Reference abstracts of

KV 2/1500 & KV 2/1501

This document contains materials derived from the fore called files

Its purpose, is: to be used as a kind of reference document, containing my personal selection of report sections; considered being of relevance.

My input: I have in almost every case created transcripts of the just reproduced file content. However, sometimes adding my personal opinion; always accompanied by:

(AOB, my comments)

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KV 2/1500
Kopkow Horst
PF 602509
I my perception, it is relevant that we first notice the positions of the persons engaged in this morning conference held in Hitler’s H.Q.

Of interest is a person nearly nowhere noticed: the Stenographer. This person was not only what the word Stenographer seem to express. His name was: General Scherff; he pasted away a week later. His duty was to be Hitler’s personal biographer. A very intriguing book is called:

Im Vorzimmer der Macht

Aufzeichnungen aus dem Wehrmachtführungstab und Führerhauptquartier 1940-1945

By Marianne Feuersenger

She was also General Scherff’s secretary. She deals with the daily life; quoting from page 91:

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht

Berlin den 1. Dezember 1941

Az: 13 o/r WFst/WKrGesch.

Nr. 639/41

Nur für den Dienstgebrauch.

Geschäftsleitung

Der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung

Des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht.

Stand 1.12.1941.

Diensträume: Berlin NW 40, Schlieffenufer 5.

Abteilungs-Chef: Obst, d.G. G. Scherff

Vorzimmer: Frau Gutschke

Zugl. g.K.* Frl. Feuersenger

* (AOB, I suppose: geheimes Kriegstagebuch)

She kept her own diary on which her 1982 book is being based upon, and was reprinted quite many times.
The Attempt on the Führer's life on the 20th July 1944 at the Führer's H.Q. in East Prussia.

As sabotage specialist I was appointed to lead the enquiry into the attempted assassination of the Führer (Fuehrer) on the 20th July 1944 to give the exact facts and especially find out the origin of the explosive. On the same day I was sent with a staff of assistants which included Kriminaltechnische Institut Officials to Wolfschanze in East Prussia in order to obtain a detailed account of the incident. In Berlin the Bendlerstrasse Putsch and its plans had been made known, which was followed soon afterwards by the execution of the assassin Obst. Stauffenberg and his assistants from the Army General Staff (AOB, Stab) and from the Staff of the Reserve Army (AOB, Ersatz-Heer) H.Q. in Bendlerstrasse.

The whole rubble was sifted with painstaking thoroughness by me and my assistants and nearly all the tools used in the construction of the bomb were found. From my knowledge of nearly all the time bombs used by all the enemy powers during the war for sabotage purposes I was able to establish at once by means of the remains found that the explosive used was not
encased and it was detonated by an English "Time-pencil". The suspicion that the assassination attempt originated in British quarters could not be taken into account as there were mainly "Time-pencils" in German possession. The material used by England for sabotage purpose in the West and captured by the Germans was placed at the disposal of the SD – Amt IV and the Amt Mil. by the Commanders of the Western Occupied Territories owing to the prevailing shortage of German material at the time. It was possible that from there we were taken these English time fuses. This presumption was later confirmed.

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After placing the brief-case near to the Führer on the large Conference table Obst. Stauffenberg left a few minutes later and daringly tricking the guards at the barrier reaching his aeroplane at Rastenburg which was ready to take off for Berlin. Arrived in Berlin he led the Putsch firmly convinced that the assassination had been a success. The same evening the Putsch was smashed and Stauffenberg together with a number of other implicated officers were shot in the courtyard in Bendlerstrasse by other officers.

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In the course of the investigation it came to light that the assassination was planned in three phases. It was originally intended to have taken place on the 11th and 15th. July at a war conference on the Obersalzberg but owing to adverse circumstances it was postponed until the 20th.

The origin of the explosives was proved beyond doubt. Altogether the explosives and fuses were obtained three different times since the Autumn of 1943; twice from the OKW stores (Amt Ausland/Abwehr II) and once from an Engineer Park Stores on the Eastern Front.

