British Army from (El) Alamein to Misurata.

d.) It explains the tone and content of many Moritz-reports, e.g. those which refer to the issue of general orders to units in different places, facts obtainable at Headquarters, but hardly elsewhere.

It is worth observing the Max's Samoijlow, the only agent whom Max has ever named, was a Staff captain, presumably a source of information parallel to some of Anker's and Moritz's attachés and their hangers-on.

In conclusion: while I do not suggest that the devout padre of (decrypt) Isk 28314 is Moritz himself, he may at least be a very near relation - a super-agent in the highest diplomatic sphere, precisely where the evidence places Moritz.

Moritz reports began on 5/12/41, though they were not at first headed 'Moritz". Up to 6/1/43 there have been 502 Moritz reports, known to us. These represent a large fraction but certainly not the whole of those sent by Sofia to (Ast Wien, by means of W/T) Vienna.

The majority of these reports have been received by Wien (Vienna) within 24-28 hour of their dispatch from (/) Egypt and in most ascertainable cases within 48 hours of the happenings reported on. Moritz reports are deemed reliable enough to be forwarded from Berlin to the Abwehr Officer with Kesselring and sometimes to the Naval Intelligence Officers of Sofia and Athens. They are known to be not always accurate, but Kesselring's Abwehr Officer complains if the supply dries up.

The Spanish Minister Prat (Minister the Spanish Ankara Legation) (Soutzo Pedro KV 2/1465; PF 67230), who desired all Luftmeldekopf (Klatt) (in Sofia) intelligence, is, apparently, to be kept quite with Moritz and Ibis reports. Max reports, for special reasons, are clearly not going to be given to him. So Moritz it is thought to merit the highest degree of security.

Moritz reports give military, naval and air force intelligence as well as some which is primarily political. About a quarter of the reports deal with air force matters, about a seventh with marine matters, the rest with military plus a few political matters. On the other hand the air force and marine intelligence is as a rule much more detailed than are the reports on troop-movements etc. Airfield equipment convoy and compositions are described with an appearance of precision. Troop-strength are not estimated. Moritz seldom if ever identifies military, naval or air force units, save in so far as he occasionally mentions their nationalities. Battle-order particulars are not given. The reports appear generally to issue from the visual observation of |Moritz or from hearsay and not from the visual observations of Moritz or from hearsay and not from official documents or from questioning.

→ keep the aerodrome of Burg El Arab under continuous observation for at least 10 days, reporting on the number of aircraft and mentioning the time of observation. He was not instructed to ask any questions. (there is no sign that he fulfilled this assignment).

Moritz reports deal with the following areas: Egypt, Libya, Tripolitania, Syria, Palestine, Cyprus, Irak, Iran (Persia), Sudan, Red Sea, Persian Gulf. It is noteworthy that while about a third of his first hundred reports dealt with Syria and Palestine, only three or four of his last hundred or so. It is still more noteworthy that from about the middle of November Moritz reports have dealt with Libya, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, almost to the exclusion of anything else. Tobruk, Derna, Benghasi, Agedabia, Sirte, seem to be successive origins of Moritz reports over the last two months. Moritz intelligence seems to hail from the area Derna round 20/11/42, from area Benghasi during the the last ten days of November and early December, from area Benghasi-Agedabia during second and third weeks of December, from El Ageila and area El Ageila-Sirte during the first week of January (43). What is general knowledge in Alexandria and Cairo no longer features largely, as it had before, in Moritz reports. The interference is that Moritz has moved west with the Eighth Army, and that before this advantage he had been at a base in Egypt.

The 'hotness' of his reports proves that he must be in W/T contact with Sofia or with a permanent intermediate relaying-station working in Sofia. The former is the more economical supposition. In either case, if he is with the 8th Army, he must be either an authorized W/T station, doing Abwehr work 'on the side'. He must also be able to encipher and decipher messages.

He must then communicate with Sofia (or an intermediate relaying-station) with a cipher and W/T procedure which resemble his normal authorised cipher and procedure. He →

→ must transmit nearly every day. (One or two possibly significant gaps will be mentioned later).

On 16/3/42 Sofia passed a Moritz message to Vienna (Wien) at 1512 GMT. The report mentioned the arrival of an American Air Force Mission at Suez early on that day. As Sofia could hardly receive, decipher, appreciate, perhaps rewrite and re-cipher the report in less than an hour, Moritz must have transmitted from Egypt before say 1400 hours on that day. Similarly on 29/3/42 Moritz must have sent his report before 1500 hours on that day. On 16/6 he must have transmitted before 1800 hours, and on the 17th before 1600 hours; on 17/8 before 1700 hours; on 27/8 before 1600 hours, on 16/9 before 1900 hours. This only proves that Moritz sometimes transmits fairly early in the day. On an ordinary day Moritz's transmission would take between 15 and 40 minutes. Moritz's habit of giving detailed particulars about airfields, his Burg El Arab assignment and the fact that he works for I Luft (military intelligence Luftwaffe related) suggest that he may have some connection with the R.A.F. or some Allied air force. And he should have been at Burg El Arab in the latter half of August. (Of course Moritz may stand for a collection of persons, in which the man at Burg El Arab need not now be in Tripolitania).

