

Combining from Kuebart's files KV 2/410 Part I and Part II parts with the aim of getting a picture of the course of Jebsen's case.

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IVAN

In the middle of March 1944, IVAN wanted the Germans to issue two navicerts for the safe passage of two oil tankers from Sweden to Portugal for purchase by an oil firm in Portugal (name unknown). He announced that this scheme would result in his being appointed to the board of the firm in question and thereby ensure his post-war employment as a consideration for his past services to the Germans.

Ivan (Iwan)

In the middle of March 1944, Ivan (who was a British Double-Cross agent, he carried the British M.I.5. cover-name **Tricycle**, was a Yugoslav Lawyer/business man) wanted the Germans to issue two navicerts for the safe passage of two oil tankers from Sweden (where these tankers were interned) to Portugal (name unknown). He announced that this scheme would result in his being appointed to the board of the firm in question and thereby ensure his post-war employment as a consideration of past services to the Germans. (In Yiddish they would say: **gotspe**) (They were Double-Cross agents. But his business partner and friend Johann Jebsen Double-Cross name **Artist**, finally was caught by the Germans and did not survive the war).

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Sonderfuehrer WEISS, of Abwehr Eins, however, being an astute business man himself, discovered that in reality IVAN and JEBSEN intended to sell the navicerts to the oil firm for a large sum without the knowledge of the Germans, and that JEBSEN was the one of the two who had concocted this scheme. This information was subsequently confirmed by a report from BRANDES in Portugal.

Some time in March 1944, BRANDES visited WEISS and KUEBART in Berlin, reporting that JEBSEN had arranged to bribe both himself (BRANDES) and WEIDE with a share of the profits of the scheme, were it to be successful.

BRANDES further informed KUEBART that an acquaintance of his, a Swiss named BUECKHARDT, was travelling to England on economic matters, and might be willing to "look into" any matters submitted to him. As a result, JEBSEN provided the following questionnaire:-

- (a) The result (sic) of the Echaillon Conference of Nov. 1943.
- (b) Relations of the Allies towards one another.
- (c) The invasion and whether this was likely to take place.
- (d) The Allied attitude and opinion regarding their plans for a new Europe after the war.

BRANDES further hinted that he might be able to establish fresh contacts in England in the future.

(A report on this questionnaire was sent by BUECKHARDT later. It was listed on the contents of a post bag dispatched to Lissabon by BRANDES, but could not be found therein, and KUEBART presumes that it was either lost or stolen.)

KUEBART now became alive to JEBSEN's whole scheme, in which even WEIDE now appeared to be implicated, for he had failed to reveal to KUEBART, JEBSEN's attempt to bribe him.

At the beginning of April 1944, JEBSEN was ordered by the Abwehr to report to Biarritz, but the latter replied that he was unwilling to do this on account of "cover difficulties", asserting that if he went to Biarritz his contact with the Abwehr might receive undue publicity. (KUEBART claims that this was ridiculous as, of course, JEBSEN was already known in Lisbon to have had Abwehr contacts.)

BRANDES then reported that JEBSEN had told him that he (JEBSEN) had no intention of going to Biarritz, and on the contrary intended to desert. The receipt of this news provoked considerable excitement in Abwehr circles and the situation was discussed with HANSEN. The latter said that JEBSEN's desertion had to be prevented at all costs, for were it to take place, the S.D. would "pounce" on the Abwehr as they had done after the VEREBEREN incident.

Moreover, HANSEN told KUEBART that such an action by the S.D. might put an end to schemes he was already concocting for the liquidation of HITLER and HINDEBERG, and the ultimate overthrow of the Nazi party (which schemes finally culminated in the events of July 20 and are described hereinafter; it suffices to mention at this stage

Sonderführer (Sdf.) Weiss ([Kuebart's assistant](#)), of Abwehr Eins, being an astute business man himself, discovered that in reality Ivan ([Iwan](#)) ([the Yugoslavian Popov, M.I.5 Double-Cross name Tricycle](#)) and ([Johann](#)) Jebsen intended to sell the navicerts to the oil firm for a large sum with the knowledge of the Germans, and that Jebsen was the one of the two concocted this scheme. This information was subsequently confirmed by a report of Brandes ([using then the cover-name "Ballhorn" and under this name known in Lisbon and surroundings](#)) in Portugal.