Page 39:

Generalfeldmarschall von Witzleben (retired)
Generaloberst Hoeppner (retired)
Generaloberst Beck (retired)
General of Signals Fellgiebel (Chief of Army Signalling)
Generalleutnant Thiele (Fellgiebel's Deputy)
Generalmajor Stieff (Army G.H.Q. Staff) (AOB, = Generalquartiermeister)
General der Artillerie Wagner (General Quartiermeister)
Obst. Mertz (Dept. Chief of C.in.C. of the Reserve Army)
Obst. Meixner (Deputy Chief of the Wehrmachtführungsstab in Berlin)
Generalmajor von Tresckow (Division Commander on the Eastern Front and later “Ia” of a German Army Corps in the East.)
General Thomas (as far as can be remembered in charge of armament requirements in Berlin)
Hauptmann Kühn (Hptm. of Engineers in the Army Generalhauptquartier Staff)
Oblst. Haften Stauffenberg’s (A.D.C.)
Hptm. Clausing (at B.d.E. (AOB, Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres in Berlin)
Obst Freytag von Loringhofen (Chief of Abwehr Dept. II at OKW and later head of Heeresabteilung „Anna“)
Obstlt. Schrader (Staff Officer in Heereswesenabteilung Amry H.)
Obstlt. Klamroth (Staff Office at Chief of Operation Dept. Army H.Q.)
Generaloberst Fromm (C. in C. Reserve Army and Chief Army Armament)
(AOB, Obstlt. i.G. Hansen Senior of Amt I has been forgotten!)(AOB, we should bear in mind, that Hansen was the one who obtained the explosives from Obst. Wessel Freytag von Loringhoven; who committed suicide after he realised that he was linked onto the delivery of the used explosives)
From the purely political group I remember the name of Oberbürgermeister Gördeler.(AOB, Leipzig)
Legationsrat Trott zu Solz (Foreign Office)
Graf von Schulenburg (Former Ambassador in Moscow)
Graf von der Schulenburg (arrested as ab Army Hptm. (Captain)
Graf Schwerin (do not confuse with Schwerin-Krosigk)
Leuschner (as far as I know leading Left Wing Trade Unionist before 1933)
Graf Bismarck (Regierungspräsident in Potsdam)
Graf Helldorf (Chief of Berlin Police)
As far as I can remember the last German Ambassador in London whose name I have forgotten.
Former Social Social democrat Member of the Reichstag Leber and others.
Admiral Canaris, who at this time was no longer Chief Military Intelligence, which had been absorbed into the Sipo and SD, was also arrested. He was doubtless implicated in the plot in some way. As far as I can remember he was charged with further misderneamours, undertaken in previous years with illegal foreign contacts.

Continuing now with matters on “Rote Kapelle”

The first operation of turned W/T agents with the Soviet-Union started in 1942 after having an agent’s message had been deciphered which mentioned the name of a German Luftwaffe Lieutenant Schulze-Boysen of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium. This deciphering was the first sign and the start of the investigation which led to the rounding up of the biggest Russian espionage organisation in Germany, Belgium and France known to the
Gestapo during the war. This organisation was given the cover name of Rote Kapelle by the office. A special commission from IV A2 was formed to round up this movement in Germany whilst other special commissions took over the work in Belgium and France.

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The Soviet Intelligence Service had left transmitting sets with a number of Berlin Agents through the channels of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin at the outbreak of war in Summer 1941. Seven transmitting stations were discovered in Berlin itself.

The spiritual leader of the Espionage network was Oblt. Der Luftwaffe Haro Schulze-Boysen who having an important position in the Attaché Group of the Luftwaffe H.Q. Staff in Berlin was able to get inside information regarding the Luftwaffe. Schulze-Boysen was paid for his treachery, but his main motive was a strong leaning towards Bolshevism.

Besides Schulze-Boysen a leading roll was played by Oberregierungsrat Harnack of the Wirtschaftministerium, who was a cousin of the former Regierungspäsident in Merseburg von Harnack.

