KV-2/130-Georgy-Gross

Please bear always in mind: The purpose of this historical contribution is for studying purposes only, therefore, do not multiply it, as still Crown Copyrights being valid, partially!

(AOB: the first date 23.February 1943 might indicate that from this moment onwards every move on behalf of Georgy Gross or his alias' were watched for by British Secret Services)

23.2.43. From D.S.O. (= Defence Security Office) Cairo, Extract from Telegram mentioning Bondy for Gyorker 1a.

28.2.43. From B.1.b. Report, Extract from Appendix C. giving description of Grosz. 3a.

3.3.43. Extract from Interrogation Report of Haggar (= Elie, KV 2/1311; PF 65661, this quite low serial-number tells us that he was a suspect quite early in the war), mentioning Bond or Bondy @ possibly of Gyoker. 4a.

16.3.43. From Camp 020 (Secret interrogation Camp, with harsh treatment sometimes beyond legality), Extract from Summary of Interrogation of Rot (KV 2/350, KV 2/1712 .. KV 2/1714, KV 2/1922; PF 65653 5a.

14.4.43. From Camp 020, Extract from Report on Rot mentioning Grosz @ of Gyorgy Andre (André). 7a.

30.4.43. From S.I.M.E. (Secret Intelligence Middle East) Report re Haggar mentioning Bondi. 8a.

18.8.43. Extract from R.I.S. (Radio Intelligence Service) Report mentioning Gyorgy. 9b.

2.6.44. From S.I.S. (= Secret Intelligence Service; dealing with matters related abroad also known as M.I.6) 12a.

3.6.44. Extract from S.I.M.E. Interrogation Report N.2. 25.5.44 re Andor Gross. 13a.

4.7.44. Telegram from SIME dated 3.7.44 re distribution of report No. on Andor Gross. 16a.

12.7.44. To Loxely (F.O. = Foreign Office) enclosing copies Reports Nos. 1 & 2 on Gross. 18a.

13.7.44. From R.I.S. asking for information, when available, re Gyorgy, Andre. 20a.

With reference to your look-up form of names extracted for the second S.I.M.E. Report on André Gyorgy, P.F. 600,052 dated 10.7.44, we have the following traces:-

In 1943 there is a record of a Obst. Haeuser at Stuttgart as chief of Contre Espionage (III-F) (Spionage-Abwehr; Gegenspionage)(Counter-Espionage) for Süd-West Germany and Chief of intelligence for Switzerland (noticed from Stuttgart), Spain and Portugal, that is to say Head of Ast Stuttgart.

In 1942 there was an Obst. Brinkmann working in the German Military Attaché's Office in Lisbon ar Rua San Domingo a Lapa 25.

There is a record of a Heinzelmann who was reliably reported in December 1943 to have been arrested in Switzerland for espionage. See our letter CX/ /B/V.B.3 of 4/3/44. This individual would appear to be identical.

A major Partl of Abteilung II (= sabotage and Brandenburg Div. linked) was reported in November 1943 to have been sent to Italy with a special sabotage unit, but there is no indication that they are identical.

The address of Etien Gero of Budapest is inscribed in Sobhy Hanna's notebook as 35 Place dos Restauradores, Lisbon (And see Camp 020 Report of 12.9.42.)

In September 1940 there is a record of Korda having approached the British Legation in Budapest through an intermediary with an offer to provide copies of his reports to the Gestapo. He then claimed that he was in charge of Gestapo supervision of Legations in Budapest, including the British Legation.

previous to this in february 1940 there was a report that a certain Fuchs, a photographer from Vienna (Wien), was Korda's nephew.

Herewith, with many thanks, is the interrogation report of Andor Gross, It has been a great help in clarifying in my mind the Gross-Klatt background.

1. The I.O. was to question Brand in detail on his knowledge of happenings and personalities described in S.I.M.E. Report No. 3 on the interrogation of Gross.

2. All references to paragraphs are references to S.M.I.E. Report on the interrogation of Gross, except for paragraph 3 which refers to Gross ??

3. The whole story related here by Gross is described by Brand ?? pure, fantastic invention.

According to Brand, Eichmann and Krumey wore the same badges of rank, i.e. four silver-pointed stars on the right (?) collar. Krumey signed all orders as Obersturmbannführer. Wislizeni wore only three similar stars on his collar, but to the best of Brand's knowledge, Gross had never seen Wislizeni. Although Brand had never seen Klages in uniform, he was always addressed as "Herr Hauptsturmführer" (= Hptm. = Captain).

5. (a) Brand states that he has never heard of the name Lt. Fendrick. There was a very young man who often sat with the Abwehr group in cafes, usually in civilian clothes, but once or twice appeared in the uniform of the Hungarian equivalent of a German "Fähnrich" (Ensign) and whom Gross may be mistaking for Lt. Fendrick. Gross, Winninger and the others knew this man, but Brand had never sat at the same table with him, had never spoken to him, and did not know his name. Brand had not seen him for at least two weeks before the German occupation Budapest.

(b) Gross states that Kastner was thick (close?) with Garzuly. Kastner (Kästner?) was the liaison between Jews and the Hadik, and received the Zionist mail and money from Garzuly. He also often visited Garzuly about small matters, e.g. the liberation of individual Jews who had been arrested; Kästner therefore knew Garzuly well, but was never thick (close?) with him. Already in Hungary, Gross had begun to spread the rumour that Kästner was working for Garzuly against him, Gross.

Gross stated that Brand or Kärstner had revealed to Winniger that Gross was working for the Allies. Brand pointed out that they did not know that gross had been working for the Allies (AOB: was he really? I don't think so), thought it had struck them that he had more to do with the Jewish Agency then the were aware of. Gross did not mention his American contacts until they were in Istambul (Istanbul). Also, it would have been against their own interest to have reported such a fact about a man who was working for them, and whom they preferred to the Abwehr group, who were ?epulsive to them.

Brand has no recollection of this conversation. Winninger was often drunk and they knew that the Germans were preparing to occupy Hungary (actually on 19 March 1944), butnothing (?) so concrete as the order for all German women working in Budapest to return to Germany was mentioned five days before the occupation. Brand is (?) convinced of this.

Gross was arrested on the entry of the Germans, at about 1000 hrs. And? according to Scholz and Winninger, was liberated against at about 1430 hrs., ?? little time? for the privation? he claims to have suffered. He himself told Brand that he had avoided the cuffs and blows administered to the others, , by maintaining a position in the centre of the crowd. He was friendly with the Abwehr group to the very end, so called hardly have suffered privation and brutal treatment at their hands.

9. (a) Kästner was never arrested. On Brand being taken into protective custody, Kästner went to Hotel Majestic, Schwabenberg (later H.Q. of the S.S.) where Brand had his second abode (Ref. SIME/P.7769, Report No. 1 paragraph 75). With Kästner, Mrs. Brand and her two children left the Hotel Majestic for their ordinary home at Apaly Utza 2a.

(b) Brand's protective arrest lasted only four days, but he did not see Gross again until a week after the German occupation of Budapest.

(c) The Abwehr group did not try to blackmail money from Brand, but were continually trying to earn money by offering to do things for him, e.g. they offered to procure the liberation of Gisi Fleischmann in return for the sum of $12,000.

(d) Schmidt and Winninger told Brand that Gross was now useless, since he was an Hungarian, and a Jew, but did not order Brand to work without Gross.

The look-ups on S.M.I.E. Reprot No. 1 on André Gyorgy, dated 10.7.44, your file No. 600052, have resulted in the following traces:-

Hungarian, resident of Budapest. Has conspicuously enriched himself by collaboration with the occupying forces in Hungary, where he was regarded as a "Gestapo" agent in May 1944.

In March 1944 he was reported resident in Budapest but travelling to Prague, Bratisllava (Preßbrug) and Sofia. Has two houses in Budapest: Vorosmartz Ter 5 and Rue Ora 36 (?). He was then working for Berchtold (Hptm. Ast Wien) and Hptm. Klausschnitzer, the latter described as Chief of Abwehr III (= counter-espionage) in Prague. One of his agents who visits Turkey is named Frau Kovacs and holds a Hungarian passport in the name of Lawicka. (AOB: how did they obtain these information?) (AOB: in my perception they obtained it via the Czechoslovakia Legation in London)

He is reported to travel on a Protectorate (by then named: Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren, formerly Czechoslovakia) passport as he is a Sudetenländer (before 1919 German/Austrian territories, 1919 - 1938 Czech 1938 - 1945 German since 1945 Czech territory) (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudetenland and en https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudetenland#History) His personal description was as follows; aged forty-two, tall, heavily built, light blue eyes, fair going bald.

Hungarian born 1894. In 1943 he was reported to be Chief of the Contre Espionage Section of the Hungarian General Staff.

In September 1943 he visited Istambul (Istanbul). In December 1943 he was reported to have been transferred to general Ujszassy's Department in Budapest dealing with internal security.

The latest information was dated April 1944, and reported that he was liaison officer in Budapest between the Hungarian Contre Espionage organisation for South Eastern Europe and the Abwehr. Holds Hungarian Passport No. 127847 issued Budapest 10.9.43.

A certain J.J. Schwartz of the American Joint Distribution Committee in Lisbon was reported in October 1940 to be handling large sums for getting Jews out of Europe to the U.S.A.

Reference your look-up form of names extracted from S.I.M.E. (Secret Intelligence Middle East) Report No. 1 on André Gyorgy dated 10.7.44, your file No. PF 600052, we have the following from Hart's (H.L.A. M.I.5 section B.1.b.) material.

No. 5. Laufer, spelt Lauffer, was in Sofia November and December 1943 and left for Budapest on December 3rd. He is presumably identical.

No. 8. Alfred Schwartz described as "of American I.S. (Intelligence Service) Istanbul (Istambul) in February 1944.

No. 9. Lt.-Col. (Obstlt.) Merkli, spelt Merkly. In February 1943 was in Budapest and was referred to as a Colonel (Obst.).

Further to my PF 600052/B.1.b of 12.7.44, I enclose copy of S.M.I.E. Interrogation Reports No. 1 on Joel Brand and Nor. 3 on Andor Gross @ Gyorgy.

These are substantial documents, covering, as they do, in much greater detail the information already sent us by S.I.M.E. in their earlier reports but I think Randall will be interested to see them.

AOB: from my experience, this might have been a first move as to come in touch with the Foreign Office, a proceeding step to apply later for a permission of bringing "subjects" to England; often to be interrogated at Camp 020.

1. Enclosed herewith is Copy No. 2-4 of SIME Interrogation Report No. 3 on the above named.

2. During the course of the interrogation Gross was questioned in order to elucidate his version of his activities; he has not, however, been cross-examined at any stage.

3. It is desired to start cross-examination as soon as possible. It would be of great assistance if recipients of the report would let SIME have their comments and all further available information at the earliest opportunity, in order that the interrogator may be fully briefed for the next stage.

1. I was instructed to interrogate G. with a cross-examination ?? detail on points which are considered to be doubtful, or on statements ??? conflict with information on G. already in our possession. The following ?? cannot therefore be accepted necessarily as the truth about his activities?

4. Studies commercial and economic subjects at the Commercial High School. An average student, who intended to work in a bank.

6. Bought a cafe from his earnings in the above firm, but in 1929 went Bankrupt.

7. Founded transport firm Corvin with Dr. Ladislas Varga and Oskar Vamos but to close it after a year as they were unable to pay the fine for a customs' offence (false declaration of silk).

8. Gross and went to Algiers to avoid repercussions in respect of their customs' offence. Found no work there, and returned to Hungary after 7 months. Started smuggling and black-market activities with acquaintances such as Istvan Koranyi, Ernst Berger, Holländer, Pollak, Friedländer and Fr?? →

15. When his 6 months were up he could see no way out of his difficulties. Kleer (KV 2/1957 Franz Koehler, alias Kleer; PF 793749), who had worked for Ast (= Abwehrstelle) I, Stuttgart, for the past 10 months, said he could help Gross if he agreed to work for the Germans. Gross was at first unenthusiastic and preferred that Kleer should obtain him a German passport so that he and his wife could go away somewhere.

16. Two weeks later, Kleer introduced him to Dr. Grovitcs (correct name Franz Szigli, who worked in Hungary for Ast I, Stuttgart and Ast I Wien. Grovitcs promised to use his influence to help Gross, provided he would work for the Germans, but said it might be difficult as G. was a Jew. (AOB: this would become nearly impossible after 5 July 1943, due to a directive on behalf of Hitler himself)

17. A few days later Grovitcs told Gross of 10,000 pengoes (Hungarian currency) for his trouble. Grovitcs did not demand straight espionage of Gross, but required him to assist the German war effort in the fields of commerce. Gross was namely to use his influence and his already established connections with transport firms to by up goods for Germany in Switzerland, and to arrange for their transportation to the Reich. Grovitcs asked Gross to wait before doing anything until his chief from Stuttgart arrived in Budapest to have a look at him.

18. A few days later Dr. Gustave Busse (correct name Bueckel (Bueckl?) head of Stuttgart department (Referat I) controlling espionage in Switzerland and Spain came to Budapest, and was introduced to Gross by Grovitcs as his new chief. Busse expressed his opinion that Gross would be suitable for the job, and promised that if he worked well he would have no further difficulties in respect of his imprisonment. Busse said that, as a final check, he would have to see the V-O (Verbindungsoffizier, or liaison officer, between the German and Hungarian secret Services) (AOB: actually, there existed quite good contacts between the Germans and Hungarians, during the war), in order to see if Gross had a political record.

19. Three days later Busse told Gross that everything was in order, and that he would receive a German passport from Grovitcs. During the remainder of Busse's stay in Budapest, Gross showed Busse the alcoholic sights of the Hungarian capital, usually paying his bills as a privilege for being guide. In this period he became acquainted with Rudi Scholz, Stuttgart V-Mann (= Vertrauensmann) in Budapest, and Bubi Bardos, a customs official and Gestapo agent.

20. Before he left Busse gave Kleer the following instructions for himself and Gross in Switzerland:-

(b) To find out, through Daanzas et Cie, a big transport concern with which Grosse already had contacts, what possibilities there were of transporting the above goods to Germany.

(d) To find out, in particular, what firm transported to Allied territory special fuzes, packed in watches, used for bombs.

21. Gross received, through Grovitcs, a Hungarian passport in the name of? André Gyorgy and after a few weeks obtained his Swiss visa with the ??? (in the name of??) Popper, a rich Jew in the German transport firm Interkontinental. ??? a period of 2-3 months, Grovitcs blackmailed Grosse out of some 40,000?? pengoes (Hungarian currency) for the privilege of having his passport.

22. On his journey to Switzerland some weeks later Gross took with him, as pre-arranged with Busse and Kleer. 50,000 pengoes, RM 120,000 and some platinum, which he hoped to convert favourably on the Zürich exchange. The profits weere to be divided out between Busse, Kleer and Gross.

23. In Zürich Gross met Kleer, who had travelled a few days previously, and learnt for the first time of the instructions which Busse had issued. Kleer and Gross, after probing the possibilities of carrying our Busse's mission soon came to the conclusion that they could do nothing useful, particularly as the Swiss required goods, and not money, in return for their own goods? ,

(AOB: this went through "clearing" where the delivery of a good had been compensated by equal valuable goods of an other country. The main drive was, that foreign money (Devisen) was rare any doing business with closed circuits was very important. Let us, for example, think of exchanging ball-bearing against butter supplies or coal supplies versus fine mechanics)

Moreover Gross spoke very little German at this time. Kleer proposed ??? the best thing they could do was to make as much money as possible in ??? order to please Busse, who was not a rich man, and whose interests ???? money, women and alcohol rather than in espionage.

24. Gross exchange his money profitably at several banks, including Wohl & Landau, which had been recommended to him by Popper.

25. After 5-6 days of idling and black-marketing, Gross and Kleer left Switzerland for Stuttgart, where they found Busse in a state of blissful intoxication. he showed no interest in whether they had carried out his instructions or not, and gladly assented to the formation of a smuggling-society composed of himself, Gross , Kleer and Scholz, for the purpose of filling our their own purses.

26. While gross was in Stuttgart, Grovitcs telephoned from Budapest to say that Gross would have renewed difficulties over his old customs' offence if he returned to Hungary. Busse proposed that Gross should live as German citizen with Grovitcs in Budapest, and accordingly obtained for him a German passport in the name of Andreas Grainer. He also obtained a German passport for Kleer in the name of Franz Koehler. Busse telephoned to the V-O (Verindungsoffizier) in Budapest, requesting him to make representation to the Hungarian Government to have Gross's prison sentence postponed till the end of the war.

27. Gross returned to Budapest, and after staying 2 days with Grovitcs, rented a room for himself and his wife in the Hotel Melinda at Schwabenburg, a suburb of Budapest. where he proposed to remain inconspicuously until his difficulties were closed up. During 4 weeks' stay in this hotel, where he lived as Grainer, gross was a lot of Joself Baumruck (half Jewish), whom he had got to know a few months previously through his mistress Ilona Talas, a friend of Gross. He carried out a number of financial transactions with Baumruck.

28. Baumruck spoke to Gross one day about Richart Klatt (real name Richard Kauder Jewish from Wien) (KV 2/1496 ... KV 2/1499 on our website) a German (Austrian) Jew who successfully controlled a vast network of wireless stations from Sofia. He explained that Klatt's Dienststelle was a special branch of Generalkommando, Wien, under (its Leiter) Graf Marogna (Redwitz) which had a special connection with Luft I department under (Obstlt.) Ritter von Wahl-Welskirch. Baumruck proposed that Gross should ? 50,000 pengoes to Klatt, who was at the moment in financial difficulties, ?? wished to build up a larger reserve of Abwehr funds in Sofia/ If Gross ??? do this. he would help both Klatt and himself, for Klatt, with his ?incredible influence in high places, was a much more important man than ???, and therefore more likely to be able to help Gross with his difficulties. It would not be dificult for Klatt to persuade Major Horina, military Staatsanwalt of the Generalkommando, Wien, to make an intervention on Gross's behalf to the Hungarian authorities, with which Klatt had a very good connection through his friend Garzuly, deputy-head of Hungarian C.E. Service. If Horina was to make this intervention, the Hungarian authorities would have to obey.

29. Baumruck said that there were 2 ways in which Gross might help Klatt and himself:

Either a) Gross was to lend Klatt 50,000 pengoes, which would be repaid at the rate of 10,000 pengoes per month. In this case Klatt would guarantee him support through Garzuly on account of his prison sentence, and give him a pass certifying that Gross worked for him.

b) Gross was to give Klatt 50,000 pengoes and smuggle for him on a 50 - 50 profit basis. gross would not be repaid his 50,000 →

pengoes, but would be able to earn so much money, as Klatt would grant him all travel facilities, that he would soon repay himself. gross was to smuggle gold from Budapest to Sofia, where he could sell it at 1.2/3 to original price, and smuggle carpets and cameras from Sofia to Budapest where he could sell a double the price.

30. Gross answered that he would wait till his present difficulties were cleared up. A few days later Grovitcs told him that he could return home as everything was in order.

31. Gross returned home and told Baumruck what he was willing to give Klatt the 50,000 pengoes and smuggle for him, if Busse would give him permission to travel to and from Sofia. He would attract Busse by saying that he had heard of good chance of earning easy money for them in Sofia.

32. A few days later Busse arrived in Budapest, and gross explained to him that he had good possibilities of making money by working for Klatt's Dienststelle. Busse was pleased with the idea and asked Grosse to arrange a rendezvous between himself and Klatt.

33. That afternoon Gross was introduced by Baumruck to Klatt, who had recently arrived from Sofia ← (AOB: incorrect please notice: E2142 ↓↓↓ E2142return) Quoting from KV 2/1498:

8.5.42 (Isos 27227) Wagner (=Wien, Obstlt. von Wahl-Welskirch Leiter I-L) Arrange your journey to Budapest so that you will be present of the 19th (May) at the arrival of Major Brede (Berlin Leiter I-L) and Wagner by schedule Lufthansa plane). ... (AOB: in the month June there are no signs of a visit to Budapest)

who had recently arrived from Sofia; Klatt told Gross that he knew everything about his smuggling activities his private difficulties and his work for Stuttgart, adding that owing-to his friendship with Garzuly he was in a much better position than Stuttgart to help him over his imprisonment worries, if Gross was willing to lend him 50,000 pengoes.

34. Gross said he was not willing to accept the first part of Baumruck's proportion as money was decreasing in value all the time, provided Busse gave him permission, he was ready to open a "business partnership" with Klatt, with whom he would share the smuggling profits. Klatt assented, and asked Gross to arrange a meeting between Busse and himself. Klatt made no further demands of Gross.

35. Next day, Gross introduced Klatt to Busse and left him alone. Later Busse told him that he was all right for him to travel to Sofia. He left gross with instructions to make another journey for him to Switzerland. Gross was, however, unable to procure a visa for Switzerland as difficulties were made on account of his Jewish blood.

36. A few weeks later Gross made his first trip to Sofia for Klatt, armed with a letter of introduction from Propper to Altmann, Sofia representative of Interkontental and Halasz, director of the Hungarian firm Chinoin. He took with him napoleons (gold coins) to the value of 120,000 - 150,000 pengoes (Hungarian currency).

37. In the course of this and subsequent journeys to Sofia in the next few months, Gross became acquainted with many of Klatt's subordinates, and was invited a number of times to lunch or dinner at Klatt's office - cum - flat in Boulevard Skobeleff 55. He saw neither the wireless station in the flat above, nor Ira Lang's (AOB: the name on Ira Longin's German passport) special W/T station which was in contact with the Russian General Staff. (KV 2/1630 - KV 2/1631; PF 602370 on Ira Longing)

38. Gross soon had the impression that Klatt was doing masterly work for Germany. He gathered this from his own observations, from odd scraps of conversation with Klatt employees or from Klatt himself, who, in a good mood, would remark for example that he had received telegrams from Cairo or →

Tangiers, or that he had had an important telephone conversation with Goehring (Göring). However, Klatt never allowed Gross to know very much about his work.

39. When in Sofia, Gross sold gold at a profitable rate of exchange, through the medium (intermediate) of Prader, Director of the firm Nikolaus Feker, Altmann, Halasz and later of Robert Groenes, who worked for Klatt.

40. On his return from one of his short visits to Sofia, gross was arrested by the Hungarian police on account of his old custom's offence. He was released after 14 days in prison as his wife enlisted the aid of an influential lawyer, who, for 5,000 pengoes, succeeded in having Gross's sentence postponed for 3 months.

41. Busse came to Budapest to see how he could help gross, but owing to difficulties with Lt.-Col. Fammemstiel (Pfannenstiel), V-O (Verbindungsoffizier) in Budapest, who later had him removed from his post in Stuttgart and sent to the Eastern Front (Russia) on account of his light-headed attitude towards his job, was unable to do anything for him in prison. Pfannenstiel refused to intervene on Gross's behalf as he was a Jew. Klatt did not, or would not, do anything to help Gross, despite to his promises; he later excused himself by saying that he had been unable to leave Sofia, because of difficulties with Dr. Delius (AOB: the latter was the Leiter of K.O. Bulgaria, and was a great personal enemy of the Jew Klatt; and also because Klatt, being a civilian he was highly regarded at the German military High Command O.K.W.) (KV 2/284, Obstlt./Obst. Otto Wagner; PF 601320) in Sofia.

42. On leaving prison, gross declared his intension to Scholz (Scholtz?) and Kleer of breaking with Ast Stuttgart, which had not lifted a finger to assist him. However, the promised gross to go to Stuttgart to see their new chief and sever his relation with the Ast, then Gross would be free to work full time for him. Klatt gave a definite guarantee to get Gross's sentence postponed till the end of the war.

43. Gross went to Stuttgart and told Straub that he wished to break off his connection with the Ast.

44. On his return to Budapest, Gross was summoned to the Hadik Barracks to see Col. Sillay, Chief of the Hungarian Counter-Espionage Service. Sillay started off by calling gross a bad Hungarian on his account of his smuggling activities and connection with Germans, and threatened to have him deported to the Ukraine for labour service. There was only one way for Gross to redeem himself, namely by accepting a proposal which Sillay was going to make him.

45. Sillay's proposal was the Gross should submit reports to Hadik on the activities of all Germans with whom he came in contact. He would be allowed to continue smuggling and travelling, but he must report every single detail about any German who was engaged in activities prejudicial to the Hungarian State. If he concealed one detail, or told one lie, he would be immediately arrested.

46. Gross accepted this offer. When, a week later Gross told Sillay he whished to travel to Sofia, the latter assented and gave gross the mission of finding out everything he could about Klatt and other Germans there, and about the activities of Hungarian artistes.

47. Gross was introduced on this occasion to Lt.Col. Merkly, Deputy-Head of the Hungarian C.E. Service, and Lt. Ferenz Bagyoni (KV 2/3646; PF 603873) also also a member of Hadik. Sillay said that, on his return from Sofia, Gross must report everything →

he had discovered to Merkly and Bagyonyi (Bagyoni). In Sofia itself he must report to Hatz (the Hungarian Military Attaché) and always go to him in difficulties.