There has been nothing to indicate in what language Moritz's messages are originally written.

Until the middle of November, Moritz would seem to have been in Egypt, probably based on Alexandria, though with some freedom of movement. (AOB: was freedom that much restricted under British occupation?) During this period while the bulk of the intelligence secured dealt with what could have been observed or overheard in Egypt, a considerable part consisted of reports, often 'hot', from Syria, Palestine, Cyprus, Irak, Iran (Persia) and other remote places. How did Moritz secure this intelligence?

sent from say, Beirut, Haifa, Cyprus, Bagdad, etc. direct to Sofia, else it would not have dried up in the middle of November. Moreover, the tidings from, say, Cyprus or Bander Shahpur came at irregular intervals and often in splashes, which independent W/T services would have obviated. Somehow the intelligence came quickly to Moritz, who sent it alongside of Egyptian and Libyan intelligence to Sofia.

There is nothing to show what these outside sources were and how they communicated the new to Moritz (save that the time available rules out anything but W/T or land-line).

It is possible that Moritz has informants in or visiting all or most of the localities from which these reports come. In this case they would, perhaps, communicate by sub-rosary use of an authorised transmitter. Alternatively the intelligence may come to Moritz's office as to an official clearing-house, some of which intelligences Moritz steals for his private use. In this case Moritz would have to be working for an Intelligence organisation such as the Staff of one of the Services. The intelligence itself seems not to be of any one restricted type, but political information, riots, morale, disaffection. etc., bulk rather largely.

Note: There have been the following gaps in the series of Moritz reports. Some of them may have been due to trouble in interception, or to holidays or preoccupation in Sofia.

29/3/42 - 7/4/42: 20/4/42 - 25/4/42; 11/5/42 - 15/5/42: 20/5/42 - 2/6/42: 2/7/42 - 25/7/42: 2/10/42 - 6/10/42: 31/10/42 - 3/11/42: 12/11/42 - 16/11/42; 21/12 - 2/1/43 (AOB: already noticed this period of the years was the utmost family and/or with their military comrades whenever possible even in Russia gathering around a Christmas-tree; Christmas time was between 24 .. 26 and Silvester on 31 and the 1 of January) 2/1/43: If a possible Moritz is found, some of his spells of absence , if any, should coincide with some of these gaps. But as, normally, a message sent by Moritz on Wednesday, say, is not passed on from Sofia to Vienna (Ast Wien) till Thursday or Friday, his dates of inaction would be one or two anterior to these gap-dates.

Budapest to Sofia (Stroh) (AOB: Klatt/ Karmany started operating from late September 1943 operating from Budapest with his station Bully - This is curious, as 7/1 would imply 7/1/44, which is on the line of some of the content)

English armoured (corrupt passage: possibly division number 7)) infantry divisions number fifty and 50-one can no longer be traced as being employed at the front orin W/T traffic. Where have these units got to? What has happened to equipment? What units have gone to Italy to replace then, and where did these come from? (AOB: The Allied forces landed at the Isle of Sicily early August 1943 thus the message must originate from thereafter; which shows that the didn't much dare of historical correctness)

I would like to transcribe the first intercepted and deciphered message interchanged between Sophia to Vienna (Ast Wien)

3284 Sofia to Wien (Vienna). kakx?m ssa on 7100 (kHz?) at 1539 on 22.2 (1943) 781718

Heavy artillery with 35 guns 3 motorised artillery regiments, 2 motorised battalions of engineers and parts of the English armoured division number 7 were on the way from Ben Gardane to Medenina, 70 km to the west of this, on 21.2. (1943).

A, "MO" report dated September 27th forwarded to Belgrade I Luft Wien September 29th. (1943?)

C. 2 Canadian Parachutist Battalions, 2 Yugoslav Infantry Battalions, 1 Greek air-borne, 1 Greek Infantry Regiment, 2 South African Infantry Battalions, 1 Indian Infantry Regiment.

E. Our comment (Post war British). This must be Klatt's source our old friend Moritz.

I have now had the letter of introduction and meteorlogical information promised by Dr. Johnson at he interview on 21.4.43. I send you:

(b) The movements of met. units in the Western desert from October, 1942 to February, 1943.

I have, on second thoughts, sent you (b) complete, as it seems to me possible that Moritz, if he has been operating in the Western desert at all, may have changed his met. unit in the course of his operations, but No. 122 is the important one, and on it Dr. Johnson comments:

"You will observe that there is a striking resemblance between the itinerary of No. 122 Mobile Met. Unit and that in the note which left with me. This unit is the original mobile unit formed in the M.E. (Middle East) and its history can therefore be given back to Feb. 1942. The other mobile units were not formed until about October 1942 for the big offensive."