Others were:

Obst. Gehrts of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium who supplied Schulze-Boysen with information. Kuckhoff the Prag-Film A.G. producer with his connections with film and stage artists, obtained important information. Von Schelitha who was Legationsrat 1e Klasse in the Foreign Office gave important information from his office to the Journalist Ilse Stoebe (Stöbe) in Berlin.

Heilmann who was an Officer Cadet working in the Cipher Dept. of the OKW gave code keys to Schulze-Boysen.
There was hardly any Government Office without some employee ready to co-operate and give information. About one hundred arrests were made almost exclusively in Berlin. The depth of the Soviet Intelligence Service infiltration can be seen in the case of an administrative Inspector of the RLM (Air Ministry) who gave away to the intermediary the most secret documents, of which only a few copies existed, concerning the strength of the Luftwaffe and the rising production output figures. Even in the OKW and the OKM were officers to be found who were ready to co-operate out of idealistic motives.

**Operation of “turned” W/T agents against the U.S.S.R.**

As a result of the above described activities the first cases of use of turned W/T agents against Moscow began in 1943. The Soviet Intelligence Service, still intact, dropped a number of parachute agents in Brandenbrug who were caught and “turned”. (Double-Cross)

In the Counter-Espionage Dept of the Gestapa Krim. Inspektor Lehmann was caught as a result of these counter moves. He had been recruited for the Soviet Intelligence Service by the Russian Embassy in Berlin years before the war. As an old official Lehmann had a considerable insight into the activities of Abwehrabteilung III especially as regards to espionage in the East.
Furthermore Prince Swiatopolk-Mirski who was a Wehrmacht Sonderführer (Sdf.) owing to a large estate in the area of Poland occupied by the Russians in 1939 (AOB, this all was the consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 25 August 1939; where was agreed upon to invade Poland and divide its territory between Russia and Germany) and who had returned from the Marew area with the re-settlement scheme was to be contacted by a Soviet parachute agent in Berlin. Swiatopolk was not in Berlin but was finally arrested by the Military Police (AOB, Geheimefeldpolizei = G.F.P.) with its unit in the Balkans. While being brought back he escaped in the Marburg-Krain (AOB, Slovenia) district and joined Tito’s Forces. Swiatopolk was to have been given important missions on contacting the agent.

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Further cases which dealt with during the war by IV A 2b.

There was for instance the attempt by the Soviet Espionage Group “Rote Drei” by which the Soviet Intelligence Service obtained extensive information from leading circles of the German General Staff, which was relayed to Moscow by three Swiss transmitters in Lausanne, Verreux near Geneva and on the Monte Bree.

Almost all the Soviet Agents active in Switzerland were recognised, amongst them was Rado the Hungarian leader, and others such as Puenter, the Dübendorfer couple, the Swiss Left wing Radical Politician Nicolo and an Englishman called Foote about whom it was uncertain as to whether he was working for both sides or not. In Germany this was never decided although there were several factors which pointed in this direction. The traffic contained hundreds of W/T messages of a military nature mostly from the Eastern Theatre and the Balkans but also from Central Wehrmacht Establishments. A study of this deciphered W/T traffic by Chief of Operations Dept. at OKH (AOB, OKW/Chi) itself showed that 40 to 50% of the information was useful. I can give further information about this matter.
Provision of Documents and Money.

The Russian agents were on the whole well equipped with forged documents; these were printed by the State Printing Works in Moscow. Food ration cards, however, were a great difficulty to the Russians after the Stapo had ordered that these be changed frequently. German ‘Travel Ration Cards’ were watermarked, and the Russians never succeeded in copying these.

Agents were supplied with considerable amounts in USA Dollars; this idea proved a failure, for, unless the agents had connections in the Black Market, which only a very small number of them ever had, this money was useless in the open market. Strict currency regulations provided for such harsh penalties for persons found to be in possession of foreign currency that no one was willing to take any chance in this respect.

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I. "ROTE KAPPEL"

Johann WENZEL

WENZEL was originally arrested by the GFP as a German emigrant. By an oversight the was not referred to the Stapo and WENZEL was released without his Communist connection having been discovered.