48. Some days later gross went to Sofia, for 8 days. He reported to Hatz as ordered by Merkly. As usual he saw a lot of Klatt and his employees, and carried out the usual gold and black-market transactions. On his return to Budapest he submitted a report, so far as he was able, on the activities of Klatt and the personnel of his Dienststelle, especially the Hungarians who worked for Klatt.

49. One day Gross met Samuel Springmann in the cafe Pariset. They had been at school together, but had seen little of each other since that time, although gross knew that Springmann was an active Zionist. Springmann greeted Gross, saying that he had heard that Gross was a rich man with good connections, who was doing very well for himself. he told gross a little about his Zionist activities, but lamented the fact that so little could be done for Jewish refugees. There were unfortunately no adequate means of having mail and money transport from Turkey, where they had a committee which had mail and money and money ready to send. He asked Gross if he could take a latter for him to Istanbul (Istambul). Gross said that he would arrange for it to be taken to Turkey, provided that Springmann guaranteed that the contents referred solely to Jewish relief, and not to any form of espionage. Gross demanded 10% of any Zionist money which would be given to him or his courier in Istambul (Istanbul).

50. Next day Springmann brought the letter to Gross, who introduced him to Erich Werner (alias Charles Popešcu), a Rumanian Jew whom Gross had met at the races some months previously, as the courier who would take the letter to Wenya Pomerance (Pomerany?) in Istambul (Istanbul).

51. After 1-2 weeks, Popešcu returned from Istambul (Istanbul) with approximately £T 3,000 (Turkish Pounds) and 100 napoleons (old French currency) for Springmann. It had been arranged between Popešcu and Gross that they should split the 10% commission, but much to Gross's annoyance, Popešcu only gave 2½%. He told Gross that he had met Pomerance and some of the other Zionists in Turkey, and his first impression was that they would not much money out of them.

52. After Popešcu's first journey for Springmann, Gross told the latter that Kleer (= KV 2/1957; PF 793749) was going to Turkey in a few days, and could be persuaded to take a letter to Pomerance if Springmann so wished. At the same time he warned Springmann against Kleer, whose reliability Gross did not guarantee.

53. After a few days Kleer took a letter from Springmann to Istambul (Istanbul), and returned with £T 1,000 from Pomerance.

54. About this time, gross was introduced by Sillay to collect information against Grovitcs, whom he regarded as one of the most dangerous (i.e. anti-Hungarian) Germans in Budapest. After a few weeks Gross was successful in making a case against Grovitcs by proving that he had blackmailed a Jewess in Budapest out of 15,000 pengoes (Hungarian currency), after making a false promise that he would arrange for 2 of her relatives to travel from Bratislava (= Preßburg) to Budapest. As a result of Gross's report, Grovitcs was arrested and sentenced to two years!

55. In the course of his work for Hadik about this period, Gross had some 35 unclassified German agen ots deported from Hungary, including Horn, Kauderer, Heves, Gärtner, Bischoff, Schröderer and Fuchs.

56. Gross continued to travel to and from Sofia, in connection with his smuggling activities on Klatt's behalf. He travelled about once every month and stayed 2 - 3 days each time.

57. Springmann asked Gross if he would take another letter to Turkey. Popešcu was struck in Istanbul as the frontier was closed at the this time to all travellers, and Kleer was unable to travel as he could not get permission from Stuttgart.

58. Gross went to see Merkly and told him that he wished to go to Istambul (Istanbul). He said he proposed to take some Zionist letters on behalf of Jewish refugees, but he did not specify from and to whom. Merkly said he was willing for Gross to travel, and that he had no objection to him carrying Zionist mail. But Gross must be very careful as Vasvary, pro-Nazi head of the Second department of the Hungarian Consul Staff, objected strongly to Zionist activities. So far as he, Merkly, was concerned, he was ready to close an eye to what gross was doing. He told Gross to obtain his visas and other papers from Hatz (Military Attaché) in Sofia.

59. In Sofia, Hatz gave Gross his visas and a note verbale from the Hungarian embassy certifying that gross was an Aryan. He also gave gross a private financial commission to carry out in Turkey, and warned the Svilengrad (train border station to Turkey) authorities that Gross's brief-case was not to be examined.

60. Gross saw Klatt who gave him £T 2,000 to exchange into gold in Istambul (Istanbul).

61. At Svilengrad Gross became friendly with the (German) Gestapo (geheime Staatspolizei) officials Ziegler and Hussel. Ziegler gave him £T 100 which he wished gross to convert into 3 napoleons (old French gold coins), and asked him to bring back cigarettes and chocolate with what was left of the money.

62. In Istambul (Istanbul), Gross went to the Pera Palace Hotel. He contacted Popešcu immediately and the latter introduced him to Pomerance and his fellow-Zionists, Collek (Theodore Kollek KV 2/2261 ... KV 2/2264; PF 66968??), Baeder and Szynd. Pomerance was very friendly to Gross as Springmann had previously sent a letter to him personally guaranteeing Gross's reliability.

63. Later, when they were alone, Popešcu told Gross that he had established a useful contact with Earle, American Naval Attaché, who had given him a questionnaire to fill up. That night he introduced gross to Wittold Blau, an agent of the Polish Consulate.

64. Next day gross contacted Koko Berisbek who introduced him to Captain Kremer of the American "Nachtrichtendienst' (?). Kremer asked him a lot of questions about Hungary, and asked him if he was willing to give information to the Americans, as Berisbek had spoken very highly of him. Gross said that he could easily give this general information. Berisbek later warned gross not to come in contact with the British, who 'squeezed information out of you as if you were a lemon'.

65. On the following day Gross had lunch with Kremer and Lehrmann, Chief of the American Parker Bureau. The latter expressed the wish that G. should work for him: he wanted gross to submit reports on German morale and public opinion, and on the economic and press situation in Hungary and Germany. He was not interested in military matters. He said he would pay all gross's expenses, but gross said he did not want to work for money as he was not an agent.

66. That evening gross had diner with ~~Collek~~ Kollek (= PF 66968 = KV 2/2261 ... KV 2/2264) and Szybd. Kollek explained the Zionist situation to Gross and expressed his satisfaction that G. told Kollek that he would be glad to help. He revealed that he was a smuggler, that he worked for Ast I Stuttgart, and that he had 'commercial' connections with Klatt (= KV 2/1495 ... KV 2/1499) (https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2_1495-kauder-klatt.htm .... https://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-1499-klatt-kauder.htm) who, he said, did more harm to England than anyone else in Germany but disclosed useful information when in an expansive mood. Further he warned Kollek against Popešcu whom he described as an agent of Major Bagel in Ast I Wien, and therefore not to be trusted. He told Kollek that he had come to Turkey to earn some money.

67. Kollek went on to say that Zionist interests lay not only by giving support to Jewish refugees, but also in assisting the British war-effort, as the British had given much help to the Jewish Agency in Palestine. He stated that he proposed to introduce gross to an 'important Englishman' who, if satisfied with gross, would employ him on espionage work. Kollek made the condition that if he decided to work for the British, he was to work for nobody else. If Gross was not willing to accept conditions, he was to say now, for Kollek held full responsibility for gross and did not wish to introduce an unreliable man to the British.

Introduction to Major Whittall and Captain Johnson (AOB: is this man the same one interrogating Richard Kauder/ alias Klatt and Paul Georg Fidrmuc/ alias Ostro? If so, than he is quite a cheater and a liar; and not the expert of the statute which M.I.5 considered him being)

68. On the following day, Kollek and Szyd took gross up to the flat of Major Whittall. The Latter, after a short talk, arranged a meeting between G. and his representative, Captain Johnson, for the next day.

69. Gross went at the appointed time to Kollek's flat where he was introduced to Captain Johnson. Kollek said that Gross had just arrived from Hungary, that Springmann had written a letter of recommendation for Gross, that he had already had a long talk with Gross and was ready to guarantee him fully as a reliable man who could do useful work for the British.

70. Gross explained that he was ready to work against Germany, but not against Hungary. He wanted no payment. He was merely interested in obtaining his personal security and expressed the desire to be given a chance to work with a British firm after the war. Captain Johnson said that he did not think it possible for him to go to London after the war, but that he might be able to settle in Kenya. (AOB: a colony with anti-British sentiments; culminating in the Mau-Mau rebellion) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mau_Mau_rebellion)

71. Captain Johnson said that before he could accept him as a British agent, he must go through a test to prove his worth. Gross answered a number of his questions about public opinion in Hungary, German sympathies in Budapest, personnel of Ast (Referat) I, Stuttgart and the Dienststelle Klatt, and about troops and military equipment he had noticed on his journey from Hungary to Turkey. Captain Johnson said at the end that if half of all this information was true he would consider Gross a reliable person to work for him/ They parted, after fixing a meeting for another day.

72. Berisbek, a constant companion of Gross, later introduced him to the American Consul Birge as 'Mr. Gyorgy from Budapest'.

73. When not occupied with the Zionists, British or Americans, Gross found time to carry out his financial transactions - purchase of gold, sale of furs etc.

74. Towards the end of his stay, Gross told Kollek of his contacts with the Americans trough Berisbek. Kollek said it was a bad plan as he must →

stick to one employer only. He said, however, that Gross might answer Birge's general questions, but that he was to see no more of Lehrmann and Kremer. It would be better if he broke off his relationship with Berisbek entirely, as he was not to be trusted. Kollek further stipulated that Gross was only to work commercially with Blau.

75. Kollek asked Gross's opinion of Popešcu; Gross answered that he was not completely reliable.

76. Gross then had a second meeting with Captain Johnson who dictated a questionnaire to him. Captain Johnson required gross to find out:-

77. Before he left Gross also received a questionnaire on general subjects from the Americans, through Berisbek.

78. Wenya Pomerance, in charge of Zionist correspondence and finance in Turkey, asked Gross to transport 15,000 dollars and some mail for Springmann, mail for Dr. Dax, Zionist representative in Bratislave (Preßbrug), and mail and money for Zionist addresses in Warsaw (Warschau), Lodz (during the war named Litzmannstadt) Lublin, Sosnowitz, Prague (Prag), Benzburg and Theresienstadt. Gross exchanged the dollars for gold through Miserli an American jeweller in Istambul (Istanbul), and kept his 10% commission.

79. Kollek took his leave of Gross by expressing the hope that Gross was a good Jew, and would 'commit no indiscretions' in Europe, otherwise he could do infinite harm to the Allied cause.

81. Gross returned to Sofia with Popešcu. On the train, the latter showed him what looked like a leaden medicine tube. Popešcu said that Roman, Polish Consul in Istambul (Istanbul), had given him £T.500 (Turkish pound) to take it to a certain Korjibowsky (?) chief editor of a Polish paper in nBudapest, Elizabeth Ring 12. Gross did not see the contents of the tube.

82. On arrival in Sofia Gross had a long talk with Klatt who asked what he had been doing in Istambul (Istanbul) Gross said that he had established good contacts with the Zionists there through the Zionists in Hungary, and that it would be a good thing if the Germans would give permission for Jew to be transported out of Poland and Slovakia, thus making good propaganda for themselves.

83. In the course of this conversation, Klatt mentioned that he used to know Earle in Sofia when he was American Ambassador, and had double-crossed him by passing on false information to him. (AOB: ?)

84. Gross went to say that Klatt was a fool to work for the Germans who gave him difficulties. (AOB: one of the reasons of Kauder's (Klatt being an alias) German engagements were: that his Jewish mother was protected) (e.g. Dr. Delius) (KV 2/284; PF 601320) (AOB: Dr. Delius was the alias of Obstlt. Otto Wagner, whom was opposing Klatt for several reasons: He was not allowed to control himself Klatt. Maybe rather significant as well was: that Klatt was highly regarded by Delius/Wagner's Chiefs in Berlin (H.Q. O.K.W.) even up to Keitel and beyond; he a high rank Wehrmacht Officer versus the Jewish Richard Kauder alias Klatt!) and that it would be much →

better if he could achieve something with the British or Americans. Klatt said the was too much risk, and that Gross was not to breathe a word about this interview.

85. In Budapest, Gross had an interview with Merkly in his private house. He said that he had discovered wonderful possibilities of working with the British and Americans though the medium (intermediate) of the Zionists. Merkly took up a sympathetic but cautious attitude, answering that it was a pity that nothing could be done in this line for the moment, as there were too many pro-Nazi Hungarians in high positions, e.g. Vasvary, Bartalits, Konya and Ferber. He said that gross must resume his contact with the Zionists - but very carefully. He could not guarantee to give Gross any help if anything went wrong.

86. Merkly then asked Gross if he knew Roman, and Gross told him about the tube Popešcu had shown him in the train. Merkly said it was a pity that Roman worked with such a man as Popešcu. He gave Gross instructions to contact Roman on the next trip to Turkey, and to do anything Roman asked of him. In this way Popešcu would be ousted.

Arrangements for Disposing of Zionist Mail and Money in Poland and Slovakia. (AOB: then a puppet state on Germany's behalf)

87. Gross then contacted Popešcu, with whom he discussed the best means of transporting the Zionist mail and money to Poland and Slovakia (Slowakei). Gross had previously reported to Springmann on his contact with the Zionists in Istambul (Istanbul). Popešcu thought that the only possibility was to induce Josef Winninger (alias Duftel), an agent in Budapest of Ast III-F (German counter-espionage Referat), Wien, to take the money as he alone had possibilities of travelling to these countries.

88. They discussed the matter with Winninger, to whom Gross was introduced by a smuggler-friend named Job. Winninger said that he could arrange for the transportation of Zionist mail and money to Poland and Slovakia (Slowakei) only if he had permission from his chief, Dr. Schmidt, main V-Mann (Vertrauensmann) in Hungary of Ast III-F Wien.

89. After a few days Winninger informed them that everything was in order - Schmidt had reported the matter to Baron von Manteuffel, head of Ast Wien Referat III-F, and von Manteuffel had referred it to Graf Marogna-Redwitz (KV 2/3160; PF 601107), heard of Generalkommando, Wien. The Wien chiefs had decreed that the Zionist mail and money be transported on condition that all the mail for Poland and Bratislava (Preßburg) be censored by Dr. Schmidt in Budapest, and the full amounts of money declared to him.

90. Winninger, however, proposed that they should only declare about 40% of the money, and divide out the 10% commission of the remaining 60% equally amongst themselves. Generalkommando Wien, was to receive 2/3 of the 10% commission of the money the couriers actually declared. This arrangement was agreed upon by all.

91. Winninger and Scholz (Scholtz?) delivered the mail and money to the addresses in Poland and Slovakia (Preßburg). Gross later learnt that he had been cheated out of some of his profits as, without his knowing, Winninger and Popešcu had allowed Scholz to have a quarter-share. Gross also found out that the others had cheated the Zionists in the exchange of gold or dollars to Reichsmarks (RM), although the the Jews were not aware of it.

92. Gross left Budapest on his second journey to Istambul (Istanbul). In Sofia he saw Klatt who asked Gross to see if he could arrange a contact between himself and the →

British or Americans. He told Gross to induce the British and Americans to give him a radio and codes, which he proposed to work himself in secret contact with the Allies.

93. Gross then saw Hatz (Military Attaché at the Legation in Sofia), who gave him 2,000 dollars with which to buy gold in Istambul (Istanbul), and at Hatz's request, introduced him to Klatt. (AOB: whether this is true I cannot judge, but on 5th July 1943, thus a few months later, Klatt's position within the Abwehr had to be broken-off. Hitler decided that from now on it was prohibited to engage full Jewish people. Klatt left then Sofia and Bulgaria and became "an Hungarian citizen under the name Karmany". Albeit, that the Luftmeldekopf remained for about a year in Sofia)

94. At Svilengrad (the train border town between Bulgaria and Turkey), Gross was not searched at all (AOB: there was a German border-group also present there. They were often informed not to search particular persons), and Ziegler and Hussel asked him to bring back some Turkish carpets for them.

95. In Istambul (Istanbul), Gross gave Pomerance some letters which Springmann had asked him to take. Gross told Kollek (KV 2/2261 ... KV 2/2264; PF 66968) in front of other Zionists, that he must be careful with Popešcu and Winninger (who recently contacted the Zionists in Turkey) as he could not guarantee their reliability. He said further, that their mail and money to Poland and Slovakia (Slowakei) were now being controlled by Generalkommando, Wien, and warned them against introducing Winninger and Popešcu to the British. Gross proposed that the courier service be broken up forthwith, and Baeder alone agreed with him. However, the other Zionists were of the opinion that everything was running very smoothly and that enormous benefit was being given to Jewish refugees in Europe, and would not hear of Gross discontinuing his service for them.

96. Gross then contacted Captain Johnson and told him of Klatt's proposal. He pointed out that he could not guarantee Klatt's reliability, as Klatt was a very small humble man when in difficulties, as at present, but very arrogant when his affairs were progressing favourably. Captain Johnson said that he must consult his H.Q. (S.I.M.E. = Secret Intelligence Middle East) in Cairo before giving an answer.

97. A few days later, Captain Johnson said he might be able to provide a radio for Klatt, if the latter could give a definite guarantee that he would keep his part of the bargain. Gross was to ask Klatt, to reveal the locations of 2 - 3 of the W/T stations in Allied territory, in return for which Captain Johnson guaranteed that the W/T operators would be allowed to continue their transmissions, controlled by the Allies. (AOB: all of this did not mature)

98. Blau then fixed a rendez-vous between Gross and Roman. The latter asked gross about the conditions of Poles in Budapest, and requested him to take some gold back to his lady-friend there, and some Polish papers to Kopjibowski. Later he gave Gross a small questionnaire on the military situation in Central Europe, and on economic conditions there.

99. Gross was David Azar introduced Gross to Earle, who asked him to bring back a bulldog from Hungary, and gave him a questionnaire.

100. Gross saw Birge and answered some general questions. Later Kollek introduced him to Captain Seager, representative of the of the American Military Attaché, who also asked a few general questions concerning Central Europe.

101. After 7 - 8 days in Turkey, gross returned to Sofia, complete with questionnaires and Zionist money.

102. Gross told Klatt of Captain Johnson's counter-proposal. Klatt lost his temper with Gross, saying that the British must be mad to think that he would give away the locations of any of his W/T stations. He rated Gross for giving away his name to the British, said that he was under suspicion (AOB: pointing at the ongoing competence fights between Klatt and his Luftmeldekopf - versus Obstlt. Otto Wagner's (alias Dr. Delius) KO (Kriegsorganisation) Bulgaria; curiously both headed by: O.K.W. Amt Ausland/Abwehr!), and forbade him to do any more smuggling or make any more journeys to Istambul (Istanbul). He said that he wished to have no more to do with Gross.

103. Back in Budapest, gross waw Winninger, whose first question was whether Gross had brought any letters back for him from Lafontaine in Turkey. Gross answered truthfully that he never had heard of Lafontaine.

104. Gross then reported to Merkly who told he was not to answer Roman's questionnaire. Merkly asked him a number of questions on the activities of Hungarian artists in Istambul (Istanbul). Gross told him later that he had been introduced to Earle, but did not mention anything about his contact with Captain Johnson.

105. About a week later, Klatt came to Budapest (see F2143 F2143return; AOB: must have been towards the end of July 1943) in a repentant frame of mind (AOB: Klatt had just brought White-Russian General Turkul and family from Rome to Wien, albeit, that their destination ultimately should become Budapest) whom he relieved of 25,000 pengoes (Hungarian currency). He still refused however, to have anything to do with Captain Johnson's counter-proposal. He mentioned to Gross that one of his W/T operators, Dr. Will Goetz (alias Wigo) (= KV 2/387; PF600802) was going to Turkey to establish a link between Istambul (Istanbul) and Sofia. (Gross had previously met Goetz through Reiner and Korda, III-F (German military counter-espionage) Wien agents in Budapest).

106. Gross had another meeting with Merkly who told him that, when the next went to Turkey, he must steer clear of Goetz, as he was anti-Hungarian agent. Merkly explained that Hatz had made a bad mistake, for he had asked Vasvary's permission for Goetz to use the Hungarian Military Attaché's radio in Istambul (Istanbul) for transmitting to Sofia with a secret code, and for Klatt to give him the translations of all messages.

107. Merkly then explained that the following changes were about to take place in Hungary, as a result of Kallay's new pro-Allied policy: Vasvary was to leave his position in Budapest, to be replaced by the pro-Allied General Staff Colonel Julius Kadar; Sillay was to leave Hadik, to be replaced by Major Ritter von Kern.

108. Merkly gave Gross instructions to establish a connection through the Zionists with Allied military representatives with a view to future discussions on cooperation between them and members of the Hungarian General Staff. Gross was to be very careful as the pro-Nazi Bartalits had written reports against Gross stating that he was often to be seen in the company of Zionists and of undesirables such as Berisbek and the Chilean Minister Briones. If Gross had any difficulties in Turkey, he was to bribe Ferber, who did anything for money, to send a radio message from the Military Attaché's office to Merkly.

109. On the third journey to Istambul (Istanbul), Gross took some mail from Enomoto a Japanese journalist (AOB: about Christmas 1944, Enomoto and his family travelled in his own car from the Balkan Germany, Denmark in to Sweden and settled in Stockholm! This was only possible with German support as, for example, he necessitated gasoline coupons and food ration-cards! And Gasoline was rather restricted available by then), to AOKI (KV 2/1504; PF 716232) Japanese Military Attaché in in Istambul (Istanbul), and Schamli, a →

Turk who worked for the Japs. (AOB: Japan and Turkey were not at war against one another) Gross handed the mail on arrival to Captain Johnson for censoring, and later posted it.

110. On this occasion he gave some ABW (Abwehr) information to Captain Johnson, and told him specifically about Goetz's new activities. Captain Johnson asked if it was not possible to induce Goetz to work on the Allied side, but Gross said he did not know very much about him.

111. At a later meeting, Gross told Captain Johnson about Klatt's refusal to have anything more to do with the W/T affair. Captain Johnson said that possibly he might be able to produce a W/T set for Hungarian use at some later date.

112. Gross also gave Captain Johnson a list off 60 names of agents working in Budapest against the Hungarians. He explained that he had taken this list from the new Hungarian C.E. office in Bajza. U 44 without anyone knowing. Gross says later he learnt that Popešcu had seen him in possession of this list). Captain Johnson kept a copy of the list. (AOB: in those days their existed in Europe only photographic copying).

113. At a meeting with Roman, Gross told him that he was unable to answer the military questions on the questionnaire he had given him, but could reply to the general ones.

114. Roman asked Gross to arrange for 150,000 French frances to be transported to a lady in Grenoble. Gross said he would be able to do this through Sholz or Winninger.

115. Meanwhile Popešcu and Winninger had arrived in Istambul (Istanbul). Popešcu introduced Gross to Julius Kovats (Gyula de Kovacs Hungarian. KV 2/284; PF 600167) of the Hungarian Freihafen Direktion (a cover firm for Hungarian 'offensive espionage)

116. Before he left (Turkey), Kollek gave him the Zionist mail, including a letter from Schwarz a Czech emigrant who had a high position with the Americans, for a certain Fritz Laufer (Lauffer? of Vörösmarti, Platz 5, Budapest. Kollek described the latter as an 'ordinary commercial latter'.

117. On his return to Hungary, Ziegler told him at Svilengrad that he had received an order from Sofia to search Gross. The latter (Gross) bribed him with some Turkish carpets to keep his mouth shut.

Meeting with Bagyoni (KV 2/3646; PF 603873) who rated him for having filched the list of 60 names from Merkly's office. He said he had been sent to Sofia to clear up the whole matter. Gross admitted he had the list, which he claimed to have taken by mistake, Bagyoni said he was not to mention anything about the list to Klatt.

119. The both then went to see Klatt who accused gross of working with 2 of his W/T operators, Dominik (alias Weiss) and Hans Sturm (Dr. Hans Sturm-Schneider). →

Gross denied this strenuously. Klatt then said that Goetz had sent him a report on Gross who was alleged to have received information from Dominik and Sturm and sold it to the British. Klatt further accused Gross of having stolen the list from Bajza U.44, but Gross told him he had no right to make such accusations as he was not his chief. Klatt sent a message to Goetz ordering him back to Sofia at once.

120. Gross returned to Budapest with Bagyoni. They both went to see Merkly who said he assumed Gross had taken the list and shown it to the British. He said that he would dismiss gross immediately if he did such a thing again without permission. Gross said that the list had got mixed up by mistake amongst his papers. Merkly was very annoyed that Klatt and Goetz should make accusations against one of his agents and promised to arrest Goetz if ever he should return to Hungary.

121. Gross reported to Merkly on the job Roman had given him to do. Merkly said it would be very dangerous for them both if anything went wrong, but Gross reassured him.

122. Gross further told Merkley of Captain Johnson's proposition to establish radio contact with the Hungarians. Merkly said that he could arrange this, Gross would have an excellent chance of redeeming himself, as Kern and Kadar had spoken badly of Gross, saying he was only a smuggler who had achieved nothing of concrete worth in the sphere of espionage.

