Page initiated 28 January 2019
Status: 6 March 2019
1 + 2 + 2a + 3
The Nordpol affair, as well as the related Englandspiel,
were probably the most successful
counter espionage affairs
on the German side.
Its British counter-part was S.O.E.
What makes it all so intriguing, is, the fact that it lasted for nearly two years!
You will encounter a most dramatic story; very sad and a real drama,
as > 50 persons had been involved and with a very few exceptions, they lost their lives ultimately.
You will be confronted with genuine British document sections, which are being selected by my choice out of the bulk of paper materials available.
Such endeavour is only fruitful, when we are in the position to take notice
of the main 'entities' involved.
Before starting our Survey, I would like to point at the fact, that I previously (before 7 February 2019), I did suppose that the famous telegram once sent to S.O.E. on 1st April 1944, could only have been addressed on behalf of Schreieder, but he, in his post-war book : Englandspiel, on page 281, he quotes:
in Dutch language: De vijand brak het spel niet af; daarom moesten wij het wel doen. Giskes stuurde dan ook op 1 April een radiogram, dat als volgt luidde:
“Aan de heren Blunt, Bingham en Co.,
Wij zijn ons ervan bewust, dat u sedert enige tijd zonder onze hulp in Nederland zaken doet. Daar wij gedurende ruime tijd uw vertegenwoordiger zijn geweest, vinden wij dit heel onbillijk. Maar dat sluit niet uit, dat, als u mocht besluiten, ons op grote schaal te komen bezoeken, wij u de zelfde gastvrije ontvangst zullen bereiden, als uw agenten.”*
Equally can be found in Guy Liddell's war-time diaries 1942-1945; on page 251
Therefore. I would like to stress, that when otherwise being noticed, you should understand the foregoing text lines. Thus: that it was Giskes who arranged this telegram (radiogram)
We should confront ourselves with:
Huntemann, Giskes assistant
Schreieder the "Kriminaldirektor" of the Sipo
who 'invented' the name Englandspiel
and he actually was the executive of the German Police operations
Maybe concluding with an abstract of the final British
RSS report of 1945.
Before hand: Britain gained upmost from wireless (W/T) intercepts, but just this aspect might have been the braking point; as in Holland, the Germans possessed an excellent telephone network and almost all crucial communications went through wires instead of wireless!
This may be considered as the main reason why these events have been so disastrous!
I choose first to digest Obstlt. Herman Joseph Giskes' file series
KV 2/961 - 962 and 963
Not foreseeable, was the fact that it would cover too many pages at once, and I have therefore decided, to divide this file into two chapters.
of which we today will have
Obstlt. Hermann Joseph Giskes
Leiter Abwehr III F of Ast-Niederlande (1941 - 1943)
Photo taken during his interrogation in Camp 020 (May/June 1945)
KV 2/961 - 962 Part I (31-1-2019)
The next file is the second part of the previous document. In some respect it gives to me the impression, that everything around has been collected in a box and ultimately made it a file. But, it also contains some unexpected aspects. His file is most interesting as he dealt with it at a practical level, but still operating in between Giskes' circles and the daily operational practice.
KV 2/962 - 2-KV 963 Part II (11-2-2019)
The third part of this quite comprehensive contribution, is on:
Huntemann Gerhard Gottfried Eduard:
Uffz. Gerhard Gottfried Eduard Huntemann
Considering, for example, a Dutch dissertation on Nordpol and Englandspiel (2003)(J.P.M.H. Wolters), its scope is rather narrow, albeit that when going into details it is done solid; but just outside it, it provides hardly anything! Therefore providing all the efforts, a quite meagre understanding of what happened in the Netherlands on the same time.
KV 2/967 Part I (11-2-2019)
Huntemann, although he was an Uffz. (N.C.O.) in the quite small organisation of III F, he did almost the daily operational work on behalf of its Leiter Major/Obstlt. Giskes. He therefore is an excellent source of information; because he really dealt with most people concerned.
However, the latter contribution covers only the file sections 1 - 3. In my perception, the most intriguing section is number 4 (to be covered within Part II, as it considers the names of all those Huntemann could add what he knew about a person. Maybe for historians the most fruitful source of information.
I went through Huntemann's which after all proved to be a bit different than was expected. I have therefore considered only what really matters.
KV 2/967-4 Huntemann part II (18-2-2019)
In my perception, he should be considered as the most relevant person of the Nordpol Affairs and the Englandspiel, on the German side.
Schreieder, Kriminaldirektor of the SD, and Hermann Joseph Giskes on behalf of the Abwehr (military Intelligence).