Prisoner is certain that it was WENZEL's traffic which revealed KENT's connection with SCHULZE-BOYSEN. He recalls that the message in question came from Moscow and was an instruction to KENT to travel to BERLIN to contact Frau SCHULZE-BOYSEN and KUCKHOFF. He does not remember the exact date, but he knows that, when WENZEL was arrested, copies of his back W/T traffic over a considerable period were found.

Prisoner is certain that it was in WENZEL's traffic and not in that of MAKAROV @ ALMO that the SCHULZE-BOYSEN message occurred, as his interest in the case only started with WENZEL's arrest.

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Kuckhoff.

Producer of the Prag Film AG, close friend of Schulze-Boysen, obtained intelligence from Czechoslovakia; he was aware of Harnack’s and Schulze-Boysen’s former connections with the Russian Embassy in Berlin; was condemned to death and executed.

Ober Regierungsrat Dr. Harnack.

Amerika-Referent in the Wirtschaftsministerium in Berlin. The "Society of Friends of the Soviet Union", which existed before 1933, had enabled him to make an extensive journey through Russia, and he was so strongly impressed by the Soviet way of life that ever afterwards he was a convinced Communist. Dr. Harnack was a cousin of Harnack, the former SPD delegate and Regierungspräsident of Merseburg, who, however, was not implicated in the "ROTE KAPELLE" case. Shortly before the outbreak of the Russo-German war, Harnack, on the recommendation of Alexandrovitch, the Russian Botschafterrat, was appointed to set up and maintain the W/T communications Berlin-Moscow. He was given several W/T sets for this purpose. Harnack was condemned to death for treason and executed.

Training of German Emigrants in the Rote Kapelle.

The First wave of parachute agents dropped by the Russian in 1941 were Prisoner states. Very poorly trained, but the training given to the parachute emigrants who appeared in connection with the Rote Kapelle organisation, was entirely different and quite adequate. This training was divided into two stages:-

↓
W/T training, which was given mainly in a “Datsche” (corresponding roughly to a farm house), where the agents were entirely isolated. The principle of individual training was given prominence; this principle, although a correct one for a well-thought-out intelligence operation, was late abandoned by the Russians when they started mass operations and turned these “Datsche” into W/T training schools. Like in a “Datsche” was extremely primitive and no value whatsoever was placed upon appearance; the sole object was to keep the agent isolated and to give him good W/T instruction by experts. After the initial stage, the agent commenced practice traffic from his “Datsche” with a control station in Moscow, where he was locked after by a specific W/T operator. This operator afterwards controlled the agent when he was on his mission in Germany. Thus he was always familiar with his pupil’s strong and weak points, which was a most valuable factor when it came to assessing the genuineness of an agent’s messages. The potential agent was then taken to various places in Russia by members of the NKVD, where he continued his practice traffic with the control station in Moscow. This was intended to simulate as nearly as possible the actual conditions of a mission.

Prisoner (AOB, = Topkow) is certain, that no links of any kind existed between Schulze-Boysen’s network and Rado’s. There was no W/T communication between the two. The arrest of Schulze-Boysen did not help in the breaking of Rado’s traffic, except that in the very general sense it increased the German CI’s knowledge of Russian codes, which may have been of some help to the cryptographers.
He was quite certain that at the end of the war both Margarete Barcza and Fritz Kent were at Friedrichroda with their child. She went there from France at about the time of the Normandy landings, for safety’s sake. He remained temporarily in Paris with Pannwitz, but later, in about April 1945, joined Barcza at Friedrichroda on her insistence. At this time both were living at liberty. Barcza was accommodated in a small pension, the name of which Kopkow could not remember, and was, so far as he knew, living under her own name. Kent presumably joined her at the pension. So far Kopkow could remember he was then using German papers provided for him by Pannwitz. Kopkow was, however, unable to remember anything about these papers, or even in what name they were.