123. A few days later, Gross was summoned by Merkly to the Cafe Biarritz to meet Klatt and Goetz, who had just arrived in Budapest. (AOB: this might have been early October 1943, when Klatt arrived in Hungary with a new Hungarian identity Richard Karmany. Since he lived in Budapest and his W/T station was named Bully (I .. III) Merkly told Goetz just what he thought of him, and said he had no right to make accusations against Gross. Goetz then admitted the truth, - that Popešcu and Winninger had pressed him to write a report against Gross, failing which they themselves would write a report against Goetz.

124. Merkly told Gross he was not to mention this meeting to Winninger and Popešcu, and Klatt said the same to Goetz.

125. Two days later, Merkley informed Gross that Kern and Kadar had said the radio affair with the British might be pushed through if Gross could give some proof that his connection with the British was genuine. Gross revealed that he was in contact with Major Whittall and Captain Johnson.

126. A few days afterwards, Gross received an urgent call from Merkly, who asked him if he knew a certain Laufer (Lauffer?). Gross said no. Merkley then asked if he had brought a letter for Laufer (Lauffer?) from Istambul (Istanbul), and Gross remembered about the letter (Kollek had given him, which he had handed to Springmann on arrival in Budapest with the rest of the Zionist mail. Gross obtained Merkly's permission to ask Springmann if he had delivered the letter yet, and after a few hours, was successful in rescuing it from Springmann. Merkly was very angry with Gross and said that henceforth all the Zionist mail must pass through his hands.

127. Merkly went on to explain that Fritz Laufer (Lauffer?) Chief V-Mann of Ast III-F (counter-espionage) Prague (Prag), had recently called with Captain Klausnitzer, head of Ast III, Prague (Prag), to make a complaint against Gross who they alleged was working for the American "Nachrichtendienstbüro", and had brought back a letter for →

Laufer (Lauffer?) They had asked Merkly if Gross had reported this fact to him, and he had said no. The latter was in reality a secret message couched in commercial terms.

128. Later, Bagyoni told Gross that Laufer (Lauffer?) was a Czech emigrant, alias Ludwig Mayer, and a first-class German agent.

129. Before Gross left for Turkey for the forth time, Merkly introduced him to Dr. Horvat, a W/T officer in the Hungarian 'Offensive Espionage Service' and instructed Gross to introduce him to the British as the W/T operator who would work with them from the Hungarian end.

130. Merkly also instructed Gross to inform the British, should they ask, that he was working for members of a pro-allied party composed of Social Democrats, Peasant-Party and Royalists, who had combined in order to form an opposition-group against Germany. Gross asked what names he might give to the British, and Merkly gave him 3 names (one of which Gross remembers to be Graf Zichy). Gross asked if he was really genuine in his expressed desire to work with the British; Merkly replied that Kadar had received instructions direct from Kally that every pro-Nazi in Hungary must be dismissed from his post. This party was willing to reveal useful information to the detriment of Germany and Rumania, but not of Hungary, which was definitely anxious to withdrew from the war.

131. Before leaving Budapest, Gross was again arrested on account of his 1½ years prison sentence, but was soon released through Merkley's influence.

132. Gross left Hungary with Horvat on his forth journey to Turkey. In Sofia, Kern told him that he must not fail to see that the W/T link between the British and Hungarians was established.

133. On the same day a big conference, at which Gross was not present, was held between Bartalits, Hatz (Hungarian Military Attaché in Bulgaria), Merkly, Kern and Klatt →

AOB: Since the 5th of July 1943, after Hitler personally decided - that no longer Jewish individuals may be engaged in Abwehr related matters. The O.K.W. Amt Ausland/Abwehr, realised that this would constitute a big blow to the information channel ran by Richard Kauder alias Klatt. As to bypass Hitler's strict orders, it was decided to move Klatt from Sofia to Budapest. It was arranged between the German and the Hungarian Authorities - that Klatt should be given a legal Hungarian status and he was provided a legal Hungarian passport, on the name of Richard Karmany. His operational W/T station name became known as Bully (1 ..5). However, the Luftmeldekopf (LMK) in Sofia remained in function, albeit, no longer directly headed by Klatt himself. Though, we learned from Klatt's file series KV 2/1498 that their Wehrmacht telephone exchange connection remained operational for some time to come. Of course, Dr. Delius was embarrassed by this fact. (see also: G2144 G2144return)

→ after which they all went on a tour of inspection round Klatt's wireless station (cover-name: Schwert)

134. On the following day, all the above except Gross and (of course) Klatt, had a conference with Dr. Delius (AOB: the alias of Obstlt. Otto Wagner, Leiter K.O. Bulgaria), and all subsequently left for Istambul (Istanbul).

136. Later, Kollek proposed to introduce Hatz (Hungarian Military Attaché in Sofia) to the American General Tindall. This proved impossible, however, and eventually Hatz was introduced to Captain Seager by Kollek and Gross Hatz stated that the anti-Nazi Hungarian clique was willing to work on the side of the Allies provided Hungary could keep all her territory intact. Seager promised to report this to Washington.

137. Gross reported to Captain Johnson on the meeting between Hatz and Seager and Captain Johnson reproached Gross for not having brought Hatz together with a British Officer. →

AOB: these circumstances could have caused consequences in Hatz's life! Because: in late 1944 Hatz, whom had been already in touch with the Russians, was later sentenced to a Russian concentration camp. Now my suggestion: might the Russians have received information via, for instance, Kim Philby (H.A.R. Philby)? As he belonged to the so-called "Cambridge Five" group? Kim Philby was employed at M.I.6 / S.I.S. and thus in touch with the Russians. Albeit that there were 4 more left, who could also have passed-on the information to the Russians. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Five

→ Captain Johnson said he hoped that by the next time Gross came to Turkey he would be able to provide him with a W/T set. Gross told him that Horvat would be the operator in Hungary, that conferences had been held in Sofia between Hungarian and Germans whom he specified, that he was working for a pro-Allied party in Hungary under 3 people whose names he gave. He did not state that Merkly had given him instructions to tell the latter to the British. He further gave Captain Johnson information about Hungarian A/A/ and Robert Groenes, who worked for Klatt.

139. Roman congratulated Gross on the success of the Grenoble affair, for he had heard that the lady in France had received the money safely.

140. When Gross returned to Hungary, Merkly informed him that he was leaving Hadik for a post in the Hungarian Gestapo (Geheimestaatspolizei?), that Hatz was to replace Bartalits in Istambul (Istanbul), that Bartalits was to be relegated to a small post in Budapest, and Garzuly was to become Deputy-Head of the Hungarian Counter-Espionage Service under Kern.

(AOB: according foregoing information in Klatt's file series, they estimated that Klatt settled in September 1943 in Budapest) with Hatz. Klatt had had more difficulties in Sofia with Delius and moved his Dienststelle to Budapest. (AOB: not entirely correct, as Klatt was forced to leave Sofia due to Hitler's directive that Jewish people were under no circumstance to be engaged in Abwehr matters. And since September 1943, he possessed a legal Hungarian passport under the name of: Richard Karmany. What changed was: that he had to provide now also copies for the Hungarian Secret Services. Whether, it concerned all his Max messages I don't know)

→ Klatt had had more difficulties in Sofia with Dr. Delius and wanted to move his Dienststelle to Budapest. (AOB: please notice foregoing additional information) It was arranged with Kadar that Klatt should take over the Hungarian C.E. office Bajza U. 44 (??) and use a flat in Szeher U. as his wireless station, controlled by a Hungarian C.E. officer Thomas Rozsa. Klatt later transported his troupe and trapping to Budapest, leaving Dr. Deutsch behind in Sofia in charge of a small ofiice.

142. Kern told Gross that in future he was only to submit reports to Hatz (??), and that if Garzuly became too inquisitive about anything, Gross must keep his mouth shut. (Klappe zu).

143. A few days later Popešcu told Gross that his chief Major Bagel had dismissed him, ordering him to remain in Budapest. He proposed, however, to make a dash by plane to Winninger for Turkey, and Bagyoni and Gross helped him to pass safely through the airport controls. However, he was arrested in Svilengrad (the rail-way border town between Bulgaria and Turkey) and brought back to Hungary for internment, as Klatt had seen him (AOB: Klatt received a German passport somewhere in 1940, implying two no-goings: Switzerland and Turkey), Gross and Bagyoni at the airport and reported the matter to Bagel. Popešcu, before his arrest, managed to pass some Zionist mail to Winninger without being noticed.

144. Gross left Hungary on his fifth visit to Turkey. In Sofia, Hatz told Gross if he succeeded in obtaining a W/T set, he was to tell Ferber to telegraph Hatz immediately.

145. In Istambul (Istanbul), Captain Johnson told Gross that he had not been able yet to obtain a radio.

146. Gross went to see Schwarz who said he knew that Gross wanted a radio. He was willing to give him one almost immediately, for he 'did not work as slowly as the British'. (The Gross received an American set) In order to convince himself that he was working with the right people, i.e. Hungarian General Staff Officers only, Schwarz proposed the following check. On a pre-arranged day at 21.30 hrs. the Tunis radio was to broadcast in French 'Attention, Hongrie, sincérité avant tout'. If Hungary did not receive this message, it would be repeated at the same time 3 days later. If the message was received, the Budapest radio was to broadcast in reply from 2210 - 2212 hrs. on the subject of the Izmir Fair. If that succeeded Schwarz would give Gross a radio, codes and detailed instructions for working with the American set.

147. Gross said he would reply to this proposal in a few days. He telegraphed Hatz through Ferber, asking him to come at once to Turkey.

149. Captain had received wind of the American plans through Überall or Kollek, (AOB: I would not wonder - when the British services intercepted some of these communications and thereafter responded instantly) and told Gross he too had means of providing a W/T set for Hatz. He proposed to use the same sort of check as Schwarz: London radio was to broadcast a message at a pre-arranged time about Hungarian journalists and Budapest radio was to give a 2 minute talk on the Izmir fair, as in the case of the Americans.

150. Gross communicated Captain Johnson's offer to Hatz, who said he wanted to take the American W/T set back to Hungary. Possibly later, there might be a change of playing back a set to the British. Meanwhile Gross was to continue negotiating with Captain Johnson for a British set, and tell him that the check he proposed would be carried out on the Budapest radio.

151. Überall reproached Gross for carrying out negotiations for the W/T set with the Americans rather than the British.

152. Two days later Gross received a (American) W/T set from Schwarz. Hatz told him to dump it in the Hungarian Consulate, but Gross objected on the grounds that Bartalits or some other pro-Nazi might hear of the matter. Hatz said he personally would open the Consulate door at 4 o'clock and take the radio.

153. At 4 o'clock Gross went along to the Consulate with the radio and Vampetits, Hungarian Consul opened the door. Gross said he wished to see Hatz. Vampetits replied that Hatz was out, but that Gross could leave the package, about which he was already informed. Gross left the radio with him.

154. A few minutes later gross ran into Hatz and told him what had happened. Hatz reassured gross that no harm had been done, and said that Vampetits knew nothing whatever about any W/T set. That evening Hatz congratulated Gross on his achievement and promised him personally to Horthy (Staatsverweser) in Budapest. Hatz took the W/T set that night back to Sofia.

155. Three days later Gross received codes from Schwarz. He gave these to Bagyoni, who was travelling back with him, as Roman had warned him that the Turks intended to search him at the frontier.

156. At Svilengrad (train border station Bulgaria - Turkey) Gross was searched for 4½ hours by the Turkish authorities, who found nothing on him.

157. In Sofia, Gross and Bagyoni heard from Hatz's chauffeur that the latter had gone to see Dr. Delius (Leiter K.O. Bulgaria) immediately on arrival. Gross suspected a double-cross and asked Bagyoni (KV2/3646; PF 603873), who was well in with Hatz, to pump the latter as to the reasons for his seeing Delius.

158. Bagyoni later reported to Gross that he had elicited from Hatz the information that he had in fact told the Germans everything concerning the projected W/T scheme, as 'the war was not over yet, and he did not wish to risk his life'.

159. In Budapest, Hatz, Kadar and Szombotay, General Staff Officer, had a meeting with Kallay and Szentmiklossy, Deputy Foreign Minister and who expressed great satisfaction about the proposed W/T links with the Allies. Szentmiklossy said that while they could satisfy use the American link, the need not use, the British one, as they already had links with the British through Anton Üllein-Reviczky, Hungarian Ambassador in Stockholm, and through Ujvary, Hungarian Consul in Istambul (Istanbul).

160. Gross requested Hatz very strenuously to do all he could to establish the British W/T link as well. Kally finally gave permission to this effect. He ordered Col. Naray, Chief of the Hungarian military-colntolled radio, to transmit the messages about the Izmir Fair as pre-arranged with the British and Americans. The outcome was, so Gross heard, that Budapest received the signal from London, but not from Tunis, and broadcast in reply the message about the Izmir Fair.

161. Hatz informed Gross that for his part in helping to establish the W/T links with the Allies, Kallay had appointed him Chief of the Hungarian Freihafen Direktion in Turkey with a salary of £T.2,500 (2500) monthly. He would henceforth be known as Gyorgy, not Gross, and he would receive a pardon in respect of his impending prison sentence. Gross received passport about this time.

162. During the next 2 - 3 months, gross saw nothing of Klatt, who had built up a reputation for himself in Budapest, and only hobnobbed with the high-wigs. The fact that gross had given away his name to the British still rankled Klatt, who gave orders to his employees forbidding any of them to have any contact with Gross.

163. Before leaving Hungary on his sixth journey to Turkey, gross arranged with Hatz that they should meeting in Sofia and that Gross should continue to Istambul (Istanbul) one day ahead of Hatz in order to arrange 2 meetings:-

Hatz said that he could tell the British and Americans that Kallay had instructed him to say that Hungary was willing to go over on the side of the Allies.

AOB: all being quite naive. As earlier in Italy, also Hungary was considered for the Germans being Kriegswichtig. Our reference: [233] Quoting partially:

Hitler's Weisung Nr. 48 b:

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht F.H.Qu. den 7.8.1943

Nr. 004124/43 g.K.WFSt/Qu. (Verw./V) 7. Ausfertigung

Der Führer wird dem Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe F - Freiherr. von. Weichs (Belgrad) ...

German troops ultimately occupied Hungary on 19 March 1944 (Operation Margarethe). (de https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ungarn_im_Zweiten_Weltkrieg) (en https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungary_in_World_War_II)

164. A few days later Gross arrived in Sofia, only to find that Hatz had already left for Turkey.

165. In Istambul (Istanbul), Hatz told gross that he had been introduced to Schwarz the day before Lotha Köves, Hungarian representative, personally recommended by Graf Berchtold (??) of O.K.W., Berlin of the joint Hungarian-German Shipping Agency D.E.T.E.R.T. (??) Hatz said that the W/T plans made in Budapest were now obsolete as Schwarz had received word (Antwort?) from Washington to the effect that he should only arrange W/T liaison with Hungary on condition that no other country had such a contact. If any other power wished work in W/T liaison with Hungary, the whole thing was off. Hatz told Gross to have nothing further to do with W/T plans, for Schwarz had told him that he had not complete trust in Gross; Hatz proposed to continue the negotiations in conjunction with Köves. Gross, for his part, was to bring his wife to Istambul (Istanbul). and settle down quietly in his new job.

166. Gross then went to Captain Johnson and told him the whole story, including the fact that Hatz had probably betrayed the plans to the Germans.

167. Gross later had an interview with Schwarz who told him that his chief had more faith in Köves than in Gross, and that he would have to cease all activities concerning the W/T affair. He could, however, continue to work for the Americans on other jobs.

168. Schwarz then gave Gross a specially-prepared lead pencil, containing a message and wireless codes, which he asked Gross to give to Winninger. Gross told Schwarz that he did not consider Winninger trustworthy as he almost certainly blabbed everything to his German chiefs. Schwarz replied that Winninger was doing excellent work for him.

169. Gross gave Schwarz a letter which he had given to him by an unknown lady in Budapest to hand to Schwarz. (Gross later heard that the lady was Frau Laufer (Lauffer?).

170. Gross returned to Budapest and gave Winninger the pencil from Schwarz. Winninger promised not to say anything about it, and threatened Gross that he would expose all the latter's associations with the Zionists if he breathed a word about this episode.

171. Gross then saw Hatz who told him he was leaving on a hunting-expedition. Winninger later told Gross that Hatz had really gone to Baden with Kadar to meet Admiral ~~Kanaris~~ Canaris and Baron Marogna-Redwitz to discuss the W/T plans. Winninger said that he and others had received an order from Canaris to keep an eye on all concerned the radio negotiations. Gross simulated ignorance of the whole affair.

172. Three days later Hatz returned from his "hunting-expedition". He admitted to Gross that he had not really been hunting but had been having a lot of difficulties over the W/T affair. He had, in fact, been parleying with Admiral ~~Kanaris~~ Canaris (Leiter of all O.K.W. Amt Ausland/Abwehr matters (neglecting Referat II being sabotage such as the Brandenburg-Division)) and Graf (Baron Marogna-Redwitz, KV 2/3160; PF 601107. AOB: after the failed assassination attempt on Hitler of 20th July 1944 - the Baron had also been murdered, as so many others) and Kadar.

173. He admitted further that he had made a bif mistake a few months ago, for he had told Dr. Delius (= Obstlt. Otto Wagner Leiter of KO-Bulgaria in Sofia) everything about the projected W/T contact between Hungary and the Allies. Canaris had given him the order to continue negotiations which would henceforth be under German control, with the Allies, and to report all details to the Germans. Gross pointed out that he could not very well carry on now with the Americans, but Hatz reassured him, saying he had "possibilities of deceiving the Germans" and of continuing to negotiate with the Americans. Gross asked what Kallay had to say about now; Hatz told him not to ask so many questions, saing that Kallay was a good politician and nothing more.

174. A week or two later, Hatz told Gross that henceforth all Zionist mail and money would be carried between Istambul (Istanbul) and Budapest by himself or the diplomatic courier, and that 10% of all Zionist money was to be given to him in Istambul. Gross pointed out that the German couriers, Winninger an Sedlacek, would wonder what had happened to their percentages, so it was finally arranged that gross should, as bbefore, collect the money in Istambul (Istanbul) and give it all to Hatz, whop would arrange for it to be transported via official Hungarian channels. In future the German couriers would receive 7½ of the 10% commission, the Hungarian C.E. Service 1¼ % and Gross 1¼ %. This would now dispense with any need for smuggling. Hatz explained that he wished to control how much money the German couriers were keeping for themselves, and to ensure that the Zionists were not being deceived.

175. Gross informed Winninger of the new arrangement, and the latter was quite satisfied as he would not not have to run any more smuggling risks. Anyhow, he would still make on the exchange of gold into Reichsmarks (RM).

176. Shortly afterwards Garzuly called Gross and Springmann to his office, thanked Springmann for the good work he had done on behalf of the Jewish refugees, and gave him a passport for Turkey which gross had promised to obtain for him. Springmann was very satisfied with the proposed new arrangement which Garzuly outlined to him. Garzuly asked Gross to introduce him a Joel Brand and Dr. Rejo Kastner (Kärstner or Kaerstner?) , who had taken over Springmann's Zionist work when they heard hw was leaving Hungary. Gross later brought about this meeting which was the beginning of a close official cooperation between the Hungarian and the Zionists.

177. Hatz told Gross that he was to do everything possible to help the Jews, in accordance with Kally's new policy. Gross busied himself in this sphere. He made strenuous efforts to recover arrested on the Hungarian-Slovakian (Slowakei) frontier. He succeeded and the courier was released.

178. Gross had about this time considerable difficulties in obtaining visas to Turkey for himself and Springmann. On his last stay in Istambul (Istanbul), Pomerance and Baeder had given Gross instructions to return with Springmann, who had achieved such magnificent work in his capacity as controller in Hungary of the Zionist Courier service. Gross was also to assist Dr. Dax, a leading Zionist in Bratiusllava (Preßbrug), and Gizi Fleischmann, a Zionist in Poland, who was responsible for establishing the first contact between Jews and Gestapo leaders (notably Obersturmbannführer (= Obstlt.) Wyli Wislizeni), in arranging their journey to Turkey.

179. The German authorities (i.e. Obst. Scholz (Scholtz?), new Verbindungsoffizier in Budapest, and Dr. Schmidt) were reluctant to grant German 'Ausreisebewilligungen' to Gross and Springmann, but finally, as a result of strong representations made to Scholz (Scholtz?) by Hatz, Kern and Kadar, Gross obtained the necessary papers.

180. Gross and his wife prepared for their seventh journey to Turkey, which Gross intended to make his last, as he wished to settle down in his new post as Head of the Hungarian Freihafen Direktion.

181. gross and his wife, together with Springmann and his wife, travelled together to Istanbul. After introducing Springmann to all the Zionists, Pomerance asked Gross if he could arrange for a Zionist, at the time in Istambul (Istanbul), to return to Hungary on Springmann's passport, after substituting new photos. Pomerance and Überall wanted someone new to return as they had not much confidence in Springmann's successors, Brand and Kastmer (Kärstner). Gross said it would be very difficult, and the matter was eventually dropped. Springmann also volunteered to return to Hungary if it was absolutely necessary. (AOB: on 19 March the German Wehrmacht occupied Hungarian territories, and gave way for Eichmann's men capturing Jews generally in Hungary!)

182. Soon after arrival gross reported to Captain Johnson on Hatz's meeting with ~~Kanaris~~ (Admiral Canaris head of the entire O.K.W. Amt Ausland/Abwehr) in Baden (near to Wien?), and stressed the fact that it would be dangerous for the British to have anything to do now with any radio communication between Turkey and Hungary.

183. Gross then went to see Schwarz who was very surprised to see him as he heard that gross had received a very bad name in German circles and that he might be arrested. Schwarz said that he had put in a good word for him, as he asked a certain German Dienststelle, with which he had 'excellent connections', to grant Gross his German exit-permit.

184. Gross then went on to tell him about the Baden meeting and Schwarz told him not to worry his head about that - Gross had done a fine job in connection with the W/T set and 'everything was in hand'. Schwarz said he would try and arrange for Gross to go to Cairo where he could live quietly with his wife. In the meantime he could live at peace in Istambul (Istanbul).

185. Gross rented an apartment in Istambul (Istanbul) for 7 months - Elirak Appt. 269 - and during the next few days associated constantly with Springmann.

186. Meanwhile, Überall, Baeder, Pomerance, Szyd and Averbuch, came to see gross, every day, either severally or individually, with pressing requests for him to return to Hungary as there was no other courier to take back the Zionist mail and money. In the first week of Gross's stay, a new order had been issued by the Turkish Government in connection with Turkish entry-visas for European travellers. The new system made it much more difficult, and in some cases impossible, for travellers to obtain entry-visas, and henceforth they were only to be issued if permission was given by Ankara. As a result of the new order the other Zionists couriers, Winninger and Sedlacek, were unable to enter Turkey. Gross however, said he had no intention of returning.

187. About two weeks after his arrival Überall told Gross that Major Whitthall had two missions of the greatest importance which had to be accomplished, one in Budapest and the other in Bucharest. Überall explained the 2 missions as follows:

(a) Winninger, during his last visit to Turkey, had been given a message to deliver in Budapest, and had been told to bring the answer back to Turkey. As, however, he was now unable to enter Turkey owing to the new law concerning entry-visas, it was imperative that someone return to Hungary in order to fetch the answer and bring it back to Turkey. Gross was the only person who could do this.

(b) Major Whittall wanted Gross to establish a continual contact between Turkey and Hungarian Military Attaché in Bucharest, to whom Gross was to give some correspondence.

188. Concerning Major Whittall's second request, Gross said he could only arrange it through Hatz. Rumanian-Hungarian relations were at the moment very bad, and Gross's life might be in danger if he travelled to Bucharest, even if he could get a visa for Rumania. Gross asked Überall to see if Major Whittall agreed with the plan.

189. Überall later told Gross that he could make all arrangements with Hatz to establish a contact between Rumania and Turkey. Through Hatz's influence, gross received a note verbale from the Hungarian Foreign Minister via Cziky, which enabled him to obtain a Turkish exit-visa. He did not, however, obtained a Turkish entry-visa.

190. Hatz agreed to do anything in Rumania that Major Whittall demanded of Gross, provided that in so doing Hungarian interests wiould in no way be compromised. If Major Whittall's letter contained anything to the detriment of Rumania, so much the better for Hungary.

191. About this time Schwarz too pressed gross to return to Hungary, saying that he had some very important work for him to do there. He said that he had been successful in clearing up Gross's difficulties with the Germans, and that Gross could now return quite safely, as hem Schwarz, had used his influence in "high German quarters' to clear Gross. (AOB: did he really?) He guaranteed that if gross was unable to procure a Turkey entry-visa in Hungary, he personally would arrange for the visa to be issued through the Turkish transport firm Antalya.