Some time in March 1944, visited Weiss and Kuebart in Berlin, reporting that Jebsen had arranged to bribe both himself ([Hans Brandes, alias Ballhorn](#)) and Wrede with a share of the profits of the scheme, were it to be successful.

Brandes further informed Kuebart that an acquaintance of his, a Swiss name Buerkhardt was travelling to England on economic matters, and might be willing to "look into" any matters submitted to him. As a result Hansen provided the following questionnaire:-

(a) The result of the Teheran Conference of Nov. 1943 ([They had got knowledge through the, for the Germans, working agent "Cicero"](#))

(b) Relations of the Allies towards one another.

(c) The invasion and whether this likely to take place.

(d) The Allied attitude and opinion regarding their plans for a new Europe after war.

Brandes further hinted that he might be able to establish fresh contacts in England in the future.

(A report on this questionnaire was sent y Buerkhardt later. It was listed onto the content of a post bag dispatched to Zosen by Brandes, but could not be found therein, and Kuebart presumes that was either lost or stolen) (AOB, [maybe removed by British Secret Service](#))

Kuebart now became alive to Jebsen's whole scheme in which even Wrede now appeared to be implicated, for he had failed to reveal to Kuebart, Jebsen's attempt to bribe him.

At the beginning of April 1944, Jebsen was ordered by the Abwehr to report to Biarritz, but the latter replied that he was unwilling to this on account of "cover difficulties", asserting that he went to Biarritz his contact with the Abwehr might receive undue publicity. (Kuebart claims that this was ridiculous as, of course, Jebsen was already known in Lisbon to have had Abwehr contacts). (AOB, [Jebsen thought himself in Lisbon outside German jurisdiction, that may have been the main reason to settle just there](#))

Brandes then reported that Jebsen had told him ([Brandes alias Ballhorn](#)) that he (Jebsen) had no intention of going to Biarritz, and on the contrary intended to desert. The receipt of this news provoked considerable excitement in the Abwehr circles and the situation was discussed with Hansen. The latter said that Jebsen's desertion had to be prevented at all costs, for where it to take place, the S.D. would "pounce" on the Abwehr as they had done after the Vermehren incident. Moreover, Hansen told Kuebart that such an action by the S.D. might put an end to schemes he was already concocting for the liquidation of Hitler and Himmler, and the ultimate overthrow of the Nazi party (which schemes finally culminated in the events of July 20 and are described hereinafter; it suffices to mention at this stage that it was sometime..

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that it was some time in the course of March 1944 that HANSEN had begun to instruct KUEBART in the details of his machinations against the German regime.)

It was now decided that KUEBART should proceed to Biarritz to meet there Major SCHREIBER of Eins Heer Lisbon, and discuss the situation with regard to JEBSEN, since both SCHREIBER and the K.O. were completely ignorant of the real situation.

Before leaving for Biarritz, HANSEN instructed KUEBART to look into the matter of any possible difficulties arising out of CANARIS' order to the K.O. Madrid to vacate their offices in their Embassy premises and to set up elsewhere on their own, as mentioned above.

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#### TRIP TO SPAIN

In the beginning of April 1944, KUEBART and WEISS left by air for Biarritz, where they put Major SCHREIBER of K.O. Lisbon in the picture as to JEBSEN and his confederates.

SCHREIBER was very surprised as he had no idea of the real situation. KUEBART then passed on to SCHREIBER, HANSEN's order that JEBSEN was to be arrested and abducted forthwith. SCHREIBER, however, did not know how this action could be taken and was in great doubt concerning the difficulties of transporting JEBSEN out of Spain. It was therefore decided to continue the discussions with the K.O. Madrid.

Trip to Spain.

In the beginning of April 1944, Kuebart and Weiss left by air for Biarritz, where they put Major (Dr. Aloys) Schreiber of K.O Lisbon in the picture as to Jebesen and his confederates.