(b) that he has no precise information about the corresponding Russian organisation in the field, except that it is framed on similar lines to that in the Middle East. He will, however, see Major Evsiev as soon as he is available, but is not very hopeful about getting detailed information from him.

(* AOB: I hope that this Dr. Johnson is not the same person whom interrogated Fidrmuc and Klatt; if so he is, in my perception, not the smartest person; and also quite an untrue actor. M.I.5 considered him an expert; which, in my perception, he definitely was not)

Movements of Meteorological Units in Western Desert from October 1942, to February, 1943.

The unit was a Wadi Natrum from 1st to 7th November, at Burg El Arab from 7th to 18th November (1942), at Sidi Haneist from 18th to 24th November, at Gazala from 25th to 30th November ('42).

At Gazala from 1st to 9th December and at Er Regina (near Bengahzi) from 11th to 30th December ('42). An advanced party left Er Regina on 10th January arrived Nofilia on 13th January, leaving on 23rd and arriving Buerat 24th January ('43). Departed Buerat 26th January arriving Tripoli on 27th January.

Main party left Er Regina on 26th January and reached Tripoli on 31st January ('43).

Located 6 miles of Tripoli early February, but moved to a site 2 miles west of the town.

At Ismailia 1st to 13th November; Burg el Arab 14th to 17th November ('43) 1st to 13th November; Burg el Arab 14th to 17th November, Quotefeiya 17th to 24th November and at Menastir (10 miles west of Bardia) from 30 th November.

Left Menastir 20th January, arriiving at Magrun (45 miles south of Benghazi) in two sections on 23rd and 26th January (1943).

Full reporting station opened at Marble Arch (Tobruk Felini area?) on 6th February.

This unit left Ramleh on 17th December and arrived at El Adem on 25 December. Took over from A.H.Q. W.D. on 20th January. Following stations were included in collectives transmitted to Almaza:- Met. Tobruk from 1st January; No. 13 Met. Unit from 11th to 19th January; Met. Derna from 11th January; Met. Benghazi (via Tobruk) from 25th January.

(AOB: I suppose that we have got at least some idea about the displacements of the British Meteorological mobile station in North Africa).

I am most grateful to you for your letter of the 23rd April and its enclosures, and am looking forward to discussing this matter with G/C. Batty in Cairo.

The itinerary of No. 122 Mobile Met. Unit is of great interest. I understand that this is a unit of the type which you have classed as (D) in your first document If so, it seems to follow from that document that it sends out reports:

i.e. the only encoded and enciphered messages sent by W/T from a mobile unit such as No. 122 would be sent on a transmitter of a range to limited to range Cairo from its present position in Tunisia and these reports would be sent at seven fixed times daily.

1. Are these times of No. 122's legitimate transmissions? And what are the frequencies of these transmissions?

2. Can you rule out the possibility that these transmitters are powerful enough to be received by any enemy in the Balkans, e.g., at Sofia? If you could let me know what sort of W/T sets these mobile units have and what their kilo-wattage is, I should be very grateful. Do these Units all operate "W/T Specialist Vehicles" of the type refused to No. 124m and what is the type?

One further question: have you any information about Met. reports (if any) sent out by ships in the Eastern Mediterranean?

If these questions can more easily be answered by G.C. Batty, please do not trouble to reply. If you get the report for March or any further information from Major Evsiev I should be very glad to have it.

1. Ibis. On 19.4.43 Berlin told Rome that Ibis is a steamship captain. Berlin's assertion need not, of course, be true, but it is likely to be so, since the information is passing between responsible I luft officers and Ibis, we know for a Meldekopf of I Luft. The information would give a satisfactory explanation of several (but not all) of the peculiarities of Ibis reports.

a) The first five Ibis reports dealt not only with Turkey, but specifically with Turkish harbour and maritime matters. It is easy to conjecture how a steamship might begin its career in Turkish waters and continue them in British (more correct: controlled) waters, but very hard to conjuncture how anyone else could control a W/T set first in a Turkish and later in a British (controlled) zone.

b) Ibis reports are sent intermittently. There are many periods of silence lasting for one or two weeks, followed by spates of activity. A ship in a British-occupied port is compelled to keep W/T silence, and the ban and other kinds of control are removed when she is at sea.

c) Ibis seems to have knowledge or hearsay information about most of the main ports in the Eastern Aegean, Egypt, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, as well as about convoy movements in these waters (But Moritz too sends many such reports).

So it is reasonable to conjecture that Ibis is a ship's captain, induced to exchange Turkish coastwise trade for a more profitable double business in the British (controlled) Middle East. We need not suppose that he visits every harbour on which he reports. Much of his intelligence might well hail from yarns with other mariners; or Ibis may have other seagoing sug-agents working for him. But there is a smell of authenticity about many of his reports which suggests that Ibis himself visits from time to time some of the following: Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Port Sudan, Massawa, Basra, Bander Shahpur, Jaffa, Haifa, Tripolis, Beirut, Nicosia, Famagusta.