(a) To ask Hatz to take 2 W/T sets back with him to Budapest, to be delivered later in Wien (Vienna) and Bratislava (Preßburg).

(b) To collect RM 100,000 deposit the sum in any place in Wien where Schwarz's agent could later collect it, and notify Schwarz telegraphically on the address where the money was deposited.

193. Gross asked Schwarz why he could not arrange this matter himself with Hatz, whom he already knew well. Schwarz replied that he wished to give Gross a chance of accomplishing something himself. Gross again warned Schwarz against Hatz, reminding him of his meeting with Canaris in Baden (vicinity of Wien), and against Winninger. Schwarz said he would take the risk.

194. Gross said that he could raise the two sums of money, and deposit them in Wien and Bratislava (Preßburg) either through Popper of Interkontinental, from whom he could easily by Reichsmarks (RM) out of his capital (at the time £25,000 -£30,000 sterling), or through Winninger. Schwarz agreed with this plan.

195. Gross referred the whole matter to Hatz, who did not think he would be able to take both sets at once back to Hungary.

196. Later Gross fell out of the picture, as Schwarz started to negotiate direct with Hatz and Köves. A few days before Gross left Istambul (Istanbul), he delivered the 2 W/T sets to Hatz, but knew nothing of the final arrangements, except that Hatz was to take them back to Budapest himself.

197. Meanwhile, Überall gave gross the details of what he was to do for Major Whittall in Budapest and Bucharest. He said that Winninger had been sent with a letter to Colonel Folli, Italian Military Attaché (I suppose of Mussolini's government) in Budapest. Gross was to contact Winninger, and ask him what had happened about "Cremisi" (a password which Winninger had been told to use when giving Major Whittall's letter to Colonel Folli). If Winninger had already received Folli's answer, gross was to bring it back at once to Istambul (Istanbul); if not, Gross was to obtain the letter from Winninger, himself see Col. Folli, announce that he came from "Cremisi", and take Folli's answer back to Turkey.

198. Regarding the second mission, Gross was to arrange with Hatz for a novel and 2 letters for Major Whitthall to be delivered to general Badani (?), Hungarian Military Attaché in Bucharest. The password to general Badani was to be "Pinto". Once this contact had been established Gross was to arrange through Hatz for a permanent liaison to be maintained between Badani and Whittall.

199. Überall gave Gross the novel and 2 letters, which Gross believes contained 'anti-Rumanian material'. Gross gave these to Hatz to make the necessary arrangements for delivery through a courier to Badani in Buchgarest. Überall also gave gross a large packet of Zionist mail and money for delivery to Brand in Budapest.

200. Before leaving Turkey, Schwarz told gross that he must hand over anything secret he was intending to take back to Budapest to Hatz, who was travelling a week later. Schwarz said he had heard from the German Consulate that Ziegler and Hussel had been replaced in Svilengrad (the railways border town between Bulgaria and Turkey) by 2 new Gestapo (geheime Staatspolizei) officers, and that it would be therefore dangerous for gross to run any risk of being discovered with anything incriminating on him.

201. Roman asked gross to pay the following sums of money to people in Budapest:-

203. After handing all documents and other secret material to Hatz, in Istambul (Istanbul) Groiss returned to Budapest alone and empty-handed. His old friends Ziegler and Hussel greeted him as usual at Svilengrad.

204. While Gross had been in Turkey, Brand had become closely acquainted with Dr. Schmidt, Winninger, Sedlacek and Lt. Fendrick, who worked for Col. Scholz (Scholtz?), and Gross noticed on his return taht he was continually in their company drinking and playing baccarat. Dr. Kastner (Kästner?), too, had become very thick with Garzuly.

205. As a result of these new liaisons, gross began to have difficulties with the Germans (they did occupy Hungary on 19th March), which resulted in Winninger stating categorically that he would see that his office opposed all Gross's attempts to return to Turkey. He promised, however, not to make a report against Gross. It came out later that Brand or Kastner (Kästner?) had revealed something to Winninger of Gross's work for the Allies.

206. Gross very nearly compromised himself over the Zionist money (71,000 dollar) which Hatz had brought back from Turkey. He, Hatz and Pomerance had arranged in Istambul (Istanbul) that they would only declare 20,000 dollars to Garzuly and send the remainder secretly to Dr. Dax in Bratislava (Preßburg). Garzuly, however, had wind of the fact - gross says that Kastner (Kästner?) had told him - that much more than 20,000 dollars had been brought back. Gross was only saved by the fact that Hatz confirmed that he had brought back no more than 20,000 dollars, and that Frau Brand refused to give up the letter from Istambul (Istanbul) disclosing the true amount brought in from Turkey.

207. Hatz arrived a week after Gross, bringing with him all the latter's effects. He did notm however, bring any W/T set with him, saying that the Hungarian Ambassador in Ankara had not given him the requisite laissez-passer.

208. Gross gave Winninger the pencil from Schwarz; Winninger was very upset as no W/T set had arrived for him. Gross asked him what news there was of "Cremisi". Winninger answered that he had been seen by Folli, and that the latter's answers now lay with Schmidt. He said that the letter contained highly important information, and that Überall would be crowned with laurels when he received it. Winninger proposed to take the answer back to Istambul (Istanbul) himself.

209. Hatz told Gross that he had ordered Bagyoni to go to Bucharest to fix up the Badani affair through Colonel Bartha, Hungarian Military Attaché in Bucharest. Kadar had sent a signal to Bartha ordering him to do what Bagyoni asked.

210. Gross then told Winninger of Schwarz's wish to deposit money for his agents in Wien and Bratislava (Preßbrug). Winninger saw the prospect of making on the deal, and the same day arranged with Gross, who brought RM 100,000 from Katz, to deposit the money in Frau Ida Rottter's house in Wien. He sent the money parcel forthwith to Wien through Otto Pessl, a III-F (Counter-Espionage of Ast Wien) agent who travelled between Wien and Budapest with the 'Völkischer Beobachter' (The Nazi Party Newspaper).

211. Winninger also gave Gross the address of Krajcovits (?) in Bratislava (Preßburg in Slovakia (Slowakei)), where he hoped to deposit 100,000 kroners in the near future. For the time being it was not possible to deposit the money there, as Slovakian kroners were hard to come (get) by in Hungary.

212. Gross sent two telegrams to Schwarz, notifying him that the requisite sums of money were now available at the above addresses in Wien and Bratislava (Preßburg).

213. Apart from the fact that Winninger was making difficulties for Gross on account of his German exit-permit, gross still had no Turkish entry-visa. He received a large number of telegrams from Überall, Schwarz and others in Istambul (Istanbul), promised that his Turkish visa would be ready for him in Budapest, in a very short time, but nothing transpired. Gross saw no hope of returning to Turkey.

214. A day or two later Winninger, well in liquor (Betrunken), ask gross if he had obtained his Turkish return visa yet. Gross said he had not. Winninger said that he would have to be quick as Germany had massed 100,000 men on the Hungarian border with the intention of invading Hungary very shortly. He (Winninger) said further, that Gross had a very bad name with the Germans. Winninger hiccoughed that this news must remain very secret.

215. Gross immediately warned Hatz, who reported it to Kadar. The latter said there was no truth in Gross's allegation.

216. The next day, Winninger, again drunk (betrunken), revealed to Gross and Brand that all Ggerman women working in Budapest had been ordered to return to Germany. Again gross reported the news to Hatz, and again he was laughed at. (ausgelacht)

217. A few hours later, Hatz admitted to Gross that there were in fact 100,000 German troops on the border, but that the Germans had merely demanded a transit-march through Hungary to the Carpathians in order to prevent a Russian breakthrough on that front. Hatz refused to warn Istambul (Istanbul), despite Gross's request to do so. He (Hatz) told Gross that if he heard anything new, he must warn Kern or Garzuly.

218. Winninger, Sedlacek and Scholz (Scholtz?) came to Gross, in the Cafe Biarritz, told him to pack a suitcase and take refuge in Winninger's house. They said that Horthy (Hungarian Staatverweser) had received a summons from Hitler to go (come) to Bechtesgaden (where Hitler possessed his residence "Berghof") at 1800 hrs. on 18th March, and that precisely at that hour the German invasion of Hungary would commence. They warned Gross that he and Brand were the only people in Hungary who knew of the impending invasion.

219. Gross later slipped round to see Garzuly and told him the latest news.. Garzuly said that gross was mad, and told Gross not to bother him.

221. On the following day, Winninger told Gross that he had only been bluffing him, and that he could return home. The Germans were not really going to occupy Hungary, but he had told Gross that they were in order to test whether gross was reliable or not. (i.e. to see if he would spread the news).

223. At 10.30 hrs. on the following day, gross was arrested by Captain (Hptm.) Klausnitzer now a S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst) officer.

224. This was gross's first hint that the Germans had occupied Hungary. He later learnt that the first German troops crossed the border as soon as Horthy's train reached Graz. Hungary was virtually occupied by 240 Gestapo men, the first German troops only arriving in Budapest on 21st March. Most of the important Government officials, including Kern, Garzuly and Kadar were away on weekends or on hunting-expeditions when the invasion came. Public opinion received a bad shockm and later it was generally rumoured in Budapest that the Germans had secretly arranged the invasion with Csatay, War Minister, Remeny-Schneller, Finance Minister, Johann Vörös, Divisional Commander, dr. Peter Hain, Police Chief, and with Imredy, Hungarian Nazi.

225. As Klausnitzer was about to escort Gross away, Scholz (Scholtz?) and Sedlacek arrived, saying it was a pity they had come to arrest gross later than Klausnitzer as Dr. Schmidt was anxious to have Gross in his own hands.

226. Gross was taken to the building of the Donau Schiffahrt Gesellschaft which which had been converted into a temporary prison. He was put in a room together with Leopold Barabyai, prsident of the Hungarian National Bank, and Bajczyzsilinky, joint leader with Tildy of the Hungarian Peasant Party (Bauern Partei). (Both have since dies in prison). They were later joined by Gabor von Barz, Hungarian Ambassador to the Vatican, Graf Tezseffy Aurel, Vice-President of the Hungarian Senate, Leopold Aschner, Chief of the Electrical Trust, Leopold Goldberger, textile magnate, Szentmiklossy, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Graf Karolyi, Graf Szapary, Karl Bayer, Social Democratic leader, Karl Rassy, Democratic Party leader, Zoltan Tildy, Peasant Party joint leader, Baron Alfons Weiss and some 17 other notables, (The above are all now interned in Gleiwitz.)

227. That evening, after a day of brutal treatment and privation, Gross was taken by Dr. Schmidt and Gönzcy, a Hungarian detective and agent Schmidt, to the latter's office for interrogation. Gross was interrogated theatrically from 1900 hrs that evening till 0700 hrs. the following morning by Schmidt, Winninger, Sedlacek, Scholz (Scholtz?), Flandered and one other. They asked him about the W/T set, the pencils, the RM 100,000 and 100,000 kroners, and Gross said he had informed Hatz of all these.

228. Schmidt seemed less interested in those matters, however, than in Gross's money and the money came from Turkey for the Zionists (living in German controlled Europe). They tried to bluff gross by saying his family was being held as hostage until he told the truth, that he would certainly be sent to Dachau even if Hatz did confirm Gross's statements, and would die in 3 days if Hatz did not confirm them, but Gross did not reveal anything about his own or the Zionist money.

229. At the end, Schmidt said he would give Gross three days in which to write out a full statement on everything he was now refusing to talk about. He was to stay meanwhile under arrest in Winninger's house.

230. Gross persuaded Sedlacek to get him phone up Szanto. Szanto told gross that Merkly was probaly going to make an intervention on his behalf.

231. After a few days, gross was released as Hatz confirmed all his statements. Schmidt said he could thank Laufer (Lauffer?) for all his difficulties, and thank him that he was still alive. Gross was not to return home, he must deposit all his capital (Vermögen) with him, and he could not have his passport back.

232. For a week gross was put up at various houses by friends. He learnt that Brand had been placed under arrest for 8 days in Scholz's (Scholtz's?) house, and that Kastner (Kästner?) had been detained in Schwabenberg.

233. Merkly was successful in obtaining permission for Gross to return home. When he went back to his house, he found it ransacked (geplündert) and most of his money and valuables missing.

234. After Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) were released from house arrest, Schmidt and Winninger immediately clamped on them with terroristic methods in order to blackmail them out of their Zionist funds. They told the two Zionists that they continue their activities without Gross, and that in future all money must be handed over to Schmidt and Winninger.

235. Brand made an earnest request to Schmidt to be allowed to see Obersturmbannführer (= Obstlt.) 'Wyli' (Wyli Wislizeni), who had formerly been negotiating about improved treatments of the Jews with Dr. Dax and Gizi Fleischmann in Bratislava (Preßburg) (Slowakei), and was now Inspektor of Jewish Camps in Hungary; Schmidt and Winninger agreed on condition that Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) pay them 20,000 dollars. The Zionist paid over (überwiesen?) the money.

236. A meeting was arranged between Obersturmbannführer "Wyli', and Obersturmbannführer Krumay, 3 i/c (in charge?) Gestapo in Budapest, and Brand and Kastner (Kästner?). The Zionists stated their position, and the Gestapo leaders said that they were willing to make an improvement in the treatment of Jews generally (AOB: a lie, as later Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann will organise the elimination of all Jews in Budapest and Hungary), if the Zionist paid them enough money.

237. Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) reported the results of their meeting to the Jewish Council, and it was agreed that 6½ million pengoes (Hungarian currency) should be paid to the Gestapo.

238. A second meeting was held, this time only Krumay representing the Gestapo, as 'Wyli' had been posted to Klausenburg. Brand stated that they were willing to pay 6½ million pengoes and Krumay promised to return 600 Jews would be transferred down the Donau (Danube) to Constanza (at the estuary of the Donau in the Black Sea), and thence facilitated to Palestine, that there would be no more ghettos or deportations (a pure lie!), that Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) would receive support from the Gestapo in case of any difficulties, that both would be elected to the Jewish Council, and that they and their families need not wear the Star of David. Krumay did not subsequently carry out his promises.

239. Despite these meetings, Schmidt and Winninger continued to extort vast sums of Zionist money out of Brand and Kastner (Kästner?). Gross noticed that they were frequently together with Schmidt and Winninger in cafes, and had received orders not to do so). The Germans, en even Kastner (Kästner?), treated Gross like an underdog whenever they saw him.

240. About this time, Gross had words with Winninger who was drunk. Winninger jeered tipsily at gross, and crowed bbecause he was stuck in Budapest. Gross in front of Brand and Kastner (Kästner?), said that anyway he did not allow himself to be treated as a 'two-year-old like these two chickens (meaning Brand and Kastner (Kästner?)), what Winninger could make a good fortune if he arranged his (Gross's) exit-visa, and that Winninger was to give up blackmailing the Zionists.

241. Garzuly summoned gross to his office and angrily made a big fuss over the problem of Zionist money. He said that a telegram had come from Pomerance in Istambul (Istanbul) asking if the Hungarian Zionists needed more money - if so, was it safe to give it to Bagyoni who was to leave Turkey. Garzuly accused Gross of having spoken badly of Bagyoni in Turkey, for the Zionists there were not sure whether they could entrust Bagyoni with the money ort. Gross denied this accusation.

242. After the interview (Gespräch) Gross went straight to Brand and Kastner (Kästner?), whom he told to send telegrams immediately to Istambul (Instanbul) stating that Pomerance must definitely not hand over any money to Bagyoni; gross explained that he knew that Garzuly would confiscate every pengoe (Hungarian currency) of it as soon as Bagyoni brought it back. Brand agreed with Gross's point of view, but Kastner (Kästner?) did not believe that Garzuly would keep their money in his own pocket.

243. That evening Winninger told Gross that he knew Bagyoni was about to return to Hungary, and warned gross to stop him as he was certain to be arrested on arrival. Brand, who was also present, said it was too late as Kastner (Kästner?) had already telegraphed through Garzuly instructing Bagyoni to return with the Zionist money. (AOB: all is rather accomplished childish)

244. Gross nevertheless telegraphed through Csiki's office to Bagyoni, using a special code-word of their own Sachbearbbeiter, meaning danger), not to return to Hungary. Bagyoni replied saying he had to come back in a few days. Gross snet another telegram telling him definitely not to return.

245. About this time Winninger told Gross that Garzuly had asked Baron von Manteuffel, of Ast Wien, to arrest gross. Von Manteuffel had replied that gross's affair was already cleared up, but he, Garzuly, could arrest him if he so wished (wished so). Garzuly had replied that he could not do so because of Hatz's interventions.

246. A few days later, Kadar, Kern, Ujszaszy and a film actress Kathalin Karady were arrested by the Germans.

247. Hatz arrived in Budapest, saying that O.K.W., Berlin had given orders for the 5 Hungarian Attachés in Istambul (Istanbul), Lisbon, Madrid, Bratislava (Preßburg), and Bucharest to be recalled to Budapest. Hatz said that Bartalits was to take his place in Istambul (Istanbul), but that he hoped to get it back through his influence with Delius (Obstlt. Otto Wagner; Leiter K.O.-Bulgaria)(AOB: at this time Obstlt. Wagner might even have moved to another place) and other Germans in high quarters. He considered that he had covered himself by reporting everything to Delius and Canaris (AOB: likely unknown to Hatz: Admiral Canaris had been removed from this function (12th February '44) and in March/April he was succeeded by Obst. i.G. Georg Alexander Hansen). Gross warned him him against Garzuly, who was now entirely pro-Nazi. Hatz did not bring a W/T set back from Turkey, nor any messages for Gross. Hatz told gross not to worry about his own difficulties, and said that he would arrange for Gross to return to Istambul (Istanbul) with him.

248. Two days later the Hungarian courier arrived bringing Zionist mail and money (540 napoleons (Old French gold-coins) and ca. 48,000 dollars). Garzuly kept half of this sum, and gave the other half to Krumay at his request. Kastner (Kästner?) received the letters.

249. Bagyoni arrived in Budapest escorted by Winninger who travelled with him from Vienna. (AOB: this specific detail might indicate that Bagyoni returned by a Lufthansa flight, as a train route would not reach as far as Wien first before then approaching Budapest). Winninger relieved Bagyoni of the following articles which he had brought with him:-

(b) A letter from Schwarz to Köves, instructing the latter to hand over the W/T set, which Bagyoni was to give him, to someone who would announce himself with the code-word Hermas (i.e. Laufer).

(c) A Letter from Schwarz to gross instructing him to collect certain military and economic information about Germany and Slovakia (Slowakei).

250. Bagyoni also brought with him some money for the Zionists, and instructions for winninger to collect certain information. This he handed over to Garzuly, who, Gross heard later, shared it out between himself and Schmidt.

251. A little later Bagyoni told gross that he and Hatz might have difficulties as a result of the recent arrests by the Germans of Kadar, Kern, Ujszaszy, and the film actress Kathalin Karady. Bagyoni explained that before the German occupation of Hungary, Kadar and Ujszaszy had been in secret W/T contact with certain high American officers had been parachuted into Hungary, picked up by Kern and hidden in Kathalin Karady's house. Their negotiations were made concerning Hungarian collaboration with the Allies, and with Tito (AOB: Tito later became the President of the old Yugoslavian Republic, before the collapse of the Warschaupact, in 1989). When the Germans occupied Hungary, Kadar had continued to negotiate by radio with other Americans in Switzerland and had imprudently made arrangements for eight more high officers to be dropped by parachute. The Germans, having picked up Kadar's signals, arrested the eight Americans, as soon afterwards Kadar, kern, Ujszaszy and Kathalin Karady. Szombotay, Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, was forced into retirement. A W/T set was found in Kathalin Karady's piano (Flügel?). The strange part of the story, according to Bagyoni, was that Kathalin Karady was now free, supposedly because she had revealed that she had been hiding her house four Americans. The latter were arrested soon after the four Hungarians.

252. The potential danger to Bagyoni and Hatz arising out of these events lay in the fact that Hatz had received a message in Istambul (Istanbul) from Kadar, ordering him and Bagyoni to check whether the American W/T connection with them was not a plant. They had checked up and found it to be genuine. But he and Hatz might get into trouble as Kadar, notorious for his inability to keep his mouth (Schnautze) shut, was bound to reveal the whole truth.

253. Köves, who had been in Budapest since March 11th, told gross, Hatz and Bagyoni privately that, on his last voyage back to Hungary, Schwarz had given him a pencil and letter for Laufer (Lauffer?). When he returned, however, he was unable to contact Laufer (Lauffer?), and later threw the pencil away, after reporting the whole matter to Graf Berchtold of O.K.W. Berlin. He kept the letter, however, which he showed on this occasion to Hatz.

254. The four men then decided that they had better decided on a line of action which they would take in order:- →

(b) To make arrangements to return to Istambul (Istanbul). They considered that Schwarz had compromised them badly by blowing the gaff all along to his personal friend and trusted agent Laufer (Lauffer?).

(a) Gross was to keep in touch with Winninger, and extract all possible information from him.

(c) Hatz was to keep in touch with Delius (AOB: to what I remember was Delius (Obstlt. Otto Wagner) about due to leave Bulgaria) and his other German friends, in order to persuade them to sanction his, and his present friend's return to Turkey. (AOB, bearing in his mind: never to return to German occupied Europe again)

256. Hatz, Bagyoni and Köves worked for two days writing a report of their activities, which they could present later to the Germans if they fell into difficulties.

257. Winninger advised gross not to go to Hatz's house as Klausnitzer was having it watched. It was better for Gross if he did not even see Bagyoni and more. However, Gross later arranged to see Bagyoni at certain times in order to report anything new to him.

258. Meanwhile Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) continued to have conferences with Krumay, Schmidt and Winninger, always allowing themselves to be cheated out of the Zionist money in the hope that one day the Germans would really do something for the Jews. According to Gross, Brand was acting out of misguided idealism and fright at the same time. Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) still refused to confide in Gross.

259. One day, Gross overheard a quarrel between Brand and Winninger in a cafe. It transpired that Brand had been summoned for an interview with (Obersturmbannführer Adolf) Eichmann, Gestapo Chief (Chief of Jewish Referat) in charge of Jewish problems in Hungary, and that he had agreed to go alone to Istambul (Istanbul) in order to buy lorries for the Germans in return for a guarantee that the Gestapo would cease their bad treatment of the Jews (??). Winninger told Brand that he was mad to tell Eichmann that he wanted to go alone, for only through him, Winninger could have permission to travel.

260. Gross could not restrain himself and went across to Brand's table to ask if he really told Eichmann that he wished to go alone to Istambul (Istanbul). Brand confirmed this. Gross then asked Winninger if he could accompany him and Brand to Turkey. Winninger said that he most decidedly could not as he was under suspicion.

261. That evening Gross came together with Brand, Frau Brand, Kastner (Kästner?) and a number of other Zionists. Brand explained that Eichmann had asked him if he could travel alone to Turkey in order to obtain from the Jews war material in return for improved treatment of the Jews. Gross told all the assembled →

Zionists that it was madness to let Brand travel, as the Allies would not allow 'one pine-needle to fall into Gestapo hands'. Moreover Pomerance would think twice before giving Zionist money to the Gestapo. Frau brand then spoke her mind about how the Zionists in Hungary were so spineless that they allowed every penny of their money to be taken away from them.

262. This meeting had no effect on the policy of Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) who continued to see as much as of Schmidt, Winninger and Krumay as before. According to Sedlacek, who was not allowed by Schmidt and Winninger to participate in this racket, much to the chagrin, Schmidt kept 25% of Brand's money, and handed over 75% for the Gestapo through Krumay.

263. About this time Schwarz (from Turkey) sent Gross a telegram ordering him to cancel all the instructions he had previously given him concerning deposit of money in Wien and Bratislava (Preßburg). Gross replied that he had already arranged for the RM 100,000 to be deposited in Wien, but that he would cancel the Bratislava (Preßburg) arrangements.

264. Gross was arrested by Kommissar Siebert of the Gestapo, and escorted to Hotel Melinda in Schwabenberg (Gestapo H.Q.). He was brutally treated and interrogated by a man whom later found out to be Obersturmbannführer von Klaages (S.D. Chief in Hungary), Siebert and a fat man whose name he did not know. He was asked a lot of questions about Schmidt and Winninger, and their relations with Brand, about Hatz and Bagyoni, Sedlacek and Scholz (Scholtz?). Gross revealed little of importance about the latter four, but said he would be glad to give evidence against Schmidt and Winninger, who he knew had been forcing Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) to give up Zionist funds. Unfortunately he lacked proofs, as Schmidt and Winninger now treated him as an outcast, and Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) had been forbidden by them to associate with him (Gross??).

265. Klaages then asked what connection he had with the Swedish M.A. Gross said faithfully that he had none, but he knew that the latter had been looking for him before his arrest (Szanto had told him this). Klaages said that the Swedish M.A. had endeavoured to deliver a parcel from Switzerland to Gross, who was now to go straight to him, collect the parcel without mentioning the fact that he had come from the Gestapo, and bring it back to the Hotel Melinda (AOB: ??).