The Englandspiel and Nordpol affairs, was on the German side unprecedented successful, mainly due to their mutual understanding.
In contrast to what often was practiced, Schreieder was against violence versus those being captured.
In my perception, please remember: what have played a major role, in contrast elsewhere, was the existence in Holland of a wide, and good functioning, telephone system; preventing the application of wireless communications.
Otherwise, the course of history concerning Nordpol affairs and Englandspiel would have had a short operational life, but it lasted from about 12 March 1942 until, at least, autumn 1943.
We should not forget: that about 50 men have been murdered in the Mauthausen Concentration Camp!
Nationaal Archief/Collectie Spaarnestad (do not copy without permission of Spaarnestad Photo!)
Joseph Schreieder on trial in Holland, in the 1940s
Ultimately considered: not guilty.
In this Drama, one female became engaged, and she was:
Born in 1911 and she passed away in 1987
Most about her is dealt within Giskes' interrogations.
But Schreieder had to take care of her after all; and she had luck, because she survived.
In contrast to foregoing interrogation reports, I have considered more facets of Schreieder's file, because his details are so rare.
After the war, the "Dutch Parliamentary Enquête Commission 1940-1945" dealt with this complex rather comprehensively, but it is, of course, genuinely issued in Dutch language.
KV 2/1332 Joseph Schreieder (18-2'19)
However, my comment is, that he could have dealt with this complex in a wider way, but he might have been limited due to his uncertain status (future); and, likely, by the British narrow scope on this real S.O.E. disaster.
On 6 March 2019
Without the implications of the Funkabwehr and its Police related counter-part the Orpo, we cannot imagine what organisation structures, once had been involved.
Holland, and Paris including its vicinity, (neglecting some other implied areas) were mainly handled by the Orpo organisation; the latter stood for: Ordnungspolizei, thus an organisation, directed by the R.S.H.A. Rivalry, of course, existed, but what can be learned from the next report, combined with my foregoing file surveys, is, that, at least in my perception, this organisation was quite well capable handling their tasks as was expected. Albeit, that they operated in more restricted areas, and consequently it was a smaller organisation. Compared with the Wehrmacht, the general personnel ranking of those concerned within the Orpo was of a higher level than that of most of the Wehrmacht Funkabwehr personnel. Maybe because they (Orpo) were professionals (civil servants); and their organisation was not directly depending upon conscripts. When we consider the names involved, in particular in regard to the 'Heer / GAF' Funkabwehr, we see that the same names repeatedly are turning up in various areas, what might imply that quite many were moved frequently allover the occupied European continent.
Another, a bit chaotic, apparently not well understood chapter, is:- on the implementation of radio amateurs. The Nazi ruled state, maybe even before this era, radio amateurism was not greatly supported by the Administrations. The numbers of HAM licences was about 475, and restrict to that number. Simply, one had to wait until someone handed-in his Ham licence. Albeit, that in wartime days, the policy was lifted a bit, and the wartime (Kriegsfunk) licences could seemingly be obtained easier than was in the 1930s. However, on the other hand, there existed a quite greater numbers of so-called 'DE' 'licences' these were (listening) radio-amateurs who were allowed to possess (and constructing) short-wave receivers and operating them privately (even throughout the war); who passed an exam controlled by the D.A.S.D. For it they were tested on basic knowledge, but in particular on their ability in handling CW (W/T) message traffics. It was just this source of well motivated, often young men, which was the 'pond' in which in particular the Abwehr derived their W/T related personnel from. When you want to know more about it, please look at our D.A.S.D related subject series on our index-page.
They wonder about the frequent application of international HAM (Q- and other) codes, which seems to have been unlikely in British W/T practice. My friend Rudolf Staritz (97) (DL3CS) told me, that just the existence of these fellow 'radio-amateurs' around, made his life bearable throughout this bleak period in life; like ever, radio-amateurs is a special specimen, with a world-wide mutual understanding (call it friendship), also in our days.
What we should, however, never forget, is, the superb British R.S.S. service, which intercepted almost all Abwehr related communication, and likely also most other wireless traffic. This service, should be considered as 'War Deciding'; as by this means an unprecedented (overwhelming) knowledge of what happened in German ruled War-effort, existed! The 'HW' series show, among other NA series, to what extent they have penetrated into German wireless communications. These efforts would not have been possible without: name it "Bletchley Park" and "GC & HQ's" superb services!
HW 34-2 final Report NEW (27-2'19)
By Arthur O. Bauer