This information about Ibis's profession throws no light on the nature of his W/T communications with Sofia or with his sub-agents (if he has W/T communications with sub-agents). It also leaves unexplained his knowledge of purely military and air force matters and of affairs in North Persia. (AOB: the latter might point at a Russian related link as well)

Lt. Wilhelm Knorr @ Keller has ruh(?) the I M reporting-station at Varna since the beginning of 1942. This station reports to Vienna (Ast Wien) on Service 7/97 (Greek and west Black Sea waters) (now 2/5184 this point as control by I M Berlin), chiefly about Turkish and Russian marine matters. (Bulgaria was not at war with Russia) Knorr recruits as informants Officers of ships plying in the appropriate waters, chiefly Russians, Bulgarians and Turks. He gets some intelligence and is requested to get more about the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. He has already sent in reports some of considerable elaborateness about Haifa, Izmir, Cyprus, Alexandria, Gibraltar, etc. We know of several mariners who have produced or are intended to produce such information, namely Captain Mikhailov, Captain Bogomil Alexieff Kostoff, Obergefreiter Lange (W/T engineer), Captain Karlowski, Captain Ibrahim, Lieut. Aleko Kirov, Captain Achmed Hassan, as well as two commercial individuals, Murat Dilber and Vladimir Mikhailov Vilenski (perhaps).

One enterprise which was planned last June concerned the steamship Balkan. This vessel had a →

→ German W/T operator on board and a transmitting apparatus suitable for a certain purpose. It was intended to establish W/T traffic for the purpose of speedier passing of intelligence. This ship was later steaming towards Brindisi, hugging the coast, apparently not yet having received the W/T and perhaps the cipher-instructions. Captain B. Alexieff Kostoff was on board, not certainly as Captain of the ship. Kostoff is not listed in October among Keller's agents 'for reason known to you' (Leiter I M, Ast Wien (Vienna)). On 11.5.42 Knorr says of Kostoff that 'at the instigation of the GFP (= Geheinefeldpolizei) the connection was once again given up'.

Two messages of last April 18 and 24, 1942 (Isos 25520 and 26164) indicate that Kostoff had reported to Varna on Turkish destroyers in Alexandretta and had therefore at that time been an agent of Knorr. On April 20, 1943 we hear again of this man, for Knorr wants a check-up on a Russian Vilenski for possible agent work in Trebizond or Izmir 'in connection with Kostoff undertaking' which suggests that Kostoff is still operating, though not for Varna. The steamship Balkan was in Trieste this January. There is no evidence that she forwards intelligence to Varna by W/T as was suggested. But it is clear that she does not ply in British-controlled waters. As Kostoff is associated with an Abwehr undertaking, we may presume that he like Lange is no longer with this ship.

Obergefreiter Lange, W/T engineer, who had been on the Balkan, has since been reported on 9/11/42 as volunteering by courier-mail to keep Varna informed of his present activity on a camouflaged sailing vessel which was acting as submarine trap. It is not clear for which side the vessel is working. We may suspect that she is officially working for us. There is no evidence that he does in fact report to Varna or elsewhere.

At this stage we are left with the mere possibility that Ibis was recruited by Varna to report on Turkey and then transferred to the Luftmeldekopf (Klatt) Sofia. There are one or two faint indications which very slightly strengthen the conjuncture.

a) Knorr's boss, Kpt. Sokol @ Junghanns, Leiter I M Wien (Vienna) (Korv.-Kpt. Hans Sokol Leiter Ast I M; very capable men), certainly had some liaisons with Major (Obstlt) von Wahl-Welskirch @ Wagner, leiter I Luft, Wien (Vienna), who is the of the Luftmeldekopf (Klatt), Sofia. In March 1942 Klatt of the Luftmeldekopf had to book hotel rooms for Sokol and Kptlt. Schueler (= D2140 D2140return).

b) There are certain parallelisms between a few of the early Ibis reports and some Varna reports which suggest (but are far from proving) that they emanate from one source.

e.g. line 7/23 (= Luftmeldekopf Sofia - Ast Wien), 28.4.42 (Isos 26626) is a report on Bandirma slightly reminiscent of 7/97 (not on our W/T map reconstruction), 20.3.42 (Isos 23549).

Whether or not Ibis was originally connected with Meldekopf Varna, and whether or not he can be identified with one or two of Knorr's Levantine informants, it is clear that the activities of Mikhailov, Karlowski, Kostoff, Lange, Ibrahim, Alim, Achmed Hassan, Murat Dilber and perhaps Vilenski need to be investigated and curbe. Of these, Captain Bogomil Alexieff Kostoff seems to be the most intriguing character.

The following are the arguments put forward by Captain Ryle of Section V.w. in favour of his hypothesis in connection with the Moritz reports.