266. Gross was escorted to within a few hundred yards (metres) of the Swedish Military Attaché's house and collected the parcel. On the parcel was written Paket II and 5 names and addresses in the following order: Brand, Gyorgy (= Gross), Sajo, Kastner (Kästner?), Szilagy. The Swedish M.A. told him that he had looked in vain for Brand in order to give him the parcel, which contained Zionist money and letters from Switzerland, but, not finding him, had tried contact gross. he said that a certain Rosetti of Geneva (Genua) had sent the parcel. Gross gave Brand's telephone saying that if he (Gross) did not come to see him on the following Saturday, he was to contact Brand and tell that Gross had received the parcel/ Gross did not mention that he had come on instructions from the Gestapo.

267. On the way back, Siebert asked him where Paket I was. suspecting Gross of having hidden it.

268. Back in Gestapo H.Q. Siebert opened the parcel which contained 31,000 dollars and some letters. Gross was then interrogated by the fat man, whom Siebert address (Ansprach) as Direktor Schröder. The latter asked what 'his good friend Schwarz' was doing in Istambul (Istanbul), and said he was really Fritz Laufer (Lauffer?) If Gross was interested in being set free, he must collect all possible evidence together with Brand and Winninger, and must find out in particular exactly how much money these two had stolen from Brand (AOB:????).

269. Gross went straight to the Cafe Biatritz where Winninger, Scholz (Scholtz?) and Sedlacek were sitting at one table, Santo and Olga (Bagyoni's girl-friend) at another, and Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) at another. Olga told Gross that Hatz, Bagyoni and Köves had been arrested by the Gestapo just after him on the previous day. Gross then had a talk with Winninger who boasted that he and Schmidt had secured his (Gross??) release.

270. That evening Gross privately told Brand everything concerning his interview with Klaages and Laufer (Lauffer?), and of the latter's wish to collect evidence against Schmidt and Winninger. Brand said he was ready to help Gross in this sphere.

271. Later that evening Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) introduced Gross to Dr. Komoly and Szilagyi of the Hungarian Jewish Council. Gross spoke to them of the dangerous situation they were in as a result of their pandering (procuring) to the Germans to the Germans, and a joint resolve was made by the Zionists not to be terrorised by Winninger, Schmidt or the Gestapo. Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) agreed that henceforth Gross should work on their behalf, and that they would take his advice. Gross said that he himself would demand from Schmidt, Winninger and Krumay something concrete in return for the money Brand had given them, on condition that Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) should have no dealings with the Germans without his knowledge.

272. Kastner (Kästner?) admitted to gross that he had been riight about Garzuly all along, for the latter had not given up any money that Bagyoni had brought back.

273. Gross went to Laufer (Lauffer?), who said that he would arrange for all funds stolen from the Zionists to be returned on the following day by (Adolf) Eichmann to Brand. Laufer (Lauffer?) expressed the Gestapo's readiness to assist the Jews as much as possible (AOB:???), and instructed gross to draw up a plan of Jewish demands together with Brand (AOB: a great charade!!).

274. Gross told Brand not to move a finger until he had received his money back from Eichmann on the following day.

275. Next day, Brand went to see Eichmann in his house. Klaages was also present, and both German officers treated Brand very civilly. Eichmann said he had with him the 31,000 dollars and letters delivered by the Swedish Military Attaché. (AOB: see also 267-268.), and would hand it over intact to Brand. He said that he had an interest in seeing the Jews well treated in Hungary and proposed that Brand should go to Istambul (Istanbul), and through the Zionists, arrange for the purchase and delivery of 10,000 lorries, chocolate and cocoa to the Germans via Turkey, Spain, Portugal or Sweden. Brand said that he could easily arrange that. In return, Eichmann promised the Germans would close the ghettoes, stop the deportation of Jews, and see that a number of Jews were given a safe conduct to Palestine or elsewhere in North Africa. Brand was to keep in touch →

with Gross, through whom he would later receive his mission in precise terms from Schröder. Gross would inform Brand when Eichmann wished to see him again. He was not to tell Winninger or Schmidt that he had received his 31,000 dollars. Eichmann ended by saying that, according to order from O.K.W. (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), Berlin, Brand was in future to give up 10% of all Zionist money to Gross who was to hand it over to Klaages and Schröder.

276. Brand returned home with his money, overjoyed at the thought of having met such nioc people who were surely going to do wonders for the poor Jews. He radiantly told the latest new to Gross.

277. There was, however, one point he had forgotten to mention to Klaages and Eichmann. He had promised to give 3 million pengoes (Hungarian currency) that afternoon to Krumay, Schmidt and Winninger. Gross told him that he was to keep his appointment empty-handed, and was to make the excuse that what he had not time to raise the money so quickly. Meanwhile Gross would see what Laufer (Lauffer?) could do about it. Brand said he would wait until Gross had seen Laufer (Lauffer?).

278. Gross went immediately to Laufer (Lauffer?) to tell him the latest developments. The latter communicated the news by telephone to his chief, Klaages, using this time a different cover-name for himself, Karl Heinz I. Laufer (Lauffer?) then instructed Gross to tell Brand to do as gross had previously advised him. Laufer (Lauffer?) said that Krumay would not really demand any money from Brand, as Eichmann had forbidden him to (too?), in accordance with the changed policy of the Gestapo towards the Jews. Brand could not come to much harm if Schmidt and Winninger demanded the money, as 'these III-F (Counter-Intelligence /Counter-Espionage) people' had no say in the higher policy concerning the Jews, and were only supposed to work in a military sphere.

279. Gross telephoned Brand to this effect. Brand kept his appointment with Krumay, Schmidt and Winninger, and said that he had been unable to raise the money. Krumay very politely took Brand's side, saying he well understood how difficult it was for him to raise the money in so short time, and Schmidt and Winninger flabbergasted (were astonished), did not dare to press their demands in front of the Gestapo officer (Kommissar?).

280. That evening Brand and Gross together drew up a detailed list of Zionist demands in respect of the Jews. Brand demanded, amongst other improvements:-

(e) The foundation of an administrative Jewish committee, on which Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) were to sit.

281. Two days later, Laufer (Lauffer?) summoned gross and Brand to his provincial residence for an interview. Brand presented Laufer (Lauffer?) with the list of Zionist demands, and Laufer (Lauffer?), to all appearances sympathetic, said that Brand was quite →

right to make these demands. He explained that Himmler (AOB: Reichsführer SS, und Chef der deutschen Polizei im Reichsministerium des Inneren) had ordered a radical change in the treatment of the Jews, and that if the latter kept their part of the bargain which Brand had made with Eichmann, the Germans would certainly do their best to meet the Zionist demands. (AOB: It is not clear to me, in as much Hitler was, in this intermediate stage, kept informed) If Brand was successful in ordering the requisite goods in Turkey or elsewhere in the S.D. and might even have the privilege of meeting Himmler. As far Schmidt, and Winninger, who had cheated Brand out of so much money, they were merely parasites who would be arrested as soon as Brand collected sufficient proof against them.

282. Gross then interceded with the objection that Brand would not have the slightest chance of obtaining a pengoe's (Hungarian currency) worth of goods from the Allies. Laufer (Lauffer?) silenced him and affirmed his confidence in Brand's ability to succeed. Brand als reiterated his certainty of success.

283. Laufer (Lauffer?) then said that Brand might prepare his journey to Istambul (Istanbul). Gross asked if he could accompany Brand, but Laufer (Lauffer?) said that he had no confidence in him. (AOB: was this Brand the personality or his chances of getting the Allies to swob Jews against 10,000 trucks?)

284. Gross and Brand were back to Budapest by Hptm.(?) Klausnitzer, who later got drunk with Brand and slept in his house.

285. Brand saw Laufer (Lauffer?) on the following the days and told him exactly about his relations with Schmidt and Winninger, specifying the total amount of money they had extorted from him (ca. 170,000 dollars). The only information that Gross gave Laufer (Lauffer?) concerning Schmidt and Winninger was the methods by which the latter had cheated Springmann, Brand and himself over the currency exchanges.

286. Brand had a quarrel with Winninger who told him that this was his last chance to hand over the money, failing which he would be arrested. gross after hearing about this, consulted with Laufer (Lauffer?) and later reassured brand that he need have no fear of being arrested. The latter again refused to give Schmidt and Winninger any more money, with the result that he was given an ultimatum to find it within an hour.

287. Brand returned with the same story after an hour; Krumay was with Schmidt and Winninger and after hearing Brand's third refusal, went away without a word. Winninger then said to Brand that their 'liaison' was at an end, that he would confiscate all Brand's papers, that Brand and his family would henceforth have to wear the Star of David (Juden-Stern), and that Kastner (Kästner?) would be arrested.

288. Brand later informed gross who informed Laufer (Lauffer?). The latter fixed a rendez-vous for all of them on the following day.

289. Next day, all three met and Laufer (Lauffer?) said that Schmidt had asked Krumay to have Kastner (Kästner?) arrested. Laufer (Lauffer?) said that he would himself arrest Kastner (Kästner?) to prevent Schmidt from carrying out the arrest. If the Gestapo was to arrest Kastner (Kästner?) at Schmidt's request, Schmidt would imagine that he was the 'Lord Almighty' of Budapest and that he had the power of demand anything from the Gestapo - a state of affairs which Laufer (Lauffer?), as an S.D. Mann, would not tolerate.

290. Laufer (Lauffer?) instructed Gross to tell Kastner (Kästner?) that his arrest was only a bluff to lure Schmidt and Winninger into a trap, and that he must pretend to be very frightened when arrested.

291. Gross went to the Cafe Biaritz where Winninger and Scholz (Scholtz?) were already installed. Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) arrived later, in the company of a detective who remained in the background. After playing cards for a while, Gestapo Officers entered the cafe and arrested Brand, Gross, Kastner (Kästner?) and Scholz (Scholtz?). They were all taken away separately to Schwabenberg (Gestapo H.Q.). Winninger was interrogated by Siebert and confessed that he had taken certain sums of Zionist money from Brand. The latter was present during the final phases of Winninger's interrogation. Gross, Brand and Kastner (Kästner?) were released soon afterwards. Schmidt and Sedlacek were arrested next day, but the latter was released after a half hour. Later, over 10 million pengoes (Hungarian currency) were found in Winninger's house and the same amount in Schmidt's - as Klaages said, "enough money to last all the Hungarian Jews for one year".

292. Brand confirmed Winninger's statements, and gross wrote out a statement for Laufer (Lauffer?) to the effect that Winninger had stolen 250,000 pengoes from him, and that he had cheated the Zionists over currency exchanges.

293. Klaages invited Gross to have coffee with him in the Cafe Negrescu. They were joined a few minutes later by Laufer (Lauffer?), Gross was very surprised that the S.D. leaders in Budapest should invite a Jewish smuggler to have coffee with them and wondered what was in the air. (AOB: we may conclude that the conversations, as well as Gross's own skills, allowed quite comprehensive discussion in the German language. Why? Gross was born in the Donau-Monarchy days, and should have been taught German language, as well)

294. They all repaired to the Arizona Cabaret for dinner, and after a few drinks Klaages expressed the desire to have a 'beautiful pump girl about 30'. Gross later arranged for his request to be fulfilled (erfüllt).

295. The S.D. chiefs then became more serious. They asked why Gross thought Brand would be not able to buy war material through the Zionists for the Germans. Gross replied that the Allies would not dream of selling anything to the Germans, and requested that Brand should not be sent on this mission. Gross agreed that Brand might be able to raise money, however, on condition that the Germans did something for the Jews.

296. Gross asked if the S.D. were genuine in their expressed desire to help the Jews. Klaages (antwortete) replied that they were, but that even if they changed their attitude towards the Jews, the new Hungarian Government would continue to maltreat them, as it was doing at present. This, however, did not matter very much as the British, when they occupied Hungary (AOB: The Russians claimed Hungary as belonging to their territory), would not blame the Hungarian Government, or the S.D. who had changed their attitude, but rather the Gestapo. (AOB: legally: The Gestapo dealt mainly with German citizens breaching German political laws, but foreigners do mix-up often S.D. and Gestapo. S.D. and Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei) not often noticed played an essential role abroad)

298. Klaages, said that he was an S.D. officer, and that Eichmann, Gestapo leader, had to do exactly as he ordered. Klaages implied all the time that the S.D. (R.S.H.A. Amt IV) was the real power now in occupied Europe, whereas the Gestapo were merely 'policemen'.

299. Gross finding Klaages in an expansive mood, asked if he might accompany Brand to Turkey, as he could help him to bring money back to Hungary for the S.D. and at the same time bring his wife home. Klaages and Laufer (Lauffer?) both said there was no chance of his going, as he had said it was impossible for Brand to order war material. The S.D. chiefs then gave gross a strict order not to persuade Brand to demand that gross should accompany him to Turkey. If this happened, Gross would find himself under arrest.

301. Gross was invited to lunch next day at Laufer's (Lauffer's?) summer residence, and after lunch they went with Klaages to the races. The discussion of the previous noght was developed. Laufer (Lauffer?) saked Gross to specify who in the Hungarian Government were responsible for the present anti-Jewish policy. Gross told him that the worst offenders were André Laszlo and Baky Laszlo (joint Secretaries for Jewish affairs), General Feketr Halmi Czidtner, Ferenz Rajniss (Imredy's 2nc i/c (in charge), Remenyi-Schneller (Minister of Finance), Najos Csatay (Minister of War), Ander Jaross (Minister of of Interior), Istvan Antal (Minister of Justice).

302. Laufer (Lauffer?) then brought up a different subject. He asked Gross if the british and Americans were really keen to help the Jews in occupied Europe, and whether there was a possibility of negotiating 'other sorts of business' with the Allies through Zionists. gross thought there was, not being quite sure what Laufer (Lauffer?) meant. Klaages continued the discussion, saying that there was a possibility of stalemate between British and Americans on the one side, and the Axis (Mussolini kept Italy, Germany and Japan) on the other. Germany (the Allied Invasion on the European Content was still imminent) must therefore combine with these two countries to fight Russia. He asked Gross whether he knew of any way to arrange a meeting in any neutral country between 2 - 3 high S.D. officers and 2 - 3 high British and American officers for the purpose of opening negotiations on the subject of a separate peace between the S.D. and the Allies (excluding Russia). (AOB: neglecting Hitler's will, as he was in charge of everything in the German Nation) Gross said he could bring about this meeting much more easily than Brand (AOB: quite bold!) would be able to buy lorries, but wondered why he, a petty smuggler, should be chosen to do this instead of, for instance, Herr von Papen (The German Ambassador in Turkey) (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz_von_Papen and en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franz_von_Papen) , Germany's diplomatic representative in Turkey. Klaages replied that they did not want to negotiate with Allied diplomats, but with military representatives. Moreover, the S.D. was at the moment having trouble with the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt; A.A.) which was envious of the S.D. power. It was, in fact, precisely for that reason that Brand had to sent on his mission: if Brand was successful in delivering war material, or at least a large amount of money to Germany, the Foreign Office could not turn round to the S.D. and ask why they were negotiating with the Zionists, and why they had altered their policy concerning the Jews. Brand's mission was really only a sop (concession) to the Foreign Office, and camouflage for the mission with which the S.D. was contemplating sending gross, namely to arrange a meeting between the S.D. and the British and Americans. The (German) Foreign Office had already tried to negotiate a separate peace, but had failed. It did not really matter if Brand failed to deliver war material, but he must bring money back.

303. Klaages went on to say that the S.D. was now the real directing power in Germany, and that whatever Heinrich mit Augenglas' (Heinrich Himmler's ugly glasses, though being the High Commander in charge of: all the Police (implying the S.D.) organisations including the general S.S. and Concentration Camps and the Waffen S.S.) decreed had to be carried out. The S.D. was genuinely keen to negotiate a separate peace and to obtain its own 'security'.

304. As they were driving back from the race-course in Laufer's (Lauffer?) car, the latter asked what guarantee gross could give that he would return, should he be trusted with a mission to Turkey. Gross said that he could give no guarantee, and that he certainly could not hope to arrange for war material to be delivered by the Allies to Germany. Klaages then asked if he could take responsibility for bringing back money. Gross replied that he could - but only on condition that the Germans carried out their word in respect of their altered Jewish policy. Klaages said that the S.D. wanted 2,000 dollars for every Jew they allowed out of Europe. Gross answered that this was fantastic and that the Zionists would only be willing to pay a price of 100 dollars per head, if hundreds of thousands of Jews were going to be sent away from Europe. Laufer (Lauffer?) said they would have to consult Berlin.

305. On his return to Budapest, Gross went straight to Merkly who had now been relegated to a small post in the Second Department of the (Hungarian) Home Office under Kuti. Gross told Merkly that he might be going to Turkey with a mission from the Germans, to try and do something to help the Jews (Gross himself was of Jewish descent) Merkly asked him to call at his office on the following day, as he wished to give him a separate mission on behalf of the Hungarians.

306. Gross slept that night at Brand's house. He had a long talk with Brand, when he instructed not to say again to the Germans that he could arrange to buy war material for them. More particularly, Brand was definitely not to suggest to the Germans that Gross should accompany him on his journey to Istambul (Istanbul). When in Turkey he must ensure, before doing anything, that the Germans definitely meant to help the Jews and had already embarked on their programme of enclosing the ghettoes, stopping the deportations, sending refugees out of Europe etc.

307. On the following morning, Brand went alone to see Krumay. Gross was not aware at the time of the reason for his visit.

308. Gross went to Merkly's office in the morning. Merkly said it was a good thing for Hungary that Gross was going on a mission to help the Jews. His (Merkly's) clique in Hungary had previously tried to do a lot for the Jews but all their good work had been undone (zunichte gemacht) since the German occupation (19th March 1944) as a result of the Prime Minister Sztojai's new policy, which was disastrous for the Jews.

309. Merkly further stated that a large section section of Hungary was in favour of going over to the Allies, and in particular the Hungarian generals Naday, Totfalussy, Asboth, Sibrik, Rappaich and Lenhardt (all of whom had been retired as soon as the Germans arrived) wished to collaborate with the British and Tito (think of Yugoslavia). Some of these generals had already been in contact with Tito, but Merkly personally was against this, as he promised to shoot himself if ever the Russians marched into Hungary (which they actually did towards the end of the year 1944) . The majority of the old Hungarian General Staff had no confidence in 'the politicians' and wished to build up a movement capable of offering resistance to the Germans. Negotiations had already been started, but they were proceeding far too slowly.

310. Merkly said he wanted gross to arrange a meeting in Istambul (Istanbul) between himself and some of the above named generals, and a member of high British officers for the purpose of discussing how the anti-Nazi element Hungary could best hinder Germany's war effort. This meeting was to be brought about by Gross through his link with the Zionists in Turkey. Gross was to tell the British that Hungary was ready to do anything the Allies demanded, conditional on a guarantee that the (Western) Allies wouldn't allow Russia to occupy Russia. (AOB: this latter very fact was what Russia wanted to do particularly whether their Western friends would like it or not!)

311. Merkly ended by saying that he was expecting to be arrested or killed any day. He regretted very much that he had been in Zagreb (then also named Agram) when Ujszaszy, Kadar, Kern and Kathalin Karady had been arrested, as otherwise he night have been able to do something for them. He said that Hatz had made a very bad mistake when he had confided in Dr. Delius. (H2145 H2145return) (once Dr. Delius was an alias of Obstlt. Otto Wagner, Leiter K.O.-Bulgaria)

312. That afternoon Gross was summoned to Klaages' office. He went there, to find Klaages, Laufer (Lauffer) and Obersturmbannführer Gäschke (liaison officer between Gestapo and Hungarian Ministry of the interior). Laufer (Lauffer) accused gross of having provoled Brand to propose that Gross should accompany him to Istambul (Istanbul). Gross denied this. (He learnt later that Brand had made a very energetic demand of Krumay that morning that he would not have to go alone to Istambul (Istanbul), as, without Gross, he would not be able to bring anything back for the Germans. The Jewish Council had resolved that Gross should accompany Brand). Laufer (Lauffer) said that, luckily for gross, this did not now matter, as he was definitely to be entrusted with a mission for the Germans in Istambul (Istanbul).

313. Klaages asked gross which were the best channels through which negotiations with the Allies might be carried out. Gross said that he had a good contact with Schwarz. Klaages was at first in favour of conducting these negotiations with the Americans only; his opinion was that the Americans, not the British, would rule the European roost after the war, for Roosevelt not Wilson any longer, was the President of the U.S.A. However, Laufer (Lauffer) and gross argued against Klaages, pointing out that England was an equally important member of the partnership, that anyway America could do nothing without England's consent and vice versa, and that all talk of an English-American split was pure nonsense. It was also discussed whether the S.D. should negotiate with England alone, but this plan was rejected on the grounds that Zionists was more strongly represented in America than in Britain, and that America would object strongly if any negotiations implicating the Zionists were made in the absence of American representatives. It was finally decided that gross should pave the way for a meeting at which both British and American officers were presented.

314. The question of place was then discussed. Gross opined that it did not matter particularly in what neutral country the meeting was held, as London was bound to dictate the place. Gross was told to report to them on the following day at 2 o'clock for precise instructions regarding his mission.

315. The only thing that Gäschke said was that if Gross did not return having fulfilled his mission, he would know the consequences'.

316. That evening Gross reproached Brand with having made an intervention with the Germans on his behalf.

317. On the following afternoon, Gross met Frau Laufer (Lauffer). Frau Brand and her two children in the Cafe Elysee. After some time he received a telephone call to come at once to Klaages' private office in Karoly Ring with his passport.

318. In Karoly Ring Gross had an interview with Klaages, Laufer (Lauffer) and Krumay. The latter looked at Gross's passport and told Gross to prepare at once for his journey with Brand to Turkey on the following day. All he needed now was his 'Sichtvermerk' (AOB: think of a special Stamp in his passport) which Krumay would obtain in Wien. (AOB: we may consider that Gross left from an aerodrome nearby Wien) As Brand's passport was not yet ready, Gross and Brand were to travel with him (Krumay) in his car to Wien and thence to Turkey by (a German) courier plane. (About two weeks previously Gross had received a telegram from Schwarz informing him that his Turkish entry-visa would be ready for him to collect on arrival at Istambul (Istanbul) airport, and that he would have to pay double the price for it. A week before, Brand had received a telegram from Überall saying that he was expected in Istambul (Istanbul) and was to prepare himself to travel to Palestine).

319. Klaages then told Gross that he was to shadow Brand wherever the latter went in Istambul (Istanbul), and was to ensure that Brand carried out the mission given him by Eichmann. Klaages summed this up as follows:-

(a) Brand was to negotiate in Istambul (Istanbul), through the Zionists, for the purchase, and delivery to Germany, of 10,000 - 15,000 lorries, cocoa, chocolate and other commodities, and money.

(b) If he was able to deliver war material, he was at least to bring enough money back to Hungary to pay the price of every Jew the Germans allowed out of Europe.

(c) If Brand failed either to buy war material or to bring money back, he was to return to Hungary and open similar negotiations in Switzerland or in Portugal.

(d) Brand was to inaugurate, through the Zionists and the American "Joint", a propaganda campaign in the British and American presses, praising the altered policy of the Germans towards the Jews in Europe.

(e) He was to give Klaages, through gross, 10% of all future Zionists money sent to him as relief for European Jews by the Zionists in Turkey.

320. In return, the Gestapo and the S.D. officers make the following concessions to the Jews:-

(b) Permission for as many Jews as practicable to be transported to Constanza (Estuary of the Donau and the Black Sea) on Donau (Danube) tugs, and thence facilitated to Palestine or elsewhere in North Africa.

321. In addition, Brand was to present to the Zionists in Istambul (Istanbul), a letter of recommendation from Samuel Stern and David Freudiger stating that, in coming to Turkey with a mission from the Germans, he was acting on behalf of all Jewry in occupied Europe, and that he was to be given plein pouvoir to carry out this mission. (Gross states that Krumay ordered Stern and Freudiger two leading members of the Jewish Council in Hungary, to write this letter against their will).

322. Klaages then gave gross the final instructions for his own separate mission which he specified as follows:-

(a) Gross was to bring about a meeting in any neutral country between high British and American officers, and 2-3 high S.D. Officers, for the purpose of discussing the terms of a separate peace between the S.D. and the Allies' (i.e. Britain and America).

(b) At best, Gross was to arrange this meeting through the Zionists with both British and American officers. If this proved impossible through the Zionists, Gross was to utilise his already-established link with the American agent Schwarz to arrange this rendez-vous.

(c) The 'Allies' could demand to meet any S.D. officers they chose except Himmler (the Head of all SS related entities including Police, R.S.H.A. Ämter I ... VII), who was unable to leave German-occupied Europe.

(e) If Gross and Brand returned to Hungary without having achieved their respective objects, they were to make similar overtures in Switzerland to Nathan Schwalb, representative of the American "Joint".

(f) If they failed with Schwalb, President of the American "Joint" and Weizmann's personal representative there.