Schreiber was very surprised as he had no idea of the real situation. Kuebart then passed to Schreiber, Hansen's order that Jebesen was to be arrested and abducted forthwith, Schreiber, however, did not know how this action could be taken and was in great doubt concerning the difficulties of transporting Jebesen out of Spain. It was therefore decided to continue the discussions with K.O. Madrid.



MEANS OF ABDUCTION:

In the course of May 1944, KUEBART received a full report from SCHREIBER (later confirmed by BRANDIS) of the means by which JEBSEN's abduction was perpetrated. Apparently SCHREIBER had summoned JEBSEN and a friend of his, one MOLDENHAUER, to the K.O. Lisbon. (KUEBART professes to know little about MOLDENHAUER. He believes him to be the son of a statesman and to have been employed as a V-man for I Wi.

KUEBART claims not to know the exact details of what followed, but both JEBSEN and MOLDENHAUER were inserted in a large box or trunks made up to resemble diplomatic luggage, and driven over the frontier without incident, to Biarritz.

No direct orders had been given for MOLDENHAUER's abduction, and owing to the latter's civilian status, KUEBART considers SCHREIBER exceeded his scope. However, MOLDENHAUER was understood to be in the conspiracy relating to JEBSEN's desertion.

KUEBART further discussed with KIEKENBUSCH and ROHRSCHEIDT, as instructed by HANSEN, their difficulties resulting from the K.O.'s removal from their former Embassy offices, but learned that ROHRSCHEIDT had arranged with the German Embassy for their new premises to receive diplomatic immunity and protection.

Means of abduction:

In the course of May 1944, Kuebart received a full report from Schreiber (later confirmed by Brandes ([Ballhorn](#))) of the means by which Jebsen's abduction was prepared. Apparently Schreiber had summoned Jebsen and a friend of his, one Moldenhauer (AOB, [it was Jebsen who asked him to join him \(Moldenhauer\) during his visit at the K.O.P office in Lisbon](#)) Kuebart (Moldenhauer himself an agent of Nest Cologne; like Jebsen, was finding his way, to not become engaged in Abwehr matters as less as possible; they both were suspected subjects)....

Kuebart claims not to know the exact details of what followed, (but both Jebsen and Moldenhauer were after abduction and being drugged) (Kuebart claims not to know details of what followed, but both Jebsen and Moldenhauer were inserted in a large box or trunks made up to resemble diplomatic luggage, and driven over the (Portuguese/Spanish and thereafter the Spanish/French frontier and reached Biarritz without delay).

No direct orders (bear in mind: that Jebsen asked Moldenhauer to join him during his visit to the K.O. Lisbon office; **Moldenhauer was not involved at all**) had been given for Moldenhauer, (as no one have counted with the unexpected appearance of Moldenhauer at the scene). However, Moldenhauer was understood to be in the conspiracy relating to Jebsen's desertion. (AOB, which was not the truth: Moldenhauer like did Jebsen, wanted to stay as far as possible out of the centres of German controlled troubles. Moldenhauer had managed to come to Madrid, but his masters in Cologne, where he belonged to, forced him to return, but he managed to move even further away and went to Lisbon).

Kuebart further discussed with Kiekenbusch ([Obstltt. Leiter Referat I, K.O. Sp.](#)) and Rohrscheidt. ([K.O. Sp. In Madrid](#)) as instructed by Hansen, their difficulties resulting for the K.O.'s removal from their former Embassy offices, but learned that Rohrscheidt ([Obstlt. von Leiter III K.O.Sp.](#)) had arranged with the German Embassy for their new premises to received diplomatic immunity and protection. ([this matured, but in a different timely sequence](#))

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HOLIDAY IN BARCELONA:

After about four days in Madrid, KUEBART and WEISS continued on to Barcelona, mainly for the purpose of enjoying a few days rest, actually spending three days there in all. He did, however, see Major TABOSCHAT of Eins Heer West Barcelona, going out with him.