1. Rot (Mirko Rot, KV 2/1713 Jewish; PF 65653) said that Klatt can interpret the Max and Moritz reports as he goes along when they are passed to him on the telephone (on the other side of the line was the White-Russian Ira Longin).

2. Max and Moritz and Ibis reports are all very similar in style and vocabulary.

3. The proper names of aeroplanes, units, etc. are very seldom given. (AOB: The Russian NKWD (NKVD) the real source apparently was not sufficiently informed on air related matters)

4. The inference is that these reports are sent in a code (as opposed to a cypher) which is probably the same or similar in all cases. It is quite possible that the groups taken from original code book which is common for all these reports are subsequently recyphered before transmission.

5. Moritz must have a fairly good transmitter as he sends blind, sends every day, and if he sends blind he must send at a fixed time. This would argue that he has access and makes use of a transmitter of a much greater power and size than that which can be carried by a peripatetic agent.

6. Even now, when Moritz is reporting Mareth or beyond, he has been able to give information about Egyptian matters of a non-military type which one would not expect to be available in the Mareth Line (Southern Tunisia)

7. He has reported convoys leaving Alexandria for the West which are quite specific as to numbers, although no →

names of ships are given. Even times of sailing are given, e.g. "A convoy of ... ships left Alexandria at 1800 this morning for the West". It should be possible to check whether Moritz is accurate on these points. It would seem difficult to believe that these could be pure inventions as the enemy could easily check them by aerial reconnaissance.

8. Most of his reports have been based on observations at airfields. Ryle proposes a rhetorical question, who at an airfield would be so little upset by operations that he could work at a fixed hour day in and day out.

9. Moritz' reports contain English high officers' surnames which are expressed in a phonetically correct manner, but with the wildest spelling, as "Macnarton" for MacNaughton. This provides considerable confirmation of the use of a code (i.e. a code book as opposed to a cypher). Moritz and Ibis write "geliopolis", "gilliopolis" or "galliopolis" when they wish to refer to the R.A.F. at Heliopolis. This is a characteristic Slav attempt at phonetic spelling and would be justified by the assumption that the groups in the code book provided essentially for their use by a Slav-speaking agent. Hence the connection with Max. On one occasion Moritz described British fighter or pursuit planes as "Istrijebietel", a Russian word meaning "fighters". This again suggests that the original code may have been prepared for use by Russians. (AOB: this is correct, as to what we know, the main channel of information were provided by the Russian N.K.W.D. (N.K.V.D.))

From this Ryle suggests the possibility that there may be an officer in an Allied Air Force Meteorological Service who is responsible for these reports. It should be remembered that there is an International Meteorological Code, in which the same symbols represent the same ideas in all languages. A copy of this code could →

be used with new meanings written against the standard groups. The groups taken from the International Meteorological Code would normally be re-ciphered by some trans-literation process as is normally done in connection with legitimate weather reports in wartime. The Meteorological Officer must have access to an adequate transmitter, and he definitely does make his reports at fixed standard times. It is by no means impossible that an agent, having made his official weather reports, might afterwards transmit on a different frequency another message which would have all the appearances of being a weather report but which would be ignored by the Meteorological Service because the frequency was wrong, and which would also be ignored by the Y Units and other interception services because it had the appearances of a meteorological report. Ryle would therefore like us to ascertain what is the general pattern of British and Allied met. working. If his hypothesis were correct, the offender might be in a Polish or European Allied Air Service, or he might conceivably be found in the American Air Service. (AOB: Britain subjects apparently being totally blind for the actual existence of Communist sympathies among British subjects! As in the 1950s and 1960s was proved within the British Secret Services; known as the Cambridge Five!!) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Five)

Moritz gives reports primarily concerned with the airfield at which he appears to be stationed at any moment, but also has sources at Haifa, Jaffa, Basra, Alexandria, Tel El Aviv and Cyprus. The sources in ports have commonly given information about shipping movements. Information about convoy movements would very rapidly be known at air stations the hour of departure because the air stations concerned would have to be notified so that they could provide cover for these convoys and at least avoid attacking them. For the same reason they would be notified of the number of ships in the convoy, but not of their names. Finally, Ryle would like to ask the Met. Office whether there has been a met. reporting station at the air station at Medenine (Tunisia) South recently. Moritz reports dealt largely with this for a period of some six weeks prior to the cracking of the Mareth Line (Southern Tunisia).

1. Between 9.12.41 and 25.3.43 we have read about 930 Moritz and Ibis reports (670 odd Moritz and 260 odd Ibis). This includes as Moritz a few early reports from the British Middle East which had no heading. About 90 of these reports which had been missed or not deciphered on Service 7/23 (Wien - Sofia) were found forwarded on Service 2/56 Berlin - Taormina or Rome (= Frascati = Togo were Kesselring's communication centres, depending where he actually resided). This total probably represents well over half, though a good deal less than the whole of their reports received by Sofia.