(g) Gross was to return with his wife without fail not later than 29th May 1944. His wife could then be held as a hostage should Gross have to undertake any more journeys for the S.D.

325. If Gross and Brand Brand would deliberately failed to return, the following counter-measures would be taken by the S.D. and Gestapo:-

(d) 'The long German arm would reach out and clutch at Gross wherever he took refuge in the wide world, and bring him back by force to Germany where he would be summarily dealt with'.

324. While discussing Gross's mission, Gross asked what would happen if he could not arrange the meeting through Schwarz. Laufer (Lauffer) said he was confident that Gross would succeed with Schwarz, even though this contact was a purely military one. At any rate, Gross was to try first with the Zionists, who certainly should be interested as the fate of so many Jews was at stake. Laufer (Lauffer) said that tomorrow he would give Gross a brief-case to hand to Schwarz in Turkey.

325. If Gross in his mission and returned to Budapest, Laufer (Lauffer) said, "We will then go to the neutral country which the Allies choose - personally, I should prefer it to be Spain or Portugal - in order to discuss with them the terms of a separate peace". He specified that Gross was to accompany whatever S.D. officers were selected to negotiate with the Allies. Brand, on his return, would be told the numbers of certain German accounts in neutral countries, into which he was to arrange with Laufer (Lauffer) and Gross to deposit the money he brought back with him.

326. Before Gross left the S.D. Officers, Laufer (Lauffer) told him that he was to give him all his money and jewellery, the keys of his house, photos and personal particular of all relations. Gross was to bring these things along on the following day.

327. The next morning, gross went to see Klatt (AOB: whom lived since about September 1943 also in Budapest under the Hungarian name Karmany) and said that he was probably going to Turkey in the near future. He asked Klatt if he might send word to Szanto through (Willi) Goetz (= KV 2/387; PF 600802) in Turkey, should he have any urgent messages to send from there, and if Szanto might communicate to Gross through him. Klatt assented (agreed).

328. Klatt, very humble and depressed on this occasion, said that he would probably have to give up his post of difficulties which his chief, (AOB: Obstlt. von Wahl-Welskirch, Klatt's guiding officer at Ast I-L Wien), who was intending to take over Klatt's Dienststelle; probably meant here the Luftmeldekopf in Sofia, which would be a logical step as Karmany (no longer known as Klatt) Klatt as such did no longer existed since, say August/September 1943; he possessed now an Hungarian passport on the name of Richard Karmany) Klatt said he might go to Madrid.

329. gross then went to Laufer (Lauffer)'s summer villa to receive his final instructions. he handed over to Laufer (Lauffer) personal property to the value of 1½ million pengoes (Hungarian currency), keeping approximately £300 (stirling?) for himself. This included his capital, jewellery and other personal belongings.

330. Laufer (Lauffer) told him that in Wien, Krumay would give him a brief-case, apparently empty, but really containing papers sewn into the lining which gross was to hand to Schwarz in Istambul (Istanbul). Gross was not to open the brief-case. Gross received the following precise instructions in respect of his private mission from Laufer (Lauffer):-

(a) Gross must tell Schwarz that he had been given the brief-case in Budapest by an unknown fat man. he was not to say that he received it from Laufer (Lauffer).

(b) gross was to bring back Schwarz's answer, which would be addressed to a non-existent firm in Budapest.

(d) He was to tell Schwarz that he had once met Laufer (Lauffer) in the Cafe Paraset.

(e) He was to tell Schwarz that Laufer (Lauffer) was a powerful man in Budapest, and had great influence in high quarters.

331. Laufer (Lauffer) further instructed that, to any other person than Schwarz in Istambul (Istanbul), Gross was only to refer to Laufer (Lauffer) as 'Direktor Schröder'. If Gross spoke badly of Laufer (Lauffer) to Schwarz, or failed to carry out any of the above instructions, Laufer (Lauffer) would immediately hear of it, as Schwarz trusted him implicitly. If Gross valued the lives of his relations, therefore, he had better see that nothing went wrong.

332. Returning to Budapest in Laufer (Lauffer)'s car, Gross reckoned up to that if the Germans demanded 2,000 dollars per head for every Jew they allowed out of Europe. the Zionists would have to raise 2 thousand million dollars - which was ridiculous. Laufer (Lauffer) a=greed with Gross that the sum was too high, but once again stated that Brand's mission was far less important than Gross's, and that so long as Brand brought some money back, the S.D. would be satisfied as they would not have to face any repercussions from the Foreign Office (AOB: Auswärtiges Amt, abbreviated A.A.)

333. In Budapest, gross took his leave of Klaages and Laufer (Lauffer), who wished him luck with his mission, and said they would see him in a fortnight's time.

335. Later in the day, Krumay collected gross and Brand and drove them both to Wien. On the way Krumay treated Brand as if the latter was a nobleman.

336. In Wien they both received their Sichtvermerke (special passport stamp), and were all prepared to take the (courier) plane next morning, when they were informed that the Foreign Office had wired to cancel their journey. They contacted Krumay who said he would use force, if necessary, to see that they caught the plane on the 19th.

337. Krumay managed to secure seats on the plane for Gross and Brand, and just before the plane left, he gave Gross Laufer (Lauffer) (AOB: this points at the very fact, that the courier plane wasn't chartered especially for their purpose, but that it was a - more or less- regular courier flight to Istambul) Brand travelled as a German engineer named Eugen Band. On the trip, he tapped his breast-pocket, saying that he had written instructions for his mission inside. He did not show them to Gross, but some day's later told him that he had given them to Barlas or (Mr.) Überall.

338. On arrival at Istambul (Istanbul) airport, gross's wife and an official from the Hungarian Consulate were waiting for them. Nobody was there to meet Brand. Later two officials of the Turkish transport firm Antalya arrived in order to guarantee Gross to the Turkish authorities, for Gross had arrived without any entrance visa. They had been sent by Schwarz. Although they were able to help gross, they refused to do anything for Brand, who likewise had no entrance-visa. Gross's →

wife said that Schwarz had ordered gross to have nothing to do with Brand. Gross said he could not leave Brand in the lurch (stagger). A bribe eventually induced the officials to let Gross and Brand through together, on condition that they went to see Mehmet Bey, President of Antalya, in order to settle the question of their entrance visas and residence-permits.

339. Gross went to his private apartment - El Irak Apartment, Cumhuriyette Caddesi 269 - and Brand to the Pera Palace Hotel.

340. Half an hour later Schwarz came to see gross who gave him Laufer (Lauffer)'s brief-case, saying that a fat man whom he did not know had given it to him. Gross expressed his opinion that the brief-case originated almost certainly from Laufer (Lauffer). Otherwise, gross carried out Laufer (Lauffer)'s instructions to the letter.

341. Gross did not mention a word about the details of his missions, merely saying that he had come with a member of the Hungarian Jewish council in order to try and do something for the Jews in Europe. He did, however, mention that he had come with a special mission from the Germans. Schwarz was tired and said they would talk business tomorrow.

342. While they were talking, Überall, Pomerance and Averbuch arrived. They discussed nothing of importance in Schwarz's presence, but Gross had a private talk with Überall by the front door as he was leaving. Überall had already heard details of Brand's mission from Brand himself, and asked Gross if he thought there was any chance of Brand carrying it out. Gross said firmly that Brand would have no hope of buying war material for the Germans, as the Allies, who would obviously have to be consulted , would certainly not agree. It might, however, be possible for Brand to take some money back provided word was received in the meantime from Szanto or Frau Brand that the S.D. had already begun to make their promised improvements in the treatment of the Jews.

343. Gross then outlined his own separate mission to Überall, who said that the idea of bringing about a meeting between S.D. and the Allies was quite out of the question, as the latter already had victory in sight. Gross was very angry with Überall.

344. On the following day, Schwarz again came to visit Gross with whom he lost his temper for having said that the brief-case probably came from Laufer (Lauffer). Schwarz said that the brief case most certainly did not come from Laufer (Lauffer).

345. Gross then complained about his arrests in Hungary, about which Schwarz professed to know nothing. Schwarz also asked why gross had not cancelled all the arrangements concerning the deposit of RM (Reichsmark) 100,000 in Wien, as his agent had been arrested there.

346. Schwarz told Gross that the Zionists had held a big conference with Brand on the previous day to discuss what steps should be taken to fulfil the latter's mission. gross said that this was not his affair.

347. By way of parting (auseinandergehen), Gross mentioned that Hatz, Bagyoni and Köves had been arrested by Klausnitzer, knowing full well that Schwarz realised that Klausnitzer was his agent Laufer (Lauffer)'s chief. Gross saw no more of Schwarz, as the latter made a journey to Ankara soon after the meeting.

348. Gross stayed at home for the next two days as he had an attack of fever. A number of friends came to see him. Pomerance came to tell him that the Zionists had discussed the plan to raise money for the Germans, and that he was going to Jerusalem on the 22nd to talk over the matter with Shertok. Nothing could be done until he returned. Baeder visited Gross, who advised him that Brand should not be entrusted with any money as he was not the right man for the job. Luis Konya came to tell Gross that Hatz had been released and was coming next week to Turkey to take over his old post as Hungarian Military Attaché. Roman asked Gross a number of general questions on conditions in Budapest. Vogl an impresario in Taksim's Cabaret and a III-F (Abwehr counter-espionage) Wien agent, came to discuss a private matter. Goetz (= Wigo; KV 2/387; PF 600802) called to ask Gross whether his house in Budapest had been bombed and whether Klatt (for whom he mainly worked) had sent him any money. Buranello, one of Schwarz's agents, called for his mission with Steinhardt, American Ambassador. Gross considered he could do nothing for the moment about his own mission, until Pomerance returned from Palestine and agreed to go.

349. On the following day, Brand told Gross that he had nearly complketed arrangements with Mehmet Boy for them to go to Ankara. Gross gave him 2 photos.

350. Two days later Cziki informed gross that Hatz would soon be coming to Istambul (Istanbul)

351, The same day, Brand told Gross that he had had difficulties with the Turkish police, and that the proposed Ankara trip did not now seem so feasible as before. Brand was detained an hour by the Turkish police on account of his illegal entry. Later that day, Gross was summoned to report to the police-station, where he had to remain until 19.30 hrs. He was then taken before the Chief of Police who said Gross must arrange for a Turkish subject to guarantee him. Gross was successful in persuading an official from Antalya to guarantee him, and was released that evening. Just before he was arrested, he was to have see Captain Johnson, but he now lost his chance.

352. Brand rang up Gross to say that he was under arrest in his hotel and that a Turkish detective forbade him to go out, Gross rang up (Mr.) Überall, who told him that their affairs were in good order, and that they had no cause to worry.

353. Next day, the Zionists informed Gross and Brand that the order had been issued by the Turks that they were to be deported, and must leave Turkey by 27th May. (Mr.) Überall had failed to help them in his negotiations with the Turkish secret police. (Mr.) Überall explained that von Papen himself had made a strong intervention with the Turkish authorities to have Gross and Brand deported. Moreover, Brand had received a telephone call from the German Consul (in Istambul) asking him why he, as a German citizen, had not reported to the Consulate. Brand had also received a telegram from his wife to say that the Germans had not started to make any improvements in the Jewish situation, which if any was worse. Gross decided that it would be better to return to Hungary straightaway, as he was wasting time his time in Turkey trying to deal with people who would not listen to him (i.e. Überall). Schwarz had by this time gone to Ankara, and gross did not know how he could now bring about the meeting between the Allies and the S.D.

354. (Mr.) Überall later attempted to persuade Steinhardt (US official) to make an intervention with the Turks on behalf of Gross and Brand, but Barlas, Head of the Jewish Agency, nipped this idea in the bud. That evening the Zionists decided to try and persuade the British to let Gross and Brand travel to Palestine instead of Hungary. Gross did not approve of this idea.

355. On the following day Averbuch came to see Gross, who said that somebody must arrange for him to stay just a few days longer so that he might arrange the meeting between the S.D. and the Allies. Gross said he had no faith now in the Zionists who had given him and Brand no support. Averbuch said that gross could negotiate just as easily in Palestine as in Turkey, but Gross said everything would take much longer from Jerusalem.

357. That evening Gross was arrested. He was told by the detective that he must return to Europe by that night's train, but Gross bribed him with £T.100 (Turkish Pound) to let him stay at liberty just long enough to miss the train. Gross missed his train and slept that night with Brand in the police-station.

359. The following day Gross was successful in arranging an interview with Muzafer, Director of Antalya. The latter arranged that Gross should not leave Turkey that day, and that he and Brand should sleep that night in the Pera Palace Hotel under the surveillance of a detective.

360. Later in the day, Gross received a telegram from Szanto to say that Gross's brother had been arrested in Budapest. Gross decided not to Hungary after all.

361. After sleeping the night in the Pera Palace, Gross bribed the detective to let him go to see Mehmet Bey. The latter's hands were tied, however, as an uncompromising order had come from Ankara to the effect that gross and Brand must definitely leave Turkey, either in the direction of Svilengrad (Train border town between Turkey and Bulgaria) or Meidan Ekbes. Barlas, who was present, said that he might be able to help Gross and brand.

362. Goetz called at the hotel for five minutes to say that Hatz and Bagyoni were free. gross asked him to telegraph Szanto and find out the news of his brother. He told (Willi) Goetz (KV 2/637; PF 600802) that he was waiting to leave Turkey in the direction of Palestine.

363. Gross quarrelled with Brand as the Zionists had done nothing whatever to enable him to stay a few days longer in Turkey; Brand reported Gross's words to (Mr.) Überall and from that time on Gross's relations with the Zionists were even more strained than before.

364. Later that day, Gross received a telegram from Szanto stating that his brother was now free, that the Jews were receiving better treatment, and that Laufer (Lauffer) was keeping his promise. Gross told Brand that he no longer wanted to go to Palestine. He also had a word with (Mr.) Überall and made an earnest plea that he should be allowed to stay a few days extra (AOB: with his wife) in Turkey. (Mr.) Überall said he would see what he could do to enable gross and Brand to return to Hungary. (AOB: the consequences, nearly certainly, should have been that Gross would have been terminated by Eichmann's "Juden Referat")

365. On the following day, however, the Chief Police informed Gross that he would have to take the train for Palestine on 1st June (1944), and that Brand was to follow him on 4th June. The detective told Gross that he and Brand might stay to night in the hotel if they could guarantee from some influential person. Gross obtained the guarantee from the manager of the Pera Palace Hotel.

366. (Mr.) Überall, Averbuch and Szynd came to see him in the hotel. Überall explained that the British Government had given orders to their Ambassador in Ankara to intervene with the Turks to allow gross and Brand to travel to Palestine. The intervention had been successful. Brand was to wait 3 days longer than Gross in Turkey - Shertok was due to arrive very soon, and it had been arranged that Brand should return with him to Palestine.

367. Gross brought up the subject of the separate negotiations once again, explaining his mission in detail and pointing out the advantages of carrying it out. (Mr.) Überall repeated that nothing could be done from Turkey, but that possibly it might be arranged from Palestine for a meeting to be held in some neutral country, with a view of bluffing the Germans. Gross would probably be able to secure a visa for Spain or Portugal in Palestine.

368. It the presence Überall, Brand, Baeder and Szynd, Gross sent off a telegram to Szanto stating that:-

(d) He hoped to announce results about 3 weeks later from Lisbon, Madrid or Istambul (Istanbul).

(e) Szanto was to telegraph the Pera Hotel, where (Mr.) Überall would collect any wires for him.

369. Brand added a postscript greeting his family and 'the whole family' (i.e. the Jews in Europe). Gross gave this telegram to a hotel porter to send off to Hungary.

369. Gross left Turkey on 1st June, was arrested in Aleppo, and sent under escort to Cairo. Brand arrived in Cairo some days later.

(a) in Spain or Portugal, where he claims he could easily convert Brinkmann (AOB: a frequently used cover-name), Chief Agent to Ast I Stuttgart, and →

his old cronies Franz Kleer??, Hans Heinzelmann, Moritz, Viktor Partz, Fritz Str???, Michel Knapp and Adolf Cero - all of the Stuttgart Abwehrstelle - to the Allied way of thinking:

or (b) in Turkey, where he could help help to start negotiations between S.D., or between Merkly (Hungarian), whichever the Allies chose.

371. One of Gross's personal weakness lies in his inabilities to tell the truth. (AOB: my query: is now speaking "the upper class" ?) Possessed of remarkably agile and inventive mind, he is never at a loss to explain away the many inconsistencies in his story. He invents the most convincing reasons for all of his actions. His attitude on the surface is the sincerest imaginable. But he defeats his own ends, for he is just that much too glib (simplistic) and too eloquent to be taken seriously. In short - the right sort of man for the Germans to send as an agent provocateur.

372. There are so many special points that it is impossible to deal with them all adequately in this interim report. The main points are commented on very briefly below.

373. References Paragraphs. A man who had formerly double-crossed the American Ambassador is not exactly the ideal choice to try and win over to the Allied side. Gross does not state that he ever told the British and Americans about this admission of Klatt's.

374. Ref. Para. 92. Gross was interrogated for a day and a half on this point alone, but which he is very 'cagey' (cautious). It is very improbable that such a successful man as Klatt should, as if seized by a sudden whim (impulse), which to work in secret W/T contact with the Allies unless he had ulterior (hidden) motives.

375. Ref. Para. 105. Why should Klatt tell gross, not apparently an employee of his, of Goetz's (KV 2/387; PF 600802) move to Turkey?

376. Ref. Para 135. It was ~~Collek~~ (Kollek = KV 2/2261 ... KV 2/2264; PF 66968) who had originally told him that he was not to work for the Americans, and that he was to serve one master only (i.e. the British).

377. Ref. Para. 160. Knowing that Hatz had told Delius (alias of Obstlt. Otto Wagner, once Leiter K.O.-Bulgaria; KV 2/284; PF 601320) of the projected Hungarian - Allied W/T link, Gross nevertheless 'requests him strenuously (energetically) to do all he can to establish the British link as well!' Gross apparently told nobody that Hatz was a double-crosser. Perhaps gross himself reported the matter to Delius and Hatz is really a genuine Hungarian patriot or alternatively, perhaps Gross was in league (club) with Hatz and the Germans to double-cross the anti-Nazi Hungarians who were genuinely anxious to contact the Allies by radio? But if Hatz is a German agent, what is the significance of news of his hanging in Hungary, as reported in the 'Egyptian Mail' at the beginning of June (when he was imprisoned by the British)? The truth concerning Hatz's loyalties or otherwise represents one of the most important factors in assessing Gross's own bona fides.

379. Ref. Para. 236. It is important to remember that all Gross's information about these subsequent negotiations between the Gestapo and → the Zionists is second-hand, as he was never present himself at any of the meetings.

the Zionists is second-hand, as he was never present himself at any of the meetings.

380. Ref. Para. 243. Gross says that this was the only decent thing Winninger had ever done in his life. He is at loss to explain Winninger's motives.

381. Ref. Para. 264. Gross is very vague about the exact functions of the S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst) and the Gestapo personalities which he mentions. He is, however, careful to draw a distinction between the S.D. and the Gestapo officers.

382. Ref. Para. 305. Gross's latest statement about Merkly's official position is inconsistent with his original statement to the effect that Merkly had a high position under Ujszaszy'. (See S.I.M.E. Report No. 1). It may be that Merkly was relegated as a result of Ujsaszy's arrest.

383. Ref. Para 322 (b). Gross originally stated (See S.I.M.E. Report No.1) that he was to arrange the meeting first and foremost through Schwarz and only as a last resort with the British through the Zionists.

384. Ref. Para. 322 (d). If gross was to arrange a meeting with the British and Americans through the Zionists, Brand was bound to hear sooner or later of Gross's separate mission from the Zionists in Istambul (Istanbul). His original statement - that he was first to try and arrange a meeting through Schwarz - seems more credible.

385. Ref. Para. 351. - Gross does not seem to have made much effort to contact Captain Johnson on his latest visit to Turkey. He makes the excuse that he was too busy preparing for his trip with Brand to Ankara, and that when this was knocked on the head, he was arrested before he had a chance to see Captain Johnson. But he could easily have seen Captain Johnson after his first arrest, as he was released in a very short time. If gross had failed to persuade (Mr.) Überall to arrange a meeting between the S.D. and the Allies, and if Schwarz was in Ankara, surely Captain Johnson was the obvious person for Gross to see if he was genuinely desirous of arranging a meeting for genuine peace-negotiations.

387. (a) That the various available organisations with which gross had any contact be asked to check gross's statements as noted in this report, and to submit their version of Gross's activities.

(v) That gross be interrogated in consideral detail on his work for the Hungarians, for Klatt and for the Allies, using the information already in our possession as evidence against him.

There are two characters now, I believe, in the hands of S.I.M.E., in whom I am particularly interested - Nelle Kapp and Andre Gyorgy, I should be very grateful if you could let me know when any information from them from them becomes available.

Kapp may know more than we do about S.D. Communications in Turkey. I am interested in Gyorgy because of his part in the extraordinary story of the Gestapo's offer to exchange Jews for goods or money. This involves a number of S.S. personalities including Schroeder (= Dr. Erich Emil; KV 2/399; PF 96729; born 12/3 1903 at Gelsenkirchen) in Lisbon, and may have reflections in our material.

(c) Frans Kleer (real name Koehler (Köhler?) KV 2/1957; PF 793749) - Now Brinkmann's agent in charge of wireless station Madrid (= Sabine / Metro). In touch with two American Clipper pilots who are of American Fascist party.

(d) Hans Heinzelmann - Formerly Busse's (= Bueckel?) agent in Switzerland, where he was arrested; later took over a wireless station in Lisbon under Brinkmann.

(e) Moritz (?) - Later representative of a Stuttgart textile firm in Lisbon, which is cover for his wireless station there.

(f) Viktor Partl - Later in charge of W/T liaison between Lisbon and Tangiers in Brinkmann's network.

(h) Rudi Scholz (Scholtz?) - A smuggler, formerly V-Mann in Portugal under Brinkmann; now Stuttgart agent in Paris.

(i) Dr. Grovitcs (alias Franz Szigli) - Chief V-Mann in Hungary, at the same time Ast I, Wien, under Major Bagel.

(j) Martha Ferenzy (Ferenczy?) - Hungarian dancer in Switzerland, who took over Heinzelmann's job when he was arrested. Also works for Ast III-F (= counter-espionage) Wien.

(k) Haggar (Elie, KV 2/1311; PF 65661) - A rich young Egyptian who was later sent to Egypt on an espionage mission.

5. Gross's work for Ast I, Stuttgart, during the next few months, consisted of not very serious economic espionage and smuggling for Dr. Busse in Switzerland. In the course of his activities he learnt to know:

(d) Josef Baumruck - Budapest representative of Richard Klatt, head of Luft I (Meldekopf = LMK), Sofia. (?)

(e) Ilona Talas - Baumruck's misstress, wko was in close contact with all German Dienststellen in Budapest.

(f) Josef Winninger (decarded 31.10.1962) (alias Duftel- a Jew) - Maria V-Mann in Budapest of Ast III-F in Wien. Now under arrest in (German controlled) Budapest.

(g) Charles Popescu (alias Erich Werner) - Worked under Major Bagel (= decarded 4 Jan. 1955) (AOB: in my understanding it is likely that Major Bagel became engaged with the to be established West-German Bundeswehr; constituting a friendly partner of Nato member Britain) of Ast I Wien. Now under house arrest in Budapest.

(h) David Reimer(?) - Director of Automobile firm M.A.M.? (M.A.N? Maschinenfabrik Augsburg - Nürnberg). Formerly worked under Korda (alias of Rudolf Kaunitz) in Ast III-F (counter-espionage), Wien, and now under Klausens in S.D. Hungary.

Prominent Budapest Zionist. Given a special mission in Turkey, by a Hungarian officer. (among it the war criminal) Eichmann

2. Eichmann, Obersturmbannführer Deputy-Chief of Gestapo in Hungary. (AOB: curious is: PF 48683 - as this concerns a file series dedicated to: Czech Refugee Trust Set up in 1939 by the British Government, in the serials KV 2/2715 ... KV 2/2729)

4. Klaages, Obersturmbannführer (equals Obstlt. = Lieut. Colonel) S.D. Chief in Hungary.

5. Laufer (Lauffer?), fritz @ Schroeder, Director, @ Mayer, Ludwig @ Heinz, Karl. Now Klaages chief S.D. agent in Hungary. Formerly chief agent of Ast III, Pague (Prag).

8. Schwarz American Intelligence Officer in Istambul (Istanbul). The S.D. wanted Gyorgy to arrange for a meeting between Schwarz & the S.D. in any neutral country, Czech emigrant.

9. Merkly, Lt. Col. (Obstlt.) Former chief in the Hungarian Counter Espionage Service. Now holds a high position in the Hungarian secret Political Dept.

11. Schwarz Dr. President of the American "Joint" in Lisbon. Weizmann's (Zionist?) personal representative there. (otherwise impossible to look-up - 600 cards.)