The latter reported that the R-Netz was in the course of being set up. During this stay, KUEBART received a letter from Madrid from KIEKENBUSCH stating that he had discovered that PAGO, the paymaster of K.O. Madrid was trying to get his wife and daughter to Spain as soon as possible, a circumstance he considered prima-facie suspicious.

KUEBART accordingly at once advised HENSEN by telegram to delay their departure until his (KUEBART's) return to Berlin.

RETURN TO BERLIN:

KUEBART and WEISS left Barcelona by car for Perpignan from whence they went by rail to Berlin, but owing to the difficulties of the journey they did not arrive in the latter city until the end of April. Awaiting KUEBART in Berlin was a telegram from Biarritz announcing that SCHREIBER had at last got JENSEN there. HENSEN, to whom KUEBART had reported fully on his journey, ordered KUEBART to instruct the Amt Bordeaux to send JENSEN to Berlin. This order was duly executed.

LEADS OF ABDUCTION:

In the course of May 1944, KUEBART received a full report from SCHREIBER (later confirmed by BRUNDEL) of the means by which JENSEN's abduction was perpetrated. Apparently SCHREIBER had summoned JENSEN and a friend of his, one MOLDENHAUER, to the K.O. Lisbon. (KUEBART professes to know little about MOLDENHAUER. He believes him to be the son of a statesman and to have been employed as a V-man for I Wi.

KUEBART claims not to know the exact details of what followed, but both JENSEN and MOLDENHAUER were inserted in a large box or trunks made up to resemble diplomatic luggage, and driven over the frontier without incident, to Biarritz.

No direct orders had been given for MOLDENHAUER's abduction, and owing to the latter's civilian status, KUEBART considers SCHREIBER exceeded his scope. However, MOLDENHAUER was understood to be in the conspiracy relating to JENSEN's desertion.

**Holiday in Barcelona (code-name Banca)**

After about four days in Madrid, Kuebart and Weiss continued onto Barcelona, mainly for the purpose of enjoining a few days' rest, actually spending three days there in all. He did, however, Major Taboschat of Eins Heer West Barcelona, going out with him.

The latter reported that the R-Netz ([stay-behind](#)) During this stay, Kuebart received a letter from Madrid from Kiekenbusch stating that he had discovered that Pago ([the Paymaster](#)), of the K.O. Madrid was trying to get his wife and daughter to Spain as soon as possible, a circumstance he considered prima facie suspicious. ([AOB, after all it turns out to be not suspicious at all](#))

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Kuebart accordingly at once advised Hansen by telegram to delay their departure until his (Kuebart's) return to Berlin.

#### Return to Berlin.

Kuebart and Weiss left Barcelona by car for Perpignan from whence they went by rail to Berlin, but owing to difficulties of the journey they did not arrive in the latter city until the end of April. Awaiting Kuebart in Berlin was a telegram from Biarritz announcing that Schreiber had at last got Jebson there. (AOB, [from Biarritz both Jebson and Moldenhauer had been flown to Berlin](#)). Hansen, to whom Kuebart had reported fully on his journey, ordered Kuebart to instruct the Ast ([Nest?](#)) to send Jebson ([and Moldenhauer](#)) to Berlin. This order was duly executed. (AOB, [foregoing in Biarritz, there was held a conference, as to assure that Jebson would be charged on behalf of the Wehrmacht as, otherwise, the S.D. could have arrested him; whereas now Wehrmacht legislation should prevail; this was valid up to the moment of Keitel's directive to hand-over both men onto the S.D. \(Amt IV\)! The complication was, that Jebson was already suspected by the S.D. for a complex of malversations](#))

#### Means of Abduction:

In the course of May 1944, Kuebart received a full report Schreiber ([KOP](#)) (later confirmed by Brandes) of the means by which Jebson's abduction perpetrated. Apparently Schreiber had summoned Jebson and a friend of his (AOB, [not according to my information: Jebson was summoned to appear on 1900 hrs at the K.O. Lisbon Office. This hour had been chosen, as there were no office employees in the building; hence, that Moldenhauer had become engaged was due to Jebson's precautions, "with two men standing more save than as a single person"](#)) ....