2. Of these reports about 100 give details of the complements of air fields in the British Middle East, numbers of aircraft, A/A defences, searchlights, etc. About 120 report the arrivals and departures of aircraft-formations. A few more report the movements and locations of parachute-units, the results of the airfield bombing by the Germans, A/A defences, including balloon barrages at key-points, etc. So about 250 of the reports concern strictly air Force matters.

3. Over 130 of the messages report convoy movements, embarkations, disembarkations etc. in Middle East ports, i.e. concern strictly naval matters.

4. The bulk of the remainder report movements of the military units, military supplies, communications, etc.

5. The apparent sources of the information given in the messages are preponderantly in Egypt, Libya and Tripolitania. But there is a steady flow of Cypus, Palestine, Syria, Irak, Iran (Persia) with a few from Turkey, Abyssinia, Malta, Gibraltar etc.

= about 320 reports in all hailing from these 5 territories. Of the Haifa reports about 2/3 are naval; of the Beirut reports nearly a half are naval, of the Basra reports about half are naval, of the Basra reports about half are naval, ditto with Cyprus. All but one of the Tripolis reports are naval.

Since the battle of El Alamein very few Moritz reports have hailed from sources other than the 8th Army's forward and rear areas. It has been left to Ibis to keep up the supply of reports from Irak, Iran, Syria, Palestine and Cyprus.

6. The majority of Moritz reports are passed on by Sofia to Vienna when only on day 'cold'; few are more than 2 days 'cold'. Ibis reports are generally 2-4 days 'cold'.

7. Neither Moritz nor Ibis reports are credited by the Germans with 100% reliability. But the Abwehr Officer at Rome with Oberbefeldshaber Süd (Kesselring?) complains if Moritz reports do not arrive. Other operational headquarters are also fed fairly promptly with Moritz and Ibis reports.

8. It is clear that Moritz and Ibis reports are transmitted to the Luftmeldekopf, Sofia, by W/T, but their transmissions have never been identified or intercepted by us. The presumption is that their W/T procedure mimics that of British or Allied authorised transmissions. Moritz should be transmitting for 5-20 minutes nearly every day. Ibis is much more irregular, but on some occasions should be on the air for a longer time. (AOB: when a - or the messages - demanded for extensive transmission intervals)

9. It is almost certain that both transmit 'blind' i.e. that Sofia does not even acknowledge reception by W/T, much less transmit messages to them. (AOB: again - most sensitive information was provided by the Russian N.K.W.D. (N.K.V.D.); the channel was always via a Russian Legation. The intermediate channel mainly was the White-Russian Ira Longin. His engagement was essential as the raw material was in Russian language and necessitated translation first) For R.S.S. (British Radio Security Service, employing quite many British volunteers). watched the Luftmeldekopf transmissions for over a year without finding a trace of transmissions to unidentified answering-stations. (AOB: for such an endeavour the intercept stations need to be more or less directly boarding the region in which communication takes place. The most near by may be considered being Cyprus or Egypt. However, what might have been possible is, that the British Legation in Istambul situated also an wireless interception facility. Britain would have been too far remote as to cope with dead-zone and propagation aspects. Because signals jumping over the British Isles; neglecting the impossibility of proper propagation). Moreover, we know that on one occasion it took a fortnight for Klatt to get a reply from Ibis to a specific query. Recently, Klatt has said that he cannot now communicate with Moritz. In the analogous case of Tobias, we know that the Germans estimated that it would take three weeks to get a question to Tobias (then in Cairo). The answer actually arrived in a little over three weeks, so we must assume that there is a courier-route to Egypt by which alone Sofia can communicate with Ibis, Moritz and Tobias. Klatt's inability to communicate now with Moritz is presumably due to the lack of an under-cover route from Egypt to Tunisia. If Moritz and Ibis transmit 'blind' they are bound to adhere to fixed timetables for their transmissions, modified only after notice has been given. The steady flow of uncorrupted messages indicates that their transmitters are quite powerful.

10. While veracity checks indicate that much of what Moritz and Ibis report is entirely or substantially false, they also indicate that some items are true, and some of these important. Some of the true reports could hardly have been based on guesswork or on hearsay from a distance. So Moritz at least must be present in the localities from which his veracious reports appear to hail (flood). If so, Moritz must have advanced with the 8th Army and must have been for some time in the recent past at or near Medenine (Tunisia).

11. As anyhow some of Moritz's airfield reports are veracious, Moritz must have some sort of personal access to 8th Army airfields. His Wien (Vienna) employers told Klatt last August to tell Moritz to watch Burg El Arab airfield for ten consecutive days, which indicates that they believed him to have such access.