8. Schwarz. Czech by birth. U.S. agent in Istambul (Istanbul) Prob. id.w. Schwarz, Alfred Minerva Han 43/48, Istambul (Istanbul)-Galata. Turkey. Agent for firms dealing in machine technical goods.

13. For the first few months of his acquaintanceship with Gross, he knew nothing about this business activities. He noticed early on, however, that Gross used to bring a large variety of articles - ties, perfumes, cosmetics, furs - back from Istambul (Istanbul), apparently with the greatest facility. He did not entertain any particular suspicions as it was not uncommon for business men in Hungary to travel about and transport goods easily if they had diplomatic connections. Springmann therefore assumed that gross must have some such connection.

14. Springmann first began to suspect gross of being a smuggler in March 1943 when Job, one of Gross's business associates told him that Gross used to be a carpet smuggler.

15. It was only at the end of May 1943 that Springmann first had concrete evidence that Gross was a smuggler. Gross revealed to him on this occasion that he smuggled gold from Turkey to Budapest and exchanged it for dollars on the black market through Szanto. Although Springmann had known previously that Gross had had certain gold dealings in Hungary with Szanto, Job and others, he had not realised that Gross was a gold smuggler. This news, however, did not worry Springmann very much as a smuggler with good connections and a knack of by-passing all the controls was a very useful person to smuggle Zionist mail.

16. Towards the beginning of June 1943, Springmann learnt by chance that gross's friend Bagyoni (KV 2/3646; PF 603873), whom he had met a month previously, was a sort of police official. He happened to overhear a waiter in a cafe saying to Gross that 'the Inspector had been looking for him'. Springmann asked who he meant, and Gross said Bagyoni.

17. About two week later Szanto mentioned to Springmann in a cafe that gross had 'good military connections' and used his influence to do favours for people, i.e. to get them off military service, to obtain passports for them etc. These facts - Job's assertion that gross used to be a carpet smuggler, Gross's admission that he was a gold smuggler, Bagyoni being a police inspector, Szanto's assertion that Gross 'had good military connections', Gross black market activities - accumulated in Springmann's mind with the result that he began to have doubts about gross's reliability.

18. Springmann then decided to notify Istambul (Istanbul) of his doubts and suspicions. About the last week in June he sent a letter to Pomerany to the effect that he did not consider gross and his courier friends and trustworthy. As Springmann is unable to write Hebrew fluently, he asked Dr. Schweiger to write out a letter, worded in circumlocutionary fashion, which contained, without mentioning any names, Springmann's doubts as to Gross's good faith, Schweiger did this and Springmann have the letter to one of the couriers to take to Istambul (Istanbul). He eventually received a reply from Pomerany to the effect that 'these people' were perfectly reliable.

19. About mid-July 1943, however, Springmann received another shock when it came out that Erich Werner, who had shown him a report about Arabs, was probably in some espionage service. A few days after this period Springmann despatched a second letter by Gross to Pomerany expressing his opinion, in a well shrouded fashion, that Werner was a spy. Tis time he dictated the latter himself in German, and in the course of a mass of irrelevant matter, some of which contained Hebrew phrases as was custom in the Zionist correspondence, inserted the Hebrew sentence 'Eri holech raeger'. This literally means 'Eri goes on his feet', for 'reger' to 'raeger' Springmann thought he would be able to convey the double meaning to Pomerany. The latter apparently got the sense of it, as he sent a letter back confirming(?) that Werner was absolutely reliable.

20. Springmann did not learn that gross was in the Hungarian I.S. until the beginning of October 1943, when gross took him to Nemet although he had had suspicions ever since Szanto told him that gross had ' good military connections'. Springmann claims not to have put any questions to Gross and his friends concerning their extra-Zionist activities.

49. Ref. Para 22. - It is not clear why Springmann should be afraid of travelling through Svilengrad (the Bulgarian train station about the border to Turkey) on the interim passport. Gross could have warned his friends at the control that Springmann was coming through (by train), whether Springmann had a Hungarian or an interim passport. It is of course possible that Pomerany instructed gross to get Springmann a Hungarian passport. without Springmann 's knowledge.

52. Ref. Para. 29 - If Pomerany wanted a Hungarian passport for his Zionist agent, surely he would have seen to it that the passport contained the right visas, as the Jewish Agency in Istambul (Istanbul)were largely responsible for liaising with the Turkish Government for the purpose of obtaining visas for European Jewish certificate holders. If Springmann is concealing the fact that he knew all along that Pomerany wanted him to get a Hungarian passport, why did Springmann not see that the right visas were procured? There would appear to be no motive for concealing this fact, as it would be in his favour to admit that he obtained the passport for Pomerany's purposes. Even if gross was instructed by Pomerany to get a passport for Springmann, which appears quite probable since he obtained Hungarian and Serbian visas valid several journeys, there is still no explanation as to why transit visas marked for Palestine were procured. It is probable that the Budapest Palestine Office were responsible for the mistake, if indeed they had been correctly informed of Pomerany’s wish.

58. It would not be safe to regard Springmann as cleared, however, until the full extent of Pomerany's and (Mr.) Überall's activities in Turkey is brought to light. If they confirm that Springmann sent letters expressing his doubts as to gross's and Werner's reliability, and if they accept the responsibility for recruiting these couriers, then Springmann is hardly to blame for associating with Gross and his friends.

3. Boastful and cunning by nature - "ein grosser Bluffer". A very successful business-man, whose sole aim was to make money, and who was up to all the underhand tricks of trade. Imposed his will on people and took many risks to come out on top in all his human and commercial dealings. Although he was indiscreet about certain matters, and frequently boated of his influence in high quarters, he knew when to keep his mouth shut and never revealed to Springmann any details of his espionage service in Hungary. Towards Springmann he was on the whole reliable, although sometimes he failed to carry out his promises.

4. Gross's commercial activities were not known in any detail to Springmann, who learnt indirectly that he was engaged in smuggling on a large scale. He would always return from Istambul (Istanbul) with trunks full of furs, cigarettes, gold etc., which he disposed of in Budapest. He habitually bought gold in Turkey, smuggled it back to Hungary by bribing the frontier officials, at Svilengrad, and exchanged it for pengoes (Hungarian currency) on the black market. For the purpose of currency exchange he dealt mainly with Ladislaw Szanto, and to a lesser extent with Katz and Budapest stockbrokers such as Koranyi and Geleri. He ran such a profitable line in gold and other smuggling that he became the leader of a band of racketeers who were? attracted by the prospect of making easy money - namely Werner, Bagyoni, Wenninger, Scholz (Scholtz?) and Kleer (KV 2/1957 Koehler Franz (alias Kleer); PF 793749) who associated constantly with him and became his partners, or rather subordinates in crime.

5. In the course of his journeys to Istambul (Istanbul) in furtherance of these smuggling activities, which coincided happily with his work for Pomerany and Springmann,

6. Gross met Springmann in the cafe Pariset towards the end of 1942, and was persuaded to take a letter from him to Pomerany in Istambul (Istanbul). In Turkey, Pomerany induced him to become a regular courier for the Zionists, and to try and recruit other couriers for the same purpose. he subsequently introduced to Pomerany and Springmann his smuggling friends Werner, Bagyoni, Wenniger, Scholz (Scholtz?) and Kleer (= Koehler), as well as Sedlacek and others from different countries, of whom Springmann does not know. he did this, not for any ideological or philanthropical reasons, but from financial and probably political motives, and was thereby able to gain access to Allied representatives in Istambul (Istanbul). Nevertheless, his interests and those of the Zionists coincided, and Springmann does not accuse him or his friends of failing to keep their part of the bargain. For his services to the Zionists it was arranged with Pomerany that he should keep a certain percentage, varying according to the journeys, of all the money he transported for the Zionists to Europe, and doubtless he made additional profits through the exchange in Budapest.

7. As Springmann found out later, Gross was a member of the Hungarian I.S. (Intelligence Service) serving first under Merkly and later (in the latter half of 1943) under Garzuly. His colleagues in the Hadik Barracks, included Bagyoni, Nemet, Kern and Horvat. Springmann knows little of Gross's activities in this sphere, except that he certainly used his influence to make money in various ways - for example by procuring passports or identity documents.

8. His main contacts in Budapest were the above-named, and also acquaintances such as Kramer (KV 2/144 ... KV 2/156) please notice → (J2148 J2148return) and Frau Berger. He was often in the Cafes Biarritz and Opera (the latter a renowned German haunt). He has a mistress named Zsuzsi, and frequently consorted with cabaret artists.

9. In mid-summer 1943, Gross told Springmann that he had been discovered, on returning from one of his Istambul (Istanbul) visits, in possession of 1,000 gold napoleons (old French currency). He had negotiated a big business deal with some Japanese acquaintances in Istambul (Istanbul), →

(AOB: Japan was not at a state of war with most European continental governments; even not yet with Russia. However, financially they relied heavily upon Nazi-German friendship. Actually, the Germans provided some financial frames, whereas the Japanese did so for German representations in the Far East.)

→ but was not afraid of the consequences of his discovery, as the Japanese Embassy had guaranteed the whole affair. One of these Japanese contacts was a French →

speaking speaking journalist named Enomoto (Dr. Enomoto Montaro (Monotyro) (AOB: The latter travelled accompanied by his wife and young child, in his own car - from the Balkans to Stockholm - before Christmas 1944! Without German support an impossible endeavour. What to think of: papers to cross the various borders including his car, and food ration-cards, petrol vouchers and many more provisions?), with whom Springmann saw Gross on a number of occasions later in Turkey. Enomoto was often in Budapest. (AOB: the latter represented also a Japanese New Paper as well as engagements connected diplomatic and intelligence work)

10. Shortly before Springmann and he left Turkey, Gross gave Springmann a list of 10-12 Jewish names (including Proper, a very rich Hungarian of the Budapest Company "Interkontinental", ~~ladislaw~~ Ladislaw Szanto and gross's brother) which he wished Springmann to recommend to the Jewish Agency for Palestine visas. Springmann was not keen to do this but said Gross should try with the Jewish Agency representative there. Gross eventually asked (Mr.) Überall to do this for him, but the latter refused. Gross probably wished to help these Jews into Palestine to further his own business ends.

11. In Turkey, Gross frequiently discussed Zionist courier affairs with Pomerany and (Mr.) Überall, and through the latter contacted a certain Schwarz, who Springmann thinks is a British agent.

12. Gross had business dealings in Istambul (Istanbul) with, amongst others, a Turk named Fadil, who was married to a German. He bought gold through Fadil. When he left Istambul (Istanbul) in March 1944, he travelled back to Hungary with Fadil and his wife.

13. Gross once boasted to Springmann that he had obtained good political connections in Istambul (Istanbul) through Kollek (KV 2/2261 .. KV 2/2264; PF 66968), and later (Mr.) Überall, and that these contacts would help to put him in a good graces of the Allies after the war (AOB: which did not mature). (Überall later confirmed that this was true). He also talked about a big scheme after the war to create an international capitalist union in Palestine or Cairo, where he intended to settle, and that he and Proper would set this plan in motion with the aid of British and the Americans.

17. Werner associated constantly with Gross, Weinniger (Wenninger?) and Scholz (Scholtz?), and was mixed up in all their smuggling rackets. In his gold and jewel 'business' he dealt principally with a Jewish marketeer named Katz.

18. Springmann was introduced to Werner by Gross soon after the latter had taken Springmann's first mail to Istambul (Istanbul). Werner was one of the first couriers Gross recruited for the Zionists, and subsequently carried letters on four or five occasions in Istambul (Istanbul) before the end of 1943. So far as Springmann knows, he did not travel to any other countries, in that year. As opposed to some of the other couriers, Werner practically never opened or read any of the Zionist mail.

21. At the beginning of November 1943, Werner was arrested at Svilengrad (the train border station between Bulgaria and Turkey). Springmann does not know the precise reason why, but presunmes that Werner was caught smuggling. Gross was arrested in Budapest two days later, on the suspicion that he was implicated in Werner's activities, and also because he failed to pay the fine for an old smuggling offence. Gross told Springmann afterwards that Werner had some Zionist mail on him, but had fortunately contrived to pass in secretly to Weininger (Wenninger?), which whom he was travelling, before being escorted away under arrest.

22. Werner was brought back to Hungary where his case was examined both by the Hungarian and German police. Sedlacek told Springmann that his brother-in-law from Wien, named Schmidt, was presented at the interrogation, and affirmed that Werner did not give anything away about his activities of behalf of the Zionists. Werner was never set free, but is now languishing in a lunatic asylum. Gross was released 10-14 days after his arrest, by dint of paying a substantial sum of money to the authorities.

26. Weininger was originally introduced to Springmann in Spring 1943, by Gross, as a jeweller who travelled a lot, and had already taken Zionist mail to Turkey and Bratislava (Preßburg). Springmann later later found out that Weininger knew nothing about jewel business, but was merely interested in illegal jewel traffic for financial reasons. Weininger made a number of Journeys in Istambul (Istanbul) and Bratislava (Preßburg) for the Zionists, through Gross, and always proved reliably.

33. The least reliable of Springmann's couriers - promised a lot, but his promises sometimes failed to materialise. By nature he was 'cunning and like an Apache (North-American Indian)'. Although discreet when sober, he cannot hold his tongue with liquor inside him. Gross told Springmann that that Scholz (Scholtz?) used to be a safe--breaker (safe cracker).

34. Scholz (Scholtz?) was one of Gross's smuggling partners, and also did a 'business' in watches with Weininger. Gross once exchanged gold for a large sun of Reichsmark (RM), which Rudi took to Paris and profitably converted into Spanish currency (Peseta). He was constantly with Gross and his friends in Budapest cafes Opera and Biarritz. Springmann heard that, apart from his Paris visit Scholz (Scholtz?) had been recently to Portugal where he bought jewels. He often travelled with Kleer (= KV 2/1957, real name Koehler; PF 793749) to Stuttgart, and Springmann thinks he is possibly stationed there.

35. In the course of his work for the Zionists, Scholz (Scholtz?) travelled at least once to Istambul (Istanbul), but more often to Poland and Slovakia. As Gross usually took charge of the Zionist mail himself, and distributed it amongst the various couriers, Springmann could not always be certain who made the journey, and to what country.

41. Very reliable towards Springmann, who considered him the best of all the couriers, He was of a different cut from the others, and was not, so far as Springmann knew, implicated in any of Gross's smuggling rackets.

42. Springmann met Sedlacek through Gross in the summer of 1943, after he had returned from a journey first a journey to Krakau (Cracow) with mail which Pomerany had given him in Istambul (Istanbul). Gross had made his acquaintance a short while previously in a train, and had introduced him to the Zionists in Istambul (Istanbul). Pomerany gave Gross a letter containing money for dr. Hilfstein, a Zionist in Krakau (Cracow), and Gross asked Sedlacek to take it there for him.

47. Kleer is an intelligent man, who looks like Adolphe Menjou. He is one of gross's friends and smuggling associates, and is often to be seen with Gross, Bagyoni, Weininger and Scholz (Scholtz?) in the Budapest cafes. He was at one time a merchant, but now describes himself as a 'ruined business-man'.

48. Kleer became known to Springmann through Gross early in the history of the Zionist underground movement, but he was only an occasional courier between Budapest and Istambul (Istanbul).

51. Greiner was known to be Gross's 'Hausmeister' i.e. managed Gross's house and affairs when Gross was away.

Ferenz Bagyoni (KV 2/3646; PF 693873) (AOB: Bagyoni remained in Stockholm late 1944 and in early 1945 he was made 'persona non grata')

54. An intelligent and well educated man, who, however, was not very self dependent without Gross, in all of those financial rackets he was implicated. (Mr.) Überall told Springmann that Bagyoni was a Nazi and an anti-Semite, and Springmann, in his dealings with him, came to confirm the impression.

55. Gross first introduced Bagyoni to Springmann as a future courier for the Zionist organisation, and Bagyoni subsequently made one or two journeys to Istambul (Istanbul) and back for Gross.

Ehud ~~Uberall~~ (Mr. Übertall) (AOB: typically a British file, as they gave a damn about correctly spelling of names!)

62. His main task was to receive and question the Agency courier from Europe, such as Gross, and his friends, whom he officially or unofficially - I should like to know which - brought with officers of the British Embassy.

103. Kastner (Kästner?) only met Gross and other couriers for the first time at the end of 1943, when he took over Springmann's job, although Springmann had kept him fully informed about their activities from the beginning.

118. Ref. Para. 19. - Werner's interest in Arab affairs, and his admission that he belonged 'zur Wehrmacht' make it almost certain that he was an Axis agent. In the event of this being true, it is possible, though not logically conclusive, that Gross, a close associate of Werner, worked for the Germans as well as for the Hungarians, - point not yet admitted, if indeed it is known by Springmann.

120. Springmann has emphasised that on the whole he had no complaints to make regarding the reliability of his couriers. Now it is obvious that these couriers - men of doubtful reputation such as Gross, Werner, Weininger, Scholz (Scholtz?), and Kleer - would only agree, to help on a profit-basis. Springmann was getting a lot out of them: what were they getting out of him? Springmann claims that they were making their regular percentage and that they were doing the work purely for financial reasons. But at the same time these couriers are known by us be Axis agents, and as such they are not likely to have missed the chance of exploiting Springmann for political as well as financial purposes, especially as high-ranking representatives of the Hungarian Foreign Office, and the Hungarian C.E. were also in the know, at any rate towards the end of 1943.

121. There seems thus to be two solutions to the problems, departing from the promise that Springmann was of use to these Axis agents politically as well as financially; either Springmann helped them consciously, or he helped them unconsciously.

122. We have no evidence that Springmann consciously helped Gross and his friends, to further their political ends. Assuming Springmann's past record, as it appears from his own story, to be genuine, it is unlikely that he would deliberately work with the Axis against the Allies. If the Allies lost the war, a lot of the Jews throughout the world would obviously be far worse. In order to prove the theory that Springmann consciously helped the Axis, it would be necessary to break down his long record of philanthropic aid to the Jews. He may of course have had political motive in wishing to be of use to the Axis i.e. desire to free Palestine of the British, but there is no evidence that he was associated closely with Revisionists or any other sort of extremists.

123. On the other hand, the unconscious help Springmann might have given to the Axis is considerable. We know that gross and his friends were introduced by (Mr.) Überall to representatives of the British Embassy in Istambul (Istanbul); Springmann was indirectly responsible for this. Although the odds are in favour of Springmann having unconsciously, rather than consciously, given help to the Axis, there are nevertheless points which require elucidation before his non-complicity can finally accepted.

CX/12799?/731/V.E. (AOB: V might have been related to counter-espionage, V.E. might than tell us the section as well as an initial of the person handling it) dated 2.6.44.

(AOB: It was typical S.I.S. / M.I 6 practise to make CX/serials/ unreadable; but sooner or later they make brief a mistake and then a group-serial slipped through)

On Andre Gyorgy alias Grayner alias Bandy whose real name may be Andor Gross a German agent working in Istambul (Istanbul) and Budapest and a personal friend of Richard Klatt (an alias) (KV 2/1495 ... KV 2/1499)(see also our index), who (Gross!) has been in touch with our Intelligence Services in Istambul (Istanbul) since June 1943, is being expelled by the Turkish police and has elected to go to British controlled territory rather than return to Axis controlled territory. By agreement with S.I.M.E. he and his wife are being admitted to Syria where he will be closely interrogated.

The couple left Istambul (Istanbul) for Syria by rail on June 1st. S..I.M.E. are in possession of full facts of the case.

It is always possible that he may be a German double agent and have elected to go to Syria on the instructions of his masters.

In Hart's (Herbert L.A. Hart, M.I.5. B1b) material there are references to him under this own name Gyorgy and also Bandy.

Information was received from I.S.L.D. (connected to S.I.M.E.) that Samuel Springmann, a Jewish Agency official, recently arrived in Turkey from Hungary, had been using as couriers between Budapest and Istambul (Istanbul) certain members of the Hungarian intelligence Service and the Abwehr, and that he had even recommended these to I.S.L.D. as possible agents. The most suspicious names were those of Andor Gyorrgy, Karl Popescu, Josef Weininger, Rudi Scholz (Scholtz?), Robert Groenes and Rudolf Sedlaceck. I.S.L.D. also had reason to suspect that Springmann's own journey from Budapest to Istambul (Istanbul) might have been undertaken in Axis interests.

Springmann's ostensible motive in leaving Hungary, was to abandon work for the Jewish Agency, and seek a home in Palestine, for which he obtained a visa. It was decided to arrest him, on his way, at Aleppo and bring him to Cairo for interrogation. Negotiations were meanwhile initiated with the Jewish Agency, which vouched for Springmann's anti-Axis opinions and long record of good service under conditions of considerable risk.

He (Springmann) is a Polish Jew by origin, aged 39, whose family had moved to Budapest. There he became a jeweller and watchmaker, and drove a fairly prosperous business from his own house. He had always held strong Zionist principles, and was connected with various Hungarian Zionist organisations, some of them Left Wing tendencies. Since the war he has been active in sheltering Jewish refugees, particularly those from Poland and Yugoslavia and organising their journey to Turkey and Palestine in concert with the Jewish Agency.

For this purpose, an organisation known as Ezra Ve Hazala was formed in Budapest and Istambul (Istanbul), Springmann accepted the service of an old school friend, Andor Gross, alias Gyorgy, who was frequently making the journey, and consented to carry letters and money sent by the Jewish Agency from Istambul (Istanbul). Gross introduced Springmann to other couriers who were used for the same purpose.

Springmann began to suspect Gross and his friends of smuggling, and then of more suspicious activities. He wrote to Pomerani, representative of the Jewish Agency at Istambul (Istanbul), and recorded his misgivings, but was reassured by Pomerany. (D.S.O. (= Defence Security Office) Turkey has been asked to question Pomerani about this correspondence, and to discover how far he knew, or ought to have known, the other activities of the couriers he was encouraging Springmann to use).

Springmann states that he and his wife had contemplated leaving Budapest for Palestine since 1941. In the Autumn of 1943 they took more active steps, and, through Gross's assistance, obtained the necessary papers from the Hungarian I.S. (Intelligence Service) official named Bagyoni. Springmann denied that he gave an quid pro quo for his travelling facilities. It is a little difficult to believe that he would have obtained them unless his journey was desired by Hungarian or German I.S., but it has been quite impossible to establish that any mission was entrusted or suggested to him: and his whole record and personality makes it unlike that he would accept such a mission.

The interrogation of Springmann has produced a mass of evidence about the underground refugee traffic in Central Europe, and has shown how extensively the Jewish Agency has been using Hungarian and even German agents as its couriers. Springmann was probably more aware than he pretends of the more sinister activities of gross and his friends, but at present it seems more likely that he mad use of their services for lack of more reputable couriers, than that he was implicated in their work for Hungarian or German Intelligence. Investigations are being conducted at Istambul (Istanbul) to discover the extent of the general connection between the Jewish Agency and the Axis couriers.

Mrs. Springmann has corroborated her husband's story on the subject of the refugee traffic, but has not thrown much light on the subject of the couriers. Even if Springmann himself was culpably involved, it is not at present thought that Mrs. Springmann knew anything of the matter.

28. Towards the end of 1942, Springmann met by chance in the Cafe Pariset Andor Gross, a Hungarian Jew with whom he had been at school, since which time he had lost touch with him. They greet each other and compared general notes on their activities during the past years. Gross, whom Springmann subsequently called by the affectionate form his Christian name, Bandi, mentioned that he was travelling to Istambul (Istanbul) in a short while, and Springmann asked him if he would mind taking a letter with him, promising that he would be willing to pay him money for doing so, if necessary. Gross said that Springmann could on him, and did not ask for any money. At this time, Springmann claims that he knew nothing of Gross' business life or other activities.

29. Springmann later wrote out a letter to Wenya Pomerany in Istambul (Istanbul) , with whom he had been communicating for the past few weeks. Pomerany had come to Istambul (Istanbul) from Palestine to see if anything could be done to organise that relief of European Jews and their passage out of Europe, and had replaced Neustadt, who had returned to Palestine. In Springmann's letter he wrote shortly, stating that the bearer was an old school friend and expressing his hope that Pomerany could profit by Gross's journey to send some help to the Jews.

30. Springmann gave Gross the letter, which he opened and read. A few weeks later he returned from Istambul (Istanbul) with Pengoes (Hungarian currency) 700 which Pomerany had given him for Springmann. Gross told Springmann that that he had spoken at length with Pomerany who had asked if it was possible for him to arrange for other travellers to journey between Istambul (Istanbul) and Budapest, and to Bratislava (Preßburg), where Pomerany also wished to establish a link with the object of secretly transporting money, letters and newspapers to various Jewish addresses, of which Springmann's was one. gross promised Pomerany that he would see to it and arrange everything. The question of payment was discussed, and Pomerany promised Gross 10% commission for all the money he or his couriers transported to Hungary, and 20% for other countries, where the contact was more difficult.