I questioned Kopkow closely about the circumstances of Trepper’s escape from German custody in Paris. He was able to remember no more than the bare facts, which were known to me already. He did, however, say that after Trepper’s escape Pannwitz received two letters from him. In these letters Trepper explained that he had felt obliged to escape because it was clear to him that the war was no longer going well for the Germans and he did not wish to prejudice his future by ending the war on the losing side. On the other hand, he regarded himself as wholly compromised with the Russians, and not in a position to risk any further contact with them. That being so, he was anxious if possible to preserve some links with the Germans, presumably in case his appreciation of the war situation should turn out in the end to have been false.
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Further particulars re Margareta Barcza.

Kent’s fiancée, lived with him in Brussels. After their arrest, Kent could be persuaded to work for the Stapo only on the condition that he was allowed to live with her and that the Stapo supported her financially. The Stapo agreed to this proposal.

Margareta Barcza was a Czech who had emigrated from Czechoslovakia, who had supported her financially for some time previously. In Belgium she met Kent, whom she subsequently dominated entirely and for whom she did some Russian IS work. Margareta Barcza and her child (which must now be three years of age and whose father is Kent) went to Friedrichroda in Thuringia a few months before Kent, her hotel accommodation having been arranged and paid for by the Stapo. Prisoner estimates that she must now be 30 years of age.

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Kopkow states that the largest Regional Kommando of the Stapo was without doubt Stapoleitstelle BERLIN; after this came Stapoleitstellen MÜNCHEN, HAMBURG, WIEN, DÜSSELDORF, DRESDEN etc., i.e. Regional stations attached to large towns or Regional stations in control of a number of Frontier Police stations and posts (Grenzkommissariato und Grenzpolizeiposten).

However, even BERLIN, the largest Regional Stapo station, was considerably smaller than Kripoleitstelle BERLIN, which maintained ‘Kriminal Inspektoren’ at all head Police stations and ‘Kriminalbeamte’ at all district Police stations. This preponderance of Kripo over Stapo must have been maintained throughout the Reich; in many mediumsized towns the Police administration had Kripo but no Stapo officials whatsoever on its staff.
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As regards the SD (S.D.), a distinction must be made between the Home SD (Amt III) and the Foreign SD (Amt VI). Both were represented in the SD sections (SD Abschnitt and SD Leitabschnitt), which for organisational purposes were considered more or less as individual units. The strength of the SD units was much less than that of the Stapo, since SD work did not require the number of executive officials required by the Stapo, nor did the SD deal with a range of work as wide as that dealt with by both Kripo and Stapo; deserters and PoW, for instance, were not dealt with at all by SD.

Although VI SD was, regionally, very small, the SD sections on the frontiers were of much greater strength than those within the Reich. III SD was also very small in relation to Stapo, but in order to do its work it employed many honorary assistants who could not have been employed on this scale on Stapo work.

Thus the position within the Reich may be summed up as follows: in the Regional Kommandos there were proportionally more Kripo personnel than Stapo and more Stapo than SD. Kopkow is, however, unable to give any approximate figures. Nosske estimates that the staffs of the Regional Kommandos consisted of approximately 35% Stapo, 50% Kripo and 15% SD; he points out, however, that the proportion of Kripo would be even higher in densely populated areas, such as the Ruhr.

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Holland.

Here the position was similar to that in the General Government (AOB, ment is occupied Polish territories); uniformed Dutch police worked under the B.d.O. (AOB, Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei), whilst Dutch Criminal Police, who only dealt with breaches of Dutch law, worked under the Leiter V of B.d.S. (AOB, Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei), The Hague. In the field of Amt IV, and especially as regards enemy agents, there were a number of Dutch police officials who did everything they could to further German ends.
Kriminal Direktor Josef Schreieder.

On the staff of B.d.S. (AOB, Befehlshaber des Sicherheitsdienst?) The Hague and was engaged in wireless 'play-backs' with London (AOB, meant the famous “Nordpolspiel” though in Holland widely known as “Englanspiel”); cooperated closely with Abw. (AOB, it was this close and effective cooperation that made the “England Spiel” such a striking (astonishing) success)

Terminated 17 December 2018