→ own personalities or affairs in their reports - at least as we see these reports. The following bits of indirect evidence are therefore worth considering:-

a) Their spelling of the names of British Generals is very quaint (old fashioned). We find 'Kenningham' or 'Keningham' (for Cunningham) in both; Moritz speaks of Magnarton, Holms (frequently), Montgommery, Pinar (for Pienaar), Autchinlek, Mackrierry (for McCreery), Air Marshall Tudor (for Air Marshal Tedder).

b) Both Moritz and Ibis spell 'Heliopolis' as 'Geliopolis', Gilio Polis or 'Galiopolis'; (this is corrected when the messages are forwarded from Berlin to Rome).

c) Moritz on one early occasion 24.4.42 (on 2/56 = Berlin - Taormina/Togo/Frascati near to Rome) calls a certain type of English fighter aircraft "Isterijebitel".

All these items indicate that Moritz and Ibis are not British, items b) and c) indicate that they are Slaves, whose messages are in Russian.

13. Moritz and Ibis are very reluctant to mention the numbers or names of military units of Air Force units or of ships. Recently Moritz and Ibis have begun to mention now and again Division numbers and sometimes Brigade numbers. Aircraft types are hardly ever specified. Moritz once mentioned Wellingtons and in one report he spoke of Fortresses, Lancasters, Bostons and Stirlings. He has never mentioned Spitfires, Hurricanes, Blenheims, etc. at all. So his airfield inventories, though precise about numbers are extremely indefinite about the types of the aircraft. Apart from Generals and one or two statesmen, no individuals are ever named. Nor does Moritz ever describe particular air operations or losses suffered or inflicted in them. There seems no good reason why Moritz should be at once so informative and so uninformative. On the other hand, he is generally very precise about place-names and locations.

14. Moritz and Ibis seem to have the same sources for their intelligence from Syria, Palestine, Irak, Iran (Persia) and Cyprus. Their style of reporting is identical, one or two of their spelling errors are identical, and on one or two occasions their reports deal with the same topic, but their activities appear to be independent. Ibis seems to have remained in Egypt, while Moritz has moved west as far as the Mareth line (Southern Tunisia). Moritz seems to keep in W/T touch with Egypt, and on rare occasions he still reports on happenings in the Levant. There is nothing to show how Moritz and Ibis are fed with 'hot' intelligence from Haifa, Beirut, Jaffa, Teheran, Bandar Shahpur, Bagdad, Mosul or Cyprus.

Note: It has been suggested that Moritz and Ibis are Russian double-crossers. The point is of very slight importance for any case they represent a grandiose leakage of information or misinformation uncontrolled by us, using a communication-method, appreciated by the Germans but completely undetected by us. Our security-system has been trickled for a year and a quarter, and the hypothesis that its motives are anti-German brings little reassurance.

On the assumption that Moritz is a person who generally reports either on what he has himself observed or on what is local knowledge, Moritz seems to have been in to following areas at the following periods:-

West of Alexandria (Damanhar - El Daba, perhaps in Damanhur itself or Burg El Arab) Late June - early November, 1942

Please digest the contents yourself as reproducing column-rows is becoming rather clumsy!

1. Mirko Rot (= KV 2/1713, PF 65653), whose information about the Luftmeldekopf (Klatt, in Sofia) has been very accurate, says that he had heard that the person communicating intelligence by W/T from Egypt was a British Officer. He does not distinguish between Moritz and Ibis.

2. In view of what we know of Afrikaans fanatics and of what some people whisper about Tobruk, it seems more likely that a suitable traitor could be found in a South African unit than in any other English (Oh, they weren't yet aware of the British Cambridge Five whom were actually Russian spies, but a non Britain was suspected in stead) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Five) or Dominions unit.

3. 26 Moritz and 14 Ibis reports mention South African units or individuals or E. or S.E. African ports. This is not in itself very significant. But Moritz once mentions the number of a South African division (a specification which he rarely gives) (Isos 50317 of 18/1/43). Ibis once mentions that 2 South African officers and 26 privates were being court-martialled in connection with sabotage to a pipe-line near Haifa. (Isos 36080 of 17/8/42). Ibis reports that some disaffected Indian troops had been removed to South Africa (Isos 37128 0f 28/8/42).

On the 3rd of January 1943 both Ibis and Moritz forwarded reports, both of 31/12/42 about a force moving from Lake Chad into South Libya. Ibis said that they were S. African brigades; Moritz gave more details about the force, especially its air complement, but did not say that the brigades were South African. This case strongly suggests that Ibis and Moritz had on this occasion a common source for their intelligence (Isos 49080 and 49200 of 3/1/43).

While Moritz was, apparently, still in Egypt, both he and Ibis got intelligence from Syria, Palestine, South Iraq and Iran, Cyprus, etc., and Ibis still does so. I have not detected any other near-identical reports hailing from these geographical sources which are common to them.

4. Though Moritz's chief business seems to be to report on British airfields, a/c (= aircraft), air force personnel, etc., he has, I think, never yet mentioned the South African Air Force, though he frequently refers to Polish, Czech, American and Australian crews, squadrons etc. Perhaps Moritz is anxious not to betray (or betray intimate knowledge of) the unit to which he belongs.

5. The chief difficulty in the view that Moritz and Ibis belong to the same set-up is the fact that the first few Ibis reports dealt with internal Turkish affairs. Since then hardly any have done so. This is hard to explain anyhow.