31. Shortly after returning from Istambul (Istanbul), Gross introduced Erich Werner to Springmann as a "business man" who was travelling soon to Turkey and who would be willing to take a letter to Pomerany and bring money back. Springmann wrote out another letter to Pomerany, too the effect that he had received money and gave the letter to Werner, explaining that its content concerned the relief of Jewish refugees. At this meeting. in the Cafe Hangli Werner introduced a German friend of his named Klein (?) to Springmann Werner eventually carried out Springmann's commission and returned with Pengoes 3,000.

32. A few days later gross fixed a rendez-vous with Springmann in in a cafe and told him that he knew another man who was willing to act as courier to Istambul (Istanbul). Springmann wrote out a letter to Pomerany, in which he explained to what purpose the money from Istambul (Istanbul) was being spent and amongst whom it was distributed. Gross took the letter but did not tell Springmann who the courier was to be. Later Gross saw Springmann and and gave him a joint letter from Pomerany, Menachen (Menachem?) Baeder (of Haszomer Hacair) and Zeef Schind (of Mapai), the latter two of whom had come to Istambul (Istanbul) to help Pomerany organise the growing underground movement and courier service in Europe. In the letter it said that the bearer was bringing back £T400, but Gross handed over £T600. Springmann asked him how it was that he had brought £T200 extra, and Gross invited Springmann to meet the man who had brought the letter with the money. They went along to a cafe Springmann and was to Franz Kleer (real name Koehler KV 2/1957; PF793749), who explained that Pomerany had originally given him £T 400 but had given him the extra £T200 just before he left and not changed the letter.

33. Subsequently Gross, Werner and Kleer made a number of similar journeys to Istambul (Istanbul), always bringing back money, letters or newspapers.

38. While Komoly was the nominal president, and was in touch with all that was going on, Brand and Springmann were the really active members. Springmann's house was a collecting centre for all correspondence and money. The Youth Organisation Plitim Chaluzim, which organised the welfare of refugees in Hungary, cooperated with the new Commission.

39. During the first few months of 1943, Springmann's courier organisation grew in proportions and branched out into other countries. It would be more correct to say that it was Gross's courier organisation as it took complete charge of the couriers themselves, who in most cases were completely unknown to Springmann, who invariably handed his correspondence to Gross himself. The latter made this a rule and told Springmann it would be better if his couriers remained as little known as possible for fear that they might be compromised.

40. Gross did, however introduce Springmann to a few more of the couriers he was employing. Joseph Weininger, for example, took letters from Gross for Springmann on several occasions to Dr. Dax (of Mapai), who was the contact man in Bratislava (Preßburg) for the escape organisation. Dax was also in contact with Schwalb in Geneva (Switzerland) and with various people in Poland. Rudi Scholz (Scholtz?) took letters for Springmann, through Gross to Warsaw (Warschau) and Cracow (Krakau), and on two occasions to a Slovakian Zionist in Benzburg named Sprenger, whose name and address had been given to Springmann by Pomerany. Dr. Sedlacek travelled with letters to Istambul (Istanbul), Cracow (Krakau), and on two occasions to a Slovakian Zionist in Benzburg named Spenger, whose name and address had been given to Springmann by Pomerany. Dr. Sedlacek travelled with letters to Istambul (Istanbul), Cracow (Krakau) and Warsaw (Warschau). Ferenz Bagyoni, a 'business' associate of Gross (this is far too simple, he was in some way or another also engaged as a kind of diplomat), made several journeys as a courier for Springmann to Istambul (Istanbul). (For full details of these and another personalities, see personality list of S.I.M.E. Report No.2)

Springmann began to suspect early in their acquaintance that Gross and his courier friends were not exactly what they posed to be. It became obvious to Springmann that Gross was a smuggler and that he used his friends Werner, Bagyoni (AOB: this might not be the true state of affairs) and Scholz (Scholtz?) for his own ends in his own racket. Gross used to travel from Istambul (Istanbul) with several large trunks filled with furs, ties, cigarettes, carpets and sometimes jewels, some of which articles he occasionally offered to Mr. and Mrs. Springmann. He invariably brought back from Turkey and Budapest did a profitable ; ine(?) in currency exchange with Black Market racketeers such as Szanto (owner of a shoe factory) and Katz (a Jewish refugee). When he smelt a rat, Springmann wrote a letter in Hebrew to Pomerany, worded in a circumlocutionary fashion, expressing his opinion that he did not consider Gross and his associates reliable. Gross, who, after the first two or three occasions, never read Springmann' s letters, took it to Pomerany, who wrote back to Springmann affirming that these people were quite satisfactory. Thus Springmann concluded he was justified in continuing his liaison.

44. On the eighth day of his leave, he met Gross who asked him to come along to meet a friend in Bajza Uzza 44. Here Gross introduced him to a Captain Tibor Nemet, who was dressed in civilian clothes. Nemet gave Springmann a letter and told him to take it to the Labour Office, which would grant him a further 4 weeks' leave. When they left Nemet, Gross told Springmann that the former was a colleague of his, whom he had bribed with 8,000 cigarettes to help . Springmann, and that he had been asked to do this for Springmann, by and that he had been asked to do this for Springmann by Pomerany in Istambul (Istanbul), where he had been recently. Gross told him further that in the letter it stated that they (i.e. Nemet and his colleagues) needed Springmann, whom the Labour Office was the leave alone. From these words and from further conversations, - Gross was a loose talker and was always boasting of what he could do for people and of the influence he had in high places - Springmann gathered that Nemet was an officer of the Hungarian Espionage Service and that Gross worked for him. He learnt later that Nemet was arrested towards the end of the year (1943) for procuring a passport for a friend against money.

45. Springmann too the letter to the Labour Office and was granted 4 weeks' leave, at the end of which he received am additional week, just by asking for it himself. By this time 3 months were up.

47. Springmann to Gross about his leaving the country and mentioned that his only fear was that he had been given in the spring of 1941, which might not get him through the German control at Svilengrad (is the Bulgarian train station near to the Turkish-Bulgarian border). Gross, in his usual swaggering manner, assured Springmann that he need not worry on his account, and that he would be able to procure him a Hungarian passport. They spoke of costs and Springmann promised to give Gross a silver cup worth Pengoes (Hungarian currency) 1,000 (Springmann knew that gross had procured passports for many others in the past for money.)

48. Springmann gave Gross the requisite passport photos of himself and his wife. Gross informed him that Ferenz Bagyoni, a colleague of his in the Espionage Service, would see personally to getting a passport. A few days later Bagyoni brought Springmann the passport for many others, and Springmann presented the silver cup to Gross.

49. At the end of October Springmann took the passport along to the Palestine Office in order to apply for the necessary transit visas, and he received the Turkish and Bulgaria visas in about a month. In the meantime Gross said that he too was travelling to Turkey in the near future and proposed to Springmann that he and his wife should accompany him and Mrs. Gross as they would pass quite safely through the German controls, Gross added that he was travelling through Yugoslavia and Springmann pointed out that he he had intended to travel through Rumania, a transit visa for which country he was expecting in a short time. Gross told him not to worry, that he would soon fix up the Serbian visa with the German authorities and could also procure Serbian visas for any Jewish refugees who might want them. Springmann jumped at the idea, and assented when he heard in the Palestine Office that there was going to be a delay in obtaining his Rumanian visa. Gross took Springmann's passport, promising to have the visa ready in a few days.

50. From this time on on began a series of false starts and delays, which postponed Springmann's departure for a few months. Springmann asked Gross every few days if his passport was ready, but Gross kept assuring him it would be ready next day without, however, keeping his word. Springmann eventually became tired of waiting and decided to apply for the Rumanian visa again, so he took his passport back from Gross and presented it for the second time to the Palestine Office.

51. In November (1943), when Springmann knew definitely that he was going away, he handed over all, his affairs in connection with his underground to Kastner (Kästner?) and Brand. About this time Gross negotiated a sort of general agreement between the Zionists and Major (?) Garzuly, Chief of Gross's section of the Hungarian Intelligence Service, in the Hadik Laktarya (Barracks). Gross introduced Kastner (Kästner?), Brand, and Springmann to Garzuly, who informed them that he knew the work they were doing and had nothing against it as long as it went through his channels. He explained that he knew of the money and letters which were being imported to Hungary from Turkey for the relief of refugee Jews, and that some was being sent to Poland and Bratislava (Preßburg), and expressed his wish to take over this work from the 'Germans'. (Springmann presumed he was referring to Weininger, Sedlacek and Scholz (Scholtz?). He said that he would arrange for everything to be taken to Turkey and brought back to Hungary by the diplomatic courier, and that he personally would negotiate the exchange if gold dollars from Turkey into Pengoes (Hungarian currency) through the National Bank of Hungary, keeping 10% of all such money for himself. The Zionists agreed to the arrangement. (Springmann says that Gross was not very pleased at this new agreement, as previously he had negotiated all the financial transactions himself on the black market, at a profit to himself).

52. This mutual agreement was known and sanctioned by Garzuly, Gross, Springmann, Kastner (Kästner?) Brand, Komoly and the Zionists in Istambul (Istanbul). Springmann is not certain if any other Hungarian officials were in the know or not, but considering Gross's reputation, this was quite feasible.

53. Despite this agreement the Zionists did not confide everything to the Hungarian diplomatic courier, who was, before he took over his post in Istambul (Istanbul), Otto Hatz, but continued to hand over some of the letters and money to Gross and →

Bagyoni, ostensibly without Garzuly's knowledge. Particularly confidential material was given secretly to a Swiss courier, whom Springmann had been using since Summer 1943 on Pomerany's recommendation. Springmann cannot remember the man's name. One day he noticed he was wearing a small Swiss red cross on a shield, and Springmann asked if he was from the Swiss Embassy. The Swiss laughed and said that it sis (it's?) not concern Springmann. (Springmann later confirmed from Pomerany that he was a special messenger of the Swiss diplomatic courier.).

54. Meanwhile, Springmann continued his negotiations for visas. His Rumanian visa was taking a long time to arrive, and matters were not made any easier by the fact that Springmann was on bad terms with Miklos Krauss, Secretary of the Hungarian Palestine Office. He did, however, receive a Rumanian visa in the end, but by this time his Turkish visa had expired. In the meantime Gross informed Springmann that his German visa for Serbia, which he obtained from Garzuly, was at least ready. The journey was delayed further by a serious illness which overcame Mrs. Springmann and rendered her unfit for travelling, and by the time spent in obtaining an extension of validity for Springmann's Turkish visa. Towards the end of January (1944), Springmann and Gross both received telegrams from Pomerany saying they must travel immediately, and so, despite Mrs. Springmann's prolonged illness, they left Hungary at the beginning of February 1944. (AOB: stricter limitations on Turkey's visa were due to come)

55. The journey to Istambul (Istanbul) was uneventful. On arrival the Springmann's went to the Pera Palace Hotel, where they stayed during the two months they were in Turkey, Gross and his wife went to their own house in Istambul (Istanbul). During his time here, Springmann was overwhelmed with Zionist conferences, and private discussions about his experiences in Hungary and the plight of Jews in Europe. He had to render reports on the courier organisation, and gave his advice about the extension and improvement. In the course of these discussions, he associated constantly with Pomerany and (Mr.) Überall, political representative of the Jewish Agency, and to a lesser extent with Barlas, Averbruch, Mitrani Baeder, Schind (Schindler??) Klarmann, Leder and Goldini all of the Jewish Agency.

62. Apart from his frequent meetings with the Zionists, Springmann had a number of private discussions on Poland and Jewish refugees with Roman Krolikovsky and Miss Wiszieczainska of the Polish Consulate, both of whom he had known formerly in Budapest. At some of these meetings Andor Gross was present. Wyli Blau, of the Polish Consulate, did a few errands for Springmann at Roman's bidding.

63. Springmann was often together with Gross, Pomerany and (Mr.) Überall in Istambul (Istanbul) - Gross for the purpose of discussing further work for the courier organisation. So far as Springmann knows, no letters went to Hungary (which country was since 19 March 1944 occupied by the Germans) through Gross during 4-5 weeks Gross was in Turkey; the only mail that was sent was confided either to the Swiss diplomatic courier or to Badios.

64. Gross told Springmann that he had contact with Konya and Csiky of the Hungarian Embassy, Istambul (Instanbul), and Gross's wife told Springmann that Gross also had contacts with Bagyoni and Hatz. In addition, Springmann knows, somewhat nebulously, of a liaison between gross and a certain Schwarz, whom (Mr.) Überall had introduced to him. Springmann never met Schwarz, but thinks that he is an Englishman and Gross's connection with him had to do with some work he was doing for the British. Bagyoni was also in contact with Schwarz, Weininger, Sedlacek and Scholz (Scholtz?) were not in Istambul (Istanbul) while Springmann was there.

65. About 4 weeks before Springmann left, Gross travelled back to Budapest and Bratislava (Preßburg), taking with him, as usual, money and letters for the Zionists. He is now stuck there as he is unable to obtain a Turkish visa. (see K2150 K2150return) Bagyoni was to travel back to Budapest 2 days after Springmann left Turkey.

82. The Zionist courier service, which was organised from Istambul (Istanbul), had ramifications into nearly all European countries. Springmann's knowledge of the whole organisation is by no means complete, as he only represented Hungary and the →

couriers he recruited with the help of Gross were not the only ones in existence, but he tabulates the organisation as follows:-

Istambul (Istanbul). - The Head Office, run by Pomerany, Baeder and Schind. This is the main reporting centre for all countries.

Geneva (CH). - Schwalb, who runs couriers to all parts of Europe, including the Swiss diplomatic courier, Hans Welti (Wälti?) and others. Silberschein is another link in Geneva.

Budapest. - Springmann, who established links with Poland, Slovakia, Istambul (Istanbul) and Geneva. His couriers included Gross, who in his turn recruited Werner, Bagyoni (?), Sedlacek, Weininger, and Scholz (Scholtz?). Since Springmann's departure Kastner (Kästner?) and Brand have taken over the Budapest branch.

Warsaw (Warschau) - Mme. Civja, a Jewess who posed as an Aryan, and was in contact with certain Polish underground organisations. Dr. Hilfstein and Schindler (AOB: the man of Schindler's List?) in Cracow (Krakau) also provided another contact address.

Prague (Prag) - Edelstein, Secretary of the Palestine Office. (He was later deported to Theresienstadt by the Germans, and Springmann does not know who is his successor.)

Bucharest. - Enzer, Secretary of the Palestine Office, and also Jancu Scarlat. Robert Greiner was one of the couriers for rumania, as well as for Bulgaria and Croatia.

83. If Springmann is guilty personally of associating with Axis agents, the Jewish Agency is involved as a whole in the same affair. All of Springmann's activities on behalf of the Jews in collaboration with the Hungarian Intelligence Service were known both to the Zionists in Budapest and to the Jewish Agency in Istambul (Istanbul), which, in fact, was responsible much more than Springmann for building up an organisation which employed Axis agents as couriers. Springmann was important as he made up an organisation which employed Axis agents as couriers. Springmann was important as the initial contact with Gross, but subsequently the courier service, if Springmann's story is to be believed, was directed from Istambul (Istanbul), where the Jewish Agency appeared to have full faith in Gross and his satellites, although they knew later on, if not at the beginning of their liaison with him, that he and his friends were members of the Hungarian C.E, Service.

84. The question whether Springmann and the other Zionists collaborated with the Hungarian C.E. Service more closely in espionage against the Allies - is much more complex. If Pomerany and his colleagues in Istambul (Istanbul) knew the truth about the activities of Gross and his satellites, then they are guilty of having introduced Axis agents to the Allies, without revealing to the latter these agents' true colours. Even of they did not know at the time, and only found out later, they are guilty in that they remained silent. There is no evidence that Springmann was was engaged in subversive activities without Zionist knowledge, and this does not appear likely judging by the character of the man himself, and by his story, but this possibility cannot be ruled out. Although he claims to have known nothing about Gross's previous activities, when he asked him on the first occasion to carry Zionist mail, and only to have found out later about Gross, he was indiscreet in trusting him without first being sure of him. Even if he knew nothing about Gross, it is likely that some of the other Zionists in Budapest, whom Springmann claims he took fully into his confidence, were really wise to Gross's activities.

AOB: I wonder, the discrepancy between the extensively frequent considerations we notice, but that this file has been considered even on 04.10.1989 is, in my perception, at least curious

We may assume, that he, like most others, was a regular smoker, and those latter hardly reached over 80 years of age, in those days.

Was this simply a standard procedure, or where they still in a state of alarm versus him?

AOB: In contrast many other KV 2/xxxx serials we here encounter some so-called Minute Sheets

17.8.44. From S.I.S. CX/12799/731?V.E* giving traces on SIME Report No. 3 (* AOB: Please look carefully at the deleted sign after CX/ / In a particular foregoing reference we encountered, as quite usually in a big file series, the true serial reference, which, in most cases had been deleted. 731 is indicating the actual file reference - which at M.I.5. - referred to PF600052; V.E. might indicate involvement of S.I.S. Section V (counter-espionage) and E. is referring to a particular handling servant) 30a.

? 8.44. From S.I.S. CX/12799/731 giving traces from Mr. Hart's (M.I.5.'s Herbert L.A. Hart; likely concerned with Loop-Up investigations) material on SIME Reports Nos. 2 and 3. 31a.

19.8.44. To S.I.S. enclosing Report No. 2 on Gyorgy('s interrogation in Egypt). 33a.

21.8.44. To S.I.M.E. enclosing summary on Gyorgy, Springmann and Brand cases. 34a.

24.8.44. Cipher telegram to S.I.M.E. (situated in Egypt) / Mr. Forrest re B.1.b. letter at 34a (thus concerning the foregoing letter of 21.8.44) 36a.

15.9.44. Letter from SIME enclosing Interrogation Report No. 1 of Eva Susanna Barna. 38b. (AOB: it concerned Gyorgy's mistress whom, according foregoing interrogations, was regarded being an Aryan)

21.9.44. To S.I.M.E. acknowledging Report No.1 on Eva Susanna Barna. (AOB: not directly a German name, but due to the turmoil just in the aftermath of World War One in central Europe, she might have originated from Czechoslovakia or other means; maybe even Hungarian with Aryan relations) 40a.

23.9.44. Telegram from SIME re Gross & his girl-friend (his wife?) Suzanne Barna. 41b.

29.10.44. Extract from information given by enemy agent Cappellaro re Gyorgy. 48a.

25.1.45. Copy S.I.M.E. report No. 5 on Dr. Willy Götz (= Willy (Willi) Goetz, KV 2/387; PF 600802) giving information re Gyorgy. 50a.

30.7.45. Not from W.R.C I/b (War Room section C.I/b; related to M.I.5.), Major Forrest (Major M.N. Forrest M.I.5. B.1.b.) to O.S.S. (X-2) (AOB: Office of Strategic Services, X-2 is indicating US - later also in the Nato Intelligence Section. This, from my practice is indicating that the concerned person being hold in U.S. controlled captivity, mostly somewhere in post-war Germany) attaching copy No.2 of SIME report on Gyorgy. 51a.

21.8.45. Extract from S.C.I. Report dated 18.7.45 on Manteuffel's Zeugnis?? mentioning Gyorgy. (AOB: Baron von Manteuffel was once engaged at Ast III-F in Wien (Vienna)) 52a.

1.4.54. From Commonwealth Relations Office enclosing letter from Mr. Norman Strachan (Consolidated Press Ltd.) re wish to write book on Andor Gross. 55a.

KV 2/131-1, page 15 (concerning minute 54a which is being kept secret up to after 1999!)

The Original Document retained in Department Under Section 3 (4) of Public Records Act 1958

(AOB: sometimes it concerned US diplomatic information on persons whom the US considered should not be made public)

Original in File No. : PF 602358 (on Klatt) (= KV 2/1495 ... KV 2/1499) Serial 39a Receipt data undated 1946.

Extract from Interrogation report Richard Klatt (real name Richard Kauder), German agent.

Gross, Sandor, @ Gyorrgy, Andor @ Grainer (German name Alexander "Bandy"). Agent of Ast Stuttgart I Meldekopf III-F (German counter-espionage) Budapest, Hungarian counter Intelligence section and of Colonel Hatz. Made numerous journeys to Turkey during 1941 and in 1942 also to Switzerland.

Has German pass with name Grainer, Hungarian pass with name of Gyorgy and obtained Hungarian official pass as representative of Hungarian Navy in freeport following Hatz's taking over of position of M.A. (Military Attaché) Gross had taken up contact with Joint (Jewish Refugee organisation) for which he smuggled much of their gold and foreign currency into Hungary. On journeys to Istambul (Istanbul), he often stopped off to visit LMK (= Luftmeldekopf as subsection of Ast I-Luft, in Wien) in Sofia until these visits were forbidden by order of Count Marogna-Redwitz (KV 2/3160; PF 601107; AOB: he was assassinated after the failed assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944) after, at least 5 July 1943, as Klatt was discharged by an order on behalf of Hitler himself; though Klatt was not the reason of this strict order but was victim of it) see also (L2152 L2152return) On one of these visits, he told Subject (Klatt) that he was taking along W/T sets of the American Intelligence Service and that he was to find operators in Budapest, Sofia and Wien ( who would take up contact with the Americans. Subject (Klatt) allegedly replied that not being III-F he could only report such matters to Marogna (AOB: actually was Obstlt. von Wahl-Welskirch his guiding officer and Baron Marogna-Redwitz Leiter of the entire Ast Wien) which he requested to do immediately. Later on, Subject (Klatt) learned that this W/T apparatus had actually been taken to Budapest with the Hungarian General Staff. Gross was arrested by the Stapo (real meaning: Staatspolizei) (Gestapo) following the (German) occupation (19 March 1944), released after few days and went with ~~Brandt~~ Brand (responsible for the migration of Jews from Hungary) by Hstuf. (Hauptsturmführer) (AOB: = Hptm. or Captain, the rank just below Sturmbannführer which was equivalent to a Major) Klaages (Klages?) of the Gestapo (as Gross it expressed during his interrogation) to Turkey. There, he had difficulties obtaining residence permission (actually getting a visa for Turkey). Being afraid to return to Budapest, he reportedly obtained a Syrian visa (through Joint and departed thereto. Subject (Klatt) states to have learnt this from Goetz. Nearly all of the Joint money is said to have been embezzled.

Original in File No. : PF 602045 (file now longer available) Serial 4a Receipt Date 21.8.45

Original from S.C.I. Unit A (US), Salzburg. by C.M.H. Section WR.H.4. (WR = War-Room)

Interrogation Report of Obstlt. (Lt. Col.) Baron von Manteuffel-Szoege (?) (AOB: I entered the query in Wikipedia and might not have tracked just the right relative but at least, likely, a nearby relative of his:

50. Of the agents for III-F (Gegenspionage - counter-intelligence) Ast Wien during his time as head of the branch (= Referat), Subject (= Baron von Manteuffel-Szoege) can only name the following:

A clever but unscrupulous and unreliable agent, this man was continually shadowed by another agent on his trips to Turkey. Through his friendship with Gyorgy (= Gross) was introduced to, and penetrated, the "Joint" organisation which he stated was working for Obersturmbannführer (=Obstlt.) (Adolf Eichmann) (AOB: in the British National Archive they possess on his trial in Israel 13 Foreign Office file serials; too extensive to refer in details in this current context) and Sturmbannführer (= Major) Krumei in Budapest in the Entjudung section (HQ. at Hotel Majestic) for the confiscation of Jewish property in Hungary.

Was arrested in 1944 in Budapest through Lauffer. When in jail in Wien supposed to have worked for the Gestapo as an informer.

51. Subject (= Baron von Manteuffel-Szoege) came into occasional contact with the following agents of other organisations during his period as Chief (Referatsleiter) of III-F (Gegenspionage) of Ast Wien:

Was (among an agent of Ast I Stuttgart; also) an agent for the Hungarians. Operated mainly in Turkey. Was a notorious profiteer. Was in close contact with the "Joint" (AOB: constituted once by US Jews) organisation in Istambul (Istanbul), Carried much gold to Germany for this organisation., Was allowed to do this as cover to gain confidence. Of this gold he always gave a certain small percentage to a certain Hungarian Abwehr officer who always met him at the airport and conducted him freely through the customs office.

Was suspected of working for the Japanese, Anglo-American, Turkish Intelligence Services as well as for the Hungarians and Germans.

Eva Susanna Barna born at Budapest December 27th 1921, possible identity with Klatts's secretary being investigated. Report of interrogation of Barna on entry into Middle East follows by mail.

1. I enclose herewith copies No. 2,3 and 4 of S.I.M.E. Report No. 5 on the interrogation of Andor Gross. This report deals exclusively with Hungarian intelligence activities and has no direct bearing on the guilt of Gross himself.

2. Gross is still talking about the Hungarian Intelligence Service. It is hoped (as the generally do, though rather often in vain) that he will shortly have told enough about the Hungarian-German collaboration to enable us to pin him down (how do they effectively?) to a confession of collaboration on his own part. (AOB: The British jurisdiction is not valid in Hungary, and he was never a British Subject versus the British Crown!)