Kuebart claims not to know ([ask Schreiber](#)) the exact details of what followed but both Jebson and Moldenhauer (after being drugged) were inserted in a large box or trunks made resemble diplomatic luggage, and were driven over the frontiers ([Portugal-Spain and Spain-French](#)) without incident, to Biarritz.

No direct orders had been given for Moldenhauer's abduction and owing to the latter's civilian status ([untrue as Moldenhauer was officially ruled by Nest Cologne, but stayed, against Cologne's directives in Madrid and Lisbon](#)) Kuebart considers Schreiber exceeded his scope. However, Moldenhauer was understood to be in the conspiracy relating to Jebson's desertion. (AOB, [Jebson was an M.I.5 Double-Cross agent, code-name Artist, and Moldenhauer was only one preventing himself to be placed near to the front lines](#)) (AOB, [by the way: Moldenhauer ultimately survived the war, albeit ending-up at Concentration Camp Sachsenhausen, where also Jebson stayed; but who was taken away by an SS man, in February 1945. And, since being considered lost, and declared dead in 1950](#))  
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DISPOSAL OF JEBSEN  
AND MOLDENHAUER:

On arrival in Berlin JEBSEN and MOLDENHAUER were detained under military arrest at Wunsdorf, near Gossen. HANSEN made arrangements for their interrogation by 2 (R) <sup>Legal</sup> experts, but some ten days later under direct orders of General KEITEL, they were handed over to the S.D. KUEBART claims not to know their ultimate fate, but thinks that JEBSEN "had it coming to him" as when he had previously worked for the S.D. he had been guilty of improperly converting S.D. monies to his own use. KUEBART claims that at the time when KEITEL's order was received, he did his best to place difficulties in the way of JEBSEN being handed over, claiming that it was entirely a military matter and had nothing to do with the S.D. HANSEN supported him in this. No argument was put forward for the retention of MOLDENHAUER.

KUEBART is at pains to point out that he was in no way responsible for the decisions taken regarding the disposal of these two men since HANSEN alone could give a valid decision regarding "disciplinary matters".

(Later, in August 1944, as will be seen, after KUEBART's arrest by the Gestapo, he was interrogated as to why he had placed difficulties in the way of the S.D. in connection with the transfer of JEBSEN).


## Disposal of Jebsen and Moldenhauer:

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Kuebart is at pains out that he was in no way responsible for the decisions taken regarding the disposal of these two men since Hansen alone could give a valid decision regarding “disciplinary matters”.

(Later, in August 1944, as will be seen, after Kuebart’s arrest by the Gestapo, (he was arrested on 22 July at Belinde, in respect to his eventual involvements with the assassination attempt on Hitler of 20<sup>th</sup> July 1944), he was interrogated as to why he had placed difficulties in the way of the S.D. (Amt IV) in connection (Jebsen) with the transfer. (In Biarritz it was just discussed - as to prevent that the politically driven S.D. would taking charge of what they considered was a purely military matter. Which actually it was not entirely, as Jebsen was involved, among other matters, in illegal money transfers, which constituted a criminal offence)

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Wrede Summoned to Berlin: (he was involved in the illegal dealings of Jebsen and Popov (Iwan)

At about the same period in the beginning or middle of May, who Sdf. Wrede was summoned to Berlin and interrogated by Sdf. Weiss (Kuebart’s assistant; who brought the entire raw in move, ending up with Jebsen’s abduction and death), who taxed Wrede with his failure to admit Jebsen’s attempt to bribe him. Wrede confessed that he had not revealed this, and after a certain amount of discussions with Hansen, who wished to avoid any further trouble over this whole question, Wrede was sent back to Paris.

(As will be seen later, Kuebart’s failure to have Wrede arrested, was brought up against him during his subsequent trial before the People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof) in connection with the events of July 20 1944)

(AOB, I must admit: that I once (2018 – 2020) did not understand Wrede’s implications within Kuebart’s trial for the Volksgerichtshof! Reason, I had not yet before noticed Wrede’s file KV 2/560, as it was unknown to me)