In default of any other scent, I should, without much confidence, I look for a South African officer, with Afrikaner traits, controlling an authorised W/T set. He should have been in Egypt until the 8th Army's advance, and he should have been in Medenine neighbourhood during the past four weeks. I should expect him to be connected with the South African Air Force and to be in regular legitimate W/T touch with Cairo or Alexandria. When he was in Egypt he may well have been in legitimate touch by W/T with North Syria, South Iraq or South Iran (I doubt whether being in the no-go area there) (e.g. Bandur Shahpur), Suez, Aden, etc. He should make illicit use of his W/T for 10 - 20 minutes per day fairly early in the day. Mirko Rot says that Klatt received reports from Egypt at 10.00 (? C.E.T. = Central European Time, time of Berlin; but the Germans also used 'Summer and Winter times, all under the name of: DGZ = Deutsche gesetzliche Zeit), which seems to fit the timetable quite well.

Whoever Moritz is, he is likely to do his own enciphering, and his operator (if other than himself, which seems probable may send anyhow his illicit traffic 'blind'. His operator might not know for whom these transmissions are intended or what is the nature of the traffic sent. Or he may be fully in the know; or believe that he is transmitting semi-illicitly to some non-enemy recipient. If Moritz ever receives messages from Sofia by W/T, these messages too are quite likely to be sent 'blind'. I doubt if Klatt ever communicates by W/T to Moritz and am pretty sure that he does not do so often or regularly. Moritz might try to baffle interception by using an unusually high frequency or by unusually rapid transmission. But most likely his illicit transmissions resemble his authorised transmissions in procedure, frequency speed, etc. i.e. his traffic has been unsuspected for 15 months because designed to look like some authorised Service traffic.

I gave you the approximate dates when Moritz seemed to be successively in the neighbourhoods of e.g. Derna, Benghazi. Sirte, etc.

There is, of course, nothing in this to rule out the possibility that Moritz and/or Ibis are English or Polish or Czech or Free French or New Zealand or Greek.

Attached is a digest of the main reports obtained by spies in the Mid-East as appearing in our sources:-

1. Egypt and the areas occupied by the VIII^th Army are the subject of the vast proportion of these reports, and the Moritz reports are by far the most frequent in volume here as elsewhere, Ibis is a close second,, but both these sources are probably far less accurate than the smaller Pasha source which reports from Cairo area to Istanbul. (AOB: please bear in mind - that the younger officers in the Egyptian Army were opposing the British occupation of Egypt: consider also: https://www.cdvandt.org/salaam-conder_operation-1942.htm and https://www.cdvandt.org/salaam-condor-mp4.htm)

Syria, as you will see, is virtually saturated by our double-cross agents, and is the least worrying of the areas concerned.

(a) Are the reports from these various agents carded and classified in Mid-East in a distinct and logical fashion, so as to enable the C/E expert to see what the problem is?

(b) Are their accuracy checked locally as a matter of course? In the case of Moritz who seems to advance with the VIII^th Army, I should have thought if the various places which these reports are sent are compared with the dates, it would be possible to narrow the field fairly closely. Who could follow an advancing Army so closely as this, and yet send signals which do not attract attention?

(c) Has Maunsell's (Head of S.I.M.E)→ organisation or indeed (Major) Denny's a full appreciation of the nature and scope or personnel of the Asts (Abwehrstellen) Salonika, Athens, Istambul (Istanbul), and Ankara, which is available to us in such great detail?

Reports which have reached us (M.I.5) seem to show that they have no amalgamated records comparable to the Who's Who's produced by V.W. (V.w.) on these stations.

As we are currently reaching the termination of the Klatt/Kauder file series, I would like to deal with a single page:

1. Increased activity of the Moritz organisation in Egypt and in the areas occupied by the VIII^th Army, nearly 40 messages being relayed by Sofia (towards Ast Wien) during this period.

2. The revival, though on a small scale, of Pasha's W/T reports to Istambul (Istanbul). (AOB: whether this was related to Wigo (Willi Goetz?) (KV 2/387; PF 600802) I don't know.

3. The revival, also, of Ibis reports, both concerning Egypt and Syria and Persia (Iran). It is noteworthy that an Ibis report was obtained on 31.12. from the area West of Lake Chad. This is the furthest West (shouldn't it be far South?) that this source has ever extended so far.

(i) Moritz. These reports are received by W/T at the Luftmeldekopf (Klatt), Sofia, and relayed to Wien (Vienna) and where necessary are passed by I Luft to the N.B.O. (= Nachrichtenbeschaffungsoffizier) Rome, for operational use.

Fore it, I have neglected the last pages, which, in my perception, being more or less, duplicates of what had been dealt with before.

After due consideration (my doubts were: - that in some respect - it concerned a sometimes dubious person) but I have, nevertheless, decided to start with this quite delicate and curious subject: